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Abstract 
Within the United States, the southern strategy of Massive Resistance to 
federally mandated racial desegregation had its origins in 1948, a year which saw the 
confirmation of Cold War hostilities in Europe. As a result, the dialogue surrounding 
matters of race was infused with Cold War rhetoric. Between 1950 and 1954, 
Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy added to this milieu, reinvigorating anti- 
communism and red-baiting as political weapons. Allied to the traditional southern 
fear of "outsiders, " many southern segregationists seized upon anti-communism as a 
weapon to undermine opponents promoting change to the region's racial status quo. 
This thesis, however, challenges the notion that all segregationists used anti- 
communism against all integrationists at all times. Rather, anti-communism could be 
a subtle, flexible political tool which individuals and groups tailored to suit their own 
needs. At times, it was used to rebuff specific civil rights campaigns, activists and 
organisations. At others, it was used sparingly. One of the main tenets of this thesis is 
that, hitherto, segregationists have commonly been treated in rather one-dimensional 
terms by historians of the civil rights movement. By examining their diverse 
responses to anti-communism and wider Cold War anxieties, it is argued that they 
were not the homogeneous political group that many have suggested, but in many 
ways were as resourceful and pragmatic as those they opposed in the civil rights 
movement. 
This thesis also examines some apparent anomalies in the uses of anti- 
communism and Cold War rhetoric. Opponents of segregation berated segregationists 
for undermining America's attempts to court newly independent, post-colonial states 
in the Caribbean, Asia and Africa. No predominately non-white country, they argued, 
would align with the US-dominated West rather than the Soviet East with such blatant 
racism endemic in the American South. Segregationists were accused of being more 
totalitarian than their Soviet counterparts, and of bringing Soviet-style one party rule 
to the region. 
Finally, by looking in depth at two southern states, North Carolina and 
Virginia, this thesis will do more justice to the nuances and complexities of anti- 
communism than would be possible in a broader, regional study. Both states were at 
the legislative forefront of Massive Resistance, and both propounded a more 
sophisticated -- though no less determined -- brand of racism than most of their 
counterparts in the Deep South, largely as a consequence of their reliance on external 
investment. 
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Introduction 
From the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 onwards, the Soviet Union made no 
secret of its desire to spread communism around the globe, whether by means of 
persuasion or force. "First we will take eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia, " 
thundered Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who had helped orchestrate the Revolution. "Then 
we will surround America, the last citadel of capitalism. We shall not have to attack. 
She will fall into our lap like an overripe fruit. "' After the Second World War, such 
declarations took on a new relevance as Josef Stalin extended Soviet influence into 
Eastern Europe. To the West, this was construed as a signal of his expansionist 
ambitions. By the turn of the decade, the crystallising Cold War had added a chilling 
realism to Lenin's earlier rhetoric. 
Even before the onset of the Cold War, Lenin's theme had been developed by 
some of his Soviet cohorts. Dimitry Z. Manuilsky, for example, told the Lenin School 
of Political Warfare in 1931 that "war to the hilt between communism and capitalism 
is inevitable. Today, of course, " he continued, "we are not strong enough to attack. 
Our time will come in 20 or 30 years. To win we shall need the element of surprise. 
The bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep. " It was Manuilsky's final remarks, 
however, that exacerbated fears within the United States for decades to come. "We 
shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There will 
be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid 
and decadent, will rejoice to co-operate in their own destruction. They will leap at 
'Vladimir Ilyich Lenin quoted in The Virginian: Serving the 48 Sovereign States, Vol. IV, No 5&6, 
Kathryn H. Stone Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, University of 
Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
another chance to be friends. "2 The West was faced with a dilemma: an aggressive 
Soviet Union would have to be countered in kind, but, as Manuilsky explained, a 
conciliatory, even comradely Russia was, potentially, at least as dangerous. "As soon 
as their guard is down, " he maintained, "we shall smash them with our clenched fist. "3 
The 20 or 30 year wait of which Manuilsky had spoken was due to come to an end in 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
Within the United States, such revolutionary rhetoric emphasised the external 
threat posed by the ideology of communism, and helped to inform -- and misinform -- 
views about its nature. The majority of Americans understandably reacted to such 
thinly veiled threats by supporting various manifestations of anti-communism. What 
at first appeared to be a straight-forward expression of opposition to communism, 
however, soon evolved into a highly complex political weapon. At different times, 
often by very different means and for a variety of motives, a diverse array of 
American individuals and groups played upon residual anti-communist fears. They 
did so for personal gain, to undermine personal and ideological enemies, and to 
foment hatred and mistrust. In sum, anti-communism became a flexible and potent 
political weapon aimed at a wide variety of targets, not just communists, internal or 
external. 
It is essential to define, and in some cases redefine, some of the terms 
associated with opposition to communism. Both among contemporaries in the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s, and within the historiography of anti-communism, there has been a 
2 By 1949, Manuilsky had climbed the ranks to become the Presiding Officer of the United Nations 
Security Council. Dimitry Z. Manuilsky quoted on flyer, enclosed with B. M. Miller letter to Wesley 
Critz George, 29 August 1955, Wesley Critz George Papers, Box 5, Southern Historical Collection, 
Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
3 ibid. 
2 
certain amount of confusion and imprecision surrounding such definitions. For the 
purposes of this thesis, several of the terms which contemporaries would have seen as 
synonyms will be used in rather specialised ways, in order to make clear distinctions 
between the various categories of opposition to communism in post-war America. 
Here, "anti-communism" is used as a macro-term to define opposition to the ideology 
of communism, whilst "anti-Communism" is used as a micro-term to denote the 
subtle, but often important, difference of being opposed to any structured and 
formalised communist political grouping, whether it be the CPUSA, the Comintern or 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "Red-baiting, " too, has often been used 
interchangeably with the term "anti-communism. " Here, however, red-baiting is used 
more precisely to describe the cynical manipulation of existing anti-communist fears 
in an attempt to discredit an opponent or undermine a specific target. Of course, in 
reality these artificial, analytical boundaries were extremely blurred, and categories of 
anti-communism often overlapped. McCarthyism, for example, was but one form of 
red-baiting .4 Anti-Communism and red-baiting 
both come under the more generic 
category of anti-communism. All three constituted attempts to root out, from all 
corners of United States society, that which was perceived to be un-American; by no 
means, however, did they confront all that was deemed to be un-American. 5 
4 Making light of contemporary confusion over McCarthyism and related terms, Senator Benton, 
Democrat for Connecticut, rhetorically asked McCarthy in a face-to-face interview, "Don't some 
people define McCarthyism as the use of the Senate floor to make attacks upon people who do not 
have a chance to defend themselves against those attacks? " "Interviews with Senator Benton of 
Connecticut (Democrat) and Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin (Republican) Reprinted from US News 
& World Report, Washington. Release to press / TV / radio 8 a. m. EDT Monday Sept 3,1951, " Francis 
Pickens Miller Papers, Box 81, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
5 Other groups who have, at various times in US history, come under the auspices of that which is "un- 
American" include anti-war demonstrators, homosexuals, hippies and other counter-culture exponents. 
This thesis aims to analyse how anti-communism was manipulated by 
southern segregationists between 1948 and 1965, a period which incorporated the 
zenith of Massive Resistance to integration. 6 The starting and closing dates for this 
study have been chosen for a number of reasons. For the United States, 1948 was a 
year of deep significance, both domestically and internationally. The Dixiecrat 
walkout from the 1948 Democratic National Convention heralded the beginnings of 
systematic southern resistance against increased northern liberal and federal pressure 
for civil rights reform. That movement came to fruition eight years later with the 
J 
signing of the Southern Manifesto and the origins of truly massive southern 
resistance. In Europe, 1948 saw the exacerbation of Cold War tensions that had been 
growing steadily since the end of the Second World War. In that year, for example, 
the Soviet Union orchestrated a purge in Czechoslovakia which left a Stalinist puppet 
regime in power. In the United States, Communist Party leaders were indicted under 
the Smith Act, and Alger Hiss first appeared before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee [HUAC]. In terms of Massive Resistance, 1965 offers a 
convenient cut off date. By then, the civil rights movement had successfully captured 
the sympathy of many white Americans, and there was less conviction behind the 
notion that it was communist-inspired. Indeed, in many ways the crusade for racial 
equality had been successfully presented to the public as a truly American campaign. 
The Johnson Administration pushed the Voting Rights Act through Congress, which, 
combined with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, created statutory equality and outlawed 
the most overt, legal expressions of southern racism. Although resistance did continue 
6 The term "segregationist" is used in this study to refer to anyone who condoned the South's 
segregated racial systems. Thus, it applies to politicians as much as to their constituents, to leaders as 
much as to followers. 
4 
in some areas, notably through the gerrymandering of electoral districts, a severe blow 
had nonetheless been dealt to the white South's hopes of preserving segregation and 
disenfranchisement. 
Conducting research on the deployment of anti-communism as a weapon of 
segregationists has involved the use of a wide variety of primary sources. The 
majority of these were the personal and political papers of southern segregationists. 
Such papers afford an intimate insight into segregationists' personal views on the 
subject, especially in letters to fellow white supremacists. Many of these collections, 
especially those of state governors, also house reams of letters from their constituents, 
and therefore reveal much about segregationist views at the grass-roots level. Some 
white supremacists, notably Ernest Sevier Cox and J. B. Matthews, hoarded the 
broadsides, pamphlets, articles and magazines issued by segregationist groups during 
Massive Resistance. These sources provided important information, not only 
concerning segregationist thought, but also about which of those thoughts were most 
vigorously and successfully disseminated to a wider audience. The papers of some of 
the individuals who dissented from the anti-communist line, including notable racial 
moderates and integrationists, were also consulted. 
These collections do have some drawbacks: there is, for example, the 
possibility that they have been "cleansed" before being deposited, as attitudes towards 
overt racism have changed over time. It is also worth bearing in mind that the 
constituents who wrote to their political leaders, particularly in a region with lower 
than average literacy levels, were not necessarily representative of mass popular 
opinion. On the whole, however, they offer access to a fairly wide spectrum of 
contemporary thought and debate. The knowledge garnered from those collections has 
been augmented by the use of a cross-section of newspapers, magazines, the 
Congressional Record, microfilmed files and oral history interviews. Most of the FBI 
files covering the period are now on microfilm, as are those of the Kennedy 
Administration's Justice Department. 
The first two chapters of this thesis seek to analyse the uses of anti- 
communism as a tool of Massive Resistance on a South-wide basis. While they 
attempt to find common patterns in the weapon's use, and to identify groups or 
individuals who were commonly targeted, they also reveal that anti-communism was 
often deployed by individual segregationists in a highly idiosyncratic manner. The 
second chapter will focus specifically on the anomalous uses of anti-communism and 
red-baiting by those southerners not traditionally associated with the weapon, as well 
as on the various tactics employed to counteract red-baiting. 
Chapters three and four will look in depth at Massive Resistance as it was 
played out in Virginia and North Carolina respectively, and will seek to analyse the 
ways in which resisters used anti-communism in the two states. Both states were 
central to the evolution of Massive Resistance in the South, but followed very 
different paths to defiance. Both formed part of the "Rim" or "Upper South", where 
attempts were made to conceal some of the most blatant forms of racism that were 
still being played out very publicly in the Deep South. This required a more complex 
and variable apparatus of oppression. As a consequence, the tools of that repression, 
such as anti-communism, were often -- but by no means always -- used in a more 
elaborate and sophisticated manner than elsewhere in the South, where overt terror 
and intimidation were commonplace. 
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More immediately, the aim of this introduction is to map out the main 
thematic concerns of this thesis; to position it within the existing historiography; to 
clarify the terminology and chronology; and to sketch out the tradition of anti- 
communism of which southern segregationists were both heirs and architects. 
II 
The historiography of Massive Resistance has tended to over-generalise and 
over-simplify where the use of anti-communism is concerned; similarly, the 
historiography of anti-communism has tended to overlook the intricacies and nuances 
of the phenomenon when it was employed in the cause of Massive Resistance.? This 
study aims to remedy some of those inadequacies. In general terms, it will show that 
segregationists are deserving of closer scrutiny and understanding, even if the cause 
for which they mobilised was, paradoxically, a betrayal of the democratic "American" 
ideals for which -- in expressing their fierce anti-communist sentiment -- they 
professed to stand. They are not easily dismissed or categorised: they did not form one 
coherent group united behind a single strategy or ideology, beyond their shared 
commitment to white supremacy. By looking at anti-communism in particular, this 
thesis will draw attention to their resourcefulness, and to the subtleties present in their 
varied responses to federally mandated desegregation and direct action civil rights 
activism. 
7 Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), for example, dedicated under ten pages to anti-communism and the civil rights 
movement, much of which covered the same ground as John Egerton, Sneak Now Against the Day: 
The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994). See especially Schrecker, Many Are The Crimes, pp. 389-395. 
Over the past three decades there has been an explosion of scholarship on all 
aspects of the post-war African American freedom struggle, including biographies of 
civil rights leaders, monographs concentrating on the efforts of major organisational 
bodies, syntheses of the Movement as a whole, narrow, local, grass-roots studies, and 
interpretative or thematic accounts of the freedom struggle focusing on, for example, 
the importance of labour, gender, voting rights, white liberals and popular culture. 8 So 
compelling have those histories proved that, if there is a collective weakness in this 
work, it is that the intricate details of the African American freedom struggle have 
been chronicled at the expense of a similarly nuanced account of white -- and, 
especially, segregationist -- responses to black activism. Even those histories that have 
sought to chronicle white responses to the civil rights movement have at times been 
8 The existing literature on the civil rights movement is perhaps the strongest arm of southern 
historiography. The following represents but a sample of the full breadth of work. Egerton, Speak Now 
Against the Day gives a very fine analysis of civil rights activity leading up to the emergence of a 
coherent, South-wide movement in 1955. For biographies, see Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: 
Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement. 1954-63 (London: Macmillan, 1988); and Eric 
Burner, And Gently He Shall Lead Them: Robert Parris Moses and Civil Rights in Mississippi (New 
York: New York University Press, 1994). For studies of specific civil rights organisations, see Adam 
Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and 
Martin Luther King. Jr (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987); David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: 
Martin Luther King. Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: W. Morrow, 
1986); and Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981). For local studies, see John Dittmer, Local People: The 
Struggle For Civil Rights in Mississippi [Blacks in the New World Series] (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994); William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro. North Carolina, and 
the Black Struggle For Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); and Adam Fairclough, 
Race and Democracy: the Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana. 1915-1972 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1995). For studies concentrating on the Movement's desire to secure the vote for 
African Americans, see Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South. 1944-1969 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976). For the Movement's relationship with popular culture, see 
Brian Ward, Just My Soul Responding: Rhythm and Blues. Black Consciousness and Race Relations 
(London: UCL Press, 1998). For the importance of labour to the development of the civil rights 
movement, see Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis 
Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); and Timothy J. Minchin, `What Do We Need a 
Union For? ' The TWUA in the South. 1945-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997). For the role of white racial progressives, see Thomas A. Kreuger, And Promises to Keep: The 
Southern Conference For Human Welfare. 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967); 
and Linda Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense: The Southern Conference Movement. 19 8- 
196i (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991). For accounts centring on 
gender, see Peter J. Ling and Sharon Monteith [eds], Gender in the Civil Rights Movement 
[Crosscurrents in African American History, Volume 8] (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999). 
unsympathetic not only to the goals of their white supremacist subjects, but also to the 
skill and determination with which they fought a desperate and sincere, if often 
unpalatable, rearguard action to preserve their way of life. 
The existing literature on Massive Resistance is dominated by three excellent 
studies, Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the 
South During the 1950's, Neil A. McMillen, The Citizens' Councils: Organised 
Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, and Francis Wilhoit, The Politics of 
Massive Resistance .9 What Bartley, Wilhoit and McMillen have failed to chronicle 
adequately, however, is the flexibility in the approach of segregationists towards 
resistance in general, and their manipulation of anti-communism in particular. In what 
is still the best over-arching account of the phenomenon in the South, Bartley viewed 
Massive Resistance as a movement both generated and led by southern "Neobourbon 
elites. " He noted anti-communism as an intrinsic part of the canon of southern white 
rhetoric, but was vague about its effects. "Certainly, " he ascertained, "it must have 
done something to harden white southern sentiment and may have won some converts 
outside the region. "lo 
Wilhoit retrod much of the ground covered by Bartley, though differed 
significantly from him in certain areas. He believed not that Massive Resistance was 
actively spawned by southern elites, but rather that it was a "political 
counterrevolution" in response to increasing African American agitation for racial 
change. More sensitive than Bartley to some of the cultural co-ordinates of Massive 
9 Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Neil McMillen, The White Citizens' Councils: 
Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction [2nd Edition] (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1994); Francis Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: George Braziller, 1973). 
10 Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 189. 
9 
Resistance, he detailed the "iconography and demonology" of Massive Resistance, 
terms which are used to refer to the psychological as well as physical aspects of the 
South's resistance movement. These included, Wilhoit noted, "not only a pantheon of 
saints and martyrs and verbalized propositions.. . but also a vast panoply of symbols, 
icons, emblems, totems, taboos, scapegoats, and stylized rituals. "11 
Neil McMillen's concentration on the South's more "respectable" organised 
resistance groups, the White Citizens' Councils, naturally offered insights that the 
broad nature of Bartley's work could not afford. He correctly identified that Citizens' 
Councils in the 1950s used anti-communism "to attract the support of conservatives 
beyond Dixie's borders, " but failed to appreciate both the complexities of 
segregationists' use of the weapon and the fact that it was not always guaranteed 
success. 12 Indeed, as this thesis will show, one of the Councils included in McMillen's 
book, the Patriots of North Carolina, Inc., refused to countenance red-baiting as a 
weapon from 1955 to 1958, during which time southern resistance hit full stride. 13 
In 1998, David Chappell made a laudable attempt to correct some of the flaws 
in the historiography of segregationists. His article on the religious ideas of southern 
white supremacists rightly pointed out that "historians have on the whole ignored the 
ideas of the segregationists of the 1950s and 1960s. "14 In partially redressing that 
balance, however, like McMillen he ignored both the times when segregationists 
chose not to use anti-communism at all, and the times when the weapon failed them 
11 Quotation from Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance, p. 122. For a full discussion of the 
Massive Resistance demonology, see pp. 122-134. 
12 McMillen, Citizens' Councils, p. 192. 
13 ibid., p. 196. Thus, while McMillen's assertion that, "second only to the question of race differences 
itself, Communist subversion became a principal tenet in the Council's defense of segregation, " is 
undoubtedly true of the majority of Councils, it by no means applied to all of them. 
14 David L. Chappell, "Religious Ideas of the Segregationists, " Journal of American Studies, 32,2 
(1998), pp. 237-8. 
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altogether. Chappell noted rather dismissively, for example, that segregationists "used 
anti-communism to great effect. But that is neither surprising nor instructive: anti- 
communism was in the air in those years. Everybody used it... " is 
A quarter of a century ago, Wayne Addison Clark's PhD thesis sought to 
explore the link between anti-communism and demagogic red-baiting, and provides a 
useful general account of the phenomenon. He was, however, heavily reliant on 
secondary sources and left many of the most bewitching questions on the subject 
unasked, let alone answered. 16 Without access to primary sources, Clark's study 
assumes the existence a South-wide consensus on anti-communism which, on closer 
inspection, was not always evident: he failed, for example, to take into account both 
the times when anti-communism was not chosen as a weapon by segregationists, and 
the mounting opposition to the phenomenon in the late 1950s. Furthermore, just as the 
early histories of the civil rights movement generally concentrated on the national 
figures, institutions, and organisations at the expense of local activists and grass-roots 
campaigns, so Clark concentrated on the `leading lights' of red-baiters, notably James 
Eastland, Herman Talmadge and Strom Thurmond. '? 
Much of the ground that Clark covered has now been filled by researchers 
privy to primary sources, such as Irwin Klibaner who has written on the Southern 
15 ibid., p. 255, ftn. 28. 
16 Wayne Addison Clark "An Analysis of the Relationship Between Anti-Communism and 
Segregationist Thought in the Deep South, 1948-1964, " PhD Dissertation, UNC at Chapel Hill, 1976. 
Clark's study appears, from his bibliography, to have had to rely on the files of the Southern Regional 
Council [SRC] and newspaper reports as primary sources. Unfortunately for his study, he does not 
appear to have gained access to, or made use of , the personal files of red-baiters, anti-communists and demagogues, or indeed to the archives of SCEF and SCHW, even though he accords these two 
organisations significant space in his work. 
17Many early histories of the civil rights movement concentrated solely on that movement's national 
figures, notably Martin Luther King, Jr. One example of this is Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle For 
Black Equality. 1954-1980 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), who sees the chronology of the 
Movement very much in line with King's involvement, running from the start of the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott on 5 December 1955 to his assassination in Memphis on 4 April 1968. 
11 
Conference Educational Fund [SCEF], and especially Sarah Hart Brown in her fine 
study of southern anti-communism at the Congressional level. 18 Brown examines the 
work of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee [SISS] and HUAC during their 
forays South between 1954 and 1958. Naturally limited to the machinations of those 
two committees, she has shown that Congress did not rein in die-hard, anti-radical 
congressmen after the censure of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy. The southern 
hearings, she maintained, "echoed distinctively regional themes and finally ended 
where they began, in a determined attempt to bolster southern resistance and brand 
white integrationists as traitors. "19 Brown's article on organised, congressional red- 
baiting in the South, therefore, offers a useful context within which to examine the 
often extemporaneous anti-communism and red-baiting of individual segregationists. 
Anti-communism as a Cold War phenomenon, rather than as a part of southern 
resistance, has been the focus of some excellent recent studies, notably Michael 
Heale's McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965. 
As is evident from the title, Heale's main concern is with both the national politics of 
"red scares" in the United States, and the ways in which individual states attempted to 
control communism. That control, he suggests, was primarily implemented via 
legislative committees, loyalty oaths and anti-communist legislation. His study looked 
outside the nation's capital to examine the local impetus behind national red scares. 
Choosing Georgia as his only southern case study, Heale focused most heavily -- in 
18 Sarah Hart Brown, "Congressional Anti-Communism and the Segregationist South: From New 
Orleans to Atlanta, 1954-1958, " " orgia Historical Quarterly, 80,4 (Winter 1996). Irwin Klibaner, 
"The Travail of Southern Radicals: the Southern Conference Educational Fund, 1946-1976, " Journal of 
Southern History, 49,2 (May 1983), later expanded upon in Irwin Klibaner, Conscience of a Troubled 
South: The Southern Conference Educational Fund. 1946-1966 [Martin Luther King and the Civil 
Rights Movement Series] (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1989). 
19 Brown, "Congressional Anti-Communism, " p. 794. 
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the Massive Resistance era -- on the work of the Georgia Commission on Education. 
Interestingly, even at this rather formal, legislative level of anti-communism, he noted 
that "the South has often been neglected as a source of McCarthyite politics. "20 
Heale fully appreciated that "any analysis which seeks to identify the 
ingredients of a red scare risks oversimplifying the phenomenon. "21 It is precisely that 
complexity which necessitates a closer study of the uses of anti-communism by 
individual segregationists and non-state-controlled segregationist groups, to 
supplement his work on government controlled agencies. This thesis will argue that 
guardians of the white South reacted with distinctive, if related, recourses to anti- 
communism -- a diversity which Heale's focus tends to conceal. 22 
III 
As a political weapon, anti-communism was not unique to the Massive 
Resistance era, but had a substantial pedigree. In order to understand the phenomenon 
in the period from 1948 to 1965, it is essential to look briefly at the evolution of anti- 
communist thought in the United States before the onset of the Cold War. To a great 
extent, post-war anti-communism was built upon an existing paranoia. Its success as a 
political weapon must be seen as a product of a much broader climate of distrust and 
suspicion. In general terms, Heale has shown that, despite the United States' own 
revolutionary origins, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards the country's 
20 Michael J. Heale, McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965 
[American History in Depth Series, eds A. J. Badger and Howell Harris] (London: MacMillan, 1998), 
p. 214. 
21 ibid., p. 298. 
22 Heale noted, for example, that "the guardians of the white South ... whether chieftains 
like the 
Talmadges or the rednecks of the Ku Klux Klan, embraced anticommunism as well as segregation" as 
a reaction to the threat of political and social change. ibid., p. 281. 
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republican tradition was ill at ease with any revolution directed at individualism, 
individual rights or property. Discourses of anti-communism, or certainly of anti- 
radicalism, were in many ways inevitable given the American culture of 
entrepreneurial capitalism and free-market economics. 23 The deployment of anti- 
communism also played upon two other distinct yet related traditions that were deeply 
ensconced in the American psyche: the first was that which Richard Hofstadter 
designated the "paranoid style" in American politics; the second involved the waves 
of extreme nativism and xenophobia that periodically seized America in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Less concerned with the apparatus of the American political system than with 
the rhetorical style and social milieu in which that system has traditionally operated, 
Hofstadter identified a common thread of embittered, embattled and suspicious 
minority politics. This "paranoid style" boasts "qualities of heated exaggeration, 
suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy. "24 In language of particular relevance to 
red-baiters, Hofstadter noted that one of the central preconceptions of the paranoid 
style was "the existence of a vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international 
conspiratorial network designed to perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character. "25 
23 Heale states that the American "respect for human and property rights qualified the American 
affirmation of the legitimacy of revolution. For much of the nineteenth century revolutionary 
movements abroad for the most part appeared to be directed at replacing monarchy with some kind of 
liberal democracy, and with these Americans could empathize. They were less enchanted by 
revolutions accompanied by widespread violence, the destruction of property, and the elevation of `the 
mob. "' Michael J. Heale, American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within- 1830-1970 [The 
American Moment] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 13. 
24 Richard Hofstadter, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics, " in Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in 
American Politics and Other Essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 3. 
25 ibid., p. 14. As further evidence of the anti-communists' proximity to the paranoid style, Hofstadter 
noted that practitioners of paranoid politics find hostile conspiracies against "a nation, a culture, a way 
of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others... his sense that his political passions 
are unselfish and patriotic, in fact, goes far to intensify his feeling of righteousness and his moral 
indignation. " p. 4. 
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As examples of the style's proponents throughout American history, he lists those 
taking stands against the Illuminati, the Masons, Roman Catholics and, finally, "reds. " 
He maintained, however, that much of the intensity of the paranoid style stemmed 
from its perpetrators' exclusion from mainstream politics. In the Massive Resistance- 
era South, that was not the case. White segregationists controlled the South's political 
processes, and could draw upon huge levels of support from their white southern 
constituents. 
While the new-born Soviet Union was planning its global expansion at the 
expense of capitalist society, the United States was in the grip of a predominately 
white, Anglo-Saxon backlash against open immigration. It is an implicit irony in US 
history that this nation, founded and sustained by immigration, had, by the 1920s, 
become wracked by xenophobia. The changing sources of mass migration from the 
1880s until the 1920s inspired hostile reaction, distrust and contempt from previous 
generations of settlers who were already successfully assimilated into American 
society. The majority of these new arrivals were not from Northern Europe, but from 
the Mediterranean periphery and Eastern Europe. Predominately Protestant migrants 
gave way to mainly Jewish and Catholic settlers. A tide of nativism characterised the 
reversal in the public's perception of these immigrants, which culminated in 
congressional approval of the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, signed in May 1924.26 
In short, those of Northern European Protestant stock feared that their own identity -- 
26 The Johnson-Reed Act imposed quotas on immigration of 2% of the number of foreign-born 
residents of each nationality, as based on the census of 1890. For more on nativism, see John Higham, 
Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism. 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), in 
which the author identifies the three strands of nativism as based on grounds of race, anti-Catholicism, 
and anti-radicalism. Alan Kraut has added a fourth strand, that of anti-Semitism. Alan M. Kraut, Thy 
Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society. 1880-1921 (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan 
Davidson, Inc., 1982). 
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synonymous in their minds with a true American identity -- would inevitably be 
diluted, and that their influence in US social, political, economic and cultural life 
would be undermined by a further influx of foreign ideologies, cultures, ethnic groups 
and religions. 
This tradition of nativism forms part of a broad tendency to define what is 
"American" in negative terms. Again, as a consequence of being an immigrant nation, 
and, theoretically, one embracing whatever cornucopia of cultures, creeds and colours 
arrived on her shores, America has always struggled to arrive at a precise, uncontested 
definition of what exactly defines "American-ness. " Americans knew almost 
instinctively what they were not, but were often rather less forthcoming about what 
they actually were. By the 1920s, Lenin and his cohorts were making it all too clear 
that there was no greater example of an alien, un-American ideology than 
communism. Thus, as Joel Kovel has noted, "the chances are that if you asked any 
sojourner or wayfarer what it meant to be American, at some point the answer would 
include the property of not being 'communistic. ' 1127 Just as communists were one 
example of the un-American, so by definition being anti-communist emerged as a 
clear way to assert one's all-American credentials. 
The pervasive mood of anti-communism increased exponentially with the 
establishment of the Communist Party of America in September 1919, which, by 
1923, had become the Communist Party of the United States of America [CPUSA]. 28 
27 Joel Kovel, Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anti-Communism and the Making of America (New 
York: Basic Books, 1994), p. 4. 
28 In 1919, the American Socialist Party split, forming two smaller parties: the Communist Party of 
America, and John Reed's Communist Labor Party. They were largely reconciled by 1923, however, 
when the CPUSA was founded. There are many histories of the CPUSA and of communism more 
generally in the United States. See, for example, Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet 
Russia: the Formative Period (New York: Vintage, 1986); Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History 
of Communism: Volume 2 Communism and the World (London: I. B. Tauris, 1985); Harvey Klehr, 
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Here, with a manifesto proclaiming that "capitalism is in collapse, " was a political 
party within the United States whose primary professed goal was the overthrow of the 
American political, economic and social system. 29 In pre-Cold War times, the CPUSA 
dogmatically followed the ideological pronouncements of the Third Communist 
International [Comintern], which had been established by the Soviet Union in March 
1919. Emerging damaged, but by no means broken, from the first national reaction to 
internal Communist Party activity -- the Red Scare of 1919-1920 -- the CPUSA 
followed the Comintern's "first phase" of underground activity and "revolutionary 
upsurge" until 1923.30 For the next five years, the Comintern predicted a period of 
"capitalist stabilization, " and the CPUSA laid low until the "Third Period, " beginning 
in 1928, which prophesied the decay of capitalism and the triumph of world 
communism. To hasten communism's ascendancy, and as part of a wider European 
Communist movement, the CPUSA proclaimed a "Popular Front" approach in 1934, 
which aimed to appeal to a broader cross-section of the public, to establish coalitions 
with other political groups, and to maximise recruitment. 
Beyond the obvious threat that the existence of a revolutionary political party 
engendered, there were three distinct aspects of the CPUSA that gave cause for 
concern among southern white elites: the composition and numbers of its supporters; 
its links to union activity; and its views on race relations. The predominance of 
The Heyday of American Communism: the Depression Decade (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984). 
For first-hand accounts, see, for example, J. Edgar Hoover, A Study of Communism (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962); William Z. Foster, Toward Soviet America (New York: 
International Publishers, 1932). 
29 "Manifesto of the Communist Party of America, " quoted in Daniels, A Documentary History of 
Communism. Volume 2, p. 41. 
30 The Red Scare of 1919 was led by Attorney General A. Mitchell "The Fighting Quaker" Palmer and 
his special assistant, J. Edgar Hoover, who was to dominate federal law enforcement for the next half a 
century. Writing on the origins of communism, Hoover proclaimed its proponents to be "committed to 
the destruction of our way of life and dedicated to the establishment of a world communist society. " 
Hoover, Study of Communism, p. 18. 
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foreign-born citizens immediately exacerbated fears about the nature of Party 
activity. 31 CPUSA officials also continually exaggerated the numbers participating in 
Party-backed events and demonstrations to boost the Party's image as a vibrant and 
expanding political force. That exaggeration rebounded on the Party, however, since it 
served to intensify popular concern about the extent of Communist activity and 
influence 32 
Even when the CPUSA's own exaggerations were taken into account, it was 
difficult to ascertain the true strength of support for the Party. There were those in the 
United States, for example, who applauded the Bolshevik Revolution and Soviet 
system of government, but nonetheless were not members of the Communist Party. 
They were referred to as "fellow travellers, " a term popularised by the German 
Communist leader, Willi Muenzenberg. 33 In the words of historian David Caute, 
"fellow-travelling involves commitment at a distance which is not only geographical 
but also emotional and intellectual. It is remote control radicalism... "34 The majority 
of fellow travellers within the United States reached an ideological consensus. For the 
most part, they believed that revolutions were rare events to be savoured, especially if 
31 By 1931, two-thirds of the Communist Party's membership were born abroad, and a substantial 
number were Jewish. Indeed, it was not until the Gastonia Textile Strike of 1929 that US-born workers 
dominated a Party demonstration of any kind. 
32William Couch, director of the University of North Carolina Press, expressed those fears in a 1935 
article in The Westminster Magazine. Writing in the midst of the Depression, Couch felt that, coupled 
with the triumph of communism in the Soviet Union, "it cannot be argued now that communism is 
impractical or the mere dream of a disordered mind. In fact, " he concluded, "it appears extremely 
probable that either communism or fascism will prevail in this country in a few years. " W. T. Couch, 
"Economic Planning in the South, " The Westminster Magazine, 23,4 (Jan-March 1935), p. 304. 
33 Muenzenberg was secretary of the International Socialist Youth League from 1914-1921, and then 
of the Young Communist International. He became an outstanding "behind-the-scenes" propagandist, 
especially for "front" coalitions. He fled the Party in 1937 after the Moscow trials, however, and was 
murdered by unknown assailants in France in 1940. See Alan Adler [ed. ], Theses. Resolutions and 
Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: 
Humanities Press, Inc., 1980). 
34 David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism [Revised Edition] (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 4. 
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enacted against the causes of poverty, tyranny and war. But that did not mean a 
revolution was encouraged in the United States: as perhaps the most famous pre-war 
American fellow traveller, Henry Wallace, once noted, "I wouldn't want communism 
over here, but it makes more sense in Russia. "35 In general, then, they were broadly 
sympathetic to the communist system where it worked in other countries. 
Furthermore, they were not overtly opposed to implementing certain aspects of 
Soviet-style centralised planning where they thought that they might alleviate some of 
America's own social, economic and even racial problems. The majority were 
socialists, college students, or those afraid of a new war in the atomic age 36 To many 
anti-communists in the United States, however, the loyalty of such figures could not 
be counted on in times of crisis. As the Cold War escalated in the wake of World War 
II, furthermore, there was little room for differentiating between the dwindling band 
of fellow travellers and die-hard revolutionaries and card carrying CPUSA members. 
To its enemies, the actual numerical strength and negligible real power of the 
CPUSA was not of the greatest significance. More important was the fact that the 
influence of an internal Communist Party in the United States was believed to 
constitute a real and present danger. The internationally respected scientist, Albert 
Einstein, succinctly summed up the situation in 1954. In an open letter to the Socialist 
Party's Norman Thomas, Einstein wrote that "America is incomparably less 
endangered by its own Communists than by the hysterical hunt for the few 
35 Henry A. Wallace quoted in ibid., p. 286. 
36 Individually, in the pre-war period Vito Marcantonio was the most notable fellow traveller in 
Congress, and J. Robert Oppenheimer in scientific circles. 
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Communists that are here. "37 As John Egerton has concluded, "there was, in sum, a 
minimum of action -- but a maximum of reaction. "38 
To add more uncertainty to any estimation of the extent of communist support, 
not all members of the Party were genuine communists. Given the paucity of 
alternative sources of grass-roots labour organisation, many industrial workers were 
often attracted to the Party's organisational skills and joined without being completely 
committed to communist ideology. Gerald Zahavi noted this phenomenon in his case 
study of the New York State town of Schenectady, dominated by the General Electric 
works plant. Zahavi quoted a former Party activist who explained that "Sid 
(Friedlander, a local organizer) was pretty good, and he was pretty militant ... Nobody 
listened to this stuff about Communism, but they liked him as a union leader. "39 
The fact that so much Communist Party activity between the wars had 
revolved around labour organisation cemented a link between communism and 
unionism in the minds of southern segregationists. The bloody battles of the North 
Carolina Gastonia Textile Strike of 1929 proved for the first time that the CPUSA 
could lead native- rather than foreign-born workers in industrial disputes; a CPUSA- 
led march in New York City's Union Square a year later showed that the Party could 
37 Albert Einstein quoted in Manning Marable, Race- Reform- and Rebellion: the Second 
Reconstruction in Black America. 1945-1982 [The Contemporary United States Series] (London: 
Macmillan, 1984), p. 12. 
38 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 451. Expanding on that issue, Egerton stated that, 
"Looking back on those frenetic times, it is clear that disruptive or criminal acts by Communists inside 
this country were less frequent and less harmful than the paranoid and reactionary behavior of rabid 
anticommunists driven by fear or hatred or insecurity. " 
39 Gerald Zahavi, "Passionate Commitments: Race, Sex, and Communism at Schenectady General 
Electric, 1932-1954, " Journal of American History, 83,2 (1996), pp. 520-521. Zahavi sets out his 
position early on in his article, arguing that "this article wants to shatter historical infatuations with 
overly abstract, ideologically driven, and institutionally focused treatments of communism and labor. " 
p. 515. 
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muster upwards of 50,000 workers for demonstrations 40 The establishment of the 
Congress of Industrial Organisations [CIO] in 1935 provided fertile ground for 
Communist Party involvement in a nation-wide labour movement. Although neither 
founded, run, nor dominated by the CPUSA, Party members were nevertheless a 
major force in many of its affiliated unions and its national office. As CPUSA leader 
Earl Browder reported to his Central Committee, "We Communists are a small, 
though important, part of this great mass movement. We are giving all our best forces 
and mobilizing all our organizations to assist the work of the CIO. "41 
In turn, unionism provided southern segregationists with one of the clearest 
links between communism and the drive for greater African American rights. Robin 
Kelley's study of Alabama Communists during the Great Depression, and Michael 
Honey's study of labour in Memphis, have both shown that black, communist, and 
sometimes even black communist participation in southern union politics during the 
1930s and 1940s was extensive 42 Moreover, Honey argues that "only recently have 
labor historians begun to connect black working-class activism and industrial 
unionism to the rise of the civil rights movement. "43 Whereas the early actions of the 
CIO had in one sense linked communism to union activity, it added race to the 
equation in April 1946 with the launch of "Operation Dixie, " ostensibly an effort to 
organise labour unions at the local level throughout the South. The southern labour 
40 The Union Square demonstration was to commemorate the death of Steve Katovis, a CPUSA 
member who had been killed in a fight with a policeman during a peaceful demonstration on 16 
January 1930. See Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, pp. 28-33. 
41 Earl Browder quoted in ibid., p. 238. 
42 Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil 
Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993). The Food, 
Tobacco, Agriculture, and Allied Workers' Union of America, and the United Auto Workers provide 
examples of unions that countenanced interracial organising. Others, such as the National Maritime 
Union, were not interracial per se, but nonetheless often supported black union activity. 
43 Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights, p. 7. 
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movement, commented Richard Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, "seemed on the 
verge of a major breakthrough. "44 Van A. Bittner, however, director of the CIO's 
southern drive, and other conservative CIO leaders attempted to accommodate 
southern unionism's largest potential constituency -- white workers. As a result, the 
drive concentrated more on building up union strength among whites within the 
South's segregated workforce than it did in breaking down racial barriers. Indeed, the 
CIO was sometimes complicit in perpetuating racial inequalities in job opportunities 
and pay because it was so desperate to recruit new members. To many segregationists, 
however, Operation Dixie confirmed the idea that blacks, union workers and 
communists were all bound together in their subversive intent. Moreover, as Honey 
and Kelley both suggest, many communist-linked unions did indeed pioneer 
interracial organisation in the South in the 1930s. To segregationists, they were all 
undesirable "outsiders. "45 
Communist interests in interracial union organising reinforced a link between 
the CPUSA and racial activism which is essential to the understanding of anti- 
communism's selection by southern segregationists as a weapon of Massive 
Resistance. The CPUSA's repeated attempts to embarrass the United States on its 
racial record had a similar effect. In 1924, only five years after its inception, the 
CPUSA had proclaimed that "the Negro workers of this country are exploited and 
44 Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, "Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the 
Early Civil Rights Movement, " Journal of American History, 75, (December 1988), p. 800. The CIO's 
goal was to bring a further million workers of all colours into the fold of southern unionism, thus 
immediately threatening the power of southern business elites. As Egerton rightly points out, the 1946 
drive, traditionally known as "Operation Dixie, " was in fact the second Operation Dixie, the first 
unsuccessful drive coming in 1942. Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 444. 
45 For more on Operation Dixie, see Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New 
Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 207-210. 
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oppressed more ruthlessly than any other group. "46 At its Sixth Congress in 1928, the 
Comintern publicly recognised the South's African Americans as an oppressed group, 
and proclaimed that they had the right to secession within the United States 47 The fact 
that those pronouncements were concurrent with the rise of the militant "New Negro" 
only exacerbated the threat of communist-inspired black insurgency in the minds of 
white southerners. Many African Americans, not just in the South but throughout the 
nation, had fought for their country in the First World War or had been drawn to 
wartime industries in the fast-expanding cities. As a result, they were bolder and more 
demanding than their predecessors. US Army Major R. M. Howell highlighted the 
perceived danger in 1932, writing in an intelligence report that "Communism has 
chosen the Southern Negro as the American group most likely to respond to its 
revolutionary appeal. "48 
The Party further aggravated segregationists by seeking to turn its rhetoric on 
racial injustice into action. Perhaps the most famous example of its intervention, and 
certainly one that earned the Party large amounts of valuable publicity, was the 
Scottsboro Trial in 1931. The pre-eminent black civil rights organisation, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP], was not initially 
prepared to use its legal resources to defend the "Scottsboro boys, " nine black youths 
who had been arrested for the alleged rape of two white women on a freight train near 
Scottsboro, Alabama. The NAACP's Chattanooga branch, which was closest to 
Scottsboro, had closed down in 1930, and the Association's national leadership had to 
46 Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 324. 
47 At the same time, the CPUSA formulated twelve demands for ending black oppression, including a 
demand for the "abolition of the whole system of race discrimination. Full racial, political and social 
equality for the Negro race. " ibid., p. 324. 
48 Major R. M. Howell quoted in Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, pp. 455-6. 
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follow the early machinations of the case through the press. The Communist Party- 
influenced International Labor Defense [ILD], on the other hand, used local CPUSA 
networks to ensure prompt representation for the defendants 49 Although initially 
unsuccessful, in that it failed to secure justice or a release, the ILD oversaw a 
successful national and international publicity campaign which highlighted racial 
injustice and the plight of southern blacks faced with a discriminatory legal system. 
Figures of world-wide renown, such as Albert Einstein and Thomas Mann, voiced 
their support for the boys. As a result, the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU]'s 
Roger Baldwin told the ILD that they had "done a job that no agency could do or 
would do, not only in arousing world-wide opinion and protest but in the selection of 
counsel for skilful handling of the moves in court. "so 
The success of the Scottsboro project for Party publicity was repeated -- albeit 
with a slightly lower profile -- with the trial of CPUSA-member Angelo Herndon one 
year later. Herndon was arrested in 1931 for organising a biracial demonstration 
outside an Atlanta courthouse, and was convicted to serve a prison sentence of up to 
20 years. In his autobiography, Herndon wrote that the most personally injurious 
charge against him had been the prosecutor's declaration that the Communist Party's 
position was one of "setting up a nigger Soviet Republic in the Black Belt. "51 He was, 
however, released after five years, when the Supreme Court struck down the 
constitutionality of the Georgia law under which he had been convicted. In the space 
49 For more on the often complicated struggle between the ILD and the NAACP, see Dan T. Carter, 
Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969) 
esp. pp. 51-103. 
50 Roger Baldwin quoted in Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 338. Ultimately the combined 
might of the NAACP and the ILD was successful, with the Supreme Court over-ruling the original 
decisions. The last of the nine was released from prison almost twenty years later, in 1950. 
51 Angelo Herndon quoted in ibid., p. 333. 
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of two years, the Scottsboro and Herndon cases had lent the CPUSA what John 
Egerton has described as "a degree of legitimacy it had been unable to achieve by any 
other means. "52 
On the whole, however, attempts to harness African American support failed 
in practical terms, as each CPUSA success was followed by a failure to plant solid 
organisational roots. The Party had some success in unions, notably in the interracial 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union [STFU] and the Alabama-based Sharecroppers' 
Union [SCU], but those triumphs belied a wider failure. 53 At the start of the 
Depression, for example, the Party's Jack Stachel admitted that black membership of 
the CPUSA was only 200-strong. Communist-dominated groups such as the Southern 
Negro Youth Congress, the Alabama-based League of Young Southerners, the League 
of Struggle for Negro Rights and the Council of Young Southerners had little 
organisational success; the American Negro Labor Congress did not have a single 
representative in the entire South. 54 
As will be seen, this failure was again largely irrelevant to white supremacists' 
perceptions of the extent of the communist threat in the South. What was important 
was that those segregationists frequently chose to associate attacks on the racial 
structure of their society with communist activity. A good example of this apparent 
contradiction was provided by Texas Congressman Martin Dies. He admitted that 
52 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 170. 
53 One of the most influential figures in the STFU was Howard "Buck" Kester. A socialist and activist, 
he was nonetheless militantly anti-communist. Arguments about communist infiltration hugely 
diminished the Union's effectiveness, and, after World War II, its work was largely confined to 
California and Louisiana. For more on the STFU and the SCU, see Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the 
Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets. 1929-1959 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1981), Kelley, Hammer and Hoe; Nell Irvin Painter, The Narrative of Hosea Hudson. His Life as .3 Negro Communist in the South (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
54 Klehr, Heyday of American Communism. 
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communist infiltration of African American groups had been largely unsuccessful. 
That was, he claimed, "a tribute to the patriotism, loyalty and religion of the negro. 55 
Nonetheless, as chairman of HUAC for seven years, he was responsible for the 
Committee's relentless hounding of interracial unions and organisations dedicated to 
racial change, on the grounds that they were communist sponsored. 56 
The CPUSA's stance on race presented southern elites with a dilemma. On the 
one hand, they recognised the potential threat posed to their political hegemony by 
Communist Party organising, however unsuccessful it proved to be in practical terms. 
On the other hand, many recognised the gilt-edged opportunity that the CPUSA had 
handed them: because the Party was well-known for its advocacy of black self- 
determination, and because it had placed so much emphasis on mobilising southern 
blacks, southern segregationists realised that they could potentially dismiss any 
agitation for greater black civil rights as communist-inspired. 57 
As this thesis will show, not all segregationists chose to make the link between 
racial agitation and the Communist Party or its supporters. The task of those who did, 
however, was facilitated by the vicious circle in which the Party inexorably found 
itself caught: the pervading anti-communist mood forced it to conduct much of its 
activity in secret, intensifying the sense of covert, sinister manoeuvrings and ensuring 
55 Martin Dies quoted in Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 456. 
56 In his autobiography for example, Dies wrote that, "Aside from the merits or demerits of any 
arguments, it is a known fact that the Communist Party has exerted strenuous efforts to increase the 
intensity of racial strife... there is no doubt, because the pattern has been so clear, that this factor is 
responsible for some of the racial strife today. It would greatly facilitate the ultimate solution if those 
who are sincerely sponsoring the interest of the Negroes would examine the various programs very 
carefully to make sure that they do not aid the purposes and desires of the Communist Party. " Martin 
Dies, Martin Dies' Story (New York: Bookmailer, 1963), p. 98. 
57 The other notable organisation that advocated black self-determination was Marcus Garvey's United 
Negro Improvement Association [UNIA]. Having established UNIA in Jamaica in 1914, Garvey 
moved to New York in 1916. His Black Star Line, however, did not succeed in its attempts to return 
African Americans to Africa. Indeed, the enduring significance of the UNIA for African Americans 
was psychological rather than practical. 
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that public knowledge of the exact nature of CPUSA aims and activities remained 
extremely limited. Many segregationists took the opportunity to manipulate those 
fears and that ignorance for their own gain. It is, therefore, an irony of Party history 
that its genuine support for African American rights, coupled with its recognition of 
the considerable propaganda value to be made from American domestic racism, led it 
to focus on racial issues. Once it had done so, not only did it expose itself to race- 
baiting, but it was also forced to look on helplessly as red-baiting took its toll on 
many civil rights organisations. 
IV 
European events in the late 1930s, in particular the rise of fascism, served to 
harden anti-communist feeling. 58 Without doubt, the greatest blow to Communist 
Party sympathy in the United States was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939. In a 
late attempt to convince his foes otherwise, and exemplifying the shock of the 
ideological break to come, Browder himself had claimed in July that there was "as 
much chance of Russo-German agreement as of Earl Browder being elected President 
of the Chamber of Commerce. "59 Stalin, however, did choose to ally himself with 
Hitler, and thus immediately alienated swathes of international communist support. 
Many fellow travellers severed links with the party, while there was marked change in 
the vocabulary of left-wing intellectuals: references to "Stalin" became references to 
58 In the Spanish Civil War, for example, Franco's fascists overcame nascent Spanish communism 
with help from Hitler and a blind eye from Britain and France. The Nazi Party continued its aggressive 
anti-communist stance in 1937 by signing an anti-Comintern pact with the Japanese, later co-signed by 
the Italians. 
59 Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 387. 
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"the Stalinist dictatorship, " and both the man himself and the political system he 
embodied were increasingly designated "totalitarian. " 
This change, as Judy Kutulas has noted, "was symbolic of the abandonment of 
a leftwing opposition to the Soviet Union and the subsequent creation of liberal anti- 
Communism. "60 A fundamental shift was triggered in liberal politics within the 
United States: the non-communist left began its transformation towards the anti- 
communist left. By the end of Henry Wallace's unsuccessful 1948 presidential bid, in 
which the former New Dealer had voiced opposition to Truman's Cold War policies, 
and had come out in support of federally enforced desegregation, the left was 
increasingly isolated 61 The pre-eminent liberal group in Washington, the Union for 
Democratic Action [UDA], turned against Popular Front politics and, in January 
1947, launched the Americans for Democratic Action [ADA], solidifying the switch 
to anti-communism in liberal circles. By 1948, in the words of Peter Kellog, liberals 
"believed themselves engaged in a desperate struggle to survive as an effective 
political force. "62 By joining the growing ranks of anti-communists, liberals ensured 
the almost total ostracisation of the CPUSA and its support. 63 Southern segregationist 
60 Judy Kutulas, "`Totalitarianism' Transformed: the Mainstreaming of Anti-Communism, 193 8- 
1941, " Mid-America: -An Historical Review, 77,1 (Winter 1995), p. 72. 
61 For a comprehensive view of Wallace's campaign, especially across southern states, see Sullivan, 
Days of Hone, pp. 243-270. 
62 Peter J. Kellog, "The Americans For Democratic Action and Civil Rights in 1948: Conscience in 
Politics or Politics in Conscience? " Midwest Quarterly, 20 (Winter 1976), p. 56. For another solid 
discussion on the change from non-communism to anti-communism amongst the national liberal 
caucus, see James V. Compton, Anti-Communism in American Life Since the Second World War 
[Forums in History Series] (St Charles, Missouri: Forum Press, 1973). See also Steven M. Gillon, 
Politics and Vision: the ADA and American Liberalism. 1947-1985 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987). 
63 The Party's political and social exclusion was cemented indefinitely after the 20th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party, held in Moscow between the 14th and 25th February 1956, during which 
Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and admitted that his predecessor had been the overseer of 
pogroms and further atrocities against his own people. 
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politicians, like their northern counterparts, were faced with a constituency that was 
increasingly united in its adherence to anti-communism. 
The effect of the Cold War on the CPUSA, and on support for Popular Front 
politics of any kind, was naturally devastating: in a few short months in 1946, 
Churchill had made his "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, and Stalin himself 
had continued the earlier rhetoric of Lenin and Manuilsky by declaring that conflict 
between communism and capitalism was inevitable. M This climate left precious little 
room for neutrals, let alone for sympathisers or apologists for communism. In simple 
terms, as the American public and government policy makers surveyed the 
complicated disorder of the post-war world, they saw only a neat delineation between 
those countries which were broadly capitalist or followed free market systems, and 
those which were communist or sympathetic to communism. 
As Patricia Sullivan has noted, the avowed and actual expansionist ambitions 
of the USSR changed the context of internal politics in the United States. 65 
Domestically, Truman's loyalty program established an internal policy that dovetailed 
neatly with the administration's foreign policy and the Truman Doctrine. The precise 
motivations for the president's adoption of a domestic loyalty programme remain 
mired in scholarly debate. According to one biographer of Truman, the president felt 
that too much was being made of the "Communist bugaboo. "66 Nevertheless, a 
number of key issues led him to enact Executive Order 9835 in May 1947, a loyalty 
oath designed to ensure the "American-ness" of all federal employees. In part, this 
64 For the full text of Stalin's speech, see "Stalin, Pre-election Speech of February 9,1946, " in Daniels, 
A Documentary History of Communism. Volume 2, p. 137. 
65 Sullivan, Days of Hope, p. 225. 
66 Harry S. Truman quoted in David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 
550. 
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was an attempt to repair the damage of the Democrats' disastrous showing in the 1946 
mid-term elections, which had been branded a choice between "Communism and 
Republicanism" by the Republican Party. 67 Truman placed a conservative Republican, 
Seth Richardson, in charge of the loyalty review board. Richard Freeland maintained 
that Richardson's appointment undermined the argument that Truman instituted his 
loyalty programme for purely political purposes. The establishment of the 
programme, he believed, would not have necessarily headed off Republican claims 
that the administration was soft on communism: it could equally, he argued, be seen 
as a vindication of right-wing claims that there were internal communists who needed 
to be investigated. 68 Equally, though, it is possible to argue that Truman was striving 
to make domestic anti-communism a bi-partisan political issue, uniting Democrats 
and Republicans alike. By so doing, he was attempting to regain political ground and 
end the powerful association in the public mind between support for vigorous 
domestic anti-communist policies and the Republican Party. 
Regardless of the complicated motives behind the implementation of the 
loyalty programme, disloyalty simultaneously became a by-word for that which was 
"un-American, " taking the vocabulary and terminology of anti-communism another 
step forward and widening the scope of behaviour that was perceived to be 
unpatriotic. The "Loyalty Program Press Release" of 22 March 1947, for example, 
defined disloyalty as "membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with 
any foreign or domestic association, movement, group or combination of persons, 
67 Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism (New York: 
Free Press, 1995), p. 197. 
68 Richard M Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy. 
Domestic Politics. and Internal Security 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972). See esp. pp. 
117-134. 
designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, " 
or one wishing to carry out an act of violence against any US citizen. Finally, in what 
was an oblique reference to the CPUSA, it was declared disloyal to seek "to alter the 
form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. "69 
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, anti-communism at the federal level also 
showed signs of cleaving that which was deemed "un-American" to support for racial 
integration. Some of the questions that formed part of Truman's loyalty programme, 
for example, had hinted at this link. They included grilling defendants over their 
stance on the Red Cross' policy of segregated blood banks, asking whether or not they 
had ever entertained negroes at their home, and, stretching the credibility of the 
exercise to an extreme, the question, "How do you explain the fact that you have an 
album of Paul Robeson records in your home? "7° Furthermore, leading southern 
segregationists, most notably Mississippi Senator James 0. "Jim" Eastland, had a 
major hand in the federal witch-hunts conducted by HUAC and SISS which, to a great 
extent, served to legitimise red-baiting. It was, therefore, unthinkable that they would 
not import such effective tactics to their home states, where they could be deployed 
even more enthusiastically in the service of white supremacy. 
Over and above Truman's domestic programme, federal anti-communism in 
the early Cold War era blossomed in two distinct areas: the crusade of Joseph "Tail 
Gunner Joe" McCarthy, nominally under the auspices of the Permanent Subcommittee 
69 Quoted from "Part V: Standards, " in "Loyalty Program Press Release, 22 March 1947, " Frank 
Porter Graham Papers, Box 31, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Allied to the Loyalty Program, the Taft-Hartley Act of 23 June 1947 
forced union leaders to repudiate communism or forfeit protection under the National Labor Relations 
Act. The Smith Act of 1940 was also resuscitated to arrest twelve Communist leaders on 29 June 1948. 
Seven of the defendants were imprisoned, five were driven underground. The Supreme Court, which 
originally upheld the convictions, did not begin to overturn them until 1956. 
70 Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 454. 
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on Investigations of the Committee of Government Operations; and the zealous 
investigations conducted by HUAC and SISS. As a Republican, McCarthy personified 
the connection between the Grand Old Party and anti-communism, which, in national 
politics, had been forged in the 1946 mid-term elections. Indeed, it is with some 
justification that McCarthy's name became synonymous with the cynical 
manipulation of public fears of communism and Communist Party activity. Even 
though he was hardly the first US politician to exploit residual fears of communism in 
an election campaign, he took calculated anti-communism to a new extreme. 7' First 
elected in 1947, McCarthy was initially best known as "The Pepsi-Cola Kid" because 
of his alleged proclivity for accepting bribes from large multinational companies, and 
for attempting to end sugar rationing on behalf of the soft drinks giant. As a politician 
he was exceptional only in his ineptitude, to the extent that he picked up the 
Washington Press Corps' award for "Worst US Senator" before commencing his anti- 
communist campaign. 72 Desperate for re-election in 1952, McCarthy seized upon the 
communist issue as his own personal political panacea. On Lincoln Day 1950, 
McCarthy's infamous speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, thrust anti-communism 
even further to the forefront of the domestic political agenda. For four years, 
McCarthy rode anti-communism's demagogic roller-coaster, which carried him first 
to the very heights of national political prominence, before finally leaving him 
71 The Fighting Quaker himself, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, was the first to attempt to use 
what Charlotte Pomerantz has described as "the Nixon-McCarthy technique of red-baiting" in a 
campaign against the Populist Tom Watson for a Senate seat in Georgia. Palmer hoped to use victory 
as a springboard to a presidential campaign, but was unsuccessful in both. Charlotte Pomerantz [ed. ], A 
Quarter Century of Un-Americana (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1963), p. 10. Similarly, Father 
Charles Coughlin carved out a niche as a proselytising, anti-communist radio-broadcasting priest. For 
more on his crusade, centred in the 1930s, see Kovel, Red Hunting in the Promised Land. pp. 23-38. 
72 For more on McCarthy's early career see Compton, "Anti-Communism in American Life Since the 
Second World War, " esp. pp. 9-11. For a fuller account, see David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So 
Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press, 1983), and Paul H. Rovere, Senator Joe 
McCarthy (New York: Harper Row, 1959). 
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discredited, alcoholic and dead. 73 During his ascendancy, however, McCarthy had 
invigorated anti-communism and red-baiting in the US to such an extent that, even 
after his fall from grace, much of his legacy remained. In the South, segregationists 
borrowed many of his techniques and much of his anti-communist invective in their 
defence of white supremacy. 
The entrenched anti-communist sensibilities of the majority of American 
citizens were repeatedly reinforced by a succession of Cold War events, both domestic 
and international. The continued existence of the CPUSA compounded those fears and 
created the added danger of organised, internal subversion; the post-war slide of other 
"western democracies, " notably Great Britain, toward socialism, which was widely 
perceived as communism's under-developed younger sibling, increased that fear yet 
further; high-profile espionage cases, such as those of the Canadian spy ring, the 
Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss and Klaus Fuchs intensified anxieties about the possibility of 
communist-sympathisers in sensitive government positions; and events of a global 
significance, such as the overthrow of Chiang Kai-Shek and the emergence of Mao 
Tse-Tung's "Red China, " provided concrete evidence of communist expansion. 74 In 
accordance with the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment, the United 
States deployed troops in Korea and later Vietnam to hold back what were perceived 
to be not indigenous revolutionary movements, but examples of communist expansion 
and aggrandisement originating in Peking and Moscow. 
73 In the late Spring of 1954, McCarthy had his last fling with an attack on alleged Communist 
infiltration of the Army. The Army-McCarthy hearings lasted for 35 days, from which 187 hours of 
television were broadcast to 20 million viewers. Compton, "Anti-Communism in American Life Since 
the Second World War, " pp. 1-2. 
74 Chiang Kai-Shek's regime in China fell to Mao Tse-Tung's Communists in the Spring of 1949. The 
term "Red" China was coined to signify Mao's regime, which was not officially recognised as China's 
legitimate government by successive American administrations. The US maintained that Chiang Kai- 
Shek and his government, both in exile in Formosa, remained the rightful rulers of China. 
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Intellectual and social theorists compounded those fears by suggesting that the 
United States was becoming increasingly susceptible to totalitarianism, whether 
communist or fascist. Hannah Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism, in particular, 
enjoyed a vogue in the post-war United States. Arendt argued that Nazi and Soviet 
totalitarian regimes had emerged in German and Russian societies respectively 
because of the breakdown of previous social values. In both societies, she claimed, an 
increasing authoritarianism and a lack of individuality had paved the way for 
totalitarianism. Thus, the emergence of a mass consumer culture in the United States 
in the 1950s awakened real fears that Americans were losing their traditional 
creativity, vigour and individualism. As works like David Riesman's Lonely Crowd, 
C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite, Herbert Marcuse's One Dimensional Man, and 
William Whyte's The Organisation Man pointed out, Americans were increasingly 
conformist, politically passive, and intellectually and emotionally repressed. As a 
result, they believed, Americans were increasingly vulnerable to totalitarianism. 75 
The willingness of both sides in the Cold War to create propaganda from any 
perceived weakness in their opponent inevitably led the Soviet Union to concentrate 
on the United States' racial situation. Segregationists, it will be argued, were well 
aware of the situation. As will be shown, some chose to curb their racial rhetoric 
accordingly; others carried on regardless. The global ramifications of the Cold War 
75 For more on the contribution to Cold War debate by political theorists, and the wide-ranging effects 
of America's burgeoning consumer culture, see Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 69-76; John P. Diggins, The Proud Decades: 
America in War and Peace. 1941-1960 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1989), pp. 221-231. See also 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [Third Edition] (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967); 
David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1950); William H. Whyte, The Organisation Man (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 
1956); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Herbert 
Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere Books, 1964). 
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revitalised the existing links between race and communism that had been created in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, this thesis will argue that the Cold War had an 
immensely powerful effect on the language and themes not just of anti-communism, 
but of the entire Massive Resistance campaign of which anti-communism was an 
integral part. 
When western powers began to grant independence to former colonies in the 
1950s and 1960s, the majority of those fledgling nations were technically non-aligned. 
They were, therefore, courted by both sides in the Cold War, as Soviet and Western 
governments tried to exert economic and political influence. As President Truman 
neatly summarised in 1948, "at the present moment of world history nearly every 
nation must choose between alternative ways of life. "76 From the slow start of 
Sudanese independence, granted on 1 January 1956, and Ghanaian independence, on 6 
March 1957, momentum took hold in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 1964, 
nineteen African and Caribbean states gained independence, eleven of them in 1960 
alone. 77 With a high percentage of those states' populations belonging to the African 
Diaspora, the imperfections of the United States' racial practices had a potentially 
huge impact on their choice of ideological allegiance. 78 
76 Truman quoted in Compton, "Anti-Communism in American Life Since the Second World War, " p. 
6. In the words of Richard Scher, "international events began to take the form of a gigantic morality 
play. " Richard Scher, Politics in the New South: Republicanism. Race and Leadership in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 225. 
77 In 1960, independence was granted to Zaire, Somali, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, 
Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. In 1961, Sierra Leone and Tanzania became 
independent, in 1962 Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda, in 1963 Kenya, and, in 1964, 
Malawi and Zambia. 
78 By the early 1960s, that drive was made all the more important by the attempts of many of those 
nations to create an independent, "non-aligned" coalition. Indeed, in September 1961, India's 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Indonesia's Achmad Soekarno, and Abdel 
Nasser of Egypt met in Belgrade to formally establish the Non-alignment Movement [NAM]. Building 
on the Bandung Conference of 1955, twenty-five states became founder members of NAM, and sought 
independence from either the Western or Soviet sphere. The US, therefore, could no longer rely on 
discrediting the Soviet Union to gain the allegiance of a newly independent state automatically. For 
35' 
This situation was clearly recognised in the final report of the President's 
Committee on Civil Rights in February 1947. "An American diplomat cannot argue 
for free elections in foreign lands, " it stated, "without meeting the challenge that in 
sections of America qualified voters do not have free access to the polls. "79 Similarly, 
the US Justice Department's amicus curiae brief to the Court in the Brown v. Board of 
Education, Topeka decision was in some respects as much a direct product of Cold 
War realpolitik as of the long struggle waged by the NAACP and others to abolish 
Jim Crow in southern education. "The United States is trying to prove to the people of 
the world, of every nationality, race and color, " it stipulated, "that a free democracy is 
the most civilized and most secure form of government yet devised by man. "8° 
Clearly, the three strands of anti-communism, race, and the demands of Cold War 
diplomacy were inextricably woven together. 
V 
Whereas, at the national level, anti-communism must be seen as an extension 
of contemporary xenophobia and residual nativism, for southern segregationists it 
must be seen within the context of the South's own peculiar history. The southern 
psyche had been permanently scarred by the indignities suffered at the hands of the 
Federal Government during the period of Reconstruction, as the North tried to 
reincorporate the South into the Union after the Civil War. Southern myths abounded 
more on the early politics of NAM, see A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of 
Alignments (London: Zed Books, 1986), esp. pp. 57-118. 
79 Quoted in Lawson, Black Ballots, p. 123. Lawson accurately contends that the "cold war with the 
Soviet Union focused attention on race relations inside the United States and spurred anticommunist 
[sic] reformers to remind the nation about living up to its egalitarian preachings. " p. 122. 
80 Quoted in Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, " Stanford Law Review, 41, 
1 (November 1988), p. 65. 
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of heavy-handed mistreatment by the federal government, northern carpetbaggers and 
their black allies. These legends were fuelled by the rise of African Americans to 
positions of unprecedented influence: in South Carolina, blacks held a 76 to 41 
majority in the state convention; in Louisiana, there was an equal divide between the 
races. Mississippi was represented by two black congressmen, Hiram Revels and 
Blanche K. Bruce. So ingrained were those memories that fears of a Second 
Reconstruction, and, more importantly perhaps, working out ways in which to avoid 
such a calamity, were constantly at the forefront of southern political thought and 
rhetoric. 81 
Those fears resurfaced with Roosevelt's New Deal, and with a succession of 
federal reports into the South's economic conditions. The Fair Employment Practices 
Committee [FEPC], established in 1941 as a response to A. Philip Randolph's March 
on Washington Movement, had little enforcement power. It did, however, 
symbolically display a willingness by the administration to intercede on behalf of 
African Americans. Under pressure from the NAACP, the Supreme Court, too, 
threatened the South's racial autonomy and white political hegemony with a series of 
decisions that provoked real fears of a Second Reconstruction. In 1944, for example, 
the Court's Smith v Allwright decision proclaimed the all-white primary to be 
unconstitutional, removing one of the pillars of continued southern white political 
hegemony. 82 It was the Court's Brown decision of 17 May 1954, however, that 
81 C. Vann Woodward was one who characterised the first Brown decision as the "New 
Reconstruction. " See, for example, C. Vann Woodward, "The New Reconstruction in the South, " 
Commentary, 21,6 (June 1956); or Woodward, "From the First Reconstruction to the Second, " 
Homer's Magazine, 230 (April 1965). 
82 Smith v. A1lwright was decided on the basis of the Fifteenth Amendment; in 1947, in the Morgan 
case, the Supreme Court outlawed segregation in inter-state transport; and, in 1950, it decided in 
Sweatt v. Painter that Texas' black law school was separate but not equal to its white equivalent. 
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brought home the immediacy of the growing threat that the white South faced from 
federal forces intent on desegregating the region. Declaring separate-but-equal 
schooling to be inherently unconstitutional, the ruling struck at the heart of the 
South's socio-political fabric, and promised to unstitch the region's carefully crafted 
racial mores. The supremacist South, in the words of Neil McMillen, "could find a 
kind of perverse satisfaction in indulging its fantasies in lurid comparisons between 
the post-Brown and the postbellum periods. "83 
This thesis will suggest that, if Brown heralded the Second Reconstruction in 
the southern psyche, then civil rights activists -- and communists in particular -- were 
conveniently cast as that Reconstruction's carpetbaggers, with the federal government 
playing its traditional role of the interventionist destroyer of the South's racial status 
quo. A letter sent to a southern newspaper by J. J. Bower in 1957, tellingly entitled, 
"History Repeats Itself In the South Even Today, " noted the links between the First 
and Second Reconstructions. "Directly after the Civil War, carpetbaggers from the 
North moved in on the South. They exploited the newly freed Negro slaves for the 
carpetbagger's gain ... A11 these conditions were agitated by the outsider. " Bower 
explained that "similar conditions exist in the South today. While the whites and the 
Negroes have been living a fairly peaceful co-existence, outsiders have again taken up 
the cry for the Negro. "84 The South was traditionally wary of "outsiders, " a term 
which southern resisters employed somewhat idiosyncratically to denote anyone 
unsympathetic to the region's racial practices. As outsiders, so it was argued, not only 
did racial agitators have no right to comment on the South's racial situation, but they 
83 McMillen, White Citizens' Councils, p. 359. 
84 "History Repeats Itself In the South Even Today, " 13 November 1957, Harry Flood Byrd, Jr, 
Papers, Box 241, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, 
Charlottesville. 
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could also not hope to grasp its subtleties. Communists fitted the southern perception 
of "outsiders" twice over: they were not only viewed as alien to the region, but were 
also excluded from any definition of "American-ness. " Although confining his 
remarks to the Deep South, Michael Heale has commented that, "from the Russian 
Revolution onward[, ] every labour organizer or civil libertarian ... risked being 
labelled 
a red, an alien `other' to whom the normal constitutional protections need not 
apply "85 
At mid-century, however, it was not just outsiders who were felt to be 
threatening the white South. More difficult for segregationists to countenance was 
opposition to the region's racial practices from their fellow white southerners -- the 
scalawags of the Second Reconstruction. In many ways, segregationists felt that the 
values they were upholding embodied the purest forms of American idealism and 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. That was a feeling bolstered by the white southern 
religious establishment, notably Baptists, Methodists and Presbyterians. Racial 
separation, it was believed, would maintain the divinely ordained purity of the white 
race, and hence ensure that the South remained a bastion of Protestant Americanism. 
As one constituent wrote to North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin, Jr, when southern 
values appeared threatened by the Kennedy Administration's 1963 proposals for a 
civil rights bill, "It was white, Christian people who founded America. And who have 
worked and struggled to make it what it is today. "86 Segregationists held those views 
religiously: southerners who questioned such accepted truths were regarded as 
85 Heale, McCarthy's Americans, p. 214. 
86 Mrs Isaac Twiddy letter to Samuel Ervin, Jr, 26 July 1963, Sam Ervin Papers, Folder 2981, 
Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
During my research, the Papers were in the process of being re-catalogued: the folder numbers listed 
are those of the original cataloguing. 
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heretics. The will to stamp out that heresy underpinned the often ferocious red-baiting 
attacks on bi-racial organisations attended by racially progressive white southerners, 
notably the Southern Conference for Human Welfare [SCHW] and the Southern 
Conference Education Fund [SCEF]. 
At mid-century, white southern society was thus facing opposition on three 
separate fronts: an increasingly hostile federal administration, an increasingly 
organised civil rights movement, and the ever-present menace of communism, both 
internal and external. This three-pronged attack was appositely summed up by an aide 
to Martin Luther King. The aide revealed that "KKK no longer stands for the Ku Klux 
Klan. `It now means, ' he said, `Khrushchev, Kennedy, and King. ' 1187 
87 Aide quoted in unknown newspaper clipping enclosed with W. C. Daniel letter to Harry Byrd, Sr., 26 
April 1963, Byrd Papers, Box 266. 
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Chapter One 
The South 
On Monday 17 May 1954, the US Supreme Court pronounced school 
segregation to be inherently unequal and, therefore, unconstitutional. The decision, 
Brown v Board of Education, Topeka, overturned the legal basis for segregation, 
which had rested since 1896 upon the separate-but-equal doctrine expounded in 
Plessy v Ferguson. Although Brown itself applied only to segregation in schools, its 
seminal importance rested upon its dismantling of the "separate-but-equal" premise: 
the South was left with no constitutional basis from which to protect any form of 
social, political, or economic segregation. 
For almost two years after "Black Monday, " southern leaders failed to 
formulate a coherent response to the decision. Many expressed dismay at the outcome 
of the case, yet nevertheless appeared unwilling or unable to define clearly their 
proposed legislative and political rejoinders. That was not, however, because they had 
been surprised by the Court's action. The case had been in the legal system for a 
considerable length of time: by December 1952, for example, it was already on 
second appeal to the Supreme Court. As Guy Benton Johnson explained to a 
Washington, DC, audience a full eleven months before the decree, "the Supreme 
Court is about to make a momentous decision on the question of the constitutionality 
of compulsory segregation in the public schools. This decision, " he predicted, "may 
precipitate a grave crisis in the relations of the races in the South. "' 
1 "Segregation Vs Integration and the Impending Supreme Court Decision: An Address Delivered to 
the Association of Former Interns and Residents of Freedman's Hospital, Washington, June 4,1953, " 
Guy Benton Johnson Papers, Box 106, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
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As historians such as Tony Badger have shown, it was not until the Spring of 
1956 that anything like a homogeneous resistance movement to Brown emerged in the 
South. 2 No single leader wanted to take the first step in defining a long-term strategy 
of defiance for the region. Furthermore, any need for leaders to give immediate 
direction to the segregationist response to Brown was somewhat offset by a second, 
implementation decision one year later, which decided rather nebulously that school 
desegregation should take place with "all deliberate speed. " Supreme Court Justice 
Hugo Black, himself a southerner, later rued the vague wording of Brown 11.3 His 
Supreme Court colleague, Justice Brennan, recalled that, "several times later at 
conference, [Black] said sadly, `... We made a mistake. `4 That mistake was twofold: it 
failed to impose a strict timetable on desegregation, and it placed responsibility for the 
implementation of the decision in the hands of local school boards, many of which 
were composed of the very whites who wanted to forestall desegregation. 
Southern discomfort with an increasingly "hands on" federal approach to 
government had been growing slowly but surely since the days of the New Deal. By 
the time of the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948, that discomfort had begun to gel into a 
formidable wave of resistance. The Dixiecrat challenge stemmed from southern 
Democrats' growing disenchantment with the National Democratic Party's political 
2 See Tony Badger, "Fatalism, Not Gradualism: The Crisis of Southern Liberalism, 1945-65, " in Brian 
Ward and Tony Badger [eds], The Making of Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement 
(London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 67-95; and Brian Ward, "Racial Politics, Culture and the Cole 
Incident of 1956, " in M. Stokes and R. Halpern [eds], Race and Class in the American South since 
12. $Q (Oxford: Berg, 1994), pp. 181-208. 
3 Looking back on the wording of the decision fifteen years later, Black said that "that was language 
for lawyers and that had been a grievous mistake. The phrase had given the South its weapon. For 
fifteen years lawyers had seized upon it to defy the law of the land. " Hugo Black quoted in Bob 
Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1979), p. 3 8. 
4 William Brennan quoted in Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (New York: Pantheon, 
1994), p. 440. 
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platform. Truman himself campaigned openly for greater black rights, and, when the 
Democratic National Conference adopted a positive civil rights plank in July 1948, 
southern politicians felt a sense of betrayal: coupled to the Presidential 
administration's attempts to desegregate the armed forces and federal government 
departments, an alliance of southern Black-Belt politicians and anti-New Dealers split 
from the ranks of the National Democratic Party. 5 The Dixiecrats based their political 
challenge to the National Party on a strong States' Rights stance, a return to small 
town "laissez faire" economics and, of course, opposition to desegregation. 6 Most of 
their support came from local politicians who had no committee positions to protect in 
Congress, although certain senior southern leaders were active supporters, most 
notably Mississippi Senator Jim Eastland and South Carolina Senator Strom 
Thurmond, the Dixiecrat presidential candidate. Although the Dixiecrats' insurgency 
would fail, it nevertheless laid many of the rhetorical and organisational foundations 
for the truly massive resistance campaign which followed the Brown decisions of 
1954 and 1955, when once again federal forces appeared determined to dictate to the 
South on the region's social and racial affairs.? 
5 Truman's desire to fight the 1948 election on a strong civil rights plank was in part motivated by the 
need to appeal to the fast-expanding African American vote in the North. It was also in part due to the 
sympathetic backlash from many white Americans to the violence that greeted so many returning 
African American veterans who had fought for freedom abroad in World War II, only to be denied it at 
home. Truman therefore set up the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which issued its report in 
1947. Entitled To Secure These Rights, its proposals included a plan to desegregate the armed forces 
and the federal establishment. In February 1948, Truman delivered his civil rights recommendations, 
based on the committee's report, to Congress. 
6 As Sarah McCulloh Lemmon has written, the ideology of the States' Rights Democratic Party [or 
Dixiecrats] was based on "the retention of present southern customs, especially segregation, by 
obtaining control of Federal policy, or failing that, by strictly limiting the powers of the Federal 
government. " Sarah McCulloh Lemmon, "The Ideology of the Dixiecrat Movement, " Social Forces, 
Vol. 30, p. 171. 
7 In the 1948 presidential elections, the Dixiecrats were not a success. They carried only South 
Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. As Goldfield has pointed out, those were the four states 
in which the Dixiecrats ran under the Democratic Party emblem, suggesting that the South as a whole 
was not ready for revolt. David Goldfield, Black. White and Southern: Race Relations and Southern 
Culture 1940 to the Present (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 67. 
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Given this context of steadily mounting white opposition to federal 
intervention, it was nonetheless the region's African Americans who played the most 
crucial role in encouraging the white South's embrace of wholesale resistance to 
federally supported racial change. By early 1956, the Supreme Court's two Brown 
decisions had come and gone, and still southern blacks saw little improvement in their 
social, economic and political positions, vividly exposing the enduring gulf between 
de jure and de facto racial equality. Southern black impatience and frustration at the 
pace of change soon transformed itself into action, and a succession of civil 
disobedience campaigns swept the South. 8 Direct action protests such as the bus 
boycotts in Tallahassee and, most notably, in Montgomery, petitions to school boards, 
and legal challenges to all forms of continued segregation brought with them a 
tremendous white backlash. As it dawned upon southern segregationists that blacks 
would not be content with the sort of prevarication and tokenism that had followed 
Brown I and II, and as a succession of southern federal judges surprised their fellow 
white southerners by upholding the law of the land and supporting black 
desegregation suits, an escalation of organised white resistance became inevitable .9 
The beginnings of what can be termed widespread, truly massive resistance, 
therefore, is perhaps best traced not to Brown itself, but to the formulation and signing 
of the Southern Manifesto, on 12 March 1956. The Manifesto declared as its primary 
purpose the use of "all lawful means" to overturn Brown, and was signed by all but a 
8 There were a number of other contributing factors leading to this increase in black protest action, 
including: dissatisfaction among World War II veterans who, having fought a war against democracy 
in Europe, found they were denied democratic rights at home; urbanisation; and, for example, a 
number of court cases preceding Brown, such as 1941's Smith v A1lwright decision which outlawed the 
all white primary. 
9 The actions of the southern federal judges who supported Brown are eloquently retold in Jack Bass, 
Unlikely Heroes (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 1981). 
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handful of southern legislators. '° The driving forces behind it were some of the 
South's most influential figures, including Strom Thurmond from South Carolina, 
Sam Ervin from North Carolina, Georgia's Richard Russell, John Stennis of 
Mississippi, and Harry Byrd of Virginia. The "lawful means" to which those 
signatories put their names soon encompassed a broad arsenal of resistance weapons, 
which came under the umbrella term of Massive Resistance. They included recourse 
to traditional southern values, such as an emphasis on the primacy of States' Rights 
and the need to maintain the "purity" of the white race, as well as specifically 
designed legislative acts, attempts to undermine the black freedom struggle by 
labelling it as subversive, the use of demagogic rhetoric and, where desegregation was 
concerned, prevarication, tokenism and occasional mob violence. 
This chapter will examine the ways in which segregationists chose and utilised 
weapons from that resistance arsenal, concentrating especially on the deployment of 
anti-communism. It will also seek to identify recurring themes in anti-communist 
rhetoric, whilst retaining sensitivity to the particular -- often local -- ways in which 
anti-communism was deployed. There was certainly something of a "call and 
response" dimension to much of the rhetoric of Massive Resistance, and to anti- 
communism in particular: the more that white communities were actively threatened 
by concerted attempts to ameliorate the position of local African Americans, the 
greater the intensity of that rhetoric. More generally, the chapter reveals the powerful 
impact of the Cold War on many aspects of southern racial rhetoric and politics. 
10 See Badger, "Fatalism, Not Gradualism, " pp. 67-95. 
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II 
Brown, mass black civil rights activism and Massive Resistance did not occur 
in isolation from the broader themes of the Cold War. The decision was as much a 
product of that conflict as it was a domestic response to increased African American 
agitation for racial reform. Internationally, the Soviets openly and continually pressed 
for explanations of America's treatment of its minorities, in an ongoing attempt to 
keep the South's racism in the world news. Internally, African Americans attempted 
to harness that growing external pressure to ameliorate their own position. Indeed, the 
decision to desegregate southern schools was ultimately used as a foreign policy 
weapon, which Mary Dudziak has described as providing a "Cold War imperative" for 
desegregation. II As she explained, African Americans attempted to focus international 
attention on American racism from the outset of the Cold War. In 1951, for example, 
William Patterson and Paul Robeson had published "An Appeal to the United 
Nations, " under the auspices of the Civil Rights Congress [CRC]. Initially formulated 
by W. E. B. Du Bois three years earlier, the Appeal strove to highlight internal racial 
abuse through the global forum provided by the United Nations. 12 It was publicly 
unveiled on 12 November 1951, with copies deposited on the desks of such notaries 
as United Nations Secretary General Trygvie Lie and Eleanor Roosevelt. Neither 
11 Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, " Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 
(November 1988). 
12 The Appeal highlighted cases of civil rights abuse within the United States which, the authors 
believed, ran contrary to the Geneva Accord's "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide. " Noting that the Convention defined genocide not as the complete and definitive destruction 
of a race or people, but as "any intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial, ethnic, or 
religious group, " the authors maintained that "the oppressed Negro citizens of the United States, 
segregated, discriminated against and long the target of violence, suffer from genocide as the result of 
the consistent, conscious, unified policies of every branch of government. " We Charge Genocide: The 
Historic Petition to The United Nations For Relief From a Crime of The United States Government 
Against the Negro People [New Edition] (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. xiv. Emphasis 
in the original. 
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would read the document. The general public, however, were less hostile, and copies 
sold in abundance. 13 
Although it ultimately failed to do so, Brown was seen by many as an attempt 
to curtail such protests. It was hoped that the decision would put an end to what on the 
global stage was becoming an increasing embarrassment for the United States. That 
embarrassment had been intensified by the knowledge that critical articles on southern 
racism had been carried by foreign newspapers. The Presbyterian Outlook of February 
1954, for example, included an article by Benjamin Mays in which he reported on a 
trip to India in 1953. Whilst in Lucknow, he began, "I held a press conference with 
nine newspaper men from different parts of India. It was, " he wrote, "an interesting 
session. They literally cross-examined me for ninety minutes, all on the race problem 
in South Africa and in the United States. "la 
At home, both national and local newspapers carried front page reports of the 
Supreme Court's decision, stressing that it was a body blow to both continued legal 
and practical racism in the South. Many of those papers, including the New York 
Times, were at pains to make it clear that news of the decision had been flashed 
around the globe by the Voice of America as soon as the Court's judgement had been 
handed down. In the wake of the decision, an editorial in another nation-wide 
publication, Time, held that the best way to win against communism was to 
"overcome the unjustified stigma, which the Communists have succeeded in making 
13 See Earl Ofari Hutchison, Blacks and Reds: Race and Class in Conflict 1919-1990 (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1995), pp. 207-215. For more on Du Bois' role, see Gerald Home, 
Black and Redo WEB Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War (Albany, N. Y.: 
State University of New York Press, 1986). 
14 The Presbyterian Outlook, 1 May 1954, p. 5. Copy in J. L. Blair Buck Papers, Box 2, Manuscripts 
Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
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stick with that two thirds of the world's population who are colored, that our own 
color (in the main white) is a symbol of exploitation. " 5 
A year after the 1954 decision, it appeared that Brown had not placated foreign 
critics of US racial practice any more than it had delivered equality to southern blacks. 
The same accusations of US racial malpractice surfaced at the Bandung Conference, 
at which delegates from 29 independent countries from Asia and Africa met to herald 
the emergence of an unaligned, under-developed "Third World" of nations. An article 
about the conference by C. L. Sulzberger appeared in the New York Times of 23 April 
1955, drawing attention to the crucial role played by US race relations in global 
politics. Soviet propaganda, the article maintained, had convinced many Asians that 
the United States had dropped an atom bomb on Japan because it was a non-white 
country. "Hatred and suspicion of such an attitude are vigorously alive on both 
continents, " Sulzberger continued. "Communism had taken advantage of this sensitive 
situation. Its propaganda seeks to describe a United States that has assumed the 
mantle of colonialism and encourages racial discrimination. " Coupled to the white 
South's determination not to abide by Brown and to forestall desegregation for as long 
as possible, it is not surprising that Sulzberger was moved to conclude that "this kind 
of propaganda has considerable success. "16 
The UN, too, continued to be a target for the newly globalised racial dialogue. 
Once the high-profile target of Patterson and Robeson's "Appeal, " the organisation 
was also at the heart of a propaganda offensive launched by the Soviet leader, Nikita 
Khrushchev, nearly six years after the desegregation decree. Khrushchev intended to 
15 1954 editorial quoted in Page d'Aulnay, "for the editors, Time, " letter to J. R. Orgain, Jr, 6 May 
1960, James Robert Orgain, Jr, Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
16 "Foreign Affairs: Bandung Draws Attention to A Problem, " by C. L. Sulzberger, New York Times, 
23 April 1955, p. 18. 
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capitalise on the racism endemic in the South. In September 1960, he "began a 
vigorous campaign for removal of the UN headquarters from New York to some other 
country, " reported Judge H. L. Riddle, Jr, to the 1961 Southern Governors' 
Conference. 17 The Soviets made much of "certain embarrassing incidents" that had 
befallen non-white foreign-embassy personnel during their visits to the United States. 
Most of these involved personal experiences of being segregated on grounds of colour 
whilst travelling through the South, or of being excluded from southern hotels and 
restaurants altogether. According to Stetson Kennedy, the Florida-born radical 
journalist, "Even if you are a diplomatic representative of some foreign government, 
there is no diplomatic immunity from arrest and perhaps mob violence if you violate 
the segregation laws and customs. For this reason, the State Department maintains a 
special office in Miami, Florida, whose chief function it is to meet visiting Latin 
American dignitaries as they arrive at the International Airport, and whisk them away 
in private limousines to be entertained until such a time as they can be put aboard 
another plane to carry them north and out of the segregated territory. " 18 As Judge 
Riddle concluded in his address to the southern governors, Khrushchev's success in 
moving the United Nations "would constitute a tremendously damaging blow to the 
prestige of the United States... "19 It was increasingly apparent that the United States' 
Cold War foes would not willingly allow an organisation as prestigious as the United 
17 "The State Advisory Committee to the Chief of Protocol: Remarks To The Southern Governors' 
Conference September 25,1961 by Judge H. L. Riddle, Jr, " Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 112, 
State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, 
North Carolina. 
18 Stetson Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide: The Way It Was (Boca Raton: Florida Atlantic University Press, 
1959), p. 182. 
19 "The State Advisory Committee to the Chief of Protocol: Remarks To The Southern Governors' 
Conference September 25,1961 by Judge H. L. Riddle, Jr, " Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 112. 
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Nations to remain headquartered in New York while institutionalised racism 
continued unabated in the South. 
The symbolic importance of Brown in an international Cold War context was 
also exemplified by the response of both segregationists and desegregationists to the 
Supreme Court's pronouncement. Predictably, racial moderates applauded the 
decision and its wider ramifications; white supremacists, equally predictably, were 
aghast. Representative of the racially progressive viewpoint was the eminent liberal 
preacher-theologian Harry Emerson Fosdick, a member of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP]'s "Committee of 100" and an 
influential supporter of the Association. Only four days after Brown, he wrote of the 
need to put into practice what he termed the "new vision of democracy" granted by 
the decree. "It would be ironic, " he believed, "if discriminations were to persist long 
after the Voice of America proudly announced a bright new emancipation to the 
peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. "20 Arthur Shores, a lawyer for the 
NAACP, stated that Brown would "prove a great boost to democracy, not only in the 
matter of propaganda value against Communism, but also from a political 
standpoint. "21 
Ever sensitive to the leverage which Cold War anxieties could offer, later civil 
rights activists were not averse to maximising the discomfort of southern 
segregationists by drawing attention to this aspect of foreign policy. On Labor Day, 
1957, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr, told an audience at Tennessee's 
20 Harry Emerson Fosdick letter to Charles Williams, 21 May 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
110, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108, Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, 
Richmond. 
21 Arthur Shores quoted in J. Tyra Harris, "Alabama Reaction to the Brown Decision 1954-1956: A 
Case Study in Early Massive Resistance, " DA dissertation, Middle Tennessee State University, 1978, 
p. 158. 
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Highlander Folk School that the South "reveals increasing sensitivity to the force of 
world opinion. Few indeed are the southerners, " stated King, "who relish having their 
status lumped in the same category with the Union of South Africa as a final refuge of 
segregation. It is not pleasant, either, " he continued, "to be shown how southern 
intransigence fortifies Communist appeals to Asian and African peoples. "22 
Unsurprisingly, segregationists widely condemned Brown. Many of them 
objected most strongly to the argument that the South ought to comply with the 
decision to appease a foreign enemy. As Dudziak has pointed out, southern 
demagogues such as Georgia's Herman "Humman" Talmadge were dismayed at the 
federal government's pragmatic use of the decision to counter Soviet claims of 
internal racial malfeasance. In his 1955 monograph, You And Segregation, Talmadge 
urged southerners to "stop and think for a moment. How many times have you read in 
your newspapers and magazines or heard over the airwaves this question: `What will 
Russia say if our government does this? ' How many times have you read or heard 
this, `What will the Reds say if we don't do this? "' Talmadge balked at the fact that, 
in some instances, the United States had shaped its domestic policy "by trying to 
please the Communists. " "These are the answers I gave when asked, `What will the 
Communists say about the stand you Southerners take on the racial situation? ' Who 
cares what the Communists say! Who cares what Pravda prints! "23 Congressman 
Elijah Lewis Forrester, a fellow Georgian, had himself "become exceedingly weary of 
hearing people say that we have got to pass laws that we know are unsound, or we are 
22 "`The Look To The Future' by Martin Luther King, Jr: An Address Delivered at the 25th 
Anniversary of the Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, Tennessee, Labor Day, September 2,1957 
(Transcribed from a tape recording. )" 8003-b Microfilm, Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Manuscripts 
Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
23 Herman Talmadge quoted in Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, " p. 117. 
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going to offend Russia and her satellites. That kind of statement, " he told the House, 
"does no credit to America. I have no desire whatever, " he finished, "to satisfy Russia 
and her satellites unless they are willing to be satisfied with that which is right. "24 
Dudziak noted this trend at a leadership level, chronicling the response of 
policy makers, government officials and diplomats. It was not only segregationist 
leaders who felt as Talmadge and Forrester did, however, but also many of their 
southern constituents. Harold Dorn, of South Miami's Dorn Fruit and Vegetable 
Company, was forthright in his condemnation of Brown. Writing in June 1954, Dorn 
protested that "liberal" writers in America "have already said that this measure 
[Brown] should disarm the most strident critics of our race relations around the world. 
In other words, " he wrote, "it is an act of appeasement, especially towards the 
Communists. " Dorn, though, felt that "such interests cannot be appeased; they will 
continue barefaced lies in America, no matter what it does. " Furthermore, he firmly 
believed, "this decision will be considered a sign of weakness, and the Communists 
will rejoice in this ready furnished means of division. "25 Dan Smoot, Dallas-based 
pamphleteer and eponymous leading light of the Dan Smoot Speaks newsletter, was 
equally sceptical. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court's decision had, in some 
quarters, been loudly applauded for "taking the teeth out of communist propaganda 
about race, " Smoot had other ideas. "If we are going to shape our national politics to 
avoid all the dishonest charges of Communist propaganda, " he proclaimed in the 
newspaper, "we will have to eliminate all of our institutions of freedom, throw away 
what is left of our Constitution, dismantle our republic, and convert America into a 
24 Congressional Record, 16 July 1956, p. 12949, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The 
Netherlands. Forrester, who represented Georgia's Third Congressional District, served from January 
1951 until his retirement in January 1965. 
25 Harold W. Dom letter to Thomas Stanley, 8 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100. 
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satellite of the Soviet Union. That, " he believed, "is the only way to avoid criticism 
from the Communists. "26 
In this prevailing climate, Massive Resisters increasingly began to use much 
of the vocabulary of the Cold War. That was perhaps most clearly in evidence as 
segregationists began to tailor their traditional calls for the primacy of States' Rights 
to suit the new situation. If the federal government and judiciary were going to try to 
pressurise the South into reforming their racial practices to appease Cold War 
propagandists, then those segregationists responded in kind, utilising the terminology 
of the Cold War in their defence of States' Rights. The South's experience of 
Reconstruction after the Civil War had hardened sentiment against federal incursions. 
Likewise, attitudes towards Roosevelt's New Deal and its threat to southern autonomy 
had been decidedly ambivalent across the region. There were perceived similarities 
between that style of "hands on' 'federal government and the state control of 
socialism: both systems relied upon extensive government involvement; both were 
anathema to the vast majority of southerners. 
Strom Thurmond, firebrand Senator from South Carolina and Dixiecrat 
presidential candidate, was one of a number of southern legislators who continually 
drew attention to the erosion of the individual sovereignty of southern states. 
Referring to the largely toothless 1957 Civil Rights Act, Thurmond wrote that, "since 
1957, the succession of civil rights proposals that tended to expand the power of the 
Federal Government provide the best examples of legislation that exceeds the bounds 
of the Constitution"27 Exceeding the Constitution was un-American; thus, Thurmond 
26 Dan Smoot Speaks, 19 August 1955, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 104. 
27 Strom Thurmond, The Faith We Have Not Kept (San Diego: Viewpoint Books, 1968), p. 161. 
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was tacitly suggesting, so was the legislation. Thurmond's long-standing colleague, 
Mississippi Senator Jim Eastland, suggested taking the doctrine of States' Rights to its 
logical conclusion of interposition, in a last ditch attempt to protect the sovereignty of 
individual southern states. 28 Interposition, he told an audience of 4,000 at the 
inaugural meeting of the South Carolina Association of Citizens' Councils in early 
1956, was the only solution to protect the South from the desegregation decisions. 
Those decisions, he maintained, were caused by a propaganda barrage inspired by "a 
radical pro-Communist political movement. "29 
A two-page printed news sheet originating in Nashville, Tennessee, entitled 
Sensing the News, provides a good example of the increasingly vocal concern 
amongst southerners of a link between the erosion of States' Rights and growing 
subversive influences in the region. In July 1956, Thurmond Sensing, printer and 
financier of the news sheet, asked the question, "who wants these civil rights bills 
passed -- besides the politicians in both parties who back them purely as a matter of 
political expediency? "30 To Sensing, the answer was simple: communists, and, more 
specifically, the Communist Party-sponsored Daily Worker. That was not, however, 
solely because the Daily Worker was interested in civil rights. Rather, the paper 
supported the measure "because it hates the South and those political leaders in the 
South who support the principles of individual freedom and local self-government to 
28 Veteran Virginia political correspondent James Latimer defined interposition as "An early-19th 
century doctrine that held, in effect, that a sovereign state by the action of its legislature could 
interpose its sovereignty to protect its citizens from usurpations created by federal judicial power, and 
if enough of its sister states did likewise, the objectionable decision could be nullified. " James Latimer, 
"The Rise and Fall of Massive Resistance", Times-Dispatch, 22 September 1996, p. A11. 
29 James 0. Eastland quoted in Nadine Cohodas, Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), p. 282. 
30 Sensing the News, No. 52,1 July 1956, William Munford Tuck Papers, Folder 3951, Manuscript 
and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg. 
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which the South so closely adheres. " Introducing his own, original slant to the politics 
of States' Rights, and further demonstrating the flexibility of segregationist rhetoric, 
Sensing believed that the Daily Worker also supported civil rights measures because 
"it means more centralised government as opposed to States' Rights, and the 
communists know it is much easier to subvert a central government than it is to 
subvert forty-eight state governments. "31 
As those such as Sensing have exemplified, the primacy of States' Rights had 
become a defence against communist advancement, as well as a weapon against 
federal incursion. Practitioners of States' Rights arguments in the Massive Resistance 
era were also placing themselves in a venerable tradition of southerners opposed to 
federal power. Figures such as John C. Calhoun, Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison were lionised by many resisters, who drew selectively from their 
achievements: Calhoun was revered for formalising the doctrine of interposition 
whilst a South Carolina Senator; Jefferson and Madison for their devotion to States' 
Rights and their suggestions in the 1790s that interposition resolutions could be used 
to check federal power. 32 Deference to such figures helped resisters not only to 
legitimise their adherence to States' Rights, but also to make respectable what was in 
essence resistance to racial change. 
Sensing was merely suggesting a link between communist subversion and the 
undermining of States' Rights and the freedoms that such rights were held to secure. 
Others did not tread so lightly. Marvin Griffin, for example, triumphant in the Georgia 
31 ibid. 
32 As Wilhoit has correctly noted, many of Jefferson and Madison's contributions to American history 
were overlooked by resisters. "One must conclude, " he noted, "... that the white South venerated 
Jefferson and Madison for their eccentric deviations rather than for the main thrust of their political 
philosophy. " Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: George Braziller, 
1973), p. 75. 
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Gubernatorial Primary of 1954, proclaimed that the "meddlers, demagogues, race- 
baiters and Communists are determined to destroy every vestige of states' rights. "33 
By 1962, Philip Braubach of San Antonio, Texas, had sent telegrams to southern 
governors to beg support for Mississippi's Governor Ross Barnett, who had 
threatened to arrest any federal officers assisting James Meredith's efforts to enter the 
steadfastly segregated University of Mississippi. "Suggest you solicit support for Gov 
Barnett from all governors based on constitutional States' Rights, " he wrote. "If 
present trend continues, " he believed, "country will be controlled by socialistic 
dictator who has thrown Constitution out the window. "34 
As Braubach and others suggested, the white South's traditional fear that its 
sovereign rights were under threat was increasingly augmented by the fear that 
communism was spreading in the region. In the majority of cases, civil rights 
insurgency was seen as the vehicle for that communist advancement. Thus, when civil 
rights activists began to force successive federal administrations to intervene in 
episodes of racial unrest in the South, for example during the Little Rock school crisis 
and the Freedom Rides, presidential administrations began to be seen as willing 
accomplices of subversive "communistic" forces. Whether those links were made 
explicitly or implicitly, they nevertheless became a leit-motif of the ideology of 
Massive Resistance. 
Alongside this belief that their sovereign rights were under threat, white 
southerners became equally convinced that their traditional social values were in peril. 
The region's social systems had been carefully constructed over time to maintain the 
33 Marvin Griffin quoted in Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the 
South During the 1950's (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 68. 
34 Philip Braubach letter to Terry Sanford, 29 September 1962, Box 232, Sanford Gubernatorial 
Papers. 
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"purity" of the white race, upon which doctrines of white supremacy were predicated. 
Patriarchal, nuclear families were sanctified. More than just a homemaker, the 
"Southern Belle" was a hallowed symbol of inviolable, "American" WASP values. To 
many white southerners, she was the guardian of moral and racial purity. By the 1950s 
and 1960s, however, a succession of cultural changes had threatened to undermine the 
myth of southern womanhood, the sanctity of the family unit and, perhaps most 
perniciously of all in white southern minds, the purity of the white race. Coupled to 
growing agitation for African American social equality and the increased fear of 
communist advancement in the South, the region's white supremacists felt 
increasingly besieged. 
World War II and its aftermath provided a catalyst for change in the 
employment and domestic practices of many American women. In the South, those 
changes were possibly slower than in the more urban industrial North, and were by no 
means complete by the mid-1950s, but, nonetheless, many southern women found 
themselves combining their traditional status as homemakers with supplementary paid 
work. As the Cold War took hold, they, too, became engulfed in the accompanying 
propaganda war. Joanne Meyerowitz has shown that, on the one hand, women's 
traditional domestic roles of homemaker, mother and wife presented them as "buffers 
against the communist threat. "35 On the other hand, Meyerowitz demonstrated the 
ways in which popular culture -- especially literature -- encouraged a more 
conspicuous public role for post-war women through educational advancement, career 
development and political participation. This strongly contrasted the popular vision of 
35 Joanne Meyerowitz, `Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 
1946-1958, " Journal of Southern History, Vol. 79, No. 4 (March 1993). See especially pp. 1458-1465, 
1469. 
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Soviet women, who were continually represented as politically oppressed menial 
workers. In a southern culture which had always valued paternalistic protection of the 
"Southern Belle, " the slow changes in female domestic status signalled an era of 
uncertainty, anxiety and defensiveness about gender roles and social responsibilities 
among both men and women. 
The emergence of a distinctive youth culture in the 1950s only added to many 
southerners' belief that their society and its mores were under siege. That nascent 
culture centred around rock'n'roll music, comic books and seemingly dysfunctional 
screen icons such as James Dean and Marlon Brando. It threatened to shatter 
traditional patterns of deference to parental and institutional authority, substituting 
new secular moral codes for old church- and family-based ones. Many southerners 
began to believe not only that their core family values were being eroded, but also that 
their children were being gravely threatened by delinquency. As recent histories have 
noted, the emergence of a truly widespread southern resistance effort was concurrent 
with a substantial increase in the popularity of rock'n'roll music, a bi-racial musical 
genre which drew heavily from African American rhythm and blues and often traded 
on overt sexual imagery and suggestive lyrics. 36 In order to confront this vibrant youth 
culture, commissions were established across the country with the mandate of staving 
off juvenile delinquency and of upholding traditional, American family values. In the 
36 Brian Ward, for example, has shown how Asa Carter attempted to use an attack on Nat King Cole in 
April 1956 to gain the initiative in Alabama's organised resistance campaign. Carter and his North 
Alabama Citizens' Council [NACC] hoped to outmanoeuvre Sam Englehardt's rival Alabama 
Association of Citizens' Councils [AACC] by playing on many of the residual white fears that Cole, 
playing to an all-white audience in the state, aroused. So knee-jerk was the reaction to rock'n'roll's 
success that even Cole, a non-rock'n'roll artist, was attacked. By focusing on rock'n'roll, "Carter 
located a powerful metaphor for the horrors of integration. He skilfully used rock and roll to tap into 
all manner of social, political and generational, as well as racial and sexual, anxieties afflicting adult 
white America at mid-century. " Brian Ward, Just My Soul Responding: Rhythm and Blues, Black 
Consciousness and Race Relations (London: University College London Press, 1998), p. 100. 
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South, those efforts were played out within the context of deteriorating race relations. 
The spectres of racial conflict, rock'n'roll, miscegenation, juvenile delinquency and 
un-American family values became inextricably fused together. 
Resistance forces, therefore, thought that juvenile delinquency and rock'n'roll 
were but precursors of imminent social collapse. Furthermore, it was commonly 
believed that destruction of the region's rigid social order could only facilitate 
communist success, as red forces made the most of the resultant turmoil. The 
CPUSA's long-standing commitment to inter-racial sex and marriage served only to 
heighten such tensions, with the result that segregationists began to place increasing 
emphasis on the link between calls for racial integration and the "racial 
mongrelization" that would "inevitably" follow. 37 Indeed, throughout its history, the 
CPUSA had been linked to the advocacy of inter-racial sex. In 1919, for example, as a 
reaction to the first Red Scare, the General Intelligence Division [GID] of the Justice 
Department produced a report on the threat of miscegenation 38 In 1953, a report 
produced by its successor, the Domestic Intelligence Division, stated that it was 
"interesting to note that one of the [Communist Party's] `concrete 
demands'... advocated the `removal of all legal restrictives and social censorship of 
intermarriage in the Southern States. "139 By 1956, when LeRoy Collins fought the 
37 As early as 1947, for example, Mississippi's Theodore "The Man" Bilbo wrote and self-published a 
book entitled, Take Your Choice: Separation or Mongrelization. Bilbo, summed up Egerton, "with the 
most serious intent, concluded that annihilation would be preferable to `intermingling'; better to see 
civilisation `blotted out with the atomic bomb, ' he wrote, `than to see it slowly but surely destroyed in 
the maelstrom of miscegenation, interbreeding, intermarriage, and mongrelization. " See John Egerton, 
`Speak Now Against the Day': The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 402-403. 
38 The GID was established by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on 1 August 1919 to collect 
information on radicals. In 1924, J. Edgar Hoover recast the GID as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
39 Domestic Intelligence Division Report quoted in Kenneth O'Reilly, `Racial Matters': The FBI's 
Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972 (New York: Macmillan, 1989), p. 147. 
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wealthy businessman Sumter Lowry in the Florida Democratic Primary, he denounced 
"integration as part of a communist conspiracy to destroy the moral fibre of the nation 
by creating a `mongrel' race incapable of preventing a red take-over. "40 
Mississippi Congressman John Rankin, who established his anti-communist 
credentials chairing HUAC from 1945 to 1946, was even more explicit than Collins. 
"The fellow travelers, " he stated simply, "are out to mongrelize this nation. " Rankin, 
though, thought the communist hordes to be more scheming and sinister than did 
Collins. "One of the most vicious movements that has yet to be instituted by the 
crackpots, the Communists and the parlor pinks of this country, " Rankin told the 
Speaker of the House, "is trying to browbeat the American Red Cross into taking the 
labels off the blood bank they are building up for our boys in the service so that it will 
not show whether it is Negro blood or white blood. That seems to be, " he concluded, 
"one of the schemes of these fellow travelers to try and mongrelize this nation. "41 
Without labels, it was probable that whites would be given "black blood" in 
transfusions, and vice versa. That in turn played upon the residual notion that blood in 
some way denoted racial essence, and that the presence of as much as "one drop" of 
non-white blood in an individual's genealogy excluded any claim to white-ness. 
Although such definitions were determined rather arbitrarily over time and place, it 
was generally held that contamination of blood could only mean contamination of 
40 LeRoy Collins quoted in Richard K. Scher, Politics in the New South: Republicanism, Race and 
Leadership in the Twentieth Century (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 243. Although initially a 
product of the South's paternalistic views on race, by 1960 Collins recognised the inadequacies of a 
tokenistic approach to racial desegregation. Under President Johnson, Collins was appointed to head 
the Community Relations Service in 1964. He took on a role of mediator in the Selma civil rights 
conflict in March 1965. Rather than being a convert to inter-racialism, however, Collins sought to 
avoid conflict in the interests of promoting a New South. See Tom Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of 
Florida: Spokesman of the New South ([n. p. ]: University of Alabama Press, 1985), esp. pp. 177-191. 
41 John Rankin quoted in Charlotte Pomerantz [ed. ], A Quarter Century of Un-American a (New York: 
Marzani and Munsell, 1963), p. 31. 
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racial purity 42 Georgia's Congressman Elijah Forrester, one of the South's more 
vocal anti-communists, followed this well-trodden path. "The Communist 
conspiracy, " he stated, "was that the fight against us would be first waged on the 
grounds of equality, but denying that intermarriage and integration was sought or 
desired. That lasted only for a season, " he noted, before coming to the crux of the 
present problem. "They are now demanding in unmistakable terms social equality and 
intermarriage. "43 
Away from the spotlight of national politics, many southerners echoed the 
sentiments propounded by the likes of Rankin, Collins and Forrester. George 
Constantine, from Chickasaw in Alabama, authored and disseminated a pamphlet 
entitled, "What Price Slavery: A Deep Look into the Melting Pot of Indiscriminate 
Breeding. " "The purpose of this publication, " he wrote, "is to reaffirm the basic 
fundamentals concerning breeding and segregation at a time when their importance is 
obscured in an indiscriminate fog. "44 Tennesseean Thomas D. Palton, on the other 
hand, not only believed that it was northerners and not his fellow southerners who 
were responsible for agitation in the South, but also that black communists in the 
North were squarely to blame. He contended that "race friction is caused by forcing 
42 As Joel Williamson has written of the South, "in those parts, in the eyes of the dominant whites the 
merest hint of Negro blood automatically made a person all Negro. " Joel Williamson, New People: 
Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1995), p. 1. See also pp. 73-75. As Richard Sherman has shown in his study of early twentieth century 
Virginia, there was considerable variation of levels of blood "purity" over time: an 1866 law, for 
example, classified as "colored" anyone with "one-forth or more Negro blood"; in 1910, as the interest 
in racial science and eugenics spearheaded a drive amongst Virginia segregationists to seek yet more 
protection for the "purity" of the white race, that level was raised to one sixteenth. See Richard B. 
Sherman, "`The Last Stand': The Fight for Racial Integrity in Virginia in the 1920s, " Journal of 
Southern History, 54,1 (February 1988), esp. pp. 69-72. 
43 Congressional Record, 23 February 1956, p. 3208, [RSC]. 
44 "What Price Slavery: A Deep Look into the Melting Pot of Indiscriminate Breeding, " by George 
Constantine, enclosed with George Constantine letter to Tom Stanley, Box 100, Stanley Gubernatorial 
Papers. 
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the unwilling races into close proximity, " from which miscegenation would result. 
"Only communistic northern negroes spread propaganda for breaking the social taboo 
and intermarriage of whites and negroes. Southern negroes, " Palton stated, "abhor 
race-mixing anyway. "45 
III 
Segregationists clearly tailored the rhetoric of Massive Resistance to the Cold 
War situation in highly individual and flexible ways. There were, however, commonly 
accepted discursive frameworks within which segregationist groups and individuals 
placed both their broader Massive Resistance arguments and, more specifically, their 
anti-communist accusations. The most well-defined of those discourses centred on the 
evolution of Brown itself, which was held to be an attack on what southerners 
perceived to be their core social values. Indeed, so great a threat did it pose that a 
genuine belief emerged among southerners that the propagators of the decree had to 
have been in some way un-American. In this context, southerners saw themselves as 
the last upholders of the white Anglo-Saxon ideals that were notionally at the centre 
of Americanism; the South, therefore, became the last bastion of a quintessential 
Americanism which was constantly being eroded by northern federalists. "I submit for 
your judgement, " thundered Alabama's George Wallace a decade after Brown, "the 
45 Thomas D. Palton letter to John Battle, 1 October 1953, Battle Gubernatorial papers, Box 142, 
Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond. James M. Thomson, of Clarke 
County in Virginia, felt so strongly about the issue that he published a broadsheet entitled, "The 
Supreme Court Legislates, " shortly after Brown. The decision was, he claimed, "social legislation. " In 
promulgating the decree, Thomson doubted whether any of the Supreme Court Justices "would argue 
that such compulsion to attend school from childhood to college graduation, and meet on terms of 
perfect social equality with other young men and women will not lead to intermarriage. " Such 
miscegenation, felt Thomson, would also lead to the break down of the "historic separation of the races 
which has been in effect since the dawn of history. " Anticipating a popular response to his publication, 
Thomson printed on the top of the first page, "reprint permitted. " "The Supreme Court Legislates, " by 
James M. Thomson, 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 101. 
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fact that every single decision of the Court in the past ten years... has been decided 
against freedom and in favor of tyranny. "46 Freedom, Wallace was suggesting, was 
inherently "American; " tyranny, therefore, was "un-American. " It was a short step 
from un-American to communist, and, armed with this belief, the major players in 
Massive Resistance locked horns with the Supreme Court. 
Segregationist ire was exacerbated by the belief that, in passing down their 
decision, the Supreme Court Justices had exceeded their constitutional remit to 
interpret the Constitution, and had instead created law. Strom Thurmond, for example, 
stated that "although the judicial revolution gained momentum over a long period of 
time, history will cite one date as the most conspicuous moment when the Court freed 
itself of its oath to uphold the Constitution. " His language was loaded, and 
intentionally so: it was a judicial revolution 47 Called before hearings of the Florida 
Legislature in 1958, J. B. Matthews declared that "communists or communist 
influence were directly involved in every major race incident of the past four years 
since the Supreme Court `legislated' on the subject of integration. "48 It is a clear 
example of the hit and miss nature of anti-communism as a weapon of Massive 
Resistance, however, that Matthews was taken to task by Florida's Tampa Tribune. 
He was, the newspaper believed, merely rehashing old charges that had already been 
brought, and which furthermore had never been proven. 49 
46 George Wallace quoted in Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Ragte George Wallace, the Origins of the 
New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1995), p. 217. 
47 Thurmond, The Faith We Have Not Kept, p. 14. 
48 J. B. Matthews quoted in James Graham Cook, The Segregationists (Appleton-Century-Crofts: New 
York, 1962), p. 300. 
49 ibid. To add to the surprising nature of the Tampa Tribune's remarks, it was a newspaper published 
by the conservative D. Tenant Bryan, who also published Virginia's Richmond Times-Dispatch and 
the Richmond News Leader. 
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Many of the South's white constituents made the same charges as their 
political leaders. The "Red River Post No. 118" of the American Legion, based in 
Coushatta, Louisiana, for example, passed a resolution calling for "the United States 
Supreme Court and the Congress of the United States [to] be censured for their role in 
promoting socialism, destroying basic constitutional principles, creating dis-unity 
[sic], strife and for lending help, aid and support to the case of Communism. "so An 
Associated Press clipping of 3 June 1954 filed from Sheridan, Arkansas, reported that 
angry patrons of Sheridan School had voted to keep the school segregated in response 
to Brown. Moreover, they voted to have Senator Joe McCarthy probe the 
"Americanism" of the Supreme Court. "I am wondering if the Supreme Court justices 
are not Communist-infiltrated, " wondered J. H. Duncan, a candidate for State 
Representative. 51 
"Why, " asked Birmingham's C. C. McLean, "have Members of Congress made 
no effort to control Supreme Court and federal judges who have usurped their 
power? ... Today, " he continued, "the American people are governed largely by 
decisions rendered by politically appointed Supreme Court and federal judges who are 
using methods comparable to those of communistic nations. "52 Miss Mary Chalmers 
Hood from Florence, Alabama, tried to put the Supreme Court's alleged subversion 
into context. "Until after the Economic War (1861-65) the country was satisfied to 
abide by Constitutional Law, " she wrote, "then it tried to substitute the 14th 
Amendment for the State Law of Segregation. Not succeeding then, on May 17th, 
50 «Resolution by American Legion, Red River Post No. 118, Coushatta, Louisiana, " [n. d. ], Sanford 
Gubernatorial papers, Box 112. 
51 Press clipping, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 107. 
52 C. C. McLean letter to [unknown] newspaper editor, copied to Aubrey Brown, Aubrey Brown 
papers, Box 1, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
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1954, " she concluded, "a small minority, (nine judges)... backed by a subtle Russian 
5th column (in America) again is trying to force the illegal 14th Amendment on the 
United States, Sovereign States! "53 The Supreme Court, like the federal government, 
was also held to be riding rough-shod over States' Rights. Kentucky's Albert S. 
Brown was more to the point. "They talk about the Kaiser of Germany [and] the zar 
[sic] of Russia being dictators or despotic rulers, " he wrote. "Well, we have it all in 
the 9 old men at Washington DC. "54 
The Independent American [IA] organisation, based in New Orleans, took its 
accusations of communist-infiltration of the Supreme Court to extraordinary lengths. 
In anticipation of the reconvening of Congress in January 1959, it published a 
collection of baseball-style "Pro-Red Batting Averages of Members of the Supreme 
Court. "55 Based on the remarks placed into the Congressional Record by Jim Eastland 
on 10 July 1958, the IA calculated that Justices Black, Douglas, Warren and Brennan 
had all scored over 90%. The pamphlet noted that, as a result, Eastland warned that 
the Warren Court was "moving step by step, decision by decision, toward 
establishment of the Communist Conspiracy in the United States as a legal political 
entity... How many more of these decisions must we take before we admit the apparent 
fondness of the Court majority for the Communist cause? "56 
53 Miss Mary Chalmers Hood letter to Tom Stanley, 31 January 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 105. Hood also referred to the "lunatic fungus" pressurising the Court, most probably a slightly 
confused reference to a "lunatic fringe. " 
54 Albert S. Brown letter to Luther Hodges, 13 April 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial papers, Box 118, 
State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, 
North Carolina. 
55 "On Whose Side Is the Supreme Court? " Box 14, Wesley Critz George Papers, Box 2, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
56 "On Whose Side Is the Supreme Court? " Box 14, George Papers, Box 2. 
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TABLE 1 
PRO-RED BATTING AVERAGES OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Name of Year Appointed Total Anti-Red Pro-Red Percentage 
Justice Appointed by Decisions Decisions Decisions in Favor of 
by US President Reds 
Senate 
Hugo L. 1937 Roosevelt 71 0 71 1000/4 
Black 
Felix 1939 Roosevelt 72 16 56 77% 
Frankfurter 
William 1939 Roosevelt 69 3 66 95% 
Douglas 
Harold H. 1945 Truman 69 37 32 46% 
Burton 
Thomas C. 1949 Truman 51 33 18 35% 
Clark 
Earl 1953 Eisenhower 39 3 36 92% 
Warren 
John M. 1955 Eisenhower 34 14 20 58% 
Harlan 
William J. 1956 Eisenhower 20 2 18 90% 
Brennan 
Charles E. 1 1957 Eisenhower 11 74 36% 
Whittaker 
Source: "On Whose Side Is the Supreme Court? " Box 14, George Papers, Box 2. 
Subversive intent was similarly imputed to two other major influences on the 
Brown decision: the NAACP, who brought the original case; and Gunnar Myrdal and 
his assistants, whose magnum opus, An American Dilemma, was cited by the Court as 
an authority on the sociological aspects of racism. Accusations that, if not actually a 
bastion of red sympathisers, the Supreme Court was at least being manipulated by the 
"communist" NAACP pervaded all levels of US society, despite the Association's 
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very public post-war attempts to purge communists or fellow travellers from its ranks. 
As Wilson Record and Earl Ofari Hutchison have described in detail, the NAACP's 
earnest attempts to become a conspicuously anti-communist organisation began in 
1948.57 At the NAACP's 1950 Boston Convention, a resolution was adopted by 309 
votes to 57 empowering the national office to expel any unit which, "in the judgement 
of the Board of Directors, " was communist-infiltrated. "Viewed in the overall 
context, " thought Record, "the actions of the 1950 NAACP convention must be 
adjudged a public gesture to protect the organization's good name, a warning to the 
Stalinists to keep hands off, and an educational device for its own members. "58 
The majority of segregationists simply ignored the NAACP's internal purges 
and anti-communist pronouncements, and continued with their attacks regardless. 
Most Massive Resisters held a deeply ingrained belief that the NAACP was 
"communistic, " and remained unmoved by claims made by the Association that it had 
cleansed itself of communist influence. As Francis Wilhoit has recognised, Massive 
Resistance leaders attempted to create a pantheon of myths, demons and scapegoats 
from which to strengthen their cause and create an "orthodoxy" for southern 
resistance. That orthodoxy included the demonising of groups which threatened the 
South's way of life: a communist dominated NAACP formed an intrinsic part of that 
canon. 59 In Congress, for example, James C. Davis of Georgia stated that it "is much 
57 See Hutchison, Blacks and Reds, and, more specifically, Wilson Record, Race and Radicalism: the 
NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1964). 
58 Record, Race and Radicalism, p. 164. As Record went on to say, "the amount of time and energy 
that the NAACP staff used in countering misgivings among prospective members and in defending 
individual members against specific charges was, as one NAACP officer said in an interview, `a real 
drain on us personally and a big handicap in trying to recruit members. ' That time and energy could 
have been used for other purposes. " p. 193. 
59 That mythology, thought Wilhoit, reached a "quasi-religious" level. See Wilhoit, The Politics of 
Massive Resistance, esp. pp. 122-134. 
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more than a coincidence that the plan and program of the Communist Party and the 
plan and program of the [NAACP] ... regarding the question of segregation are so 
similar. "60 A resolution carried by the South Carolina House of Representatives, and 
replicated in Mississippi, was placed in the Congressional Record by the Vice- 
President, Richard Milhous Nixon. In response to the Association's role in the legal 
process of Brown, the resolution requested that the Attorney General of the United 
States "place the... [NAACP] on the subversive list. "61 
By far the most widely disseminated published criticism of the NAACP's 
links to communist agitation was produced by Georgia's Attorney General, Eugene 
Cook. Entitled "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP, " Cook's work was 
enthusiastically quoted by many of his fellow segregationists. 62 Part of the reason for 
its appeal lay in Cook's determination to emphasise the respectability of his anti- 
communist charges, and, what is more, to do so in a highly organised and methodical 
way, a facet of his politics which places it firmly in the tradition of Hofstadter's 
"paranoid style. "63 The booklet originated as a speech to the 55th Annual Convention 
of the Peace Officers' Association of Georgia. It was because of the Peace Officers' 
reputation as the guardians of individual rights and liberties, said Cook, that he used 
the occasion "as the proper forum for revealing, for the first time, the authenticated 
details of the most ominous of these threats [to individual rights and liberties] to arise 
60 Congressional Record, 16 April 1956, p. A3067, [RSC]. 
61 Congressional Record, 12 March 1956, p. 4444, [RSC]. 
62 "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP" was, for example, reprinted by the North Carolina Defenders 
of States' Rights Inc. Copy in George Papers, Box 115. 
63 "A final aspect of the paranoid style, " wrote Hofstadter, was its "quality of pedantry. " "One of the 
impressive things about paranoid literature, " he continued, "is precisely the elaborate concern with 
demonstration it almost invariably shows... The very fantastic character of its conclusions leads to 
heroic strivings for `evidence' to prove that the unbelievable is the only thing that can be believed. " 
Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: University of Harvard Press, 1952), pp. 35-36. 
68 
during our lifetime. " That threat was one of integration, as posed by NAACP-backed 
court cases. Cook reiterated that he was "prepared to prove everything I say. " Then, 
seeking to pre-empt the Association's claims that it had put its house in order with 
regards to communist infiltrators, he went on to state that, "for the benefit of those 
who undoubtedly will attempt to smear me and discredit my findings and 
conclusions... I would welcome the opportunity to present the evidence I have in hand 
for determination before a trial jury in a court of law. "64 
The specific charges that Cook levelled at the NAACP were based around the 
files of HUAC, which speculated on innumerable communist links with members of 
the Association. Intriguingly, he also made much of the colour of the organisation's 
founding members. All but W. E. B. Du Bois were white, said Cook. As a result, he 
claimed that "none of the organizations which have exploited the race issue in this 
country has ever had the welfare of the negro people at heart. " They had, in fact, 
merely "seized upon this issue as a convenient front for their more nefarious activities 
as one which they could dupe naive do-gooders, fuzzy-minded intellectuals, 
misguided clergymen and radical journalists to be their pawns. "65 So successful was 
Cook's work on the NAACP that it soon informed the language and arguments of 
others hoping to discredit the Association. Maryland's Brita Counselman, for 
example, berated Virginia's influential Senator and HUAC member, William Tuck. 
"Why do you and the Southern leaders permit the subversive NAACP to interfere 
with your State Rights? " Counselman inquired of him, especially since, "as the 
64 ibid. 
65 ibid. 
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Attorney General of Georgia declared, 75% of the NAACP leaders are 
Commu fists. "66 
The persecution of the NAACP continued in state legislatures, where specially 
convened committees hounded the Association. In March 1957, television and radio 
audiences watched and listened to the "experts" of Louisiana's Rainach Committee 
denounce the NAACP as communist. 67 In September 1958, R. J. Strickland, the Chief 
Investigator of a Floridian Committee, wrote to all southern Governors for 
information about the NAACP. "Inasmuch as the Florida State Legislative 
Investigating Committee is, at this time, going into the racial situation that exists in 
the State of Florida, " he wrote, "which is, more or less, predominately controlled by 
the NAACP, we would appreciate any copies of petitions which have been served on 
the various school boards in your state... We have been successful, to a point, so far, " 
he reported, "in showing certain Communist affiliations with the school movement in 
the State of Florida, and have also been successful, to a point, of showing 
Communistic affiliations with the NAACP in the State of Florida. "68 In January 1959, 
an Arkansas Committee followed suit and found the Association "guilty" of 
communism. 69 
Nevertheless, there were southerners who felt that, such denunciations 
notwithstanding, the region's legislatures were still not doing enough to counter the 
66 Brita Counselman letter to Sam Ervin, 18 March 1956, Ervin Papers, Folder 1124, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
67 Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 187. The "Joint Legislative Committee, " as William 
Rainach's committee was officially known, held three days of hearings on "subversion in racial 
unrest. " According to Adam Fairclough, "even by the kangaroo-standards of McCarthyism, it was a 
crude affair. " See Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: the Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana 
1915-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), pp. 223-4. 
68 R. J. Strickland letter to Luther Hodges, 16 September 1958, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 313. 
69 Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 187. 
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NAACP. Joseph E. Lally, for example, from Wheeling, West Virginia, the site of 
McCarthy's original anti-communist speech, felt that southern politicians should 
increase their efforts to root out such red influences 7° He reported that he had "been 
combating communism for many years, and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People under the leadership of the Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court. "71 O. R. Phillips, from Columbia in South Carolina, 
thought that there were "good grounds" for defying Brown, primarily because it had 
been "ramrodded [sic] through the Court by a movement with a Communist front. 
From what I can find out, " proclaimed Phillips, "the NAACP is a movement with a 
Communist front and we should fight it to the bitter end. "72 Such sentiment also 
appeared in segregationist broadsheets. The regional director of the fiercely 
segregationist America First! magazine, George E. Deartherage, for example, wrote to 
the combined southern governors on 5 June 1954. "With regard to the forthcoming 
Governors' Conference on the segregation matter, " he wrote, "we thought it important 
to call your attention to the fact that the [NAACP] is in reality a communist front. "73 
J. B. Matthews, however, was more conciliatory. Having spent much of his 
early years in popular fronts, communist-infiltrated organisations and, eventually, the 
CPUSA itself, Matthews grew disenchanted with the Left, and repudiated all his links 
with it, emerging as one of the South's most fervent anti-communists. 74 Newly 
70 As Albert Fried has commented, there is no accurate report of the original speech given by 
McCarthy at Wheeling on 9 February 1950, but it is known that he cited 205 State Department 
employees as Communists. In an interview held the following day with a reporter, McCarthy lowered 
that number to 57. See Albert Fried, McCarthyism: the Great American Red Scare. A Documentary 
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 78-79. 
71 Joseph E. Lally letter to Luther Hodges, 6 September 1957, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 228. 
72 O. R. Phillips letter to Tom Stanley, 31 May 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100. 
73 George E. Deartherage letter to Southern Governors, 5 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 100. 
74 Matthews had, for example, been chairman of the United States Congress Against War, a post he 
retained when it became the League Against War and Fascism. This political shift was a common 
71 
converted to anti-communism, Matthews pursued it with zeal and fervour. He 
authored a 51-page book entitled Communists, Negroes, and Integration, which 
referred to the "interlocking apparatus" of liberal circles, the drive towards racial 
amalgamation, and the communist desire to cause racial turmoil within the United 
States. 75 
The NAACP, however, escaped Matthews' censure. Stating that the 
Association was deserving of a "special word, " Matthews conceded that it "had been a 
prime objective of Communist penetration and, in numerous instances, prominent 
individuals connected with [it] have succumbed to the appeals of the Communist-front 
approach. " However, according to Matthews, the Association "is =a Communist 
Front. " He based this belief on the NAACP's own publication, "The Communist Party 
-- Enemy of Negro Equality, " written by Herbert Hill, one of the Association's field 
secretaries. "This pamphlet, " contended Matthews, "is a devastating indictment of 
Communist views and tactics on the Negro question. "76 
Less surprisingly, Alfred Baker Lewis, a member of the NAACP Board of 
Directors, responded to accusations of communist infiltration of the NAACP in 
general, and to Eugene Cook's infamous "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP" 
specifically. In an October 1959 edition of The Christian Century, he sought to 
explain that segregationists' use of anti-communism was primarily pragmatic. 
Building upon the NAACP's self-published booklet, "The Truth Versus the Ugly Lies 
About the NAACP, " Lewis implied that the majority of Americans were now aware 
occurrence post-World War II. The left-wing novelist John Dos Passos, for example, later served on 
the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, the propaganda arm of the Old Dominion's 
State-backed Massive Resistance campaign. 
75 J. B. Matthews, Communists. Negroes. and Integration [n. d., n. p. ], J. B. Matthews Papers, Box 714, 
Special Collections Library, Duke University. Quotations from p. 1 and p. 30. 
76 ibid., p. 51. Emphasis in the original. 
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of the Association's anti-communist stance although, he admitted, "North and South, 
some sober-minded people still believe that the Negro organization is `subversive. "' 
Lewis' article was designed to set out "the facts" to change that minority's mind, and 
took on both the more extreme and the more measured segregationists. 77 He cited the 
NAACP's own comprehensive anti-communist programme to disarm the more 
measured approach; the more outlandish charges, thought Lewis, could "be 
discounted out of hand, because the people who make them are generally the same 
people who charge that the United States Supreme Court is under Communist 
influence. "78 
The third part of the communist-influenced trio that southern resisters believed 
responsible for Brown was Gunnar Myrdal, author of An American Dilemma. 79 
Senator Jim Eastland from Sunflower County, Mississippi, was once again in the 
vanguard of those targeting Myrdal for alleged subversion. In 1954, he asked for a 
Senate Committee to probe the Brown decision, solely because, a newspaper reported, 
"Communist groups apparently had wielded influence on authorities cited by the 
court ... Eastland's resolution, 
" the newspaper continued, "quoted the court's opinion 
written by Chief Justice Warren as saying that `this finding is amply supported by 
modern authority. "' Eastland went on to declare that a footnote to the opinion "lists 
six allegedly modem authorities and concludes with a sentence `and see generally 
77 Again, this approach conforms to Hofstadter's "paranoid style. " 
78 Alfred Baker Lewis, "Is the NAACP Communist? " The Christian Century, 7 October 1959, 
Reprinted by the NAACP, " Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 3. 
79 Virginia's influential segregationist writer, James Kilpatrick, wrote that "half a dozen studies of the 
Negro deserve mention as reference works. Primus, of course, the monumental (and monumentally 
unreadable) work of Gunnar Myrdal and his associates, An American Dilemma. There are said to be 
eleven persons in the United States, apart from the collaborators, who have read the whole two 
volumes; I am not among them. " "A Bibliographical Note, " in James J. Kilpatrick, The Southern Case 
For School Segregation ([no city], USA: Cromwell-Collier, 1962), p. 216. 
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Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944). "180 By Christmas 1955, Eastland had become 
even more vehement. Myrdal "called himself a social engineer, " he told the Senate. 
"He was a Socialist who had served the Communist cause. He admitted he had no 
knowledge of the Negro question in the United States. Myrdal stated that the 
Constitution... was `impractical and unsuited to modem conditions' and its adoption 
was `nearly a plot against common people. ' This is purely Communist propaganda, " 
Eastland concluded. "I have often wondered what was the source of the pro- 
Communist influence in the Supreme Court. "81 
Such assertions had little foundation, however. Myrdal's son, Jan, was a 
communist, and actively participated in Communist Party events, but Gunnar and his 
wife, Alva, openly and often quite forcefully opposed the ideology. Myrdal wrote to 
Walter Lippmann in 1953, exemplifying his distaste for his son's communist 
sympathies: they were, he believed, "a passing ailment, " and he felt that Jan's 
communist links were "a psychological protest against his parents. "82 A Social 
Democrat and a proponent of social engineering, Myrdal held American values close 
to his heart. Indeed, when Nazi aggression threatened his native Sweden in 1940, Alva 
and Gunnar published Kontakt med Amerika, which argued against the growing 
Swedish mood for accommodating Nazism. Instead, the Myrdals argued for a creed 
80 Clipping, "Eastland Asks Probe of Court Racial Decision; Says Red-Front Groups Influenced 
Authorities Cited, " 25 May 1954, Sam Ervin Papers, Folder 1119. 
81 "`The Supreme Court's "Modern Scientific Authorities" in the Segregation Case' speech of Hon 
James 0. Eastland of Mississippi in the Senate of the United States, Thursday May 26 1955, " enclosed 
with Elmore D. Heins letter to Tom Stanley, 12 December 1955, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
103. 
82 Gunnar Myrdal quoted in Walter A. Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience: Social 
Engineering and Racial Liberalism. 1938-1987 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1990), pp. 328-9. 
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similar to that of the United States, with an emphasis on democratic principles and 
civil liberties. 83 
Nevertheless, it was not only at the lofty senatorial level of Eastland that 
claims of Myrdal's affiliation to communism were made. The American States' 
Rights Association, Inc., sought to investigate the origins of Myrdal's role in the 
Brown decision. "The Carnegie Foundation financed programs to promote subversive 
propaganda in our colleges, " it wrote to the Trustees of the University of Alabama in 
August 1955. "The Carnegie Foundation financed Dr Gunnar Myrdal to make a study 
on the negro issue in America. The result: a book, `An American Dilemma, ' quoted so 
many times by the Supreme Court in its decision on school segregation. "84 S. Carter 
Williams, a resident of Washington, DC, simply stated that "the Supreme Court now 
deems to base its decisions upon the work of a known Communist, one Gunnar 
Myrdal. "85 Major General Robert S. Travis journeyed from Savannah, Georgia, all the 
way to Washington, DC, in order to "investigate" the desegregation decision. He 
found that "the citations of authority included a number of references to documents by 
communists, men who belonged to the NAACP, and then stated as the chief authority: 
`See generally Myrdal's `American Dilemma. ' 1186 
83 ibid., pp. xv-xvii. 
84 American States' Rights Association, Inc., letter to University of Alabama Trustees, copied to 
Wesley Critz George, 5 August 1955, George Papers, Box 2. 
85 S. Carter Williams letter to Tom Stanley, 16 November 1955, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
103. 
86 Major General Robert S. Travis letter to Luther Hodges, I1 January 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 119. 
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IV 
No southern institutions were red-baited by segregationists with as much 
fervour as those groups who came under the rather nebulous, umbrella-term of "racial 
moderates, " often referred to by the even less precise "liberals. "87 More accurately 
defined as racially progressive, those organisations and their members were targeted 
as communist-tainted from at least as early as 1938, when the Southern Conference on 
Human Welfare [SCHW] first met in Birmingham, Alabama. A template was created, 
whereby any individual or organisation threatening to undermine continued white 
political, racial and social dominance in the South was publicly targeted, linked to 
communism and declared subversive. So fulsome were the attacks on racial 
progressives that, just as the 1930s saw interracial unionism become synonymous 
with communism, that decade also saw the cleaving -- in segregationist minds -- of 
racial progressivism to communism. 88 That link continued into the 1960s. As Sarah 
Patton Boyle neatly summarised in a 1957 letter to Jim Dombrowski, "We must, as 
you say, choose between being effective and being unattacked [sic]. We cannot be 
both in the present climate. And yet, " she concluded, "I think that each inexperienced 
liberal must find this out for himself before he can believe it. "89 
As a result, organisations which worked for racial change in the South such as 
the SCHW, its spin-off educational arm, the Southern Conference Educational Fund 
87 One of the most useful definitions of a "liberal" comes from the somewhat unlikely source of Phil 
Ochs: "In every American community, there are varying shades of political opinion. One of the 
shadiest of these are the liberals. An outspoken group on many subjects... ten degrees to the left of 
center in good times, ten degrees to the right of center if it affects them personally. " Phil Ochs, spoken 
word introduction to "Love Me, I'm A Liberal, " Phil Ochs in Concert, Elektra, ELK-7310,1966. 
88 As Linda Reed has commented, "If the race issue divided liberals in the 1930s, Communist 
allegations divided them in the 1940s and 1950s. " Linda Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense: 
southern Conference Movement 1938-1963 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1991), p. 56. 89 Sarah Patton Boyle letter to Jim Dombrowski, 1 June 1957, Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Box 7. 
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[SCEF], the SRC, the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen [FSC] and the Highlander 
Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee, were all depicted as hotbeds of radicalism. The 
need to maintain a consensus among members meant that those organisations took up 
different stances on the desegregation question: some of the South's more militant 
progressives wanted integration; others recognised the inequalities of the region's 
separate-but-equal systems, but nonetheless found integration unpalatably radical. The 
SCHW, for example, did not initially endorse the maintenance of segregation, but nor 
did it specifically support integration. Hoping to avoid splits within its predominately 
middle-class white membership, delegates were still declining to tackle the divisive 
issue of segregation head-on at the Conference's 1942 convention in Nashville, 
Tennessee 90 Similarly, the founding statement of the SRC in 1944 proclaimed only 
that the white South had a responsibility to administer segregation equitably; it took 
almost eight years of internal argument for the Council to come out in favour of 
desegregation. 91 
Attacks on the South's progressive organisations were not only attempts to 
undermine the racially egalitarian principles that they propounded, but more 
importantly, perhaps, formed part of a wider move to discredit dissenting voices in the 
South. Furthermore, because so much of their membership consisted of southerners, 
they could not simply be described as "outsiders. " It is a common theme in the red- 
baiting of such organisations that those attacks did not take place until segregationists 
felt explicitly threatened by their work: Highlander Folk School, for example, had 
90 As Egerton has commented, at the Nashville conference "delegates and their leaders leaned over 
backwards to avoid flashing a radical image to the public. " Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 
300. 
91 That decision was made on 12 December 1951. See Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hopes Race and 
Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 164-7, 
and Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, pp. 564-8. 
77 
been founded in 1932, but it was not until it began to establish itself as a centre for 
developing potential civil rights leadership in the early 1950s that southern 
segregationists stepped up their attacks on the institution. 92 The SCHW's first 
conference, held in Birmingham in 1938, posed a similar threat. As Robin Kelley has 
shown, it resulted in so much conservative opposition that a "Little Red Scare" 
ensued. 93 Rumours that the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, had moved her chair into 
the aisle between black and white sections of the auditorium to protest Birmingham's 
racial ordinances caused consternation in segregationist circles 94 Indeed, the backlash 
provoked by the Southern Conference's lax attitude to local segregation ordinances 
caused a mass exodus from the organisation, especially among southern politicians 
who feared for their political futures. 95 To avoid a repeat of such damaging defections, 
the SCHW shied away from the emotive issue of desegregation, and concentrated 
instead on abolishing the poll tax. 
There was, to some extent, a communist presence in SCHW that, it could be 
argued, justified anti-communist attacks. Joseph Gelders, Howard Lee, John B. 
Thompson, John P. Davis, Rob Hall and Donald Burke were singled out by SCHW 
executive secretary H. C. Nixon as possible Communist Party members linked to the 
organisation. Burke and Hall both freely acknowledged their Party associations, but 
92 Aimee Isgrig Horton, The Highlander Folk School: A History of Its Major Programs. 1932-1961 
[Martin Luther King, Jr, and the Civil Rights Movement Series] (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1989), p. 213. 
93 Robin Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 188. 
94 Egerton notes that "Mrs Roosevelt's part in that afternoon episode would be talked about for years 
to come, and the story of her seating would be so embellished in the telling and retelling that the truth 
would slip away and myth would replace it. Most accounts would paint a stirring picture of a boldly 
rebellious First Lady -- some even had her defiantly placing her chair straddle a chalk line in the aisle 
between the white and black segments of the audience... " Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, pp. 
193-4. 
95 Those that severed their links included Congressman Luther Patrick, Senators Lister Hill, Claude 
Pepper and John Bankhead, Governor Bibb Graves of Alabama, Brooks Hays from Arkansas and 
Burnet Maybank, the Governor-elect of South Carolina. 
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the case against the other four was far from watertight: Gelders, for example, had 
helped with the Scottsboro defence, and had an office in the same building as Hall and 
the Alabama Communist Party; Thompson, although "close" to the Party, had 
believed that Christianity and not communism provided the only path to man's 
fulfilment ever since he had studied under Reinhold Niebuhr. 96 
Nevertheless, the presence of those six had a twofold effect, causing splits 
within the Southern Conference Movement itself as well as increasing the ferocity and 
frequency of segregationist attacks. Francis Pickens Miller, for example, an anti-Byrd 
Democrat from Virginia with progressive political views, refused to serve the SCHW 
in any official capacity because of Burke's presence at the 1938 convention. 97 Three 
years later, Mark Ethridge and Barry Bingham resigned when Thompson failed to 
answer their questions about his political affiliations 98 By 1946, even the talismanic 
Eleanor Roosevelt declined to attend the New Orleans convention, disillusioned, as 
Kreuger has pointed out, by the Southern Conference's "occasional connections with 
fellow travelers and known American Communists. "99 
As specific studies concentrating on those organisations have chronicled, 
segregationists continued in their attempts to brow-beat the organisations with 
accusations of communism throughout the 1950s and 1960s. '°° One of the enduring 
96 For a fuller discussion of the actual communist presence in SCHW, see Thomas A. Kreuger, And 
Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare. 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1967), pp. 65-96. 
97 Kreuger, And Promises to Keep, p. 38 "Off the record, " noted Kreuger, "he [Miller] acknowledged 
that he not only opposed association with Communists on principle but also that if his connection with 
Burke became known it would ruin his chances of winning elective public office. " 
98 Thompson's slow response could, however, have been explained by his attempts to recover from a 
serious car crash at the time. 
99 ibid., p. 152. 
100 See Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense; Kreuger, And Promises to Keep; John A. 
Salmond, "`The Great Southern Commie Hunt': Aubrey Williams, the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund, and the Internal Security Subcommittee, " South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 77; Irwin 
Klibaner, "The Travail of Southern Radicals: the Southern Conference Educational Fund, 1946-1976, " 
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themes of their collective work is the notion that guilt by association underscored the 
success of such red-baiting. When HUAC investigated Joe Gelders, a mainstay of the 
Southern Conference movement, for example, it concluded that the New Deal had 
been "hand-in-glove" with the Communist Party. Because the SCHW had embraced 
much of Roosevelt's New Deal programme, therefore, HUAC concluded that it was a 
communist-backed organisation. '°' Klibaner, too, has shown how SCHW President 
Jim Dombrowski was aware of the "early animus against the [Southern] Conference, " 
much of it stemming from perceptions of it as a subversive organisation. 102 For white 
southern supremacists, perception and association was all where communism was 
concerned. 
As a result of this persecution, racially progressive organisations spent 
precious time and resources attempting to stress that they were not communist- 
infiltrated. William Mitch, President of the United Mine Workers, attended the 
controversial 1938 Birmingham meeting of SCHW. "It was always my belief, " he 
wrote in a letter to Frank Porter Graham, looking back on the situation in 1955, "that 
communism in the South was and has been practically nil... there was never at any 
time, in my opinion, " he concluded, "anything that resembled a situation that the 
Communists were a real factor in the Conference. " 103 Thinking that this did not, 
perhaps, make his views clear enough, Mitch wrote to the Conference's former 
Journal of Southern History, Vol. XLIX, No. 2. (May 1983); Aimee Horton, Highlander Folk School; 
Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets. 1929-1959 (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1981). 
101 Dunbar, Against the Grain, p. 57. 
102 Dombrowski quoted in Klibaner, Travail of Southern Radicals, note 17, p. 186. 
103 William Mitch letter to Frank Porter Graham, 19 April 1955, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 48. 
Graham was an immense figure in twentieth century North Carolina politics, as well as in progressive 
circles. Elected President of the University of North Carolina from 1930, he was committed to southern 
progressive causes, served as Chairman of the SCHW, and served in the Senate. For more on Graham, 
see chapter 4. 
80 
chairman again a week later. "Relative to an oversight in my recent letter to you, " he 
noted, "first let me state that I am sure the Communists and their fellow travelers in 
the South at no time had influence to their benefit in the Southern Conference. "104 
Mitch, it would appear, saw the need to go out of his way in order to make it as clear 
as possible that there was no real communist influence in the SCHW. 
Nonetheless, the issue haunted the SCHW. At the Birmingham conference, 
delegates and executives joined forces in an attempt to exclude whatever pro- 
communist sentiment did exist. One such delegate, Yelverton Cowherd, stated that 
"only those who were trusted implicitly" were brought together on the conference 
floor via a previously devised series of floor signals. Through these organised groups, 
"unbelievably large votes were cast in opposition to any proposals made by the small 
communist group. "°5 The communists who had attended the Conference were 
effectively marginalised, and their ability to stamp their mark on the organisation 
greatly diminished. 
At the second conference, though, held in Chattanooga in April 1940, the 
situation worsened. W. T. Couch wanted the convention to ratify a resolution 
condemning communist aggression in Europe, in the same way that the 1938 
delegates had castigated Nazi aggression. Again attempting to maintain SCHW's 
fragile political consensus, part of the executive committee decided not to discuss 
foreign policy at all. '°6 After much commotion, Couch succeeded in introducing a 
104 William Mitch letter to Frank Porter Graham, 25 April 1955, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 48. 
105 Yelverton Cowherd letter to Frank Porter Graham, 28 December 1955, Frank Porter Graham 
Papers, Box 48. 
106 Fellow travellers within the SCHW were firmly against a resolution condemning the Soviet Union; 
Pacifists, on the other hand, stood unanimously against a concurrent resolution in support of aid to the 
Allies. See Kreuger, And Promises to Keep, pp. 55-64. 
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proposal to condemn Soviet aggression in Finland. Although scuffles broke out on the 
floor after its introduction, it was passed overwhelmingly. 
The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, who had led the indigenous civil rights 
protests in Birmingham, Alabama from the mid-1950s, denied any links with 
communists upon assuming the Presidency of SCEF, the educational off-shoot of the 
SCHW. Aware that the Fund had a past history of criticism by segregationist press 
and leaders alike, and that "most often the label is Communism or some other type of 
subversive activities, " Shuttlesworth wrote to Bobby Kennedy in June 1963 to dispel 
such notions. "Since serving on this Board, " he noted, "and being in attendance at 
most of its meetings, I have never observed anything but complete support for the US 
Constitution and the American Way of life in its policies and resolutions, and in the 
words, and acts of its members. "logy 
By the 1950s and 1960s, segregationist attempts to discredit mainly white 
racially progressive organisations diminished, partly because the years of pressure 
began to take their toll: Highlander, for example, had finally succumbed in 1961, and 
the SCHW had been replaced by the SCEF in 1948. In the context of the Cold War 
and Massive Resistance, however, it is easy to over-emphasise the effect that red- 
baiting had on liberal institutions, and to blame the weapon for all the ills and 
difficulties that they experienced. As Linda Reed has pointed out, communist charges 
did cause SCEF to lose some financial support and to spend too much time having to 
defend itself. There was, though, a plus side to the red-baiting, for it kept the Southern 
Conference movement and its work in the public eye. There were, simply, other 
107 Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth letter to Bobby Kennedy, 6 June 1963, Civil Rights During the 
Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963. Part 2: The Papers of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney 
General For Civil Rights, Reel 7,0069, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 
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factors that limited the efficacy of the South's racially progressive organisations more 
thoroughly than anti-communism. Their refusal to take direct action as protest 
increasingly moved to the streets via mass civil disobedience campaigns, for example, 
naturally limited their effectiveness. Other issues, such as the differences of opinion 
over race at the 1938 Birmingham SCHW Convention, the dilemma over whether or 
not to charge membership fees for SCEF, and the personal animosity between Jim 
Dombrowski and James Foreman, were equally if not more debilitating. 108 
Regardless of the real reasons for the Southern Conference movement's 
collapse, guilt by association extended to prominent individuals who had taken part in 
the movement's organisations, many of whom were hounded ceaselessly by 
segregationists. In 1954, for example, SCEF's Aubrey Williams was summoned 
before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee [SISS] in the aftermath of a radio 
debate on school desegregation that he had conducted with the fiercely segregationist 
governor of Georgia, Herman Talmadge. Although Williams had been the only person 
to enter into debate with Talmadge, other stalwarts of the Southern conference scene 
were targeted by SISS: Myles Horton, Jim Dombrowski and Clifford Durr were all 
subpoenaed alongside him. Furthermore, Jim Eastland, who chaired the SISS 
hearings, paid very little attention to the activities of SCHW and SCEF during the 
investigations, and concentrated instead on attempting to establish links between the 
four defendants and the Communist Party. 109 
108 See Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense, pp. xxiii-xxvi, 46-64,99-128,186-187. 
109 Asked by Jim Dombrowski's lawyer, Benjamin E. Smith, to outline the rules of procedure for the 
hearing, "Eastland's reply that "I will announce them when I desire" indicated that witnesses could 
well expect to be grilled on almost anything, and that they would not necessarily be able to dispute any 
adverse testimony. " Salmond, "The Great Southern Commie Hunt, " p. 439. 
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Even though Francis Pickens Miller had refused to serve the SCHW officially 
after the 1938 Birmingham meeting, he and his whole family were stigmatised by his 
support for racially progressive organisations. In the winter of 1956, for example, 
Miller's son, Andrew, was refused promotion to first lieutenant in the infantry 
division in which he was serving because of his father's alleged political views. 
Promotion required a security clearance report, and, Andrew wrote to his father, 
"when the Army asked the FBI for a check on me apparently the latter came up with a 
fifty-page report. I understand practically all of this was on family background... I was 
questioned from nine until four, " he continued. "I was finally asked to make a 
statement of my views on Communism as well as what I thought yours were. "I10 
Much of the questioning, Andrew told his father, was based on the FBI report, which 
noted that "F. P. Miller had addressed the Southern Conference of Human Welfare in 
Birmingham, true or not. "111 
Both Jim Dombrowski and Carl Braden faced more than just harsh questioning 
from the authorities. Their sustained work for progressive southern organisations led 
to protracted legal battles, both of which ended up in the Supreme Court. Braden was 
indicted for contempt by Congress in August 1958 for failing to answer questions in 
front of a HUAC committee in Atlanta, and Dombrowski brought a case against New 
Orleans police who had raided his house for incriminating evidence and SCEF 
membership lists in October 1963. In February 1961, the Supreme Court upheld 
Braden's contempt charge 5: 4, drawing a stinging rebuke from one of the minority 
110 Andrew Pickens Miller letter to Francis Pickens Miller, 21 December 1956, Francis Pickens Miller 
Papers, Box 103, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. 
111 FBI report quoted in ibid. 
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judges, Justice Hugo Black, on the methods of investigating committees. ' 12 In 
contrast, the Supreme Court found in Dombrowski's favour in April 1965. It was not, 
however, until 1969 that the Louisiana legislature made a full apology to Dombrowski 
and SCEF's officers. Tellingly, it declared that previous allegations of "Communist 
Front" activities had been misleading and entirely false. 113 
V 
As segregationists shifted their focus towards those -- predominately black -- 
protest organisations that were advocating non-violent direct action, the tactics of 
smear and guilt by association remained true to the template of harassment forged to 
counter racially progressive groups. As part of a smear campaign designed to 
undermine the freedom struggle, southern politicians sought information from the FBI 
on the extent of communist involvement in the Movement. Indeed, such information 
was thought to be sufficiently important by southern governors for it to be discussed 
not just at their own regular regional conference, but at the National Governors' 
Conference in January 1951. The fact that it was a national conference serves to 
highlight another facet of the segregationists' anti-communist weapon: unlike so 
much of the rhetoric of Massive Resistance, the spectre of "red" subversion affected 
the whole nation; anti-communism, therefore, theoretically appealed to northerners as 
well as to southerners. Hoover realised the importance of holding such information, 
112 "If the Un-American Committee is to have the power to interrogate everyone who is called a 
communist, " wrote Black, "there is one thing certain beyond the peradventure of any doubt -- no 
legislative committee, state or federal, will have trouble finding cause to subpoena all persons 
anywhere who take a public stand for or against segregation. " Hugo Black quoted in Sarah Hart Brown 
`Congressional Anti-Communism and the Segregationist South: From New Orleans to Atlanta, 1954- 
1958, ' Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Winter 1996), p. 812. 
113 Klibaner, "Travail of Southern Radicals, " p. 195. 
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however, and was initially reluctant to share it. 114 A compromise was reached, with 
the FBI agreeing to disseminate information, but only on members of the Communist 
Party employed in war industries. 
Just over three years after the exchanges between Hoover and the governors, 
the Brown decision reinforced the importance of holding information on communists 
and subversives. As has been noted, the formulation of a truly massive, South-wide 
resistance effort did not take place until African Americans made it clear that they had 
not been placated by Brown, and agitation for racial change increased. Similarly, J. 
Edgar Hoover and the FBI were content to monitor civil rights activity from a 
distance, and to leak snippets of information on alleged Movement communists, until 
the spectre of wholesale racial change altered from being a mere possibility to become 
a definite probability. As Kenneth O'Reilly has shown, the catalyst for the change in 
the FBI's outlook from passive containment to an active, aggressive programme 
against the civil rights movement in general and Martin Luther King, Jr, in particular, 
was the March on Washington of 28 August 1963. "The decision to destroy King, " 
O'Reilly noted, "was not made until the March on Washington Movement 
demonstrated that the civil rights movement had finally muscled its way onto the 
nation's political agenda. " 5 
The FBI singled out King not only because of the impetus and national 
attention he was bringing to the freedom struggle, but also because the agency's 
114 On 3 February 1951, Hoover wrote to the Attorney General to inform him that "the problem was 
raised by some of the Governors as to the Federal Bureau of Investigation making information 
available to them relating to subversive activities in their respective states. " J. Edgar Hoover letter to 
the Attorney General, 3 February 1951, The McCarthy Era Blacklisting of School Teachers, College Professors, and Other Public Employees, Microfilm, Reel 1,0001 [RSC]. 115 O'Reilly, Racial Matters, p. 133. For a full discussion of the FBI's specific attempts to target King, 
see pp. 125-155. 
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director, J. Edgar Hoover, personally disliked him. Hoover had always seen the civil 
rights movement as a challenge to authority, and had never been progressive in his 
racial outlook. Indeed, as Richard Gid Powers has pointed out, there were only five 
blacks working in the FBI until the advent of the Kennedy administration, and all of 
those worked personally for Hoover. Part of the Director's reluctance to pursue civil 
rights cases in the South stemmed from experience; he knew that southern white juries 
would not convict southern whites of crimes against blacks. More dogmatically, 
however, Hoover remained convinced that communists played at least some part in 
organised civil rights activity. ' 16 He was equally convinced that King was a moral 
degenerate. As an example of that animus, Hoover rejected out of hand an FBI memo 
compiled by William Sullivan five days before the March on Washington that 
described Communist Party infiltration of the Movement as "infinitesimal" -- it was 
not, frankly, the answer that Hoover had wanted to hear. ' 17 In order to placate his 
superior, Sullivan and his agents resubmitted a penitent memo to Hoover, suggesting 
that the Director had, in fact, been correct all along and that there was indeed 
"substantial" Communist influence at work. "8 Such sycophancy aside, Hoover 
stepped up his battle against King, using the Red menace as "a commodity as well as 
a threat. " 119 
116 For more on Hoover's stance on the civil rights movement, see Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and 
Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: The Free Press, 1987), esp. pp. 323-332. 
117 Although it is convenient to view the March itself as a turning point in Hoover's attitude towards 
King and the Movement, as O'Reilly has done, the timing of Sullivan's rejected memo suggests that 
Hoover's change in emphasis came during the planning of the March rather than during the March 
itself. 
118 "The Director is correct, " wrote Sullivan. "We were completely wrong... the Communist Party, 
USA, does wield substantial influence over Negroes which one day could become decisive. " William 
Sullivan quoted in O'Reilly, Racial Matters, p. 130. 
119 ibid., p. 136. 
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Although segregationists often appeared paranoid with their assertions of 
communist infiltration, notably of the Supreme Court, beyond the power games of 
Hoover there was at some level a greater justification for labelling certain players in 
the civil rights movement communist. The small number of active communists did not 
vindicate the smearing of the entire Movement, but the presence of Bayard Rustin, 
Stanley Levison and Jack "Hunter Pitts" O'Dell strongly suggest that, in targeting the 
Movement, segregationists were employing a mix of both genuine anti-communism 
and cynical red-baiting. 120 The calculated cynicism evident in so many instances of 
anti-communism during Massive Resistance must, therefore, be qualified. 
Rustin's case is deserving of special interest. He combined many of the 
characteristics anathema to the white, segregated South: he was an articulate African 
American who believed passionately in racial integration; he was gay; he had been 
arrested on sexual deviancy charges; and he had been a Communist in the 1930s. As 
his biographer, Jervis Anderson, has noted, Rustin was chiefly attracted to the Party 
because of its stance on racial equality. 121 Although, like so many American 
Communists and fellow travellers, Rustin broke from the Party during the Second 
World War, he remained tied to organisations that were deemed to be "un-American. " 
He was, for example, a member of A. J. Muste's pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation 
[FOR], and was jailed in 1944 for refusing induction into the armed forces. 122 During 
120 The FBI believed that, alongside Rustin, Levison and O'Dell, the other communists manipulating 
King were Clarence Jones, Harry Wachtel, C. T. Vivian, Randolph Blackwell and Lawrence Reddick. 
ibid., p. 133. 
121 As a member of the Young Communist League, for example, the young Rustin was dispatched to 
City College, New York, to organise and agitate on behalf of the League under the guise of being a 
student. See Jervis Anderson, Bayard Rusting Troubles I've Seen. A Biography (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1997), esp. pp. 51-56. 
122 For more on Rustin's turbulent life and career, see John D'Emilio, "Homophobia and the 
Trajectory of Postwar American Radicalism: The Career of Bayard Rustin, " Radical History Review, 
62 (Spring 1995). 
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the 1950s and 1960s, Rustin was hugely influential in the Movement. During the early 
days of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, he convinced King to purge guns from his 
home and to wholeheartedly embrace a Gandhian non-violent approach. It had been 
Rustin, attempting to consolidate upon the boycott's success, who had set up the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference with Ella Baker and Stanley Levison. He 
remained very much in the shadows, however, mainly because, in the words of John 
D'Emilio, he "affected a pose -- his own version of the mask that gay men of the era 
wore. "123 To segregationists, that low profile was interpreted as part of the 
Machiavellian intrigue that surrounded the CPUSA. 
When the Alabama Legislative Committee to Preserve the Peace [ALCPP] 
stated that King was "wrong and untruthful" to claim that the SCLC was "un- 
Communist, " it was to Rustin that they were referring. "Rustin was a young 
Communist leader, " wrote the ALCPP, "and, by his own admission in an interview 
published in the Saturday Evening Post... was a Communist Party organizer for twelve 
years. "124 Herein lies a valuable insight into Massive Resisters' anti-communist 
attacks: they were, on the whole, unconcerned with whether communist activity was 
current or in the past, or whether an individual had been a fellow traveller or a card- 
carrying CPUSA member. Any hint that a civil rights worker was -- or, indeed, had 
ever been -- engaged in either communist activity or Communist Party support was 
sufficient to give credence to broad, sweeping accusations that the entire Movement 
was communist inspired. 
123 ibid., p. 91. 
124 "Communists in Civil Rights, " Prepared by the Staff of the Alabama Legislative Committee to 
Preserve the Peace, 1965, Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, Papers, Box 3, Manuscripts Division, Special 
Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
89 
King was forced to distance himself from Rustin in 1960, after threats not 
from any southern segregationist, but from Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell, Jr. In June, Powell took exception to Rustin's planned civil rights 
demonstration at the National Democratic Party convention in Los Angeles, either 
because of Rustin's alleged left-wing links, or because Powell, as a Democrat, thought 
that the protest would threaten Kennedy's accession to the White House. Regardless 
of his true motives, Powell threatened to state publicly that King and Rustin were 
having an affair. It was not until after Rustin's successful role as co-organiser of the 
March on Washington in 1963 that he resumed a close political alliance with King. 125 
O'Dell and Levison proved problematic for the SCLC once Hoover and the 
FBI had become convinced that they were Communists. Of the two, Levison was by 
far the closest to King, described by Taylor Branch as his "closest white friend and the 
most reliable colleague of his life. "126 Having trained as a lawyer, Levison spent much 
of his early career as a fund-raiser for liberal and radical causes; O'Dell was expelled 
from both the National Maritime Union and from an insurance job in Montgomery, 
Alabama, for his Communist connections. The FBI's concern with their respective 
roles was heightened when they were seen by field agents taking part in the eleven- 
man "Dorchester retreat" with King in January 1963. What proved most damaging, 
though, was the FBI's leaking of stories about Levison and O'Dell's Communist 
Party connections to the press. 
125 Although some members of SCLC were wary of Rustin's return to King's close circle of advisors, 
he nonetheless accompanied King on his trip to Europe to collect the Nobel Peace Prize in December 
1964. See Anderson, Bayard Rustin, pp. 223-32, and 273-7. 
126 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement 1954-63 
(New York: Macmillan, 1988), p. 208. 
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As O'Reilly and David Garrow have shown, the FBI's counterintelligence 
programme (COINTELPRO) furnished information on O'Dell to newspapers such as 
the Birmingham News, the Times-Picayune, and the Atlanta Constitution in October 
1962, and in June and July 1963.127 Once that information was in the public domain, it 
achieved two things: it furnished anti-communist segregationists with "evidence" of 
Communist infiltration of the Movement with which to substantiate their attacks; and 
it added to the distrust and misgivings that many white southerners at the grass roots 
level had about the actual aims of the Movement. Segregationists did not, however, 
confine their attacks to the likes of Rustin, O'Dell, Levison and, by extension, the 
SCLC, all of which had at least some links to communists. In 1964, for example, the 
ALCPP published a detailed study of the civil rights movement, taking stock of the 
flurry of civil rights demonstrations of the 1950s and early 1960s. "The pattern of the 
Communist racial program clearly emerges in the present Civil Rights struggle and its 
violent by-products, " it concluded. "The facts establish beyond any peradventure of 
doubt that the major role of the Communist in America in 1964, is being played out 
within the framework of civil rights. " 128 
The close relationships King held with Rustin, O'Dell and, in particular, 
Levison, had a tremendous effect on the rhetoric employed to attack him. Historians 
such as O'Reilly, Garrow, Michael Friedly and David Gallen have chronicled King's 
harassment, concentrating on Hoover's personal vendetta against King, and on the 
FBI's efforts to smear him and the Movement as a whole. 129 Adam Fairclough, too, in 
127David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King. Jr. (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 53-54,61- 
62,66-67. 
128 "Communists in Civil Rights, " Prepared by the Staff of the Alabama Legislative Committee to 
Preserve the Peace, 1965, Byrd Papers, Box 3. 
129 See Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King. Jr., and Michael Friedly and David Gallen, Martin 
Luther King. Jr.: The FBI File (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 1993). 
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his history of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference [SCLC], detailed the 
FBI's leaking of information alleging the Communist associations of the SCLC's 
O'Dell and Levinson. 130 
There are, however, two central aspects of segregationists' use of anti- 
communism against King which have not been fully explored: the ways in which the 
hounding of him was played out at the grass roots level; and the subtle yet pivotal 
significance of O'Dell and Levison in determining both the tenor and the focus of 
anti-communism at that local level. Local white supremacist groups from across the 
South targeted King extensively in their literature. The South Carolina-based Grass 
Roots League, Inc., for example, disseminated its information and misinformation on 
King's communist involvement on a huge scale. In August 1962, the League's 
grandly titled "Research Department" released a "Fact Finding Memo, " selling at 
$2.50 per 100 copies. The document was headed, "America's Betrayal: Martin King, 
Red Tool, " and contained sub-sections entitled, "Government Officials Support Anti- 
American Drive, " "The `Red-ucation' of Martin L. King, " and "King's Communist 
Associates. " It drew from a range of articles published in the New York Post. Some of 
them alleged Communist Party affiliation on the part of King's "mentor, " Benjamin 
Mays. Others quoted Fulton Lewis, Jr, reporting in Human Events that King was a 
member of CORE, officials of which "have long histories of association with 
Communist causes. " Still others quoted The Daily Worker, which noted King's 
130 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America" the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
and Martin Luther King. Jr. (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1987). See esp. pp. 69, 
95-99. 
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participation in the March on Washington, at which "three bus-loads of Communists 
from New York" arrived. 131 
In the main, however, the smearing of King at the state level rested almost 
entirely on his attendance at Highlander's Labor Day seminar in 1957, and relied upon 
the well established segregationist staples of smear and innuendo. Reports of the 
meeting as a subversives' summit were widely disseminated. Huge posters of King 
sitting in the front row of the seminar along with Abner W. Berry, Aubrey Williams 
and Myles Horton were posted on billboards across the South, and the photograph 
was reprinted by all manner of resistance organisations. 132 According to J. B. 
Matthews, "it is of great significance that King is in close touch with such 
Communists and pro-Communists" as were assembled at the school. But then, in a 
tacit admission that King himself was not yet a Communist, Matthews contended that 
"the Communists would like nothing better than to take him under their wing. "133 For 
all the rhetoric, Matthews believed that King was merely an attractive possible target 
for subversives. "The Party looks upon Martin Luther King's work and movement as 
a new opportunity to incite racial animosity, and upon King's attendance at the 
Highlander Folk School seminar as a most desirable contact, " thought Matthews. 134 
Ironically, Hoover made light of the allegations, fearful of the vagaries of any 
debate played out in the public domain. He merely forwarded all official queries and 
131 Research Department, Grass Roots League, Inc., Box 551, Charleston, S. C., "Fact Finding Memo 
`F"' August 1962, James. J Kilpatrick Papers, Box 4, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections 
Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. The March on Washington referred to here 
is most probably the Prayer Pilgrimage, organised at the Lincoln Memorial in 1957. 
132 Berry had been given a leadership role in the CPUSA by James Ford in early 1934, and took over 
the League of Struggle for Negro Rights in the same year. Williams and Horton were mainstays of the 
Southern Conference movement. 
133 J. B. Matthews, Communists. Negroes. and Integration [n. d., n. p. ], J. B. Matthews Papers, Box 714. 
Quotations from p. 25. 
134 ibid., p. 26 
93 
correspondence on the matter to the Kennedys. 135 Among all the allegations, 
furthermore, categorical statements that King was a CPUSA member or a communist 
were rare indeed. Like Matthews, the ALCPP felt that King was not a communist, but 
merely "has been closely aligned with known Communist Party members for many 
years. "136 Earl Lively, Jr, again peddled the line that "King's associations with 
Communists, fronters, and fellow-travelers are legion, " without clearly describing 
King as a communist. 137 Manning Johnson, a Communist Party member turned 
HUAC "friendly witness, " made it clear that he was "not saying that Rev. King is a 
Communist, but I am saying that Rev. King is doing the Negroes considerable 
harm. "138 The Rockwell Report, official publication of the American Nazi Party 
[ANP], appeared forthright when it titled an edition, "Is Martin Luther King a 
Communist? The Shocking Record! " Even then, there was no explicit charge. "We 
think you are well qualified to judge for yourself whether this black agitator is a 
genuine `Christian' Reverend or whether he is a conscious part of the despicable and 
deadly Communist conspiracy to destroy our Christian Constitutional Republic and 
our White Race, " thundered that edition's author, Karl R. Allen. There followed 
twelve pages of press clippings and articles from which readers were invited to make 
up their own minds. 139 
135 O'Reilly, Racial Matters, p. 151. 
136 "Communists in Civil Rights, " Prepared by the Staff of the Alabama Legislative Committee to 
Preserve the Peace, 1965, Byrd Papers, Box 3. 
137 Earl Lively, Jr, "The Invasion of Mississippi, " American Opinion Reprint Series [n. d. ], Harry 
Flood Byrd, Sr, Papers, Box 5. 
138 Johnson quoted in Earl Lively, Jr, "The Invasion of Mississippi, " American Opinion Reprint Series 
[n. d. ], Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, Papers, Box 5. 
139 The Rockwell Report, Vol. 2, No. 20 (1 August 1963), copy in Ernest Sevier Cox Papers, Box 26, 
Special Collections Library, Duke University. 
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There are a number of reasons why segregationists shied away from directly 
labelling King a communist. First, once Hoover began to leak information to 
newspapers, the link between King and known communists such as O'Dell and Rustin 
was both verifiable and, crucially, sufficient to smear him without the need of further 
fabrications. Second, it is possible that the hesitancy in naming King as a communist 
stemmed from segregationists' collective desire not to associate the Communist Party 
with a leader of King's rising stature and success. If they had done so, they would be 
tacitly admitting that the Communist Party had much to offer African Americans in 
their drive for greater freedom. 140 
On the other hand, the South's resisters were aware of King's growing 
popularity with racial progressives in the North and, indeed, with a global audience. 
By the early 1960s, segregationists increasingly recognised that popular support and 
opinion was swinging towards King and the Movement. In the first few months of 
1965, for example, Hoover's leaking of material concerning King's extra-marital 
affairs had been widely ignored and glossed over as irrelevant by a generally 
sympathetic press. 141 Segregationists, therefore, had to perform a balancing act. They 
needed to discredit King subtly: innuendo and guilt by association would do that more 
effectively than all-out attack, especially when there was no hard evidence to back up 
accusations of any actual communist involvement. 
140 As Highlander Folk School's Myles Horton commented in the wake of a grilling by Eastland's 
SISS, "The hysteria spread by your committee and the McCarthy committee has made substantial 
contribution to the fiction that the only dynamic force in the world is Communism... " Myles Horton 
quoted in Horton, Highlander Folk School, p. 213. 
141 As David Garrow has noted about the FBI's material on King's extra-marital sex life, "By early 
1965 the Bureau's leadership was extremely disappointed and surprised that no one had made available 
to the public any of the material believed damaging to King. This realization became especially 
pronounced in the wake of the December and January efforts to interest a substantial number of 
newsmen in the material... " Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King., p. 170. For a broad 
discussion of the motives behind the FBI's focus on that aspect of King's life, see pp. 151-172. 
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It is the style of The Rockwell Report's special edition on King, however, that 
gives the clearest indication of the reason behind this refusal to name him explicitly as 
a communist. 142 To do so would be libellous, and could be directly challenged by 
King in the courts. '43 To list accusatory articles and statements that had emanated 
elsewhere, however, as the ANP had done, was not. King could not, for example, 
successfully argue in a court of law that none of those present at Highlander were or 
had been Communist Party members: Abner Berry, for one, was well known as a 
reporter for the CPUSA's Daily Worker. The exact status of Rustin, O'Dell and 
Levison would also have caused him great discomfort, and would have almost 
certainly damaged King if held up to public scrutiny. In such circumstances, it was 
safer and just as effective to note King's "close association' 'with such known 
radicals. 
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King was not, however, the only part of the freedom struggle to be red-baited. 
One of the underlying trends of segregationist anti-communism was to suggest that the 
burgeoning civil rights movement was infiltrated, directed, administered and staffed by 
communists. For many southerners, claims of communist involvement explained 
African American unrest in a region that had always held the paternalistic view that 
blacks were content with their lot. The cry that communists, who, after all, were 
"outsiders, " were whipping up racial foment also satiated the southern desire to 
discredit agitation as the work of non-southerners, and therefore of those who did not 
142 The Rockwell Re WA, Vol. 2, No. 20 (1 August 1963), copy in Cox Papers, Box 26. 
143 One of the reasons for the ongoing success of red-baiting committees such as HUAC and SISS was 
that witnesses hauled up in front of them had no right of reply. Had King met any of his protagonists in 
the courts, the senatorial privilege which protected those committee men would not have applied. 
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understand the South's peculiar racial practices. Claims that communists had 
infiltrated the Movement and concern that subversive outsiders were coming to the 
South specifically to cause racial chaos remained constant throughout the Massive 
Resistance period, among both political leaders and white southerners in general. 
Within that consensus, though, individuals varied their arguments and their language 
in subtle ways. 
Mississippi Congressman Frank E. Smith, for example, believed that the 
Communist Party aimed to link up with southern civil rights agitators in order, 
quoting the words of the CPUSA's Claude Lightfoot, to "dramatize the plight of the 
Negro people in the South. " Smith read into the Congressional Record a New York 
Times article which substantiated his own views. "The Communist Party, " the Times 
article reported, "... plans to inject itself into the civil rights struggle in the South. " 44 
The Citizens' Council newspaper, the influential organ of organised white supremacy 
in the South, agreed with Smith. In April 1956, it proclaimed on its front page that 
"the racial revolution seeking to wreck America's entire social system is the offshoot 
of a diabolical plot first hatched in Soviet Russia by Communists nearly three decades 
ago. "145 While sharing the same broad belief that agitators were involved, Georgia's 
Congressman Forrester, on the other hand, did not believe that the agitators were 
"outsiders" per se. As he explained to the House in February 1956, he maintained that 
"communist organizations would bring Negroes from the South up to the large cities 
144 Congressional Record, 23 February 1956, p. A1729, [RSC]. 
145 The Citizens' Council quoted in Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to 
the Second Reconstruction. 1954-64 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p. 198. 
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in the North, indoctrinate them with communism, and send them back South to sow 
the seeds of discontent. I personally know this to be true. "146 
Again throughout the Massive Resistance period, the majority of white 
southerners demonstrated that they shared the views of their political leaders. H. P. 
Moore, from Hyattsville, Maryland, made his own thoughts clear in the Summer of 
1956. He compiled a manuscript entitled "The Black Tide, " the second chapter of 
which was entitled "Communism's Pawn. " Exemplifying the complacency in so much 
segregationist argument, Moore wrote in the book that "the Negro group is shown as 
being Communism's Pawn, the instrument which they have and are utilizing in order 
to reach their objectives. Some detail is given to why the Negro group was selected 
and the great advances which have been gained by their utility. " The surprise about 
Moore's work, which serves to highlight inconsistencies not only in the application 
but also in the success of anti-communism and red-baiting, was that it remained 
unpublished. Moore complained that "the large publishing houses do not wish to 
publish" any book dealing with anti-communism and "pro-segregation. "lay 
By 1959, Winton M. Blount of Montgomery's Blount Brothers Construction 
Company wrote that the "closing of the schools is a terrible and serious step but 
certainly it should not be only the white children who are sacrificed in this vicious 
struggle. " Blount was adamant that it was a struggle "which surely must be led and 
146Congressional Record, 23 February 1956, p. 3207, [RSC]. Forrester's knowledge came from his 
role in the Ingram case. "Before coming to Congress, " he stated, "I tried the cases known as the Ingram 
cases. " A black woman and her three sons were accused of the brutal murder of a 65-year-old white 
man. When their case was heard, it was rumoured that large amounts of their defence fund was 
financed by communist donations. "Millions of dollars were raised over this country [by 
communists], " maintained Forrester, "ostensibly for the defense of the Ingrams... " 
147 "The Black Tide" manuscript enclosed with H. P. Moore letter to Tom Stanley, 29 July 1956, Box 
108, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers. Most of the large publishing houses were based in the North, 
especially in the North Eastern cities of New York and Boston, adding to the difficulties of getting a 
"pro-segregation" tract published. 
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abetted by the Communist forces in this country. "148 As late as 1965, Tom Kennamer, 
writing from the Office of the Minority Door Keeper in the House of Representatives, 
reported to Virginia's Congressman Bill Tuck on the levels of anti-communism he 
had encountered on a recent visit to Selma, Alabama. During his trip, he happened to 
be "in conversation with Circuit Judge James Hare and Sheriff Jim Clark, both 
expressing a desire to testify before the House Un-American Committee [sic] in 
regards to this `Civil Rights' movement. " The Judge, Kennamer continued, "has quite 
a file, well documented, on this movement, which he allowed me to read. "149 
It would not be correct, however, to suggest that all segregationists used anti- 
communism against all civil rights agitators at all times. The Cold War climate 
ensured that, as a weapon, anti-communism was available for use whenever it was 
needed. On certain occasions, it was indeed used indiscriminately; on others, 
however, it was used economically and with precision. The basic premise that the 
Movement was infiltrated by communists was at times narrowed down to respond to 
specific civil rights confrontations, and other factors necessarily contributed to the 
vehemence of segregationist anti-communism: the Little Rock crisis, for example, 
was concurrent with the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik, a satellite roughly the 
same size as an inter-continental nuclear missile. As much as segregationist leaders 
responded to such individual events and specific civil rights campaigns with -- albeit 
highly varied -- expositions of anti-communism, so their constituents were equally 
likely to do so. 
148 Winton M. Blount letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 13 January 1959, Almond Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 135, Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond. 
149 Tom Kennamer letter to William Munford Tuck, 7 December 1965, Folder 4343, Tuck Papers. 
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It is worth looking in detail, here, at the Little Rock crisis, as it provides 
perhaps the best example of the ways in which the international climate affected the 
language and tenor of Massive Resistance in general, and the use of anti-communism 
in particular. It was a crisis precipitated by the NAACP-backed move to desegregate 
Central High School, Little Rock, in the late Summer of 1957, in the face of 
pragmatic segregationist opposition orchestrated by Governor Orval Faubus. '5° 
Faubus was searching for an issue in 1957 that would ensure him an unprecedented 
third term as governor. He settled upon the race issue, and contrived a campaign of 
defiance that once again thrust the American racial question onto the front pages of 
the world's press. The Little Rock school crisis provided a vehicle for his ongoing 
political success. '5' 
Akin to other southern states, Arkansas had devolved decisions on school 
desegregation to local school boards, in the knowledge that such a move would result 
in only measured, tokenistic desegregation. Faubus maintained that segregation was 
"a local problem which can best be solved on the local level. "152 In Little Rock, 
however, the local school board and segregationist organisations were insistent that 
Faubus should decide on the fate of the city's Central High School. When Faubus 
sounded out the Eisenhower administration's willingness to deploy federal forces to 
implement Brown in areas that were reluctant to comply, the Justice Department's 
150 Faubus had always been an opportunistic political operator. As John Kirk has astutely noted, in the 
1954 gubernatorial campaign against Francis Cherry, although Faubus "was generally inclined to take 
a moderate stance on the question of school desegregation, " he was nonetheless hampered by "the need 
to court votes in eastern Arkansas [which] prevented Faubus from expressing unequivocal support for 
compliance with the Brown decision. " John A. Kirk, "Black Activism in Arkansas, 1940-1970, " PhD 
Dissertation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1997, p. 131. 
151 As Richard Scher has noted, Faubus was "searching for an issue that could improve his chances for 
a third two-year term, something which no Arkansas governor had achieved in more than fifty years. " 
Scher, Politics in the New South, p. 247. 
152 Orval Faubus quoted in Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 262. 
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Arthur B. Caldwell was instructed to tell the governor that the federal government had 
no plans for taking on such a responsibility. 
As court-ordered desegregation approached for Central High, segregationists 
and concerned parents' groups sought an injunction from the chancery court 
prohibiting such a move. Armed with the knowledge that Eisenhower was not poised 
to usurp Arkansas' sovereign rights with federal force, Faubus agreed to give evidence 
at the hearings. Reportedly on the grounds of his testimony, which stressed the 
possibility of violence if desegregation was to go ahead, an injunction against 
desegregation was granted on 29 August. The very next day, however, it was 
overturned by a federal court. '53 Faubus ordered in the National Guard. 
Whereas Faubus was willing to use Arkansas National Guardsmen to keep 
black students out of Central High, Eisenhower continued to prevaricate over the use 
of federal troops to uphold the law of the land, reluctant to force any kind of stand-off 
between state and federal forces. According to his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, 
Eisenhower wanted to arbitrate between two sides, not take sides. 154 Although the 
school year began on 4 September, it was not until 24 September that Eisenhower 
went on national television to explain the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division 
in an attempt to ensure peaceful desegregation in Little Rock. 
What made the episode especially significant in terms of anti-communism and 
red-baiting was that, on 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union hurled their Sputnik 
satellite into orbit, invigorating the space race and once again intensifying Cold War 
153 ibid., p. 264. 
154 Brownell reported that "President Eisenhower's position was that he was president of all the 
people. He felt that his role was to stay in a position where, when the showdown came for 
enforcement, he would be able to talk to both sides and persuade them. " Herbert Brownell quoted in 
Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years. 1954-1965 (New York: Viking, 
1987), p. 103. 
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tensions. There was something menacing about the controlled launching of a bomb- 
sized satellite that was not lost on Americans, and that menace was maximised by the 
Soviets. "Those damn Russians, " bemoaned West Virginia's Fred Haislip, "they had 
to call it a Sputnik, which was worth more to them than five zillion dollars worth of 
hydrogen. If, " he believed, "they had called it a Geophysical Astraglobulus, like we 
would do if we could ever get one up there, it wouldn't have been worth a dime to 
anyone. "55 
Harry Ashmore, editor of the Arkansas Gazette, wrote in Hamper's Magazine in 
June 1958 that the whole Little Rock affair "was about as handy a package as the 
Russians have had handed them since they set out to woo the colored peoples of the 
earth. " 56 Not only did Little Rock prove conclusively that the Brown decision had not 
been the required panacea for internal racial strife in the United States, but it did so at 
a time when world interest was focusing once again on the battle between East and 
West. Indeed, Arkansas Senator Sid McMath remembered talking to Faubus in an 
attempt to dissuade him from playing the race card over the schools issue and keeping 
blacks out of Central High for precisely that reason. "The most important point that I 
made or attempted to make, " remembered McMath, "was that I thought that at that 
particular time, the United States would be injured around the world by this kind of 
publicity, and that the Communists would take it and use it to advantage against us, 
beat us over the head with it around the world. And, " he concluded, "they did. "57 
Others, such as Mississippi Judge Tom Brady, chose to draw parallels with 
other Cold War flash points when berating Eisenhower for his -- albeit delayed -- 
155 Fred Haislip letter to James Kilpatrick, 16 January 1958, Kilpatrick Papers, Box 3. 
156 Harry S. Ashmore, "The Easy Chair: the Untold Story Behind Little Rock, " Hamper's Magazine, 
June 1958. Copy in Francis Pickens Miller Papers, Box 80. 
157 Sid McMath, Columbia Oral History, p. 11, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 
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deployment of the US Army. "The most recent and most shameful abuse and 
usurpation of power by the executive transpired not in Korea, " Brady stated, where 
US forces had been desegregated in combat for the first time, "but in Little Rock, 
Arkansas. The shame and blot of this tyrannical act will remain on the scroll of the 
executive branch of this government, " he concluded, before adding with a degree of 
southern optimism, "so long as we have any government. " 58 
For Massive Resisters, the deployment of the National Guard to enforce 
federally mandated desegregation over the substantial protests of the State 
Government was in every sense a gross violation of States' Rights. Even more 
alarmingly, the impetus for that desegregation had, they strongly believed, come from 
outsiders, subversives and communists. The Arkansas Legislative Council [ALC], 
having held hearings on Little Rock at the State Capitol in December 1958, found 
"that the incident which occurred at Little Rock... was not something that just 
happened overnight. It was planned, schemed, calculated, and had as its motivating 
factor the international Communist conspiracy of world domination squarely behind 
the entire shocking episode. " 59 State Representative Dale Alford, who read the 
ALC's findings into the Congressional Record, told the House that he would "prove 
that racial agitation is a major weapon of the Communist party -- and that many of the 
racial incidents of the past 25 or 30 years can be traced directly to Communist 
leadership and direction. " Alford's accusations centred on the role of a white woman 
shown by newsreels to be "befriending and comforting" one of the African Americans 
158 "THE RED DEATH: A Complete Address in Sacramento, California by Judge Tom P. Brady of 
Mississippi in 1957, " Tuck Papers, Folder 4028. Truman was held to have usurped power by failing to 
allow Congress the opportunity to debate US entry into the Korean War. 
159 Hearings of the Arkansas Legislative Council quoted by Representative Alford, Congressional 
Record, 17 February 1959, p. 2545. 
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chosen by the NAACP to integrate Central High. "Of course, the reporters and 
photographers had no way of knowing that scene was a staged affair, " he continued. 
"However, an inquiry would have revealed that the white woman was the notorious 
Grace Lorch, ... a Communist functionary, whose record is in the files of the FBI, " 
HUAC and, he claimed, SISS. 160 
It was not only Arkansas' leaders who supported Faubus during the Little 
Rock crisis. Georgia's Senator Richard Russell anticipated much of Alford's rhetoric, 
when, in August 1958, he urged that articles from the New Bedford Standard-Times 
be placed in the Appendix of the Congressional Record. He wanted to record the 
views of the paper's editors, as well as the content of articles entitled, "Forced 
Integration Fails to Promote Harmony, " and, significantly, "Communists' Basic Goal: 
To Incite Racial Strife. "161 "No domestic problem is more important to the people of 
this country, " claimed the Standard-Times editorial, "than relations between white and 
Negro Americans. An issue in which the extremist views are so widely separated is a 
natural for exploitation by the Communist Party. In this series of articles, " it 
continued, "the Standard-Times documents and reviews the Communist campaign to 
promote racial unrest in the South and the influence of that campaign in the origin of, 
and the aftermath to, the impasse at Little Rock ... "162 
160 ibid. Dale Alford, an eye specialist with strong segregationist views, surprisingly defeated the 
eight-term incumbent Brooks Hays in the November 1958 congressional race. A member of the Little 
Rock school board, he was, notes Tony Freyer, voted in on a platform "insisting on the value of 
segregation and the threat of communism. " Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional 
Interpretation (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 157-158. 
161 Congressional Record, 12 August 1958, pp. A7213-A7215. 
162 Editorial and Articles sent to Basil Lee Whitener, Basil Lee Whitener Papers, Box 82, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University. The articles, all written by Edward B. Simmons, included 
"Senate Group Says South [is] Red's Target"; "Reds Goad NAACP to End Moderation"; and "Daily 
Worker Led the Cry For Federal Intervention. " 
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Claude Hill, Jr, from Williamsburg, Virginia, was so incensed by the events of 
Little Rock that he copied a letter to politicians across the South, from Harry Byrd and 
Lindsay Almond in Virginia, to Richard Russell and Marvin Griffin in Georgia, Orval 
Faubus in Arkansas, LeRoy Collins in Florida and, finally, to "the Hypocrite Earl 
Warren" in the Supreme Court. His argument was a subtle variation on those of 
Alford and Russell. Hill did not suggest that communist agents were deliberately 
inciting racial strife at Little Rock, but rather argued that, because racial unrest so 
preoccupied the activities of the federal government, communists were benefiting 
more generally. Hill listed what he referred to as "the fundamental errors and crimes 
committed by Eisenhower in the name of legality, " which read as if it were a blueprint 
for southern resistance. He was angered by Eisenhower's disregard for States' Rights, 
noting that the President had "forced his way into states' rights without exhausting 
legal processes and without an act of Congress, " and "disregarded the constitutional 
responsibilities of Governor Faubus to keep order in Little Rock. " Uniquely, Hill 
argued that Eisenhower had allowed the Soviets to launch a satellite before the United 
States was capable of so doing because of his absorption with federalising the South. 
"Preoccupation with these fundamental errors [of overstepping States' Rights] has 
caused the United States to lag behind Russia in scientific advancement and 
armaments. The security of our nation, " he concluded, "has been put in jeopardy, 
therefore, by diverting all federal Executive functions toward the thought-control of 
the citizenry and agitation of the racial issue. You should be warned, " he finished, 
using language reminiscent of that used to describe totalitarian dictators, "that you are 
not dealing with the sensible man Eisenhower but with a ruthless tyrant. " 163 
163 Claude M. Hill, Jr, letter to Harry Byrd, Sr, Lindsay Almond, Richard Russell, Marvin Griffin, 
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Each period of sustained civil rights activity posed its own distinct problems 
and called for subtly different forms of anti-communist charges. One such conflict 
was sparked by the Freedom Rides in the Spring of 1961. The Congress of Racial 
Equality [CORE] initiated the rides in response to the Supreme Court's December 
1960 ruling, in the Boynton case, that segregation in inter-state bus terminals was 
unconstitutional. Following on from the FOR's 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, in 
which an integrated bus travelled South to test the Supreme Court's Morgan ruling 
outlawing segregation on inter-state transport, thirteen volunteers headed South from 
Washington, DC, in May 1961. 
Travelling through the Carolinas and Georgia, the two buses -- one Trailways 
and one Greyhound -- initially found little resistance. That changed, however, when 
John Lewis was assaulted by two whites in Rock Hill, South Carolina. Then, on 14 
May, the two buses set out from Atlanta, Georgia, on their way to Birmingham, 
Alabama. The first was set upon by an angry mob as it made a scheduled stop in 
Anniston, Alabama. Over two hundred whites threw stones at the bus and slashed its 
tyres. When it pulled over six miles outside Anniston to repair some of the damage, a 
mob attacked again, and a firebomb forced the Freedom Riders out of the bus. 164 
When the second bus arrived in Birmingham, enraged whites attacked unhindered by 
local police. The Commissioner for Public Safety, Theophilus Eugene "Bull" Connor, 
later recounted that his force had not afforded the riders protection because most of 
Orval Faubus, LeRoy Collins, and "the Hypocrite Earl Warren, " 7 November 1957, Harry Flood Byrd, 
Sr, Papers, Box 241. 
164 For eyewitness accounts of the Freedom Rides, see Howell Raines, My Soul Is Rested: The Story 
of the Civil Rights Movement in the Deep South (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 109-13 1; and 
Catherine A. Barnes, Journey From Jim Crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit [Contemporary 
American History Series] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 157-75. See also Williams, 
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his officers were at home for Mother's Day. It was later revealed that an informant 
had told the FBI in advance that the Freedom Riders would be attacked in 
Birmingham. 165 
The violent attacks on the Freedom Riders put pressure on the federal 
government, not just because it was the first time that the Kennedys had been faced 
with such serious racial violence. With a summit looming with Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev, press coverage of mob attacks on the riders was potentially hugely 
damaging to US international prestige. The Kennedy administration appeared to have 
weathered the storm when the original Freedom Riders, unable to find company 
drivers willing to take them onwards by bus, flew from Birmingham to New Orleans 
to complete their journey. Within days, however, ten more students -- eight black and 
two white -- arrived in Birmingham to complete the original planned route. 166 
Alabama Governor John Patterson refused to speak to Kennedy throughout the 
escalating crisis. Patterson was finally forced to talk to the Justice Department's 
representative in Alabama, the Tennessean John Siegenthaler, however, when the 
Kennedys threatened to escort the Riders with federal troops. Exemplifying his 
distrust of "outside" northern interference, Patterson greeted Siegenthaler by stating 
that he was "Glad to see you -- you're a southerner. " Patterson released a public 
statement to ward off the impending arrival of federal forces, claiming that state 
police would allow anyone passing through Alabama safe passage. The statement 
165 Williams, Eyes on the Prize, p. 148. 
166 The decision to fly to New Orleans was taken after two days of fruitless negotiations with bus 
companies to find willing drivers to go on with the journey. The second wave of riders had experience 
of non-violent direct action protest, having taken part in sit-ins in Nashville, Tennessee. They were 
arrested in Birmingham on 17 May, the anniversary of Brown. 
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ended, however, with Patterson ominously announcing that "we don't tolerate rabble- 
rousers and outside agitators. "167 
The Freedom Riders were faced with more violence in Montgomery, and, 
when Martin Luther King, Jr, flew there to speak at Ralph Abernathy's First Baptist 
Church, an estimated 2,000 whites surrounded the building. After much prevarication, 
and much to the chagrin of southern segregationists, the Kennedys were forced to 
dispatch federal marshals. King and his congregation were eventually escorted from 
the building by federal troops. 
Anxious to defray accusations of lax policing and even complicity in the 
violence in Anniston, Birmingham and Montgomery, authorities strove to portray the 
Freedom Riders as communists. "Surely, " Governor Patterson wrote to Bobby 
Kennedy in the Justice Department, "you have ample evidence by now that these 
invaders are nothing more than rabble rousers and law violators whose aim is to create 
riots and breaches of the peace in Southern States. Surely, " he continued, "you know 
by now that many of them are Communist and Subversives and that their movement is 
backed and supported by the Communist Party with the intent of dividing our country 
and creating domestic disturbances at a time of international crisis. "168 MacDonald 
Gallion, Alabama's Attorney General, aimed one higher in the federal hierarchy, 
writing not to Bobby but to John F. Kennedy. In his official capacity as head of 
Alabama's judiciary, Gallion sought to link communist involvement to the Freedom 
Riders' apparent disrespect for States' Rights. "Since federal intervention was brought 
about in Alabama, " he wrote, referring to the coterie of federal marshals deployed to 
167 Williams, Eyes on the Prize, p. 152 and p. 153. 
168 Governor John Patterson to Robert F. Kennedy, copied to Terry Sanford, Sanford Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 374. Emphasis my own. 
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shadow the Riders, "through the planned actions of a group of so-called `Freedom 
Riders' led by one James Douglas Peck, an official of the Congress of Racial 
Equality... I wish to enquire officially of you, " Gallion continued, "whether you were 
or are aware of the record of the said... Peck as a communist associate and a 
demonstrated enemy of America? "169 Exemplifying the cleaving together of the dual 
threats of an interventionist federal government and subversives that had come to 
underpin so much Massive Resistance rhetoric, Gallion stated that he made his 
enquiry "particularly in view of the fact that statements from high administration 
officials, including Attorney General Robert Kennedy, indicate clearly that CORE 
was encouraged in its trip to Alabama, and offered safe conduct by the federal 
government. "loo 
Outcry at the actions of the Freedom Riders, and the belief that they were 
communist inspired, spread from Alabama throughout the South. David Humphrey, 
for example, from Savannah, Georgia, believed in the wake of the Freedom Rides 
that, if "we southerners stick together we can win this battle for state rights [sic] and 
against Communism. " Humphrey broadened his attack to encompass the loathed 
federal government. "President Kennedy uses our money to fight Communism 
abroad, " he continued. "Why doesn't he take that money and fight it here in the US? " 
On a more basic level, he asked "what has happen [sic] to our God-fearing 
country? "ill Politicians from outside Alabama also contributed to the red-tainted 
169 Peck was the only Freedom Rider who was a veteran of the Journey of Reconciliation, and was the 
white editor of CORE's newsletter. When the Trailways bus, on which he was a passenger, pulled into 
Birmingham, Peck was dragged into an alleyway and beaten with iron pipes. He needed 53 stitches in 
head wounds. See Barnes, Journey From Jim Crow, pp. 158-60. 
170 MacDonald Gallion letter to John F. Kennedy, 23 May 1961, Sam Ervin Papers, Folder 2512. 
171 David Humphrey letter to Terry Sanford, 3 September 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
111. 
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attacks. "Though it was unwilling to intervene effectively in Communist Cuba, " stated 
South Carolina's Strom Thurmond, quoting a News and Courier editorial, "the US 
Government moved armed men into Alabama despite the protest of the Governor of 
that state. " The Freedom Riders were, he believed, not actually communists per se. 
Rather, Thurmond pursued his own line of argument, accusing them of merely being 
"red pawns and publicity seekers" who were "playing directly into the hands of the 
communists in agitating racial disturbances in the South. "172 
Beyond the South, others also expressed doubts about the Riders' intentions 
and provenance, again suggesting the potency of anti-communism throughout the 
nation, and the wisdom of Massive Resisters in using it to garner broader support for 
their cause. "The Southern states and its people must stand together alongside 
Governor John Patterson of Alabama, " wrote New York City's Walter Farrar in May 
1961, "if they are to help stop the Radical elements in their vicious conspiracy to 
overthrow the Southern states. "173 From the West Coast, California's Chester Gilles 
had "been interested in the `Freedom Rides' case ever since it began, for the reason 
that I believe these demonstrations to be... obviously Communist-inspired. " Gilles 
continued that the "obvious suggestion is that the Communists are about to try and 
create friction between ourselves and our Allies by trying [sic] the so-called 
integration program into an international controversy of major proportions. " 174 Harry 
S. Truman, retired from the Presidency, was quoted as saying that "Northerners who 
go South as Freedom Riders are meddlesome intruders [who] should stay at home and 
attend to their own business. "las 
172 Strom Thurmond quoted in Cohodas, Strom Thurmond, p. 324. 
173 Walter Farrar letter to Terry Sanford, 25 May 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111. 
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Accusations of communist-backing were also levelled at James Meredith. The 
native Mississippian applied for entry to the segregated University of Mississippi the 
day after President Kennedy's inaugural address in 1961. His enrolment was strongly 
opposed by the State Government, and by a very vocal contingent of local 
segregationists. Amidst much acrimony, and after three failed attempts by the Justice 
Department to force Governor Ross Barnett to allow Meredith entry to the University, 
Bobby Kennedy and Barnett stage-managed a solution. As Taylor Branch has 
commented, Kennedy wished to appear accommodating; Barnett's political reputation 
as a staunch defender of segregation required that, if he was to submit to 
desegregation, it would only be by the forceful deployment of federal troops. 
Meredith's eventual arrival was greeted by a night of rioting which left 160 marshals 
injured, a French journalist killed, and a local juke-box repairman dead from a 
gunshot wound to the head. Much against the will of the Kennedy administration, 
Barnett's adherence to the primacy of States' Rights was only weakened by the 
intervention of the US Army. As John Dittmer has commented, "for the New 
Frontiersmen of the Kennedy administration, it should have been apparent that the 
doctrine of Federalism had not played well in Oxford. "176 
The extent of federal involvement needed to enforce Meredith's induction 
clearly influenced angry condemnations by segregationists from across the South, but 
so too did the ever-present Cold War context. Mrs Isaac Hardeman, of Louisville, 
Kentucky, wrote to the Jackson Daily News after hearing of the events surrounding 
176 John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle For Civil Rights in Mississippi [Blacks in the New 
World Series] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p. 141. For more on the crisis at Ole Miss, 
see pp. 138-142. For details of the negotiations between Barnett and the Federal Government, see 
Branch, Parting the Waters, pp. 647-672. See also Walter Lord, The Past that Would Not Die (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1965). 
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Meredith at Ole Miss. "There can be no controversy or difference of opinion as to the 
evil consummated by the ones in the back of all this, " she wrote, "the ones who 
planned it; the ones who paid Meredith and his lawyers and his claque [sic] to invade 
Old [sic] Miss and bring rioting and danger to a state which has always had ideal race 
relations. "177 Somewhat unusually, though, Hardeman did not point the finger directly 
at the Communist Party, but at the "Bulletin For the Fund For the Republic. " It was 
they, she believed, who bankrolled the NAACP, thus indirectly financing Meredith. 
Moreover, she wanted that seasoned red-baiter, Mississippi's Jim Eastland, to lead an 
investigation of the Ole Miss affair. "Ask him to tell you which tax-free foundations 
furnished Meredith and the NAACP the money to pay for the invasion of 
Mississippi, " she continued. "Then take the roof off of hell until you force Congress 
to rescind the tax-free status of these privileged foundations. "178 
Hardeman's emotive description of the "invasion" of Mississippi by federal 
troops at Ole Miss was a popular term, preying on the spectre of the federal 
government's abuse of Mississippi's States' Rights and memories of the Civil War 
and Reconstruction. "The Invasion of Mississippi" was, for example, the title of a 
much-copied contemporary pamphlet written by Earl Lively, Jr. A reprint in the 
"American Opinion" series that sold for only one dollar, copies were dispatched with 
a sticker on the front referring to the proximity of Communists in Cuba. "Wake Up 
America! " it exclaimed, next to a hammer and sickle. "They're just 90 miles away! " 
Lively's intent in writing the pamphlet was clear from his first sentence. "Oxford, 
177 Mrs Isaac Hardeman letter to Jackson Daily News, 7 October 1962, enclosed with letter to James 
Kilpatrick, 22 October 1962, Kilpatrick Papers, Box 3. 
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Mississippi, was the setting, September 30,1962, the time, " he wrote, "but the script 
and the performance were better suited to Havana, Budapest or Peking. "179 
Having steeped the events of Mississippi in the prevailing language of the 
Cold War struggle, Lively attempted to immerse Meredith's actions in the rhetoric of 
Massive Resistance. He placed the battle at Ole Miss firmly in the context of the 
struggle between the "sovereign" South and the "federal" North. "The Communists 
and their supporters, " he wrote, "planned an all-out campaign against the heartland of 
the South... the invasion of this heartland came at Oxford, Mississippi, when federal 
troops and marshals occupied the town and University of Mississippi. " Lively was, 
therefore, substantiating his military metaphor of the "invasion" of Mississippi with 
terms such as "heartland, " "campaign, " and "occupied. " This was a battleground on 
which the noble South was pitted against communists, northern federalists and their 
black pawns. 
To States' Righters like Thurmond, federal invasions were clearly anathema. 
As he had shown with his criticisms of the government's handling of the incursions of 
the Freedom Riders, Thurmond clearly believed that the resources used to help 
Meredith's enrolment would be far better deployed internationally. "If the 
administration would demonstrate as much determination about decontaminating 
Cuba of communism as it has in forcing... Mississippi to bow to federal usurpation of 
power over education, " he thundered, "the American people could rest much easier 
about the forward momentum communism has attained around the world. "180 Asking 
"why is this administration 5aft on Communism? " the Texan G. C. Inge wrote that 
179 Earl Lively, Jr, "The Invasion of Mississippi, " American Opinion Reprint Series [n. d. ], Byrd 
Papers, Box 5. 
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"the use of troops in Mississippi have cost the federal government 4 1/4 million dollars 
to keep Meredith there. Using negro soldiers on the campus. Why, " he concluded, 
"doesn't Bobby [Kennedy] use soldiers to put Communists in jail... "181 
Such sentiments did not die out with Meredith's eventual matriculation. In 
August 1963, A. Philip Randolph, veteran organiser of the 1941 March on 
Washington, joined forces with Bayard Rustin to organise another march on the 
capital. They intended to maximise pressure on the Federal Government to improve 
the ongoing paucity of job opportunities for African Americans -- the main goal of 
Randolph's 1941 effort. 182 Randolph and Rustin, however, soon bowed to pressure 
from civil rights organisations to include demands for the passing of civil rights 
legislation as part of the March on Washington's agenda. Southern white supremacists 
reacted predictably. "The great majority of American votes of all 50 states, " wrote 
Tallahassee's Carl Liddle a fortnight before the demonstration, "consider the District 
of Columbia belongs to them, and not an an [sic] insignificant number of Communist- 
incited trouble-makers. "183 Pausing to make a rare southern appeal to the federal 
judiciary for succour, albeit sufficiently far from his native Florida for safety, Liddle 
felt that a "federal law should be passed prohibiting or restricting massive 
demonstrations and questionable marches in the District of Columbia, before some 
million hell bent for the devil rascals try to take over several years hence. "184 
The proposed legislation that leaders such as Randolph and Rustin called for 
manifested itself initially in a weak civil rights bill in 1963. Before his assassination, 
181 G. C. Inge letter to Terry Sanford, 21 January 1963, Terry Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 374. 
182 The 1941 March on Washington never took place, mainly as a result of Executive Order 8802 
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however, President Kennedy had strengthened the bill, and his successor Lyndon 
Johnson was able to use his political acumen to ensure the bill's safe passage in 1964. 
Like most white southerners, and all segregationists, Strom Thurmond was incensed 
by the Johnson administration's more forceful bill. "This legislation, " he declared, 
choosing his terminology very carefully, "will make a Czar of the President of the 
United States and a Rasputin of the Attorney General. "185 Again, segregationists from 
across the country reacted very specifically to the proposed Civil Rights bill, rising to 
meet its particular challenge. In 1965, the staff of the ALCPP published a booklet 
entitled "Communists in Civil Rights, " which carried a summary of the Committee's 
other segregationist propaganda works. In other studies which, as the pamphlet 
pointed out, were all available by mail order, "we have documented in depth the fact 
that the 1964 civil rights bill was copied from the Communist Party platform of 
1928. "186 Such ideas were eagerly taken up by segregationists at a grass roots level. "I 
have read much on Communism that does exist in this country, " wrote Eleanor M. 
Skinner, a southerner who had emigrated to Hawthorne, California. "This Bill has 
very similar things to what the Communists have been telling us they had planned for 
us, " she continued. "Many years ago the Reds knew that if they agitated the Races it 
would be easier for Communism to advance, and, " she concluded, "they seem to be 
accomplishing what they started out to do. "187 
Birmingham, Alabama, provides probably the best example of a city whose 
prior reputation as a hotbed of communist and unionist agitation had an unmistakable 
185 Strom Thurmond quoted in Cohodas, Strom Thurmond, p. 351. 
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effect on the tone of red-baiting and anti-communism in the Massive Resistance era. 
As Michael Honey's work has shown, the Communist Party in Birmingham, along 
with its counterpart in Atlanta, sparked "unprecedented interracial working-class 
activity" in the 1920s and 1930s. 188 This was caused, he rightly points out, by the 
Party's willingness to go beyond mere posture into direct action. It was in response to 
this activity, thought Honey, that authorities in the area "made a fetish of `common- 
ism. "1189 By the 1890s, Birmingham had emerged as a major industrial centre; when 
the Depression hit in the mid-1930s, anti-communism formed part of what Robert 
Ingalls has shown to be a wider pattern of violence against radicals. 190 A leaflet 
produced in that decade warning African Americans away from Communist activity, 
for example, was circulated by the Number 1 Klavern of the Robert E. Lee Ku Klux 
Klan. "Negroes beware, " it stated. "Do not attend Communist meetings ... The Ku Klux 
Klan is watching you. Take heed. Tell the Communist leaders to leave. "191 A leader of 
one of Birmingham's most heavily subscribed unions, the United Mine Workers 
[UMW], attempted to explain the reason for this early red-baiting. "Most of this scare 
talk about Communism is started by industrialists who are using mythical red armies 
as bait against organized labor. Some capitalists, " he believed, "who say they are 
fighting Communism actually are fighting labor union recognition. " 192 
Segregationists in Birmingham in the Massive Resistance era, therefore, had a 
rich tradition of red-baiting and anti-communism from which to draw. The main 
188 Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers 
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targets of the post-Brown attacks were not, however, traditional labour groups, but 
civil rights agitators. That shift in focus was not instant, though: the direction of red- 
baiting attacks had been slowly changing since the end of the Second World War. 
Bull Connor, Birmingham's then police chief and later Commissioner for Public 
Safety, was in the vanguard of that change. In the Spring of 1948, for example, the 
Negro Citizens' Defense Committee was established to improve African American 
living conditions in the city. It quickly petitioned for better law enforcement for 
blacks. To Connor, that could mean only one thing. The petition, he stated, followed 
the "straight Communist party line. "193 Two years later, Connor wrote an article in the 
Alabama Local Government Journal entitled, "Birmingham Wars on Communism, " 
which provided further evidence of the change in focus to a stress on communist 
manipulation of local blacks. "In its electioneering, in its above-ground political 
activity, " he wrote, "the Communist Party spreads only propaganda intended to 
deceive and agitate the people, for the purpose of creating class and racial hatred and 
to undermine our government. "194 
By 1958, Connor was openly harassing the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, 
leader of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights [ACMHR] and 
Birmingham's indigenous black protest movement. In October of that year, Connor 
arrested three black ministers from Montgomery who were visiting Shuttlesworth. 
"We don't need, and we're not going to stand for any out-of-towners coming to 
Birmingham and agitating our people, " fumed Connor. 195 Glenn Smiley, who arrived 
193 Eugene "Bull' Connor quoted in R. G. Corley, "The Quest For Racial Harmony: Race Relations in 
Birmingham, Alabama, " PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1979, pp. 48-49. 
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in Alabama to aid Shuttlesworth in December 1958, was directly linked by Connor to 
the broad communist goal of disturbing southern race relations. Smiley's Fellowship 
of Reconciliation, noted Connor, was surely a communist-front, if only because its 
name fitted "perfectly with `co-existence, ' `human welfare' and other Communist 
terminology. "196 
Alabama Governor George Wallace claimed during the non-violent 1963 
demonstrations in Birmingham, which were marshalled by Shuttlesworth and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference [SCLC], and which were met with vicious 
police repression, that most residents of both races were "fed-up" with the unrest. The 
Governor blamed the turmoil on "left-wing groups. " In order to protect what he called 
the white "race of honor, " Wallace vowed to fight "agitators, meddlers, and enemies 
of constitutional government. " Referring to the leadership of the SCLC and to 
Shuttlesworth in particular, Wallace believed that "so-called clergymen and their 
communist, left-wing-inspired followers have set out to destroy the freedom and 
liberty of Americans everywhere. It's tragic to me, " he continued, "that in 
Washington, we have weaklings who are afraid to expose the reds wherever they may 
be. "197 Just as Faubus had been in Little Rock, so Wallace's red-baiting was primarily 
pragmatic. It was designed not only to undermine his opponents in the way that 
Birmingham's white elites had attempted to undermine union activity in the 1920s 
and 1930s, but also as a pragmatic appeal to the insecurities of his white constituents. 
As John Kohn, a Wallace advisor in the 1960s explained, "if George had parachuted 
into the Albanian countryside in the Spring of 1962 he would have been head of a 
196 ibid., p. 164. 
197 George Wallace quoted in Stephen Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1994), p. 188. 
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collective farm by harvest time, a member of the Communist Party by midwinter, on 
his way to the district party meeting as a delegate by the following year, and a 
member of the Comintern in two or three years"198 
One year after the SCLC's campaign, the Right Reverend Henry Lee Doll 
reacted against George Wallace's overt use of red-baiting. He accused the governor of 
sharing similarities with Adolf Hitler. In response, one Alabamian woman wrote to 
Doll that Wallace was "only interested in preserving the rights of the States and in 
preserving the purity of the races.... The negro in Alabama has made great progress, " 
she proclaimed, "and is treated with consideration and encouragement. Will you 
explain, " she demanded, "why after a hundred years of neglect of the negroes by the 
North, there appears this sudden surge of interest in the North for the negro, 
particularly from the preachers and politicians and a probable prod from the 
Communists? " 199 
VII 
"Crank, " wrote Frank Porter Graham in pencil over a letter received from H. G. 
Willingham of Columbia, South Carolina, on 4 October 1946. Categorising Graham 
with Mary McLeod Bethune, Paul Robeson, Jonathan Daniels and "any other 
Communists you want to bring, " Willingham asked, "why don't you go to Russie and 
quit being a traitor[. ] I refer you if you deny me this fact to J Edgar Hoover[, ] patriot 
and gentlemen [sic] head of the Federal Bureau [of] Investigation Washington DC[. ] 
198 John Kohn quoted in Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the 
Conservative Counterrevolution. 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), p. 
9. 
199 Gaylord Lee Clark letter to Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, enclosing letter from his niece's Alabamian 
grandmother to the Right Reverend Harry Lee Doll, 22 July 1964, Byrd Papers, Box 266. 
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Ready [sic] Kraychenokos book as well as the 2/3 Rrosky [sic] wrote before Stalin 
ordered him killed in Mexico. "200 A study of the full range of segregationists' uses of 
anti-communism would not be complete without a brief survey of some of these more 
eccentric claims of communist involvement in the black freedom struggle. Although it 
could not be said that these were widespread, neither were such claims rare. There is 
no great consistency in the language used or in thematic content, although syntax and 
spelling is generally of a low quality, suggesting poor education. The biblical imagery 
common to the majority of such claims was informed by a fundamentalist religious 
bent. 
William Nevins, of Lexington, Kentucky, sent a copy of his book, Segregation 
Versus Integration, to politicians across the South in late 1948. Admitting that it was 
not a commercial venture, Nevins stated that "those who have read it say it is the best 
thing on the subject they have seen. " It was, he believed, "a holy crusade to save our 
children and grandchildren from this horrible Moloch of integration that threatens 
us. "201 The themes that Nevins' book touched upon included miscegenation, whether 
or not segregation could be reconciled with Christianity, and whether or not the South 
needed a new States' Rights political party. 
"The best way to blow the lid off the Pope's US Supreme Court decision to 
mix the races, " Louisville's Haskell K. Meacham wrote to all southern governors one 
month after Brown, "is to throw the Pope's Papal Hierarchy[, ] from the Priests to the 
Archbishops[, ] into our State Penitentiaries and throw the keys away... We have spent 
nearly 300 billion dollars and look at the American Boys who have been murdered on 
200 H. G. Willingham letter to Frank Porter Graham, 4 October 1946, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 
31. 
201 William Nevins letter to Virginius Dabney, 20 November 1958, Virginius Dabney Papers, Box 9, 
Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
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foreign battlefields fighting ex-Catholic Communists. All Catholic nations, " he 
declared, "are going to go Communist as told in Revelation 18: 4... "202 The Biblical 
passage to which Meacham referred described the Whore of Babylon, a figure often 
used by religious fundamentalists to both symbolise and denigrate the Catholic 
Church. In the Cold War era, the Whore was also used by some as a metaphor for 
communism. This interpretation rested on the notion that the Whore "sits on many 
waters, " which suggested an international menace. To Meacham and others, that 
menace could only be the global communist conspiracy. 
Not all such correspondents tied their anti-communist concerns explicitly to 
the civil rights movement, however. Norman Williams, for example, produced a 
shorter body of work than Nevins. Printed in pamphlet form, it was titled, "Excerpts 
from the First Book of Norman; The Printer That's Dedicated to God. The Most 
Amazing Book of Revelation Since the First Holy Bible by Norman Lee Williams" 
The second page of the First Book of Norman dealt solely with the communist 
menace. "Communism is a lot of `Hooey, "' he proclaimed, "along with Witchcraft 
and Voodooism and other such Quacks, for after all Communism is only a term for 
Good or Bad Men, Godly or Evil, and surely Russia and other Communists have no 
more, no less bad Communists than my Country. "203 
202 Haskell K. Meacham letter to "The Governors of Southern States, " 1 September 1954, William B. 
Umstead Gubernatorial Papers, Box 58.2, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, 
Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina. The text of Revelation 18: 4 in the King 
James Bible is as follows: "And I heard another voice from Heaven, saying, `Come out of her, my 
people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues. " 
203 "Excerpts from the First Book of Norman; The Printer That's Dedicated to God. The Most 
Amazing Book of Revelation Since the First Holy Bible by Norman Lee Williams, Richmond 19, 
Virginia, USA, " enclosed with 17 August 1955 letter to Tom Stanley, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 90. 
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It would appear that such offerings, although adding to the rich tapestry of red- 
baiting and anti-communism, nevertheless had a negligible effect on the thinking of 
those receiving them; there are certainly no records of any replies. A year after 
Williams had first written to Virginia Governor Thomas Stanley, for example, he 
wrote again, noting that, "after hearing from my first letter in December 1954,1 have 
written and mailed you several or more pieces, in which, for some reason of your 
own, you failed to respond... " 204 However eccentric they may seem, their authors 
nonetheless all exhibited some degree of literacy. They could, therefore, cast their 
votes in support of candidates who shared their general fears of communism. Here, 
then, was another constituency which would react positively to southern politicians' 
red-baiting. 
204 ibid. 
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Chapter Two 
Opposition, Anomalies and Deviation 
"It was and is an offence against sanity to try to stop all dissenting views by 
calling them `communistic, "' wrote one-time University of North Carolina Press 
chairman William Couch in March 1955.1 Although far from being representative of 
popular opinion, Couch's remarks do serve to illustrate a lack of truly consistent, 
homogeneous support for red-baiting: it was simply not always guaranteed a receptive 
audience, either in the North or in the South, when deployed as a weapon of Massive 
Resistance. 2 This lack of uniformity and efficacy has only rarely been hinted at by 
historians of Massive Resistance and of southern politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Neil 
McMillen, for example, quoted the PR Director of the Citizens' Councils, Dick 
Morphew, as stating that the Councils should not be overtly concerned with what he 
termed the "side issue" of communism 3 According to Robert Sherrill, when Southern 
Regional Council [SRC] staff writer Pat Watters heard Jim Eastland at a fund-raising 
dinner for the Georgia Citizens' Council, he found that the Senator was "a 
disappointment, a sing-song speaker who often lost the tune, a stringer-outer of 
sentence structure, a constructor of swimming syllogisms, a citer of confused 
communist-front charges, and in this performance anyhow, a bore. "4 But these are 
exceptions: the historiography has rarely sought to qualify the success of anti- 
I William Terry Couch letter to Frank Porter Graham, 9 March 1955, William Terry Couch Papers, 
Box 13, Southern Historical Collection, Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
2 Northern opposition to red-baiting was particularly galling for segregationists. As has been noted, 
anti-communism was one of the few weapons of Massive Resistance that, theoretically, could appeal as 
much to northerners as southerners. 
3 Dick Morphew quoted in Neil McMillen, The Citizens' Councils: Organized Resistance to the 
Second Reconstruction, 1954-64 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p. 199. 
4 Pat Watters quoted in Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South: Stars of the New 
Confederacy (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 205. 
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communism as an instrument of Massive Resistance, or to explore the multifaceted 
opposition to the phenomenon that emerged on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. 
The ignominious fall of "Tail Gunner Joe" McCarthy in December 1954 had 
increased public wariness of red-baiting. For over a decade prior to the Senator's 
disgrace, however, and before the onset of a truly massive resistance movement, more 
enlightened southerners had begun to differentiate between genuine anti-communism 
and gratuitous -- if politically effective -- red-baiting. In 1942, for example, labour 
organiser Lucy Randolph Mason wrote to the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, accusing 
Frank Daniel of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union of spreading "false 
rumours" about the communist backing of Highlander Folk School. "Mr Daniel began 
to accuse the School of Communism, " wrote Mason, who was closely associated with 
the institution, "though he has privately admitted to members of its staff that he 
knows there is no connection between the Communist Party and the school[, ] but that 
this is a good weapon for attack. "5 A decade later, in the Winter of 1952, William 
Couch wrote to Edward C. Kennelly of the Committee to Investigate Foundations. "I 
do not believe that the influences in this country that have been building up the power 
of Communism can be identified by the methods that are being used, " he argued. "The 
procedure followed so far has been about as sensible as if we had looked for people 
wearing false beards and carrying bombs and had assumed that on jailing these people 
we stop the Communist influence. "6 
As has been noted in the previous chapter, southerners tended to resort to red- 
baiting when rising to the challenges of specific civil rights activities in their own 
5 Lucy Randolph Mason letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, 13 January 1942, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 
Microfilm Reel 13,762, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands. 
6 William Couch letter to Edward C. Kennelly, 7 November 1952, Couch Papers, Box 3. 
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localities. They appeared more reluctant to level general charges of communist links 
at individual civil rights organisations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation 
[FOR], Congress of Racial Equality [CORE], the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference [SCLC] and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee [SNCC] 
when there was an absence of such activity. That stemmed partly from the "call and 
response" nature of so much of Massive Resistance, when challenges to the racial 
status quo by either the Movement or the federal government elicited specific 
responses. It also emanated from the growing awareness, both within the white South 
and in the North, that such attacks on the Movement represented cynical red-baiting 
and not genuine anti-communism. Thus, whereas in one sense anti-communism had 
offered resisters the opportunity to present themselves nationally as defenders of 
democracy, red-baiting also threatened to discredit the southern segregationist 
movement. The "Marginal Notes" section of the February 1957 edition of Fellowship 
in World Focus exemplifies this point well. "Lady in Pittsburgh wrote she wanted to 
use FOR Christmas cards but was afraid to because a columnist had said FOR was 
communist, " the anonymous writer reported. "Looked up column. Columnist didn't 
say FOR communist, simply gave such a distorted account of Carnegie Hall meeting 
last May, and motives behind it, as to make any other inference impossible. " With a 
resigned air suggesting that this was not the first time that this had happened, the 
writer continued: "Wrote columnist. No reply. No surprise. "7 
Aubrey Brown, a member of the National Student Christian Federation and 
various SRC affiliates, was a little more cautious in his attempts to publicise the 
7 "Marginal Notes, " Fellowship in World Focus, Vol. 23, No. 12 (February 1957), p. 2. Copy in Sarah 
Patton Boyle Papers, 8003-b microfilm, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, 
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
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cynicism of red-baiting, but was perceptive nonetheless. In an address to the North 
America Area Council of the World Presbyterian Alliance in the Spring of 1957, he 
noted that, in some cases, churchmen had acceded to the will of the Klan and White 
Citizens' Councils by promoting continued segregation. Brown stated that they "have 
accused their brethren of supporting atheism, socialism, communism and 
mongrelization of the [white] race. " But Brown explained to his audience that those 
accusations merely formed a manipulative weapon which allowed white supremacist 
churchmen to "drive a preacher from their midst if he antagonized the supporters of 
segregation. "8 Even Arkansas Congressman Dale Alford admitted that "there is an 
impression among some of our citizens outside the South that leaders of our Section, 
who are dedicated to resistance to forced integration, have sought to raise the issue of 
Communist influences in race agitation as a smoke screen to hamper the integration 
movement. " Alford, one of the South's more vocal anti-communists, unsurprisingly 
moved quickly to dispel the idea. 9 
An article by Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely that appeared in The Nation 
on 5 January 1957 sought to explain more of the motivations for segregationists' use 
of red-baiting. "The conduct and accomplishments of the Negroes during the last year 
have obviously shaken some of the firmest convictions held by the whites, " they 
wrote. At the beginning of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, they revealed, "it was often 
said that Negroes, `can't organize anything but a crap game. '... Then, of course, the 
white people began to admit the Negroes were organized, but `outsiders' had done it: 
8 "`The Church in Southern United States' by Aubrey Brown, May 13 1957, to North American Area 
Council of the World Presbyterian Alliance, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Atlantic City, " Aubrey Brown Papers, 
Box 3, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
9 Congressional Record, 17 February 1959, p. 2547, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The 
Netherlands. 
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Communists, 'NAACPs, ' `some of [Attorney General] Brownell's gang, ' 
`troublemakers' in general. "10 Paralleling the reasons behind the rise of a consistent 
Massive Resistance strategy, Dykeman and Stokely were insinuating that it was only 
once black protest was successful, and, therefore, threatening, that accusations of 
communism and subversion were necessary to undermine their efforts. 
Most of the opposition that red-baiters faced did not centre on the accuracy of 
reports of communist infiltration of black organisations; rather, as Dykeman and 
Stokely suggested, it focused on the realisation that red-baiting was a well-chosen, 
manufactured weapon designed to stifle nonconformity and undermine opposition. 
The SRC, for example, moved swiftly and publicly to expose the red-baiting implicit 
in Eugene Cook's infamous pamphlet on the NAACP. Responding to Cook's baiting 
of the SRC and its affiliate, the Georgia Committee on Interracial Co-operation, the 
Council produced a pamphlet entitled "The Attack On Free Opinion. " In it, Cook's 
attack on the two "constructive organisations" was depicted as a "side attack" 
intended to "frighten off thousands of religious, civic, labor, and business leaders who 
have joined together to work most positively" on the South's racial problem. 
Furthermore, the SRC believed, "every intelligent person will recognize this cynical 
attack for what it is, " a last resort to "smear and innuendo in the public forum. Those 
who seek, for political or other reasons, to fan the fires of racial prejudice have set out 
to brand interracial progress as `communist-inspired. ' By this, " it was concluded, 
10 Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, "Montgomery Morning, " The Nation, 5 January 1957. Copy in 
Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, 8003-b microfilm. 
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"they hope to confuse the public and discredit the growing number of individuals and 
organizations who believe in equal citizenship for all. "11 
The SRC also seized upon the language and ideological context of the Cold 
War to question the efficacy of red-baiting. "No informed person believes that the 
communists want to see Negroes accorded equal rights and dignity or that they want 
to see our racial problems solved through the orderly processes of the law and 
constructive community action, " the Council stated. "The communists, " however, 
"want to see us hopelessly bogged down in our prejudices and our fears. They want to 
see us defying the law of the land, whipping up racial hatred for political purposes. " 
For its final indictment of Cook and his manipulative brand of anti-communism, the 
Council concluded that "in this respect, they [the Soviet Union] have a common 
purpose with Attorney General Cook and his kind. "12 
Succeeding to the Presidency of SCEF in 1961, Aubrey Williams had a vested 
interest in deconstructing the vicious red-baiting attacks that were hurled at the Fund. 
In June of that year, he did so with some aplomb. In the wake of charges made by a 
Floridian Legislative Committee that all organisations working for integration in the 
State, including SCEF, were communist controlled, Williams wrote a form letter to 
the "Friends of SCEF. " He claimed that the Legislative Committee's report was "one 
of the thinnest and flimsiest of its kind I have ever come across. It is little more than a 
series of assertions that the SCEF and those other organisations associated with it are 
Communist and the proof is that they are against segregation and working for 
I1 "The Attack On Free Opinion, " Southern Regional Council Publication, p. 1 and p. 6., Virginia 
Conference on Human Relations Papers, Box 1, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections 
Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
12 ibid., p. 7. 
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integration. " 13 Williams was "sure you recognize this attack on SCEF for what it is, a 
blind, angry sputtering of frustrated men. " Nonetheless, he importantly pointed out 
that such denials of communist control, and such disassembling of the segregationists' 
red-baiting ploys, were useless unless the public could be convinced of what was 
happening. "Each of us must fight this, " Williams concluded, "... each of us has a 
personal responsibility for this sort of thing. "14 
The unabashedly progressive news magazine, The Nation, made its stance on 
red-baiting very clear. In an article titled "Summer in Mississippi: Freedom Moves in 
to Stay, " it stated that "representatives of the National Council of Churches, CORE 
and the NAACP's legal branch are reported to have refused to work with the 
[National Lawyers] Guild in Mississippi because of its left-wing reputation. Peace 
was eventually established and everyone calmed down except the Red-Baiting 
Mississippi Press, which, " the article continued rather mischievously, "tends to call all 
civil rights workers Communist anyway. "15 The New York Times reporter C. L. 
Sulzberger, filing an article from London where he was covering anti-nuclear protests 
aimed at the visiting Greek monarchs, wrote that it "is of course slanderous to even 
hint that the American integration campaign is in any way led or financed by 
Communists, and, " he continued, "such attempts to smear a genuine necessary drive 
have been properly denounced. "16 
One of the ways in which the meretricious red-baiting of civil rights activists 
could be exposed was by demonstrating how little headway communists had actually 
13 Aubrey Williams letter to "Dear Friend, " 27 June 1961, J. B. Matthews Papers, Box 500. 
14 ibid. 
15 "Summer in Mississippi: Freedom Moves in to Stay, " The Nation, Vol. 199, No. 6, pp. 104-11. 
Quote from page 107. 
16 Clipping of C. L. Sulzberger article [n. d], Virginius Dabney Papers, Box 2, Manuscripts Division, 
Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
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made either in the South in general, or in the African American freedom struggle in 
particular. If groups could successfully refute the alleged evidence of a significant 
communist presence in the freedom struggle, accusations that the Soviet Union was 
running the Movement could then be attacked as cynical red-baiting, not genuine anti- 
communism. Perhaps the most surprising suggestion that the extent of communist 
infiltration of civil rights organisations was overstated came from J. Edgar Hoover 
himself. He was not, however, making any broad, sweeping statements about the 
Movement as a whole, but specifically about the NAACP. A newspaper advertisement 
run by the Charlottesville, Virginia, branch of the NAACP, titled "Is the NAACP a 
Communist Front? " opened with the statement that "J. Edgar Hoover replies: `The 
NAACP's national leadership has vigorously denounced communist attempts at 
infiltration. "117 The FBI director had also congratulated the Norfolk, Virginia, 
NAACP on "one of the most effective anti-communist measures I have heard of... " A 
meeting of the Association opened with the chairman, a clergyman, asking "the 
simple statement that if any members of the Communist Party were present they 
would be excused. " This was followed by the questioning of each individual present. 
When the minister got to the back of the room, to where the "state organizer of the 
Communist Party" was sitting, he said simply, "you are excused. " The advertisement 
concluded by stating that "earlier, in a letter to the NAACP's national office, Mr 
Hoover stated: `Equality, freedom, and tolerance are essential in democratic 
government. The NAACP has done much to preserve these principles and to 
perpetuate the desires of our founding fathers. "' The NAACP realised the potential 
17 "(paid advertisement) by the Charlottesville Branch of the NAACP, " The Daily Progress, 21 
September 1960, VCHR Papers, Box 2. 
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importance of those words in allaying at least some of the fears that white southerners 
had about the Movement, especially given Hoover's reputation for hostility towards 
civil rights activities and his eagerness to root out all subversion. To make the most of 
their coup, the Charlottesville branch reminded readers in large bold capitals that 
"these statements reprinted with the permission of J. Edgar Hoover. "18 
Less surprisingly, perhaps, Nicholas Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney General 
to the Kennedy Administration, soundly dismissed notions of communist involvement 
in the black freedom struggle. Katzenbach had been involved in the stand-off between 
federal and state forces at Meredith's attempted enrolment at Ole Miss, and with 
George Wallace's Schoolhouse Door stand against the desegregation of the University 
of Alabama in 1963. Like Hoover, he was a federal employee; unlike Hoover, he was 
firmly behind the dismantling of segregation. In an interview with the Associated 
Press' Joseph E. Mohbat, published in The Washington Post of 4 April 1965, 
Katzenbach was asked what he made of George Wallace's contention that "the 
Communist Party of the United States has some influence or control over the civil 
rights movement and some of its leaders. " Katzenbach replied that he did not "think it 
is true at all in terms of any of the organized civil rights groups or their leaders. " The 
only qualification that he offered was that "of course there are efforts by Communists 
and left-wing people to involve themselves, inject their ideologies and beliefs into the 
18 ibid. Hoover reiterated this position nearly four years later. In the progressive national magazine, 
New Republic, Alexander Bickel wrote an article titled, "After a Civil Rights Act. " In it he sought to 
describe the state of the civil rights movement -- North and South -- and its leadership in the wake of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. "The aggressive, scattered, self-starting new leadership that has been 
causing all the brouhaha in the North in recent weeks is young. Often, " he continued, "... it is composed 
of very recent arrivals from the Deep South. It would be expected that the eagle eye of J. Edgar Hoover 
would detect -- where has it not done so? -- that some of them are subject to Communist influence. 
But, " concluded Bickel, "Mr Hoover offered no evidence to the House subcommittee to which he 
revealed his vision, and there does not seem to be any... " New Republic, Vol. 50, No. 19 (May 1964) 
pp. I1-15. Quote from p. 14. 
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civil rights movement. I think they have been remarkably unsuccessful in actually 
influencing any decisions, " he concluded, "and certainly have not captured any of the 
leadership. "19 
Katzenbach, though, was an integrationist. Judge Tom P. Brady of the 14th 
Circuit Court District in Brookhaven, Mississippi, was not. Brady's most notable 
contribution to the South's resistance efforts was a pamphlet entitled Black Mondau 20 
In a speech which summed up that booklet, entitled "A Review of Black Monday, " 
Brady roundly and unceremoniously attacked the Supreme Court's Brown decision. 21 
Although proclaiming elsewhere that both the Truman administration and Brown were 
"socialistic, " and giving support to a proposed youth indoctrination programme to 
teach "the truth about communism, " the speech that McMillen has termed the 
"inspiration and first handbook of the Council movement" propounded a surprising 
line on communist involvement in African American affairs. 22 Brady noted in passing 
that the "assault that is being made on the American mind is terrific. We know that the 
Communist organizations, and we know that Russia itself dreamed at one time of 
setting up a `Black Empire, ' of disfranchising the white man. And, " he continued, "we 
know that they worked along those lines for a long time, until finally they were told to 
quit, and they quit either because of the economic superiority of the white man, or the 
loyalty of the negro, or a combination of both. "23 Quite clearly, Brady believed that 
19 "Associated Press interview between AP's Joseph E. Mohbat and Attorney General Katzenbach, 
Washington Post, Sunday 4 April 1965 p. A5, " J. B. Matthews Papers, Box 128, Special Collections 
Library, Duke University. 
20 Tom Brady, Black Monday (Winona: Association of Citizens' Councils of Mississippi, 1955). 
21 "A Review of Black Monday" by Judge Tom P. Brady, 14th Circuit Court District, Brookhaven, 
Mississippi; An Address Made to the Indianola Citizens' Council, " enclosed with Robert Patterson 
letter to Wesley Critz George, 28 October 1954, Wesley Critz George Papers, Box 2, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The speech was first addressed to 
the Greenwood Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution, in Brady's home state. 
22 McMillen, The Citizens' Councils, p. 17. 
23 Judge Tom P. Brady, "A Review of Black Monday. " 
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blacks had at one stage had the chance of communist assistance in their struggle for 
equality, but, whether because of the strength of America's capitalist economy, or 
because blacks were not interested in the ideology of communism, that chance had 
passed. 
Gunnar Myrdal, whose socialist background and citation as the sociological 
authority in Brown gave rise to a rich vein of segregationist anti-communism, was of 
the same opinion. In the twentieth-anniversary edition of American Dilemma, he 
acknowledged that the majority of African Americans were in economic distress, and 
that they were feeling increasingly excluded from mainstream US society. "It is 
further true, " he wrote, "that the Communists have seen their chance and have been 
devoting much zealous work to cultivating the Negroes. " Like Brady and Katzenbach 
before him, however, Myrdal insisted that "the Communists have not succeeded in 
getting any appreciable following among Negroes in America. "24 Such denials, 
however, could be expected from individuals such as Myrdal who were themselves 
perceived to be part of the communist conspiracy behind Brown and the civil rights 
movement. The CPUSA was known to move in Machiavellian, conspiratorial ways, 
and such rebuttals by integrationists were expected. What had more of an impact, 
though, were the denials of communist involvement by the likes of Brady and -- in the 
specific case of the NAACP -- Hoover. Both men were held in high esteem by 
southern segregationists, and both were motivating forces behind white resistance. 
Much has been written on the formalised red-baiting carried out by 
government sponsored anti-communist committees such as the House Un-American 
24 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem in Modern Democracy [20th 
Anniversary Edition] (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 508. Italics in original. 
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Activities Committee [HUAC] and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee [SISS]. 
What has not been chronicled adequately, however, is the extent of the opposition to 
the red-baiting of such committees. North and South, an increasing number of 
Americans saw through the sham of those various committees and their cynical 
manipulation of residual fears of communism, and were increasingly moved to public 
protest. 25 The discrediting of federally sponsored anti-communist witch-hunting 
brought with it at least the potential to undermine the use of such tactics against the 
civil rights movement. 
In June 1952, HUAC held hearings outside the South, in Los Angeles, 
California. The growing strength of feeling against the Committee, however, cut 
across regional boundaries. A petition opposing the Committee's work was signed by 
98 people, including some notable southerners, such as Jim Dombrowski from New 
Orleans, the Reverends Alva Taylor and Claude Williams from Tennessee and 
Alabama respectively, and Dr H. W. Kloepfer, a Professor of Zoology in Clarksville, 
Arkansas. 26 By 1959, that discontent manifested itself in an editorial by the 
Washington Post and Times Herald of 7 January. The editorial, signed by individuals 
including Bishop Edgar Love, pacifist A. J. Muste, Reinhold Niebuhr, Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Aubrey Williams, petitioned for the elimination of HUAC as a standing 
25 A notable exception here is John Salmond's work on Aubrey Williams. During Williams' trial 
before SISS, the Montgomery Advertiser polled journalists who were covering the trial, asking which 
of the people that they had heard constituted the greatest threat to American ideals. "Half the 
journalists thought Eastland was, " noted Salmond. "Of the remainder most went for [SISS prosecutor 
Paul] Crouch. No one voted for Williams... " John A. Salmond, "`The Great Southern Commie Hunt': 
Aubrey Williams, the Southern Conference Educational Fund, and the Internal Security 
Subcommittee, " South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 77, p. 445. 
26 FBI memo, "Statement circulated in medical circles in California, " 16 June 1952, FBI File on 
HUAC, Reel 3,954-5, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands. 
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committee. 27 "We believe, " the petitioners stated, "that the US Supreme Court has, in 
the United States vs. Watkins, made it clear that the Committee has habitually misused 
its mandate in unconstitutional ways for political purposes; that it has become an 
agency for repression, " they continued, and "that it has usurped the functions of the 
executive and judicial branches of our government. "28 Martin Luther King, Jr, joined 
the growing anti-HUAC throng. He believed that the Committee "should not be used 
to thwart integration. We see the rise of McCarthyism in the South again because all 
other weapons of the segregationists have failed. "29 
The reaction to the editorial by red-baiters was, as could be expected, 
aggressive in its rejection of such claims. The FBI's J. P. Mohr reported the remarks of 
Pennsylvania Congressman Francis Walter to the Bureau's Director, J. Edgar Hoover. 
Walter, according to Mohr, "pointed out that the editorial stated [that] the committee 
had succeeded in persuading a great many who are gullible that any organization 
which seeks social justice or racial equality or freedom of expression or restraints on 
police authority has been infiltrated by Communists. He advised, " concluded Mohr, 
"[that] `this is the line the communists have been putting out for years and is 
completely false ... "'30 Walter's defence of 
HUAC was totally in character. He was 
appointed to the chair of HUAC in 1955, and had co-drafted the Walter-McCarren 
Immigration Act. Once reported to have replied to criticism by Edward Corsi, head of 
27 Although signed by only 35 individuals compared to the earlier petition's 98, the appearance of the 
1959 petition in the Washington Post and Times Herald was higher profile and received more 
publicity. 
28 Editorial, Washington Post and Times Herald, Wednesday 7 January 1959, p. A8, FBI File on 
HUAC, Reel 6,784, [RSC]. The Supreme Court decided, in US vs Watkins, that committees could not 
ask witnesses questions unless the answers were "demonstrably relevant to legislation that such 
committees were actively considering for submission to Congress. " See Stephen J. Whitef ield, I 
Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 123-124. 
29 Martin Luther King, Jr, quoted in Charlotte Pomerantz [ed. ], A Quarter Century of Un-Americana 
(New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1963), p. 82. 
30 Memo from J. P. Mohr to The Director, 19 February 1960, FBI File on HUAC, Reel 7,110, [RSC]. 
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the State Department's Refugee Service, with the words "I'm not afraid of dagoes, " 
Walter had stated on national television that neither the Ku Klux Klan nor the 
American Nazi Party "constitute a threat to the liberties of Americans. "31 
So compelling had the opposition to HUAC become that, in the Summer of 
1958, Committee members felt the need to defend themselves publicly by means of a 
pamphlet entitled "The House Committee on Un-American Activities -- What It Is -- 
What It Does. " "It is apparent that the document was issued with the hope of 
improving the HCUA [sic] in the public eye, " an un-named agent wrote in a 
memorandum to the FBI's A. H. Belmont in July 1958. It was, he felt, designed to 
counteract "the charges and attacks which have been levelled recently against the 
HCUA [sic]. " The agent made his own views on the Committee abundantly clear to 
Belmont. "The document correctly emphasises, " he concluded, "that the communist 
menace is more serious than ever before. "32 
Perhaps the least documented use of anti-communism occurred when it was 
deployed against segregationists. At times, a large number of seemingly unconnected 
individuals turned the traditional use of red-baiting on its head, and accused die-hard 
southern segregationists of the kind of totalitarianism usually associated with 
communist regimes, or of actually being in the service of the Soviet Union. Fred J. 
Cassibry, a member of the New Orleans City Council, exemplified this point in an 
address delivered in the Winter of 1960 about the need for racially progressive 
organisations to take the lead in the South. "There is yet time, " he began. "No lasting 
damage has been done. No charge of communism or integrator should deter those 
31 Francis Walter quoted in Pomerantz, AAQuarter Century of un-Americana, pp. 73-5. 
32 Memo to A. H. Belmont, 11 July 1958, FBI File on HUAC, Reel 6,381-2, [RSC]. 
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political, business, civic and labor heads from leading us through the trying crisis [of 
desegregation]. Demagogues, " he continued, "have been the spokesmen of our 
people. " In a direct attack on the misuse of anti-communism by those demagogues, 
Cassibry concluded that it "is high time their destructive and irresponsible mouthings 
are replaced by voices of responsibility and decency. "33 
Daniel Powell, Director of one of the CIO's Political Action Committees, told 
the CIO's Arkansas Convention that the United States needed responsible 
conservatives "just as we need responsible liberals because the American people need 
to hear both sides of any issue" in order to come to an intelligent decision. "The 
responsible conservative, " he maintained, "deals in fact and logic, but, " in a veiled 
reference to the red-baiter, he concluded that "the radical right winger resorts to 
distortions, lies, fear and smear. "34 Mrs Maybelle Nixon, from High Point, North 
Carolina, was more explicit in linking the ways in which segregationist leaders had 
dealt with the race question to "un-American" totalitarianism. "Don't you think our 
country is playing right into the enemy's hand when they read about all this 
commotion among us? " she wrote to North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges. "When 
in war against them we are all Americans, " she continued, "and now since the 
Surpreme Courts [sic] have issued the proclamation [Brown] to treat us all as 
Americans, how America is kicking up about it is just playing into their hands. "35 
33 Address of Councilman Fred J. Cassibry quoted in "Southern Regional Council Report L-24 
February 16,1961, " page 2, Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 2. 
34 "Address by Mr Daniel A. Powell COPE Director, Area 5, " Daniel Augustus Powell Papers, Box 
19, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 35 Mrs Maybelle Nixon letter to Luther Hodges, 20 February 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
228, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, 
Raleigh, North Carolina. 
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Such sentiment was directed South by northerners, too. Henry Harman, of 
Dayton, Ohio, was one who "hoped and prayed" that southerners would abide by the 
Supreme Court's Brown decision. "`Segre ag tion' is not `Democracy', but is 
'Fascism, "' "'Segregation' 'Democracy' e wrote. is as Dangerous to as 
`Communism' itself... "36 Garnett E. Phibbs took a somewhat more eccentric stance 
than Harman. Minister of the Killingworth Congregational Church in Connecticut, he 
sent a three page letter to Virginia's Tom Stanley, imploring Virginia's acceptance of 
Brown. "The next time you meet a rabid segregationalist [sic] speaker, just ask him if 
he ever heard the official solution to America's race problem offered by the 
Communist Party in 1933, " he wrote, before describing in some detail the Party's 
proposals for a separate African American state. "Isn't it ironical [sic], " he continued, 
"that the very Communists who purportedly love equality and classless brotherhood 
offer as a solution even more segregation? So you see, " he concluded with a flourish, 
"one might even argue that segregation is the Communist solution to our problem ... "37 
The Cold War obviously heightened discussions of the relative merits of 
"totalitarianism" and "democracy, " and that language permeated through the 
vocabulary of all Americans. As a native of Memphis, Tennessee, wrote in 1963, 
"when Senator Eastland raves about oncoming totalitarianism here in the South, he 
36 Henry Harman letter to Luther Hodges, 20 January 1957, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 228. 
Such sentiment existed before Brown, too. In 1950, a councillor representing the City of Miami Beach, 
Florida, wrote to Senator Frank Porter Graham to congratulate him on his vote against the "iniquitous" 
McCarran-Mundt "Communist Control" Bill. "It took a tremendous amount of intestinal fortitude and a 
deep sense of understanding of fundamental American principles to have, in the face of national 
hysteria, voted as you did, " wrote Burnett Roth. Realising that Graham's opposition to such a bill was 
made even more difficult by the onset of war in Korea and "present world conditions, " Roth concluded 
that it "is indeed unfortunate that those of us who have the deepest feelings against Communism must 
go to the extreme of Fascism and destroy all human rights in order to prove our Anti-communism. " 
Burnett Roth letter to Frank Porter Graham, 27 September 1950, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 39, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
37 Garnett E. Phibbs letter to Tom Stanley, 30 August 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 110 
Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond. 
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must surely know that we already have it to a great extent when you consider how we 
have taken the law into our own hands so often in dealing with the negro. "38 
II 
In the previous chapter, the ways in which various southern racially 
progressive individuals and organisations were red-baited both before and after Brown 
were examined. On many occasions, however, red-baiting simply did not have the 
desired effect of either destroying or discrediting such racial progressivism; on others, 
it was either ignored or openly exposed as a pragmatic and cynical weapon of 
segregationists; at yet others, it was turned on its head and used against the very white 
supremacists who sought to undermine those who supported agitation for racial 
reform 39 
One of the ways in which racially progressive organisations in the South 
sought to rebuff such attacks was through highly skilled deconstructions of the 
different methods of red-baiting that southern segregationists had at their disposal. 
One of the clearest examples of these counter-attacks was delivered by Rabbi Arthur 
Gilbert to a conference of ecclesiastical racial progressives in Lexington, Kentucky, in 
the Summer of 1960. In a paper entitled "Problems of the South, " Gilbert noted that 
"it will be sadly ironic if the ardent segregationist, in order to protect his Southland 
38 [unreadable] of Memphis, Tennessee letter to Terry Sanford, 18 July 1963, Sanford Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 347, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and 
History, Raleigh, North Carolina. 
39 There are the odd -- very brief -- exceptions: Anthony Dunbar, for example, quotes SCHW treasurer 
Alva Taylor in a letter to the editor of the Nashville Tennesseean, in which he wrote that "we have 
never paid any attention to those who mouth the red-phobia, moronic yawp of `Communist'; their 
Peglerian poison is falsehood beneath the contempt of progressives. " Quoted in Anthony P. Dunbar, 
Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets 1929-1959 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 226-7. 
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from a `communist-inspired' attack on racial purity, in effect replaces our democratic 
system with a police-state of totalitarian stripe. "40 
Gilbert broke segregationist red-baiting down into five distinct parts, all of 
which were legitimised by so-called "emergency laws" passed by southern state 
legislatures. "They clearly have as their purpose, " he felt, "the harassment, the 
deterring, the muzzling of individuals or organizations who would speak out for 
desegregation. "41 The first such law called for the disclosure of membership lists of, 
and contributors to, organisations which worked for desegregation in an attempt to 
"intimidate the members"; the second, which Gilbert thought "particularly effective, " 
simply forbade public employees from belonging to such organisations; the third 
established "investigatory committees to ferret out the influence of communism and 
subversive activity in the state"; the fourth were laws against barratry, designed to 
prohibit anyone from assisting a court case challenging segregation; and, finally, 
looking specifically to the states of Florida, Georgia and South Carolina, Gilbert 
identified the passing of "emergency powers" for governors to crack down on 
dissenting voices. 
Not only did Gilbert show the depth of understanding that many southern 
racial progressives had of the deliberate misapplication of anti-communism by 
segregationists, but he also identified another deep flaw in their constant cries of 
subversion. "It seems to me a dangerous course, " he said, "to give communism credit 
for every impulse that challenges the pattern of segregation. This falsely exaggerates 
40 "'Problems of the South - Acts of Violence and Intimidation, ' by Rabbi Arthur Gilbert; A Paper 
Read at the Interracial Consultation on `Southern Churches and Race Relations'; The College of the 
Bible, Lexington, Kentucky, July 20,1960, " Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 5. 
41 ibid. 
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the importance of communism and harms the cause of American democracy. "42 
Logically, he concluded, if every organisation with a sensitivity to minority group 
interest and social justice was accused of being communist, those minorities would 
come to believe that such sentiments "can derive only from the secularist political 
tradition of communism rather than the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition of the 
American democratic heritage. " Once again it was argued that segregationists were in 
great danger of being hoisted by their own petards: to label all dissent to the 
segregationist line "Communist, " white supremacists were naturally imbuing the 
Communist Party with more significance than its extremely limited action deserved. 
A statement from Highlander Folk School's Myles Horton, directly rebuffing 
charges made by the Georgia Commission on Education [GCE] that Highlander was 
nothing more than a "Communist Training School, " exemplified the dark humour 
with which southern racial progressives faced up to a continual barrage of red-baiting. 
The GCE printed quarter of a million copies of its four-page attack, which was 
directed not only at Highlander, but also at Martin Luther King, Jr, for his attendance 
at the School. In his statement, Horton referred to "a letter from the Deep South, " 
which, he believed, illustrated the red-baiters' attempts to "drive a wedge between the 
white and Negro integration leaders in the South. " He went on to quote that letter at 
length: "`Being a white professor in a Negro school I am used to being classed as a 
Communist, "' the anonymous author had written. "`All believers in integration are so 
classed. The reason for my writing is that I should like to know more about 
42 ibid. 
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Highlander Folk School. You must be doing a good job, "' he concluded, "`or the 
Georgia commission would not take notice of you. "143 
Not all moderates greeted the GCE's attack with such good humour. So 
incensed were some supporters of the South's racially progressive groups that, in 
direct response to the GCE's attack, Reinhold Niebuhr, Lloyd K. Garrison, Monsignor 
John O'Grady and Eleanor Roosevelt herself all signed their names to a document 
headed "National Leaders Answer Griffin's Attack on Highlander. "44 The attempts of 
Griffin and the GEC, the statement declared, "to draw from the serious and fruitful 
deliberations of this gathering sustenance for the efforts of the Southern racists to 
equate desegregation with communism evokes our strong condemnation. This kind of 
irresponsible demagoguery is obviously designed to intensify the difficulties 
confronting decent Southerners who might otherwise give leadership in the 
adjustment necessary for the desegregation which is inevitable. "45 The material, they 
believed, was slanderous, and such attacks on institutions like Highlander were 
morally indefensible. Indeed, in January 1958, Horton challenged Cook to label him 
unequivocally a communist so that Horton could take him to court and sue for slander. 
True to form, and true to the reliance of red-baiting on smear and innuendo rather than 
hard evidence, when a reporter telephoned Cook to see whether or not he would call 
43 "For Immediate Release October 5,1957 Statement From: Myles Horton, Director, Highlander Folk 
School, Monteagle, Tennessee, " Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Box 3. 
44 «'National Leaders Answer Griffin's Attack on Highlander, ' Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, 
Tennessee, December 18,1957. Signed by Reinhold Niebuhr, Lloyd K. Garrison, Monsignor John 
O'Grady, & Eleanor Roosevelt, " Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Box 3. 
45 ibid. 
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Horton a communist, Cook would only reply, "`People who live with dogs are bound 
to have fleas. "146 
Marion A. Wright carried the themes espoused by Rabbi Gilbert to Highlander 
Folk School two years later, in the Spring of 1959. Wright was unimpressed by 
segregationists' accusations of un-American behaviour amongst southern racial 
progressives and radicals. "If there is any group in this country which has given aid 
and comfort to the Communist cause, " he said, "it is the segregationists. Their 
activities have been grist to the Communist mill. " The Soviet's powerful media 
machinery, including Tass and Pravda, reported Wright, had "emblazoned" the words 
of segregationists across their pages. Furthermore, such propagandists targeted 
segregationists whether "suave and oily, as some of them are, or harsh and raucous, as 
others are. " The South's segregationists were the greatest allies to the Communist 
cause, he concluded, and had the "unspeakable effrontery to accuse those who dare 
disagree with them of [being] subversive! "47 
Beyond their attempts to expose the rationale behind the more cynical 
instances of segregationist anti-communism, there was a shared feeling amongst racial 
moderates that the red-baiting of their organisations was in many ways ridiculous. As 
early as 1940, Eleanor Roosevelt, an active supporter of the SCHW, had written to Joe 
Cadden that she was "sorry for the name-calling and everlasting red-smearing, 
which, " she felt, "seems stupid. "48 Virginia Durr, also a stalwart of the SCHW, 
46 "Memo For: Executive Council From: Myles Horton Re: Possible Suit Against Governor Griffin, 
Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, Tennessee, January 18-19,1958, " Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, 
Box 3. 
47 "Who Is A Subversive? An Address by Marion A. Wright Before Highlander Folk School, 
Monteagle, Tennessee, May 23,1959, " VCHR Papers, Box 7. 
48 Eleanor Roosevelt to Joe Cadden, 15 May 1940, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Reel 3,911, [RSC]. 
Cadden was accused of being a Communist by the Dies Committee because of his links to the 
American Youth Congress [AYC], but always denied any membership ties. 
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revealed that many of her contemporaries throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s 
thought red-baiting to be preposterous. "You see, the thing you've got to realize from 
our point of view, " she said, looking back at the Conference's heyday, "was, in the 
first place, none of us were communists, and we thought the whole thing was 
absolutely insane... the whole communist fear was insane. "49 The SRC's George 
Mitchell put it more simply. Exemplifying the effort made by southern racial 
progressives to align the civil rights cause with patriotism, decency and obedience to 
the law, Mitchell declared that he thought it was "the height of Americanism to 
support the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States! "50 
III 
The attempts of various African American separatist groups to use anti- 
communism as a weapon for their own gain naturally complicates a study of the uses 
of anti-communism in the Massive Resistance era. Post-war black separatists saw 
theirs as the only solution to the South's racial problems. They drew from a long 
tradition which included the teachings of Henry Highland Garnet, Martin Delany, 
Bishop Henry McNeal Turner and Benjamin Singleton. 51 Perhaps the greatest 
exponent of the black separatist tradition was Marcus Garvey, whose Universal Negro 
Improvement Association [UNIA] ultimately offered blacks psychological, if not 
49 Virginia Foster Duff, Southern Oral History Program, A-337, p. 30, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
50 George S. Mitchell letter to Mrs Morris Brown, 17 September 1956, VCHR Papers, Box 1. 
51 Garnet, for example, was the first African American theorist to claim publicly that God was black. 
Along with Turner, they both advocated a separate black nation outside the United States. Singleton, 
on the other hand, wanted to set up a separate black nation in either Oklahoma or Kansas. See William 
Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon: the Black Power Movement and American Culture. 1965-1975 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), especially pp. 31-62. See also E. U. Essien-Udom, 
Black Nationalism: A Search For Identity in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); 
John T. McCartney, Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political Thought 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). 
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actual, empowerment. 52 In the 1950s and especially the 1960s, a renewed interest in 
separatism emerged among many African Americans, centred around Malcolm X and 
the Nation of Islam. Although Malcolm found his most willing constituency in the 
North, he nonetheless also attracted the support of some southern blacks. 53 
Although in many ways polar opposites, in other respects there was much 
common ground between black separatists and their white segregationist counterparts. 
Their motives and their means may have been different, but their ends were very 
much the same. Both wanted the enforced, long-term separation of the races. For 
white segregationists, this was because they believed blacks to be a denigrating 
influence on their culture, society and economy. For their African American 
equivalents, it was an attempt to separate themselves from the persistent, 
institutionalised racism of the white world. Black separatists never constituted 
anything more than a minority of African Americans, but, nevertheless, their presence 
adds considerable complication to an understanding of the South's racial patterns. 
They had, moreover, one further similarity with their white counterparts: they, too, 
used anti-communism and red-baiting. 
Headquartered outside the South in Sausalito, California, the Joint Council for 
Repatriation [JCR] nonetheless appealed strongly to southern white supremacists. The 
correspondence entered into between the JCR and the Richmond-based property 
52 Garvey's aim to transport blacks to Liberia failed in physical terms, but psychologically he had a 
galvanising effect on black consciousness. He instilled in African Americans a belief that they could 
indeed control their own institutions, and raised them from what he termed the "slumber of 
accommodation. " For more on Garvey, see Amy Jacques Garvey [ed. ], Philosophy and Opinions of 
Marcus Garvey or Africa for the Africans [Second Edition] (London: Frank Cass & Co, [n. d. ]), 
especially "An Introduction to the Second Edition" by E. U. Essien-Udom, pp. vii-xxvii. 
53 Malcolm admitted that his views were extreme. In an interview with Alex Haley, for example, he 
admitted that, "Yes, I'm an extremist... You show me a black man who isn't an extremist and I'll show 
you one who needs psychiatric attention. " Malcolm X interview with Alex Haley, quoted in Robert 
Weisbrot, Freedom Bound: A History of America's Civil Rights Movement (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 1990), p. 175. 
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developer and eugenicist Earnest Sevier Cox exemplifies the similarities both in the 
aims of black separatists and white segregationists, and in the language that they used. 
Cox, for example, was solicited by the JCR's Willis Carto to become Honorary 
Chairman of the Temporary Council. 54 The letterhead of the JCR proclaimed it "A Bi- 
Racial Coalition United for Justice for Persons of African Descent. " "It is a tragedy, " 
stated the Council's explanatory literature, "that the legitimate aspirations of the 
Negro have been pushed to the background by the demands of professional 
troublemakers who mask their real intentions with the canard that they represent the 
Negro and his real desires. "55 In case the true identity of those "professional 
troublemakers" was in any way in doubt, the document went on to accuse the NAACP 
of being a Communist Front, and of being at the "very forefront of the subversive 
movement to pit race against race. " This vitriol was not, however, reserved 
exclusively for the NAACP. One of four JCR goals was "to seek to destroy the evil 
influence of radical, trouble-making, race-mixing, Communist-front organizations 
which masquerade as being for the benefit of the Negro, but which actually 
deliberately cause strife. " 
Perhaps the starkest example of a red-baiting black segregationist organisation 
is provided by a group from Memphis, Tennessee, called "The Mutual Association of 
Colored People, South, " [MACPS] whose letterhead included the words, `Bulwark 
Against Communism. " Their President, M. L. Young, proclaimed that "we feel we can 
progress and advance much faster by remaining in separate schools. We shall continue 
our strong stand against the ideals and principles of radicalism, communism and 
54 Willis Carto letter to Earnest Sevier Cox, 21 January 1955, Earnest Sevier Cox Papers, Box 10, 
Special Collections Library, Duke University. 
55 "What is the Joint Council For Repatriation, " enclosed with Willis Carto letter to Earnest Sevier 
Cox, 21 January 1955, Cox Papers, Box 10. 
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integration. " The MACPS's literature set out its position in no uncertain terms. The 
Association claimed that it had "begun a more vigorous and serious movement to 
fight the policy of Negroes and White in the same school. It is regrettable, " it 
continued, "that Communist and filtrated [sic] minded people seek to destroy the 
society of the White man and Negro in the South. " The most striking statement made 
by the MACPS in the context of anti-communism was that "integration is one of the 
sentiments used by the Communist and radicals seeking to bring about trouble, 
disloyalty and distrust... "56 
One of the highest profile black separatist individuals in the South in the 
1950s was Zora Neale Hurston. Her outlook was a complicated one. Born in the all- 
black town of Eatonville, Florida, and having studied under Franz Boas at Barnard 
College, Hurston strove to prove that her home town was capable of functioning 
within a segregated society. As she articulated in much of her written work, she did 
not see either the institution of slavery or the ideology of racism as peculiarly 
southern phenomena. Rather, she held that the nation had a racist illness, of which 
southern segregation was merely a symptom. Hurston remained adamant that race was 
a "loose classification of physical characteristics [which] tells nothing about the 
insides of people, " believing not in desegregation, but in ensuring that black schools 
and teachers received the same resources as their white counterparts. As such, she 
supported the separate-but-equal ideology propounded by the Supreme Court's Plessy 
v Ferguson decision of 1896, and was at odds with Brown. 57 Although common to 
56 M. L. Young, President, "Mutual Association of Colored People, South; Bulwark Against 
Communism, " letter to "Dear Sir, " 4 August 1956, Cox Papers, Box 10. 
57 For a general overview of Hurston's life, See Tiffany Patterson, "Zora Neale Hurston" in D. C. Hine 
[ed. ], Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1993). More 
specifically on her racial politics, see Annette Trefzer, "`Let us all be Kissing-Friends? ': Zora Neale 
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many accommodationists before the Second World War, by the 1950s the vast 
majority of African American protest organisations were actively seeking equality and 
integration. Hurston's continued adherence to the premise of separate-but-equal 
throughout the Massive Resistance years left her increasingly isolated. 
She added to her defence of separation of the races by re-emphasising that 
integration was the official Communist Party line. "It is most astonishing that this 
[integration] should be tried just when the nation is itself to shake off the evils of 
Communist penetration, " she wrote in the Asheville Times in August 1955. "It is to 
be recalled that Moscow, " she continued, "being made aware of this folk belief [of 
integration], made it the main plank in their campaign to win the American Negro 
from the 1920s on. "58 The implication in Hurston's statement was that, if integration 
was taken as the communist line, segregation must by definition have been anti- 
communist. A month later, Hurston was more vindictive in an appraisal of the 
NAACP. The Association, she believed, "has not now, nor ever has had any 
substantial Negro following. " Instead, she believed, it was headed, financed and 
master-minded by those "who cunningly seek to give the South a pistol-whipping 
with a black hand. They hotly and bitterly resent certain rejections of themselves, " she 
continued, and "are more socialistic-minded than any other group on earth. "59 
Davis Lee, publisher of The Herald, the self-proclaimed "Leading Negro 
Newspaper" of South Carolina, held similar views to Hurston, albeit ones that were 
put across in a less vituperative manner. In a front page article published on 31 May 
Hurston and Race Politics in Dixie, " Journal of American Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1997). Hurston 
quotation from p. 77. 
58 Zora Neale Hurston, "`White Mare' Doctrine False, " Asheville Times, 30 August 1955, clipping in 
Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 119. 
59 Zora Neale Hurston letter to Virginius Dabney, 29 September 1955, Dabney Papers, Box 7. 
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1959, Lee stated that he was a "full fledged, full blooded American. " He did not 
believe, he stated in a reference to subversive forces, "that we will ever achieve our 
full potentiality by pressure, agitation and force. " Lee followed a third way between 
forced integration and forced segregation, preferring instead a system of voluntary 
segregation. He believed that "the race issue has gotten out of hand to the extent that 
our race has been set back from 15 to 25 years... Those of us who have gone along 
with these agitators have become willing tools of the Communists. They have, " he 
concluded, "set out to divide us, and then conquer us... "60 Lee's vocal pro-segregation 
stance ensured him a relatively high profile. Billy James Hargis, leader of the far-right 
Christian Crusade, wrote that the "views of such Negro leaders as Davis Lee are 
deserving of much more prominence in the American press" than had, he believed, 
hitherto been the case. 61 
The Reverend O. B. Brown, pastor of the Negro Belmont Heights Church of 
God in Tampa, Florida, shared Lee's position in many respects. Brown was troubled 
by what he had witnessed at a 1956 conference held at Booker T. Washington College 
in Tuskegee, Alabama. The Tampa Tribune reported that "Brown said there were 
white speakers at the conference and they were `cramming' integration down the 
throats of Negroes. He accused Communists of agitating on the segregation question 
and added, `For God's sake, let us, the Negro race, alone. " Brown was in no doubt 
that the instigators were not only communists, but also that other traditional enemy of 
60 Davis Lee, "Pressure Groups Have Aroused Prejudice, Bitterness and Hatred Never Heard of Before 
in This Nation, " The Herald, 31 May 1959, clipping in B. Everett Jordan Papers, Box 257, Special 
Collections Library, Duke University. 
61 Billy James Hargis, Communist America... Must It Be So? [3rd Edition] (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Christian 
Crusade Publishing, 1960), p. 97. Hargis also identified the Southern Negro Improvement Association 
of Alabama as a black segregationist group, stating that they had "sent a 350-word telegram to 
President Eisenhower indicating that most Southern Negroes don't want forced integration. The group 
asked for a government-sponsored poll of Southern Negroes to prove the point, " p. 96. 
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the white South, outsiders. "You should have heard the messages that came from 
white peoples lips. These people were not from the Southern states. They spoke on 
segregation. They want to cram some things down our throats whether we can 
swallow them or not. "62 
62 "Article from The Tampa Tribune, Tampa Florida of June 21,1956: Tampa Negro Pastor Hits 
Integration, " clipping in Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108. 
150 
Chapter Three 
Virginia 
It was in many ways fitting that Virginia Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, was 
credited with coining the term "massive resistance. "' From the mid-1920s onwards, 
he was the commanding figure of Virginia politics, constructing an "organisation" 
from a rural, agrarian power base which came to dominate the Old Dominion for forty 
years. Byrd's controlling interest in Virginia was sustained by the limited size of the 
electorate, and by the unrepresentative concentration of voting wards in the 
segregationist, Black Belt stronghold of the "Southside. "2 The senator's continued 
political pre-eminence was taken for granted by almost all Virginians, and the 
organisation faced few challengers before mid-century. In keeping with other southern 
states, the vast majority of Virginia's African Americans were excluded from 
mainstream political processes. It is an indication of the stifling political atmosphere 
of the Byrd-era Old Dominion that, whereas blacks had no control over their 
exclusion, much of Virginia's white population chose to shun politics at the state- 
level. They preferred instead to devote their energy to "traditional nonpolitical" and 
"localized" interest groups. 3 
I James Latimer, who first reported Byrd's use of the term "Massive Resistance" in the Times- 
Disl2atc ironically wondered afterwards whether he had misheard Byrd, and that what the Senator 
had really called for was "passive" resistance. See Earle Dunford, Richmond Times-Dispatch: The 
Std of a Newspaper (Richmond, Va.: Cadmus, 1995), p. 362. 
2 One of the ways in which Virginia's white elites ensured this small, controllable electorate was via 
the poll tax, which was reintroduced in 1902. It was a traditional mechanism for disfranchising 
southern blacks and, when it suited, poor whites. 
3 Matthew D. Lassiter and Andrew B. Lewis, "Massive Resistance Revisited: Virginia's White 
Moderates and the Byrd Organization, " in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma: 
Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1998), p. 15. 
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After the Second World War, however, Byrd's rural-oriented machine was 
increasingly found wanting: it responded slowly to the development of cities and 
suburbs, and was not prepared for the resultant state-wide shortfall in public services. 
Suddenly Byrd and his political allies began to face significant opposition in 
elections. Francis Pickens Miller, a retired colonel with a heroic war record and 
progressive credentials, ran the machine-stalwart John Stuart Battle close in the 1949 
gubernatorial contest, and, in 1953, Republican Theodore "Ted" Dalton garnered 
almost 45% of the vote in an ultimately unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign. 
With his power looking somewhat precarious, Massive Resistance came as a 
revitalising tonic for Byrd and his organisation. From an early, surprisingly mild 
response to Brown, under Byrd's influence Virginia first drifted and then galloped 
towards increasingly robust defiance. Crucial to the unfolding of this story was the 
way in which the organisation pounced on a referendum ratifying relatively moderate 
pupil placement plans and a local option solution to the desegregation crisis, and used 
it as a mandate to follow a more mutinous course. As part of a strategy that was 
always underpinned by an expressly legal-minded approach, the state constitution was 
altered to allow the governor to close schools that were directly threatened by 
desegregation. By 1958, Massive Resistance in Virginia was as intemperate as 
anywhere in the Deep South, and Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, actually closed 
schools in three localities. 
Ironically, as we shall see, the school closures actually hastened an end to all- 
out defiance in two ways. First, white resistance sentiment increased until the schools 
were actually shut; at that point, the majority of Virginia's white citizens decided that 
they placed a higher value on the continuation of public education than on the 
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continuation of segregated schooling .4 Second, federal and local courts found the 
closures to be in breach of both US and Virginia Constitutions. For a state that placed 
so much emphasis on due process and legal argument, open resistance to Brown was 
no longer tenable. 5 From late 1959 until federal civil and voter rights legislation in 
1964 and 1965, and finally the Supreme Court's Green v. County School Board of 
Kent decision in 1968, Virginia returned to a local option scheme of token, voluntary 
segregation. 6 The state's two commissions set up to formulate a response to Brown, 
one under Garland Gray and the other under Moseby Perrow, therefore bookended a 
far more obdurate spell of fierce resistance with a more measured, moderate approach. 
This chapter plots the evolving politics of Virginia's legislative Massive 
Resistance programme, and the development of related arguments and counter- 
arguments designed to bolster opposition to federally mandated desegregation. It thus 
provides a detailed, local context within which to evaluate the use of anti-communism 
and red-baiting not only by those opposing desegregation, but also by those 
supporting the aims and goals of the civil rights movement. 
4 As Lassiter and Lewis have suggested, "When it meant not just accepting the status quo but also 
standing by while politicians tampered with the future of public education, popular support for de jure 
segregation outside Virginia's Black Belt turned out to be less rigid than scholars have often 
recognized. " ibid., p. 15. 
5 Richmond Times-Dispatch reporter Charles McDowell provided a glimpse of that atmosphere of 
strict adherence to process and ceremony. He wrote that the post-World War II legislature was "a place 
where the members tended to be the leading citizens of their towns and counties. They came there as a 
great honor... Their observance of parliamentary procedure was the most devoted and precise that I 
have ever seen in any legislative body. Everybody was forever in his seat. Nobody was reading a 
newspaper in his seat. They were as attentive as school children. " Charles McDowell quoted in Jack 
Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political 
Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Meridian, 1976), p. 343. 
6 The Green decision ruled that the "freedom-of-choice" concept of local option desegregation was 
unconstitutional, where dual black and white school systems persisted. The exception to the return to 
local option controls and public education was Prince Edward County, which, as will be discussed, 
persisted with private education until after the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
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II 
One of those to whom Byrd entrusted responsibility for formulating a legally 
based response to Brown was David J. Mays, widely perceived to be one of the finest 
legal minds of the South. Mays kept a personal and very frank diary of the internal 
machinations of the Virginia legislature during the period of Massive Resistance.? 
From those diaries, it is clear that Mays thought Byrd to be a man without any new 
ideas for the maintenance of segregation, in what was an increasingly hostile federal 
climate for the senator. To compound his problems, as veteran Virginia political 
correspondent James Latimer recalled, "Just before [Brown], the Young Turks had 
done something that nobody else had done for an awful long time, that was take 
control of the House of Delegates at least temporarily away from the Byrd 
organisation leadership. "8 It was this downturn in the Byrd machine's electoral 
fortunes, remembered Latimer, that started rumours that Brown, and more specifically 
Massive Resistance, might serve to revitalise the Byrd camp. Bereft of fresh ideas 
before the decision, and in the face of the onslaught from a younger generation of 
thrusting politicos, Byrd and his cohorts adopted the school desegregation problem as 
a political panacea. 
Although there are interpretative problems in judging mass public opinion 
simply by the content of letters sent by constituents to politicians, such 
7 Since his diaries were left sealed until 1996, even the most recent histories of Virginia have been 
unable to take them into account. Ronald L. Heinemann, Hally Byrd of Virginia (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1996), makes no mention of them, whilst Lassiter and Lewis [eds] I]g 
Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1997) note that the Diaries are open, but make no use of them. James 
Latimer, therefore, remains the only journalist or historian to have written on the Mays Diaries. See 
"The Rise and Fall of Massive Resistance", Times-Dispatch, 22 September 1996, pp. Al, A9, A10-12. 
8 The "Young Turks" saw themselves as the progressive arm of the Byrd machine, and had all entered 
the legislature after World War H. James Latimer Interviews with Former Governors Darden and Tuck; 
Program 6, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, 
Charlottesville. 
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correspondence offers at least an indication of Virginia's mood. 9 In the month 
following the Supreme Court's decision, the correspondence received by Governor 
Thomas Bahnsen "Bahne" Stanley revealed a strong current of pro-segregation 
opinion. On 1 June 1954 alone, Stanley received 46 letters on the subject of Brown: 
41 were for continued segregation, two were against, while three suggested names of 
possible members for a proposed commission designed to respond to the decision. Of 
a total of 191 letters received between 2 and 8 June, 183 were for continued 
segregation with only three against, and a further three suggesting commission 
members. 10 Clearly, of those who were moved to write, the overwhelming majority 
were against the desegregation of Virginia's schools. 
In keeping with other southern states, there was a period of relative calm in the 
immediate aftermath of Brown in Virginia. The Old Dominion's first legislative 
response to the decision, the Gray Plan, was the result of a consultation commission 
set up in late August 1954, under the tutelage of state senator Garland "Peck" Gray, a 
Byrd machine stalwart. The reason behind Gray's appointment was quite clear. He 
had written to Byrd only twelve days after Brown, expressing views similar to Byrd's 
own. "I have been racking my brain to see if there is not some way that we, here in 
Eastern Virginia, can circumvent the effect of the Supreme Court Decision, " wrote 
Gray, who, like most of Byrd's acolytes, held power in Virginia's Black Belt. "The 
9 Historians should not assume, for example, that all members of the public, whether taking an active 
interest in contemporary politics or not, deem it necessary to write to their political representatives. On 
a different level, Sarah Patton Boyle admitted in a letter to Lillian Smith that, as of September 1951, 
she had been the author of fourteen of the eighteen pro-integration letters published by the Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, many under assumed names. Boyle letter to Lillian Smith, 9 September 1951, Sarah 
Patton Boyle Papers [8003-b], Microfilm, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, 
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
10 "Segregation Jan -- June 1955", Thomas Bahnsen Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 104, Archives 
and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond. 
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territory I represent has approximately two-thirds negro children and I do not believe 
that many of our white people would accept the situation where their children will be 
subjected to such overwhelming numbers of negroes without exhausting every effort 
to prevent this situation. "11 Stanley, as a machine-backed Governor, was expected to 
rubber stamp the appointments that his patron wished to make. In short order, Gray 
was entrusted with chairing a commission to decide upon Virginia's response to 
Brown. 
The diaries of David Mays provide a unique insight into the internal wrangling 
of that decision making process. They confirm what veteran Virginia political 
correspondent James Latimer has referred to as political manoeuvres of the Massive 
Resistance era which have "long been largely rumour. "12 According to Mays, "Peck" 
Gray was enmeshed in a private battle for the next governorship with the then attorney 
general, J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. The situation seriously affected their judgement and 
respective political stances. A diary entry on 19 November 1954, for example, stated 
that, "involved in the whole segregation affair [is] a backstage fight for the next 
governorship. Peck and his friends... are busily trying to undermine the Atty-Genl. 
[sic] who has gained considerable ground in the past four months. This I am keeping 
out of... "13 So much was he keeping out of it, in fact, that Mays turned down a 
position on the Gray Commission itself, although, along with Henry T. Wickham, he 
served as the Commission's counsel. 14 In the emerging behind the scenes battle for 
11 Garland Gray letter to Harry Byrd, Sr, 29 May 1954, Mills E. Godwin, Jr, Personal Papers, Box 1, 
Manuscript and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg. 
12 Latimer, "The Rise and Fall of Massive Resistance. " 
13 David J. Mays Diaries, 19 November 1954, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
14 Mays had met Gray on 6 January 1955, and was given four days to consider whether or not he 
wished to join the Commission. "I know this to be a fearfully difficult assignment", wrote Mays, "and 
if I accept I must have some definite conditions agreed to in advance. A very supplicating factor is the 
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the governorship, Gray remained the organisation's choice to succeed Stanley, and 
thus had the backing of many of Byrd's key players. Even Stanley himself was caught 
up in the feuding, and it began to affect his choice of counsel. "Stanley is passing up 
Almond frequently, and bad blood between [them] can easily lead to major disaster in 
State problems. "ts 
The principal clash between Almond -- supported by Mays -- and Stanley -- 
supported by Gray and Byrd -- appears to have come over the strength of Virginia's 
resistance formula. Almond and Mays both favoured a more legally tenable "local 
option" or "assignment plan" approach, which would put school placement criteria in 
the hands of local school boards. As was the case across the South, the majority of 
those boards were comprised of the very white, pro-segregation forces that wanted to 
halt school desegregation. The assignment plan would, therefore, show a willingness 
to comply with Brown in the broadest of terms, whilst simultaneously ensuring that 
the minimum amount of desegregation would take place. 
The Byrd camp refused to endorse anything that could be taken as even tacit 
acceptance of the Supreme Court's desegregation edicts, and was loathe to accept the 
possibility of even token desegregation. The intensely legalistic approach both Mays 
and Almond brought to their work, however, made it highly unlikely that they would 
follow Byrd's line of total exclusion, knowing that it was sure to be rebuffed in time 
by both state and federal courts. As a result, both Almond and Mays were gradually 
excluded from the decision-making progress. "While Peck's treatment of Lindsay 
[and] me has been shabby, " wrote Mays, "I realise that the gubernatorial bug has 
battle for the governorship, Lindsay Almond and Peck Gray trying to use the school issue to win the 
high office. " ibid., 6 January 1955. 
15 ibid., 16 June 1955. 
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bitten him very badly and that he is but trying in his clumsy way to carry out the 
wishes of Harry Byrd, Bill Tuck, Watt Abbitt, and other extremists who want the 
assignment plan killed. "16 If the local option assignment plan was indeed shelved, the 
only available options were to desegregate or close public schools. Byrd, Tuck and 
Abbitt would not have endured desegregated schooling. 
On 11 November 1955, the Gray Commission presented its report to Stanley. 
It represented the first comprehensive, systematic examination of the scope for legal 
defiance of the Supreme Court and Brown. The plan did, after all, endorse the local 
option, assignment plan route to compliance. The commission also proposed an 
amendment that would allow state-funded tuition grants for white students who 
wished to attend private schools rather than endure desegregated public education. In 
order to enact those provisions, a public referendum was needed to clear the way for a 
special legislative session. More than two-thirds of Virginia's enfranchised population 
voted in favour of the constitutional change necessary to enact the commission's 
proposals. 
Surprisingly in the circumstances, Byrd publicly supported Gray and his 
commission's relatively moderate findings. The senator was determined to portray his 
organisation as united in its resistance to Brown, especially in the wake of Miller and 
Dalton's anti-organisation campaigns in 1949 and 1954 respectively. He was also 
determined that, having already compromised his hard line stance, passage of the 
tuition grant amendment would not be blocked by organisation factionalism. On 21 
December 1955, Virginius Dabney wrote to Byrd, stating that he was "glad you have 
thrown the weight of your great influence behind the Gray Commission's report. I am 
16 ibid., 26 June 1956. 
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sure that will go far to put it over, but we will still have a lot of work to do. "17 Perhaps 
less surprisingly, moderates and the Young Turks who threatened Byrd's political 
hegemony also supported Gray: by formulating a plan which stopped short of actually 
closing the schools, the commission had ploughed a relatively moderate furrow. In the 
light of these developments, the state referendum was advertised as a vote not on the 
continued opening or imminent closure of schools -- which had been Stanley and 
Byrd's personal choice -- but on whether or not integration should be forced. One 
advertising flyer, for example, besought Virginians "On January 9th [to) Vote X For 
the Convention. A Vote For the Convention is a Vote Against Enforced Mixed 
Schools. "18 Although it is a subtle difference, nonetheless a vote against forcing 
desegregation in schools appealed far more to moderate, liberal-minded Virginians 
than a stronger, more reactionary-sounding vote for school closures. 
Virginia's response to Brown did not, however, remain hidebound by the 
relatively moderate approach of the Gray Plan for long. The more extreme arm of the 
organisation, including Stanley and Byrd, took the public's overwhelming ratification 
of the Gray Plan as a mandate for a more hard line response. At the same time as the 
state's segregationist leadership began to retreat from moderation, Byrd confidant and 
Richmond News-Leader editor James Jackson "Kilpo" Kilpatrick sought other means 
of defiance. Starting in November 1955, he used a series of editorials to revamp the 
confederate doctrine of interposition as a means of bolstering resistance legislation. 
Short of secession, a resolution of interposition was the ultimate manifestation of the 
17 Virginius Dabney letter to Harry Byrd, Sr, 21 December 1955, Byrd Papers, Box 3, Manuscripts 
Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
18 Advertisement by the "State Referendum Information Center. Room 370 Hotel Richmond, 
Richmond, Va., Dabney S. Lancaster Director. Henry T. Wickham, Counsel, " Stanley Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 91. 
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States' Rights doctrine. As Kilpatrick's work showed, however traditional or even 
predictable calls for States' Rights had become in southern politics, the weapon 
offered a more flexible form of resistance than has often been acknowledged, and 
serves as an example of the malleability of resistance weapons in general. Kilpatrick's 
interposition campaign culminated with the introduction of a Virginia Senate 
resolution "Interposing the Sovereignty of Virginia against Encroachment upon the 
Reserved Powers of this State, and appealing to Sister States to Resolve a Question of 
Contested Power. " As Bass and DeVries have succinctly commented, however, "once 
examined calmly, interposition was legal nonsense. "19 
In this atmosphere of increasing extremism, Stanley and the assembly passed a 
package of bills in late August 1956 that represented the pinnacle of legislative 
resistance in Virginia. The assembly established a State Pupil Placement Board, 
removing authority for pupil assignment away from local school boards to the 
governor himself. Stanley now had the authority to close any schools under direct 
court order to desegregate, and to cut off state funds to any school threatening to 
integrate upon reopening. Although often obscured by Brown's specific focus on 
school desegregation, this period of hard line Massive Resistance also saw legislative 
moves aimed at ensuring the continued restriction of the black voting franchise. As a 
result, the National Association of Colored People [NAACP] was widely vilified by 
resisters, not only for bringing the Brown case to court, but also for its wider attempts 
to increase African American voter registration numbers. To complement school 
closing measures, therefore, Virginia legislators established committees that were 
19 The matter of interposition, they continued, "had clearly been resolved by the Civil War. " Bass and 
DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics p. 347. Kilpatrick's interposition plan was struck 
down by the courts on 19 January 1956. 
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intended to destroy the state's NAACP chapters. The Thomson Committee, 
established in 1957 under Alexandria's Congressman James M. Thomson, and the 
Boatwright Committee, under Buckingham County's John B. Boatwright, were 
eventually merged by Act of the General Assembly into one Committee under 
Boatwright20 They were empowered by two "anti-NAACP" Acts passed in 1956, the 
most potentially useful of which ordered the names of all members of, and donors to, 
the NAACP to be made public21 
In November 1957, Almond won the gubernatorial elections, although he did 
not replace Stanley until inauguration day on 11 January 1958. Just before Almond's 
inauguration, Byrd wrote to Virginia Congressman William Munford Tuck, urging 
Almond to "prepare a great States Rights speech for his inauguration and not suggest, 
at that time, any changes in our existing laws to prevent integration. "22 Almond 
would, therefore, be signalling his intention to continue defiance of the federal 
government without having to go into explicit detail. The new governor initially 
announced that he would follow existing resistance legislation, reporting that his 
concern was to "maintain and preserve an efficient and well functioning system of 
public free schools. "23 The manner in which Almond chose to preserve the state's 
20 The official names of these two committees were, respectively, the Committee on Law Reform and 
Racial Activities, and the Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice. Boatwright 
had previously served as Chairman of the Division of Statutory Research and Drafting, in the State 
Capitol, Richmond. Passed over by many historians, a brief discussion of the activities of both the 
Thomson and Boatwright Committees can be found in James W. Ely, Jr, The Crisis of Conservative 
Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1976), pp. 46-50. 
21 Along with this demand, "the new statutes make it illegal for any person, firm, or corporation to stir 
up litigation by offering, promising, or donating anything of real value as an inducement to another 
person to commence or continue a suit before a court or administrative body. " Walter F. Murphy, "The 
South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, " Western Political Quarterly, 12 (June 1959), p. 374. 
22 Harry Byrd, Sr, letter to William Munford Tuck, 10 December 1957, Byrd Papers, Box 262. 
23 J. Lindsay Almond to Reverend Charles L. Lady, 27 February 1958, J. Lindsay Almond Personal 
Papers, Box 6, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
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public schools, however, evolved dramatically during his tenure as Governor: in his 
1957 gubernatorial campaign, he had proposed cutting off one of his arms before 
allowing any integration in education; on 28 January 1959, he publicly announced that 
school closures were to be consigned to Virginia's political past. 24 
Again, Mays' diaries encapsulated not only some of the reasons behind 
Almond's apparent volte face, but also crucially delineated between resistance as a 
heartfelt matter of principle and resistance as political pragmatism. According to 
Mays, Almond acceded to the governorship on a segregationist ticket in 1957 not on 
ideological grounds, but because Republican candidate Ted Dalton had out- 
manoeuvred him and claimed the moderate ground for himself. "This, " as Mays 
succinctly noted, "puts Lindsay [Almond] in a deep hole since he must now go for 
`massive resistance' without stint, backing Governor Stanley's statute that would cut 
off school funds in any county or city where any integration took place. "25 What 
Mays' clandestine writings demonstrate, therefore, is that during the era of Virginia's 
Massive Resistance, politicians were frequently driven into taking stands and 
outlining positions that they not only disagreed with, but to which they were 
fundamentally opposed. He clearly establishes that politicians were fully prepared to 
24 "It was three years ago that Ex-governor Almond, in a spectacular performance, reversed his 
frequently announced opposition to federally enforced integration of public schools in Virginia. 
Opposition to integration had been the main plank in the platform on which he was elected governor. 
Reversal of his position was made more conspicious [sic] by his speech of just 10 days before in which 
he urged the people of Virginia, to stand firm and never surrender in their opposition to enforced 
integration. It was in that speech that he said he, as governor, would cut off his right arm before 
submitting to the iniquitous and unconstitutional school decision by the Warren Court... " Statement by 
Sen. Harry F Byrd (D. Va. ) January 19 1962, Byrd Papers, Box 264. 
25 Mays Diaries, 5 July 1957. This sly manoeuvring was not unique: future Governor Albertis S. 
Harrison, Jr, was, according to Mays, "driven into running for Atty-Genl [sic] against his will, he has 
denounced the local school assignment recommended by the Gray commission, when he has to admit 
privately that no other method of resistance will work. " ibid., 10 September 1957. 
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expound hard line policies and indulge in extremist rhetoric in the name of short term, 
pragmatic political expediency. 26 
But there is also a more subtle explanation for Almond's turn around. As a 
lawyer and former attorney general, he realised that closing public schools was legally 
untenable in the long term. Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, Almond claimed in 
an interview conducted in 1964 that he felt Virginia's move away from the Gray Plan 
had "broken faith with the people. " By actually closing schools, Almond alleged that 
he knew full well that the courts would strike down the state's 1956 Massive 
Resistance legislation, and that Virginia would once again steer a more moderate, 
legally defensible course. 27 Indeed, at the start of January 1959, Stanley's hard line 
resistance measures began to be dismantled by both federal and state courts. By 
January 19, the Virginia Supreme Court had effectively wiped out what remained of 
the Old Dominion's Massive Resistance laws. The NAACP, too, proved that it had 
been on firmer legal ground than the Virginia legislature. The Old Dominion's anti- 
NAACP statutes were declared void in NAACP v. Patty, which held that the 
publication of the names of those supporting or associated with the NAACP was a 
violation of the rights of free speech and assembly, and interpreted the attempts to 
curtail the Association's access to the courts as a denial of due process of the law. 28 
On 5th February 1959, the state legislature authorised the establishment of a 
committee under state senator Moseby Perrow to provide new direction in the 
26 Almond was also pressurised by Virginia's business community. As J. Douglas Smith notes, for 
example, Almond's U-turn came "after a group of statewide business leaders apparently convinced 
him that further defiance would destroy the commonwealth's reputation... " J. Douglas Smith, "`When 
Reason Collides With Prejudice': Armistead Lloyd Boothe and the Politics of Moderation, " in Lassiter 
and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, p. 46. 
27 J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, quoted in Lassiter and Lewis, "Massive Resistance Revisited, " p. 11. 
28 Murphy, "The South Counterattacks", pp. 374-375. 
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desegregation struggle. Staffed, in contrast to the Gray Commission, by a majority of 
moderate legislators from around the state and not just from the more reactionary 
Black Belt, the Perrow Commission not only accepted the premise of Brown as law, 
but was also infused with a real sense of the danger posed to public education by 
school closures29 The development of the commission's views strengthens the 
argument that resistance in Virginia hardened steadily until schools were actually 
closed. From that point, only committed, die-hard segregationists continued to fight 
for total resistance rather than some form of token integration. As, among others, 
James Herschman, Jr, has suggested, the closing of public schools also saw the 
emergence of a large-scale, white political backlash against school closures. Forced to 
chose between no schools in their own localities or token desegregation, the number 
of whites who joined the Virginia Committee for Public Schools [VCPS] proved that 
continued public education was a priority. 30 The VCPS brought together a number of 
federated, local committees for continued public education. After only one year in 
operation, it boasted a membership of 25,000.31 In an attempt not only to forge a 
white consensus, but also to offset any claims of excess radicalism, these committees 
steadfastly refused to support integration. Instead, they couched their moderation in 
terms of keeping public schools open. 32 
29 There were, according to James Herschman, only nine pro-Massive Resisters on the Perrow 
Commission. James H. Herschman, Jr, "Massive Resistance Meets Its Match: The Emergence of a Pro- 
Public School Majority, " in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, p. 130. 
30 ibid. 
31 J. L. Blair Buck Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, University of 
Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
32 J. Albert Rolston, for example, wrote to Almond outlining the purpose of the Charlottesville CPE as 
follows: "1. We are determined to pursue every legal means to keep public schools open. 2. We are 
concerned with neither encouraging integration nor perpetuating segregation. 3. We oppose any 
permanent arrangement with [sic] entrusts public education to private hands having no responsibility or 
accountability to the general public. 4. We have faith in Charlottesville's ability to meet its public 
education needs. " J. Albert Rolston letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 16 September 1958, Charlottesville 
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The case of Prince Edward County is deserving of special mention, for it was 
the one area in Virginia where public schools were closed until the end of the 1964 
school year, and where white moderate opinion had not rejected total resistance to 
desegregation once schools were actually closed. Even after Almond had performed 
his U-turn on resistance strategy, the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors 
continued with a private school system. That was in part due to the nature of the 
county itself; a central part of the Southside Black Belt, Prince Edward's African 
Americans made up 45% of the population. The completion of the modem, all-black 
Moton High School in September 1953 publicly demonstrated that -- in some areas at 
least -- the county was committed to separate and equal facilities. As a result, Massive 
Resisters were able to label desegregation in the county as a specifically social 
problem, to be dealt with by the black and white communities. 
That, in turn, allowed the county's political elites to unite their white 
community behind the decision to close schools and operate a private alternative for 
white students. As Amy Murrell has demonstrated, leaders of the resistance campaign 
effectively eliminated any white moderate opposition to school closures by couching 
their arguments in terms of community consciousness. Die-hard segregationists 
dominated public meetings, and succeeded in convincing "average white citizens that 
theirs was a pro-education, civic-minded mission, and they applied social pressure to 
those [whites] who doubted them. "33 As Harry Boyte, who volunteered to teach black 
children after the school closures noted, "no one dares speak out. It is a strange thing 
Committee For Public Education Papers, Box 1, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections 
Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
33 Amy E. Murrell, "The 'Impossible' Prince Edward County Case: The Endurance of Resistance in a 
Southwide County, 1959-64, " in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, p. 135. 
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to see such control over public utterances. "34 Indeed, so pervasive was the consensus 
among the white population that rabid Massive Resistance rhetoric was not necessary. 
Prince Edward's white leadership was helped by two other issues in its 
attempts to constrict public debate about the efficacy of closed schools. The county 
had been named in the original Brown decision, which helped the white community to 
focus on resisting desegregation. Furthermore, the private school system that was set 
up -- for the county's white children -- was hugely effective, in part because white 
teachers were guaranteed the same pension schemes and social security benefits that 
they had received when in the state system. The unity of the white community also 
contributed to the establishment of that successful school system, as desks, filing 
cabinets and books were donated by local businessmen. One third of the $212,830 
needed to support private schools was pledged at the private school fund's inaugural 
meeting. 35 In the end, it was the constant yet painfully slow legal process instigated by 
the NAACP and the county's black population that led to the Supreme Court 
declaring, on 25 May 1964, that the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors had 
violated the 14th Amendment by ending public education in the County. 
Beyond the borders of Prince Edward County, Virginia's Massive Resisters 
were guided by the Perrow Plan, the main tenets of which echoed the earlier focus of 
the Gray Plan. It heralded a return to "local option" pupil assignment, although 
provision was made to facilitate the establishment and operation of private schools, in 
a move to appease the Southside legislators still persevering with closed schools in 
Prince Edward County. The Plan passed by only one vote. A circular letter from the 
34 Harry Boyte quoted in ibid., p. 162. 
35 ibid., p. 141. 
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VCPS, dated 2 May 1959, exemplified the impact that the adoption of the Perrow 
Plan made. "The special session of the General Assembly is over, " it proclaimed. 
"What is its significance?... The adoption of the Perrow Commission's `freedom-of- 
choice' program represents the first step away from Massive Resistance. The 
psychological impact is probably much more significant than the actual measures. "36 
Sarah Patton Boyle, too, sensed that the indefatigable campaign against desegregation 
was, at last, tiring. The notable and outspoken white moderate, who lived in 
Charlottesville for much of the 1950s, wrote to her New York City-based friend and 
fund-raiser, Flora "Florsch" Morrison, in February 1959. In the letter, she stated that 
she was "feeling more hopeful on the integration front. All quiet still. So people know 
it can be, even if there's trouble latter [sic]. Massive resistance is broken. New laws 
are being hastened through it's true. But I know of no way to repair broken ice. "37 
III 
Virginia's complicated and varied legislative response to Brown did not occur 
in domestic isolation. Like the United States as a whole, from the late 1940s onwards 
Virginia was plunged into the chilling milieu of the Cold War. 38 The views of those 
on all sides of Virginia's Massive Resistance debate were affected by the global 
situation. Those in favour of hard line resistance legislation continually supplemented 
their arguments with rhetoric concerning the links between communism and 
integration, just as racial progressives appealed to the state's ruling elites to end 
36 "Correspondence of Committee, 1959, May", Buck Papers, Box 1. 
37 Sarah Patton Boyle letter to Flora Morrison, 10 February 1959, Boyle Papers, Box 5, 
38 Ely's assessment here is surely wide of the mark. "Cold War themes, " he writes, "so misplaced in 
this bitter domestic controversy, primarily serve to emphasize the anticommunist mood of the 1950s. " 
On the contrary, Massive Resistance and the schools issue were inextricably bound up in the Cold War. 
Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 121. 
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segregation because of its detrimental effect on the United States' global image. 
Although an undercurrent of Cold War rhetoric continued unabated, its tenor and 
vigour was dependent upon the urgency of the situation: a softening of legislative 
resistance strategies, for example, brought forth more intemperate rhetoric from hard 
line segregationists who feared that their battle was in danger of being lost. 
While Gray's commission was still hearing arguments over Virginia's 
proposed response to Brown, the organisation's moderate and hard line factions 
reacted very differently to the pressures that the Cold War placed on the race issue. 
Mays, who, along with Almond, supported a more moderate line than Stanley and 
Byrd, was aware of the need to soften Virginia's racial image. In August 1955, when a 
visiting Ambassador from India was forced into segregated restaurant facilities on a 
visit to Houston, Texas, Mays seized the opportunity for the Old Dominion's own 
propaganda purposes: by 10 September 1955, Mr Melita, the Ambassador, had 
accepted Mays' invitation to address the Richmond Bar Association on 3 November. 
"I intend, " wrote Mays, "to make quite an affair of it. "39 Stanley's camp, on the other 
hand, was not so conciliatory. Lucas D. Philips, a pro-Byrd member of the Virginia 
House of Delegates, wrote to tell Stanley of his outright opposition to Brown. The 
decision was, he believed, "wrong. " As a result, he continued, "it is a time for action, 
and I for one am not willing to remain silent in order to please all the Socialists and 
do-gooders who have fallen for false doctrine under the lash of Communist 
propaganda. "4° 
39 Mays Diaries, 24 August 1955 and 10 September 1955. 
40 Hon. Lucas D. Philips letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 26 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 100. 
168 
Once the state's hard line Massive Resistance laws had been passed in the 
Summer of 1956, segregationist anti-communism became gradually less shrill. In 
contrast, moderate forces in the state began to use Cold War issues to support their 
opposition to school closures. As the "Peninsula Council for Community Co- 
operation, " a self-styled non-profit, non-political, Newport News-based organisation 
suggested to Almond during his gubernatorial campaign, "the Sputniks are continually 
warning us that the battle for the minds of the people of the world is not for keeps. 
Thus, it is our duty to tell our citizens no matter how repugnant it may be emotionally, 
that it is no longer a question of preserving the southern way of life but rather the 
pressing question of preserving the national life itself. It is within such a context of 
meaning that the preservation of our public school system must be considered. " 
Otherwise, the Council continued, any victory for Massive Resistance in such 
circumstances could "well be a pyrrhic one. "41 
In February 1958, a month after school closures had been authorised, 
Konnarock's Lutheran Reverend Charles L. Lady wrote to Almond. Lady was 
"greatly concerned to know whether my governor is more interested in `cross burning' 
than he is in `cross bearing, ' I believe that we need to remember that the white race is 
the minority race in this world. The great mass of yellow, red, brown, and black- 
skinned people of this world are not going to accept Christ proclaimed by American 
Christians as long as we continue to promote segregation and forbid integration in this 
country. Have you ever stopped to consider what would happen to the teaching of the 
Bible in Africa or India if the governments of those lands would have taken the same 
41 "Peninsula Council for Community Co-operation; a Non-Profit, Non-Political Organization, " 
Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 2, November 1957, Byrd Papers, Box 241. 
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attitude as your policy [of segregation] has proclaimed? " Almond sought to deflect the 
Reverend's criticisms by counter-attacking. "You express great concern over what 
peoples of other colors throughout the world may think relative to our position in this 
matter, " he wrote. "You cite Africa and India. You are apparently not familiar with 
the caste system of India, the terrible discriminations on racial lines enforced 
throughout the Soviet world, nor with racial conditions which prevail in Africa..: 142 
While still advocating the hard line of school closures, Almond did his utmost 
to make States' Rights, such an intrinsic part of any Massive Resistance campaign, a 
part of Cold War concerns, too. "Advocates of centralized power, " he said in 1958, 
referring to those who would support federal rights over those of individual states, 
along with "misguided theorists" and jurists "either ignorant or indifferent to 
provisions of the fundamental law, " were firmly linked to "subversives eager to take 
advantage of every opportunity. " Together they had succeeded, thought Almond, in 
bringing a state of inertia and confusion to Virginia. 43 The Old Dominion's 
constituents, too, joined Almond in rebranding States' Rights as a Cold War issue. 
Phoebus' Dana Wier, for example, wrote that "I believe the proper state officials 
should find out who the clique may be that is being financed to overthrow State and 
individual rights that we have enjoyed since the birth of our nation... If Communist 
people are behind the revolution to overthrow state policies they should be given a 
fast trial plus a cheap funeral. "44 
42 Reverend Charles L. Lady Letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 24 February 1958, and Almond letter to 
Lady, 27 February 1958, Almond Personal Papers, Box 6. 
43 "Address of J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, Governor of Virginia, American Legion Convention, 
Department of Virginia, Roanoke, Saturday August 2,1958,11 a. m. " Almond Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 143, Archives and Map Research Room, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
44 Dana Wier letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 29 October 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
103. 
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At the start of 1959, when Almond's decision to reopen public schools once 
again reinvigorated desegregation debates, supporters of both sides of the argument 
were still trying to use the Cold War climate to their own advantage. The moderate 
Waynesboro News-Vir iinian, for example, noted in January that "the world is torn by 
a gigantic struggle between opposing ideologies... Communism and Christianity. The 
United States, of which Virginia is an integral part, is a Christian nation. We believe 
in the dignity of the individual, the freedom of the person and in equal opportunity for 
all citizens. The free public school is the bulwark of our democratic philosophy. " 
Damningly, the editorial ended with the admonition that "we cannot shipwreck 
anything as fundamental as our school system on the shoals of prejudice and hate. "45 
In the same month, the CBS network broadcast a television programme 
entitled "The Lost Class of 1959, " in reference to those affected by Virginia's school 
closures. It featured the forthright views of Colonel James G. Martin on the issue, who 
still saw school integration as a communist inspired plot. "As a device in 
implementation of this scheme of subversion of American institutions, " broadcast the 
Colonel, "the Soviet [sic] has adopted this technique called integration -- integration 
of the races for use in the United States... to so amalgamate the races in America that 
there will ensue a mongrel race so debilitated and so diffused that it has little or no 
principle left with which to withstand the avalanche of Communism, which then plans 
to take over. "46 
45 Editorial, News-Virginian, Waynesboro Va., Saturday, January 24 1959, clipping in 
"Correspondence of Committee, 1959, May", Buck Papers, Box 1. 
46 "'The Lost Class of 1959' Edited and Produced by Edward R. Murrow, Fred W. Friendly, as 
Broadcast Over the CBS Television Network, January 21,1959 ---- 8: 00 to 9: 00 p. m. EST, " Byrd 
Papers, Box 242. 
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By the Summer of 1959, when Virginia had returned once again to a more 
moderate, local option approach with the Perrow Plan, the vituperative nature of 
correspondence on the subject of race and the Cold War increased. In July, for 
example, many of Virginia's segregationists reacted angrily to reports that a US 
fashion show in Moscow was to feature interracial barbecue and wedding scenes. "I 
cannot imagine a more shameful and outrageous waste of the tax payers money, " 
wrote Virginia Beach's Richard Tucker to Byrd, "than to include this false and 
disgraceful picture of the American way of life in an exhibition in Moscow. " 
According to a report in the Virginia-Pilot, the scenes were eventually abandoned 
because of objections from US fashion editors 47 
Given the pervasive influence of the Cold War, it was hardly surprising that 
Virginia's politicians, and, indeed, much of the Old Dominion's population, 
harboured anti-communist views. In Virginia, as throughout the nation, however, anti- 
communism was not the monolithic ideology which many historians have described. 48 
Any discussion of anti-communism and red-baiting must take into account the 
genuine communist presence in the state. Anti-communism was, to a certain extent, 
predicated upon a realistic, if much exaggerated, threat. There had been signs of local 
47 Virginia-Pilot article, 15 July 1959, enclosed with Richard B Tucker letter to Harry F Byrd, Sr, Byrd 
Papers, Box 262. 
48 Much of the historiography seriously underplays the role of anti-communism in Virginia, or, at the 
very least, its fluidity. Ely, for example, has characterised Massive Resistance as resting "upon the twin 
pillars of state rights [sic] philosophy and a belief in white supremacy. " He oversimplifies anti- 
communism as an argument made by segregationists that "racial integration was promoted by the 
communists. " Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 100 and p. 121. Similarly, Ann Elizabeth 
Bumette, in a communication studies PhD dissertation examining the language of Massive Resistance, 
looked at the effect of "two arguments of different stases" for resistance to Brown, namely white 
supremacy and States' Rights. Ann Elizabeth Burnette, "A Lost Cause Revisited: Virginia's Massive 
Resistance, 1954-1962, " Dissertation, Evanston Illinois 1996, p. 11. Robbins S. Gates makes no 
mention of anti-communism as a weapon of Massive Resistance. Robbins S. Gates, The Making of 
Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation. 1954-56 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1962). 
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Communist Party activity in Virginia since the CPUSA's Popular Front period. In 
July 1944, the Virginia State Democratic Platform stated that "we have observed with 
apprehension the public announcement by the Communist Party of its purpose to 
infiltrate our party. We resent and deplore any action that encourages these subversive 
elements to feel that they and their policies are welcome in the National Democratic 
Party. "49 By the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 1949 estimate, there were 150 
members of the CPUSA in Virginia. 50 
The most active chapter in the state was the Communist Party of Norfolk. In 
the minds of Virginians, its activities would have done little to disassociate the fears 
of integration from the fears of communism. The Norfolk branch produced flyers in 
the wake of Brown, for example, praising the Supreme Court for finally stating that 
"segregated schools are illegal. " Furthermore, it urged citizens to write to 
representatives of the State political machine to demand desegregation. Byrd and his 
cohorts, it believed, would "try to find ways to evade the decision -- to delay its 
enforcement. " Indeed, the Norfolk Communist Party worded its missive in what 
appears to be a deliberately provocative, even triumphalist way, so eager was it to 
celebrate the victory over segregation. "The militant and united demands of 15 million 
Negro Americans, " it wrote, in language sending shivers down the spine of the white 
South, "supported by millions of white Americans -- among them, of course, every 
American Communist -- could no longer be denied. "5' 
49 "Virginia State Democratic Platform adopted at Roanoke, Virginia, July 8,1944, Presented by 
Colgate Darden, Jr, Resolution Committee Chairman, " Byrd Papers, Box 5. 
50 FBI file on HUAC, Roll 3 -- 573, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middleburg, The Netherlands. As 
has been noted, though, membership numbers did not provide an accurate reflection of overall 
strength or influence. 
51 "END SCHOOL DESEGREGATION -- NOW Issued as a public service by: The Communist Party 
of Norfolk", J. B. Matthews Papers, Box 154, Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, 
North Carolina. 
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The way in which the state's Communists reacted to Brown, coupled to the 
increasing permeation of Cold War fears in Virginian domestic life, convinced many 
segregationists that Brown was a communist inspired plot. Thomas D. Hewitt, for 
example, told Governor Stanley that, having lived in Alexandria all his life, and 
having talked with "thousands" of people since May 17, he found each and every one 
of them to be "bitterly opposed" to integration. It was, he indicated, "a known fact that 
this is a Communist conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States. " 
Drifting into McCarthyite territory, Hewitt attempted to undermine racial moderation 
and its advocates with red-baiting smears. "This applies to Armisted Boothe [sic], 
state Senator for the 10th District who definately [sic] is not speaking for the people 
when he says that we should comply with the Supreme Courts [sic] desegregation 
order. "52 
In order to justify this belief that Brown was part of a Soviet plot, many of 
Virginia's segregationists followed a South-wide pattern: they looked for, and more 
often than not found, signs of communism in the Supreme Court, which had 
promulgated the decree, the NAACP, who had brought the original school 
desegregation cases to court, and Gunnar Myrdal, whose work had underpinned the 
sociological arguments of the case. Representative Burr P. Harrison, for example, 
hinted at the Supreme Court's sympathies in an address to none other than the 
Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police. He told them to "remember in passing that 
these nine men are the same who have decreed that a public school board may not 
52 Thomas D. Hewitt letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 29 July 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
108. Hewitt lived in Alexandria, one of Washington, DC, 's Virginia suburbs. Boothe entered the 
Virginia legislature at the start of 1948, and realised almost immediately that Virginia's continued 
segregation statutes would eventually be struck down by the courts. See J. Douglas Smith, "When 
Reason Collides With Prejudice, " in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, pp. 22-50. 
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dismiss a teacher who refuses to say whether he is a communist; that a state may not 
convict a person actively engaged in a plot to overthrow its government ... "53 The 
inference was clear: the nine Supreme Court justices could not be trusted, such was 
their pandering to communist causes. A little over a year later, Harrison omitted the 
last vestiges of subtlety displayed in his earlier address. In October 1958, he identified 
the drive for school integration as "part of a world-wide movement to create tension 
and strife between races, " races which had, he claimed, previously lived together 
peacefully. It was the decision of the Supreme Court which had "been seized upon as 
a vehicle for use by those who are masterminding the move. " More than most 
segregationists, however, Harrison had a vested interest in presenting the Court as 
tyrannical. Along with Stanley and fellow congressman and organisation stalwart 
Howard W. Smith, Harrison had been responsible for formulating Virginia's hard line 
resistance legislation in the Summer of 1956. By the time of his outbursts against the 
Court, therefore, that legislation had led to school closures. 54 
The state's senior senator, who shared Harrison's interest in undermining the 
court, agreed with him. "In my judgement, " proclaimed Byrd, "the Warren Court is 
irresponsible to public interest, and subversive to our form of government. If you 
think I base this conclusion solely on the school integration decision, " he continued, 
attempting to head off such criticism, "you are wrong. That is only one irresponsible 
decision of many which... form a pattern which can be described only as subversive to 
53 "Address of Representative Burr P. Harrison of Virginia at banquet of Virginia Association of 
Chiefs of Police, Richmond, Virginia, Thursday, September 19,1957, " Byrd Papers, Box 356. 
54 "Address Delivered by A. S. Harrison, Jr, before Henrico County Democratic Annual Celebration, 
John Marshall Hotel, Richmond, Virginia, October 3,1958,8: 00 p. m. " Byrd Papers, Box 244. Perhaps 
also taking a lead from the weighty correspondence received by governors Stanley and Almond on the 
issue, Harrison stated categorically that the "majority of Virginians are opposed to voluntary 
submission to court rulings which they regard as unconstitutional and tyrannical. " 
175 
our form of government and all that it stands for. "55 The Court had passed a list of 
deplorable decisions, "usually protecting communism or exalting special social and 
political minorities, " stated Byrd. Whilst noting the implications of each of these 
"communist exalting" decisions, Byrd fell back on some of the other standard themes 
of Massive Resistance: the Court had, for example, attempted to "destroy the 
sovereignty of States guaranteed by the Constitution, " and had disregarded "the 
clearly stated intent of laws enacted by Congress. " Above all, however, "the United 
States Supreme Court has decided 15 cases which directly affect the right of the 
United States of America to protect itself from Communist subversion. "56 
White segregationists outside Virginia's political decision making processes 
were also drawn towards the belief that, with Brown, the Supreme Court had aided the 
communist cause. Myrtis J. Baber, for example, complained to Stanley that "the 
Supreme Court decision[, ] instead of taking `a formidable weapon out of the 
Communists [sic] hands as so many poor dumb, benighted white souls profess to 
believe has done just the opposite. They played right into the Communists' hands for 
that is exactly what they planned, so that internal friction and turmoil could keep our 
minds off what they are doing. "57 It was a double-edged sword: pre-Brown, 
southerners were castigated by the Soviets for being openly racist; post-Brown, the 
Soviets benefited from the United States' internal turmoil, amidst which, it was 
commonly believed, the CPUSA could make greater headway. 
There were subtle variations on this theme. Delegate Lucas D. Philips, for 
example, told Stanley that "if carried to its logical conclusion, [Brown] embraces the 
55 "1944-1959 Virginia, Schools, Integration, " Byrd Papers, Box 5. 
56 ibid. 
57 Myrtis J. Baber letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 7 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
100. 
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Communist Doctrine by placing all children on a basis of being treated exactly alike 
without regard to ability. "58 Philips' stance does not, therefore, suggest sweeping anti- 
communism or red baiting, but rather the reasoned -- albeit imprecise -- belief that the 
decision represented the communist ideology. Furthermore, reinforcing his white 
supremacist standpoint, Philips castigated the Supreme Court for not taking into 
account what he saw as the innate inferiority of African American children. Philips 
also implied that it was not Virginia's blacks who were the communists: they, like the 
Old Dominion's white citizens, were merely pawns in a wider game orchestrated by a 
left-wing court in Washington. 
Virginians also sought to discredit and disable the NAACP by linking it to 
communism. The legal training of many of the Old Dominion's political elites 
enlivened them to the dangers posed by a legal approach to dismantling segregation. 
Furthermore, as has been noted, the Byrd machine's continued political success rested 
in no small way upon the preservation of a compact, predominately segregationist 
white electorate. Organisations which strove to expand the African American 
franchise therefore posed a considerable threat to Virginia's elites. As a result, both 
the NAACP and other organisations with similarly legalistic approaches to fighting 
segregation had been red-baited before the Brown decision had been promulgated. 
The extent of that pre-Brown red-baiting is exemplified by the celebrated case 
of the Martinsville Seven. Seven African Americans were accused of rape by a 32 
year-old white woman in Martinsville, on Virginia's southern border, in January 
1949. Two organisations vied to represent the Seven: the NAACP and the Civil 
58 Hon. Lucas D. Philips letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 26 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 100. 
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Rights Congress [CRC], which had been established to offer an alternative to the 
NAACP in 1946.59 Neither organisation was able to avoid being red-baited during the 
case. Indeed, Martin A. Martin, of Hill, Martin, and Robinson, who finally took the 
case for the NAACP, told a clemency hearing for the Seven on 7 July 1949, that, 
although "some quasi-liberal and quasi-Communist groups have tried to get into this, 
to make it another Scottsboro case, we have made every effort to keep them out. We 
feel that justice will be granted in Virginia. "60 
It is testament to the strength of Virginia's anti-communist fervour that, as 
early as 1951, Governor Battle was swayed away from clemency for at least some of 
the Seven because of the connotations of acceding to the demands of the radical 
protest organised by both the CRC and the NAACP. A CRC delegation visiting the 
Governor to petition for clemency, for example, prompted the Danville Register to 
question "just how many of the scum who have changed their loyalty from Uncle Sam 
to Uncle Joe the CRC can bring into Virginia's capital... "61 What is, perhaps, most 
remarkable, and indicative of the global stakes now involved in southern race 
relations, is the coverage that the trial and execution of the Seven received from 
abroad. Just as southern segregationists were alive to the possibilities of undermining 
the CRC by red-baiting, so the CRC were alive to the opportunities that this global 
coverage afforded it. On 26 August 1950, for example, a CRC press release stated that 
59 The CRC replaced the communist-tainted International Labor Defense. 
60 Martin quoted in Eric W. Rise, "Race, Rape, and Radicalism: The Case of the Martinsville Seven, 
1949-195 1, " Journal of Southern History, Vol. LVIII, No. 3 (August 1992), p. 480. For a fuller 
account of the case and its wider implications, see Eric W. Rise, The Martinsville Seven: Race. Rape. 
and Capital Punishment (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995). 
61 Quoted in Rise, "Race, Rape, and Radicalism, " p. 484. Importantly, Rise also noted that, "Although 
Battle denied at the time that CRC involvement had affected his decision to deny clemency, he 
admitted years later that at least two of the men probably deserved commutations to life 
imprisonment. " p. 486. 
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"1,044 Polish Groups Have Sent Protests on Martinsville Seven Frameup, " whilst a 
similar release of 15 January 1951 claimed that "West German, French Youth, East 
Africans, Protest Martinsville Seven Death Sentences. "62 Even with the knowledge 
that the case had become a world-wide examination of southern racial mores, 
Virginia's judiciary and executive were not prepared to be seen either siding with a 
black attorney from an allegedly radical organisation, or to allow due process to 
contradict the testimony of one white woman against seven African American men. It 
was, as Eric Rise has shown, the first case in which statistical evidence was used to 
point out the systematic discrimination against blacks in capital punishment cases. 63 
Regardless, the last of the Seven was executed on 5 February 1951. 
After Brown, the vilification of the NAACP intensified. Segregationist lawyer 
Henry J. Lankford wrote to Stanley that he was "confident that your position is the 
right one, namely, that integration must be resisted by Virginia on a state-wide basis. 
If the matter is left to the localities, the NAACP and their fellow travelers will divide 
and conquer us. "64 Lankford had chosen his words very carefully. Staying away from 
any potentially libellous claims of direct communist links, he chose the suggestive 
term "fellow travelers" to insinuate that the NAACP was inextricably bound up in the 
seedy, ill-defined underworld of communist conspiracy. 
Thurgood Marshall, of course, as Legal Defence for the NAACP, was an open 
target. A week after the signing of the Southern Manifesto in March 1956, James 
Thomson wrote a letter urging ex-Governor John Battle to seek higher office. "It 
62 ibid., p. 481. 
63 For a fuller, more detailed exposition of this novel legal strategy, see Rise, The Martinsville Seven, 
pp. 99-132. 
64 Henry J. Lankford letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 25 August 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 106. 
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would make me happy to see you vice president of the United States, " he wrote to 
Byrd's former lieutenant, "on a ticket which would not have to be passed on and 
approved by Thurgood Marshall and his Northern Socialist, Communist fellow 
travelers in the National Democratic Party. "65 Thomson went on to accuse 
Communists of trying to take over Virginia's "Governor, our Legislature, our schools 
and our public affairs, " and, again, provides an example of the interwoven concerns 
within Massive Resistance. "You possibly know the work which these Communists, 
Socialists, radical and meaner elements have attempted to do among our public 
schools, our colleges, our labor unions and political organisations. According to 
Thomson, "the paramount problem, " not just in Virginia but across the South and 
throughout the United States, was ensuring a return to States' Rights. Interestingly, 
Battle replied that "you and I think alike on many fundamental issues but I am afraid 
we are very much in the minority in this country. "66 
The actions of NAACP members in Virginia give an indication of the 
widespread extent of this red-baiting. At the local level, branches mirrored the 
Association's national purges of suspected radicals and distanced themselves from 
leftist polemic. 67 As part of a wider voter registration drive in 1952, for example, E. B. 
Henderson, the vice-president of the Virginia State Conference of NAACP branches, 
wrote to all the chapters under his control. "Uniting around a theme of resisting 
65 James M. Thomson letter to John Battle, 19 March 1956, John Stuart Battle Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 6, Archives and Map Research Room, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
66 ibid. 
67 As early as June 1950, for example, at the 41st Annual Convention of the NAACP, a resolution was 
passed instructing the Association's Board of Directors to "take the necessary action to eradicate 
[communist] infiltration, and if necessary to suspend and reorganize, or lift the charter and expel any 
unit, which... comes under Communist or other political control or action. " Quoted in Mary L. Dudziak, 
"Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, " Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1. (November 1988), 
p. 76. 
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godless communism and improving democracy, " he suggested that "organized groups 
should make suffrage a leading item on their agenda. "68 
Henderson had made a common contemporary link between "godlessness" and 
communism. For many Virginia whites opposition to integration was every bit as holy 
a crusade as the battle of western democracies against communism. It was a conflict 
often portrayed as one of religion against atheism. With no official state religion, 
Soviets and other communists were assumed to be godless. It was commonly thought 
that Americans, on the other hand, necessarily had God on their side because they 
were involved in an absolute contest with an atheist foe. 69 A 16-year-old white 
Virginian, Tuck Waller, added another link to the chain connecting "godliness" and 
anti-communism, namely segregation. He wrote to former governor Stanley to tell 
him that his "stand concerning integration is to be commended... God will lead us in 
our fight against Communism, you are our leader and He is yours. We can't go 
wrong! We are praying for you. "70 
Virginians also accused Gunnar Myrdal of communist links: not only was 
Myrdal a sociologist, he was also a foreigner and a socialist, facts which provided 
grist to the southern red-baiter's mill. In a letter to the Richmond News Leader copied 
to Governor Stanley, for example, Norfolk citizen Randolph McPherson expressed 
outrage that even a colleague of Myrdal's, and a co-author of An American Dilemma, 
68 E. B. Henderson "To Negro Groups", 14 November 1952, Boyle Papers, Box 3. 
69 As part of their drive for a pure America, for example, the Daughters of the American Revolution 
[DAR] passed a resolution praising the President of the Richmond Academy of General Practice for 
organising youth clubs in Virginia. In particular, they praised his "high Christian standards, " which, by 
implication, prepared Virginia's boys and girls to meet "the menace of atheistic Communism. " 
"Resolutions, " Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government Papers, Box 1, Archives and Maps 
Research Rooms, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. 
70 Tuck Waller letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 19 February 1959, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
106. 
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had been invited to speak at the installation of the new Chancellor at St Mary 
Washington College, Virginia. The invitation to this "gentleman of decidedly `Pink' 
Communist leanings, " as McPherson referred to him, was made by Colgate Darden 
and the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia. "This gentleman who was 
invited to address the young ladies at Mary Washington College, is known all over the 
world as an [sic] mongrelizer of the races, and his `scientific' books are widely quoted 
by integrationists. "71 
J. R. Orgain, a sometime member of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and 
Individual Liberties and serial writer of letters, thought the Swede's intellectual 
outlook to be of central importance to the Supreme Court's infringement of what he 
took to be inalienable southern rights. "When a political group of un-Americans took 
over the Supreme Court bench and substituted sociology and philosophy for the law 
of Constitutional government, " he wrote to Stanley, "the negro has become [sic] `top 
dog. "' According to Orgain, Virginia was fortunate only because the Old Dominion 
had the "State government" standing between the people of the state and the federal 
incursions of the Supreme Court. States Rights could yet save the South from this 
unwanted foray by the Supreme Court, under Myrdal's influence, into southern racial 
affairs. 72 
The red-baiting of Myrdal was in no way confined to the pro-Massive 
Resistance masses in Virginia, but extended to political leaders, too. Almond also 
indulged. Tellingly, he did so three months before he set Virginia back onto a more 
moderate resistance path. Still maintaining a hard line stance against Brown, he had an 
71 Randolph McPherson letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 5 August 1957, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 107. 
72 "Brunswick County Race Relations Past and Present" by J. R. Orgain, [n. d. ], J. R. Orgain Papers, 
Folder 687, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
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interest in undermining those who were perceived to be behind the desegregation 
decision. Claiming in October 1958 that he would "never" become party to the 
destruction of the races by mixing them in schools only nine months before he did just 
that, Almond proclaimed that "the children of Virginia will be educated. I shall do 
everything within my power to prevent them from being victimized by this 
experimentation of sociological hallucination, Communist inspired. "73 
Within this ideological milieu, Virginia's politicians, civic leaders and 
segregationists all began to attach their anti-communist concerns to the burgeoning 
African American civil rights movement. The Byrd machine's stultifying grip on 
Virginia politics, and the dominance of Southside leaders in positions of power, 
limited the scope of an indigenous movement in Virginia. Nevertheless, as claims of 
communist plots and rumours of internal subversion became more common, the 
charge of communist involvement increasingly became a weapon with which to tar 
anyone suspected of undermining any aspect of segregation, not just in schools or via 
civil rights legislation. In such a charged atmosphere, moves by blacks to buy 
property in non-black areas made them part of this insurgency. As one Norfolk 
attorney stated in September 1954, "there is a vile gang of communists here engaged 
in the practice of contributing money for the purposes of purchasing a piece of 
valuable white property. " By so doing, the attorney argued that they would lower the 
price of real estate in the area, which would cause "depreciation of property values, 
causing depreciation of moral values, causing depreciation of liberty of white people. " 
73 "Address of Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, Virginia Education Association, Richmond, Va., 
October 30 1958, " Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 13. 
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These "negroes", he went on, were clearly "communists despoiling property as well as 
white men's rights. "74 
As integrationist, civil rights activity blossomed in the decade following 
Brown, so anti-communism and red-baiting were modified to confront each new form 
of black protest as it developed. Beginning on 1 February 1960, four African 
Americans breathed new life into the traditional "sit-in" method of protesting against 
segregated facilities, when they occupied the Woolworth lunch counter in Greensboro, 
North Carolina. 75 Sit-in protesters became a favoured target of red-baiters. As has 
been noted, communism was inextricably linked to the destruction of cherished 
property rights in the American psyche. Sit-ins, labelled as "trespasses" against 
private property by their detractors, could thus readily be linked to a communist plot. 
An editorial in the Richmond News Leader shows how this connection was made. 
"These actions of trespass, " it seethed, "in brazen violation of private property rights, 
obviously have served to inflame race relations all over again. The Communists live 
on friction and thrive on divisiveness, " it continued. "This sort of thing is their 
meat. "76 The CPUSA's response to the sit-ins did little to deter such accusations. As 
the editorial went on to say, "Last week's Communist Worker devoted two full pages 
to a report from Richmond, in which correspondents exulted in heightened tensions 
and gleefully exhorted the Negroes to further provocations. "77 
As ever, Harry Byrd was at the vanguard of the Virginia segregationists who 
attempted to undermine civil rights activity as the work of subversive agitators. 
74 Garrett Baxter letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 9 September 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 102. 
75 The four were Franklin McCain, Ezell Blair, Jr, Dave Richmond and Joseph McNeil. 
76 Richmond News Leader, 9 March 1960, Editorial, clipping in Kathryn H. Stone Papers, Box 2, 
Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
77 ibid. 
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Furthermore, he was equally aware of the military danger that the Cold War 
represented. In 1957, he merged these two concerns together. At a time when the 
national guard had been called out to restore order during the Little Rock school 
crisis, Byrd was appalled to learn that US troops were being trained specifically in the 
art of riot suppression. To Byrd, it was diabolical that there was no better employ for 
US troops at a time of threatened global war than to train them to put down internal 
disturbances, specifically those caused by the question of desegregation. "When the 
international crisis is what it is, " he thundered, "and Russia has shown a superiority in 
missile development, to train troops to stop rioting appears so ridiculous that I can 
hardly believe what I see and hear. We can be certain, " he continued, "that troops so 
trained can accomplish little against the brutality of those who may threaten us. "78 
Discussing the racial crisis accompanying the Freedom Rides in Alabama 
nearly four years later in May 1961, Byrd hinted that the situation "was deliberately 
provoked by a mixed group of outsiders who went to Alabama to influence the people 
for propaganda purposes. " Although not explicitly labelling these "outside agitators" 
as communist, implicitly Byrd made it very clear; "provocation" and "propaganda" 
were terms that went hand in hand with the language of communist insurgency. 79 His 
stance was echoed in the letters that he received from his constituents. He was, 
according to Ruth Galloway, a "conservative" and a "real democratic statesman" at a 
time when others were abrogating their responsibility to the South. "Politics are not 
78 Learning from an article in the Times-Dispatch that Byrd was pursuing an investigation into the 
matter, a woman wrote to Byrd that her "husband is now in the Army. I received a letter from him 
dated September 22, in which he said: `This afternoon I was on a raiding party (aggressor). We had to 
harass them and see if they could repel us. Our only weapons were rocks, yes rocks... "' "Byrd- 
Speeches-Drafts-Civil Rights, etc., for reference 1956-1960, " Byrd Papers, Box 1. 
79 "Statement -- May 23,1961 on the situation in Alabama, " Byrd Papers, Box 413. 
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the crisis at hand, " she continued. "Communism is the great issue. You know and I 
know it is infiltrating our great country in a most diabolical way. "8° 
For many white Virginians, Martin Luther King, Jr, was, if not a willing agent, 
then at least a vehicle for that infiltration. His visit to Richmond in late 1963 provoked 
a hostile reaction from some segregationists. On her weekly Saturday radio broadcast 
on Station WINC WRFL-FM, for example, Mrs Betsy Osth stated that "big bold 
black headlines in the Communist paper, The Worker, appeared in their October 1 st 
issue reporting on Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
recently held at the John Marshall Hotel in Richmond. That The Worker lent valuable 
space to this shindig shows how important it was to the Communists. " Before the end 
of her broadcast, other civil rights activists -- black and white -- had also been tainted 
by allegations of communist involvement, notably Jim Dombrowski, Andrew Young, 
Carl Braden, and the Highlander Folk School. 81 
But, as elsewhere in the South, any attempt to stamp a single blueprint on 
segregationists' deployment of anti-communism in Virginia must be tempered by the 
knowledge that, in both real and in oratorical terms, it was a weapon with many 
permutations and nuances, and its application often eluded tight definition. At times, 
for example, the decision not to use anti-communism was as revealing as the decision 
to use it. Byrd himself did not always take the easy opportunity of discrediting Brown 
as communist inspired until after the 1956 referendum on Gray's resistance proposals, 
when he was certain that a majority of Virginians supported circumventing the 
80 Ruth M. Galloway letter to Byrd, "Monday 18th, " Byrd Papers, Box 268. No year was listed for the 
letter, which was filed in the folder "1961-1965 Misc Political Corresp `G. "' 
81 "12 October, 1963 MINUTE WOMEN USA, Va. Branch WINC WRFL-FM RADIO" enclosed with 
Mrs R. E. "Betsy" Osth letter to William Munford Tuck, 6 October 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 4247, 
Manuscript and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg. 
decision. Indeed, on the eve of the referendum, Byrd was exceedingly cautious in his 
use of language. There was no hint of reds anywhere, not even a subversive: "The 
conditions confronting us are such that we will succeed better, " claimed Byrd, "by 
going forward on a flexible basis or on a basis of stand-by legislation than by 
attempting at this time to enact complete and final legislation to begin with the school 
term of next September. " In the light of this, as Mays' diaries strongly suggested, it 
would appear that Byrd was so unsure about the course of events unfolding before 
him, and of the options available to him, that he was almost timid in the early defence 
of his position. 82 
As one of Byrd's leading lieutenants, Kilpatrick shared the Senator's early 
restraint, at least publicly, and avoided any reliance on red-baiting. As Joseph J. 
Thorndike has clearly shown, Kilpatrick did not embrace radical resistance methods 
openly until Virginia's official opposition to Brown had been firmly established. 83 
Even then, he was not offering any glib answers. "Lord knows I have no pat solution 
to propose. I don't think there is one, " he wrote. 84 Famous throughout the nation for 
calls for interposition, Kilpatrick was not a red-baiter. In a whole range of speeches 
given by the Richmond News-Leader editor between December 1957 and November 
1964 on the issues pertinent to Massive Resistance, from civil rights and States' 
Rights to integration, there are simply no examples of red-baiting. 85 
82 See "Statement -- December 18,1955, on the Referendum"; "Statement -- Feb 26,1956 on 
Interposition, " both Byrd Papers, Box 409. 
83 See Joseph J. Thorndike, "'The Sometimes Sordid Level of Race and Segregation': James J. 
Kilpatrick and the Virginia Campaign against Brown, " in Lassiter and Lewis [eds] The Moderates' 
Dilemma, pp. 51-71. 
84 Kilpatrick quoted in ibid., p. 55. 
85 Those speeches without any hint of red-baiting include: "Speeches 1957: Sharon, Connecticut, Race 
Issue"; "Speeches 1958: Rotary Club, Richmond, On School Integration"; both Kilpatrick Papers, Box 
1; "Speeches 1959: City Club, Cleveland, On School Integration"; "Speeches 1960: Camden High 
School, Camden, S. C. On the Constitution, " both Kilpatrick Papers, Box 2; "Speeches 1962: 
Hampden-Sydney College on School Integration"; "Speeches 1963: Hampden-Sydney College on 
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Although Kilpatrick himself did not red-bait, he did, however, seem to 
acknowledge the necessity of anti-communist purges. Referring to a book on Senator 
Joseph McCarthy in an editorial, he noted that, "Gradually, ever so slowly, the 
McCarthy years are coming into perspective so that rational men may distinguish who 
was persecuting whom. The evidence is mounting that a courageous American was 
driven to an early grave as a sacrifice to `liberal' self-esteem; that a myth was made 
by the small-souled men who could not accept even the possibility that they may be 
wrong. "86 McCarthyism, however, was never directly linked to the southern race 
problem and, therefore, it must be assumed that Kilpatrick did not feel that red-baiting 
was an appropriate weapon for specifically southern resistance. He had, after all, so 
many other strategies to chose from, having consistently championed interposition 
and States' Rights. 
IV 
If committed segregationists like Kilpatrick, Mays and even, on occasions, 
Byrd, could avoid red-baiting the Movement and its allies, there were those in 
Virginia's resistance lobby who could scarcely speak without fastening onto the 
communist threat. One such figure was William Munford Tuck, one of the most 
important and influential members of Byrd's political organisation, and one of the Old 
Dominion's foremost exponents of red-baiting. A former Governor of Virginia, he 
settled into a role of Southside congressman during the Massive Resistance years, and 
Civil Rights, " both Kilpatrick Papers, Box 3, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, 
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
86 Earle Dunford, Richmond Times-Dispatch, p. 321. 
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held views on civil rights that were typical of the area. 87 On the 1957 Civil Rights 
Bill, for example, he informed the press that "the reported compromise on the Civil 
Rights bill is more than a compromise on principle -- it is a complete surrender to 
iniquity. "88 In fact, Tuck was so zealous in his advocacy of Massive Resistance that 
he occasionally managed to offend fellow segregationists in his own State. Remarks 
that he made in the winter of 1958, suggesting that even if the people of Norfolk and 
Arlington did not want Massive Resistance they would be forced to accept it 
regardless, caused some controversy. Harrison Mann, for example, told Tuck that "the 
vast majority of our people don't want to integrate any more than you do. When you 
speak of forcing Arlington and Norfolk you sound as arrogant and as arbitrary as the 
Supreme Court. I suggest you run your district and quit minding the business of the 
people in the 10th district. "89 
Tuck's vehement anti-communism had crystallised during his 1945-1949 term 
as Governor. Notably, as a direct rebuttal of Truman's Fair Employment Practices 
Commission [FEPC] and the President's support for the Committee on Civil Rights, 
Tuck proposed a change to Virginia's ballot system for presidential elections which 
became known as the "Anti-Truman Bill. "90 More moderate Virginians, such as Ted 
Dalton and Howard Carwile, were fervent in their opposition to Tuck's proposals. 
87 Tuck's biographer, William Crawley, has written that, "from the beginning of the Byrd hegemony 
until the end, it is likely that no political figure in the Commonwealth better personified the essence of 
organization politics than did William Munford Tuck. " William Bryan Crawley, Bill Tuck: A Political 
Life in B dyx 's Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), p. 16. 
88 "85th Congress, 1st Session 1957 -- Civil Rights Part II", Tuck Papers, Folder 3974. 
89 Harrison Mann telegram to Tuck, 14 November 1958, Tuck Papers, Folder 4029. 
90 The proposed "Anti-Truman Bill" was not universally popular, intending as it did to keep the names 
of presidential candidates off the ballot entirely, as well as limiting the parties on the ballot paper to 
those listed at the last election. Effectively, it headed off any third party challenge for the Presidency. 
As Heinemann has shown, Tuck objected to the President's Committee on Civil Rights' report, IQ 
Secure These Rights, because it "called for passage of a federal antilynching law, abolition of the poll 
tax, creation of a permanent fair employment practices commission, and stronger enforcement of civil 
rights. " Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia, p. 255. 
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Tuck's erstwhile riposte was that "the papers, the Communists, Jews, Negroes, and 
so-called liberal Democrats, as well as the Republicans, are giving us a hard fight, but 
I hope that we will succeed in passing it through the General Assembly.. . We are in 
this fight to the end. "91 
Elected to the US Congress in the wake of Brown, Tuck made his views on 
integration clear. "On this subject, I am not a `gradualist, ' I am a `neverist. '1192 He 
certainly believed the Supreme Court and most civil rights groups were part of a 
communist conspiracy, which, to his satisfaction at least, explained Brown. In 1956, 
for example, he told Governor Stanley that "only by a firm and determined resistance 
on the part of the people of the State and their officials we can succeed in thwarting 
the efforts of the left wing groups and the Supreme Court to foist upon us an unholy 
and intolerable situation... "93 In January 1959, he urged Almond to use the 
gubernatorial power handed to him by the 1956 Massive Resistance laws to close 
schools faced with desegregation. Tuck, with typical racial paternalism, claimed that 
"We have not had any trouble between the races in Virginia since the War Between 
the States. A breaking out of trouble of this sort would be tragic and would mar the 
good name of Virginia and of her present leadership. The left-wingers and 
communists would wish nothing more than to create such a situation and thus bring 
disfavor upon us and demean the high standing of our great commonwealth. "94 By 
1965, Tuck had become even more belligerent, sensing the impending failure of his 
91 Tuck quoted in Crawley, Bill Tuck, p. 149. 
92 ibid., p. 219. 
93 William Tuck telegram to Governor Tom Stanley, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 157. 
94 William Tuck letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 14 January 1959, Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
185. Those gubernatorial powers Tuck referred to included, "the Governor's power to suppress public 
mischief... power to prevent bloodshed, " and finally, "power to enhance the peace and tranquillity of 
any community in the State. " 
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cause, and desperate to rally support for one last stand. He told Albert Tatum in no 
uncertain manner that "any and all of these menacing so-called Civil Rights groups 
which are lawless and un-American" should be investigated by HUAC. The reasons 
were clear. Those groups harboured members and leaders whose names, according to 
Tuck, "are thoroughly familiar as persons who have engaged in communistic 
activities. " Furthermore, it was those groups who were responsible for the recent 
"national turmoil and strife, and for much of the bloodshed which has gone on in 
America in the last months and years. "95 
Tuck's involvement in a rare incident of indigenous civil rights activity in 
Virginia, occurring in Danville, in Pittsylvania County on Virginia's southern border, 
acts almost as a case study of red-baiting resistance. Coming as he did from Halifax, 
the county to the east of Pittsylvania, Tuck immersed himself in the city's racial 
controversies. At the same time that George Wallace was grabbing the national 
headlines with another "set piece" of Massive Resistance at the University of 
Alabama in June 1963, widespread civil rights protests against segregation were 
underway in Danville. Police wielding night-sticks and deploying high-pressure fire 
hoses caused 48 of 65 black protesters to seek hospital attention in one night. Martin 
Luther King, Jr, sent a telegram to the Kennedys, imploring them to intervene in order 
to stop the "beastly conduct of law enforcement officers. " 96 The Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference [SCLC], in the words of its leaders, began to try to "work up" 
a large movement in the city. 97 
95 William Tuck letter to Albert Tatum, 28 September 1965, Tuck Papers, Folder 4343. 
96 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement 1954-63 
(London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 822. 
97 Andrew Young quoted in ibid., p. 916. 
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Having previously attacked such organisations as the SCLC, and such 
individuals as King, from afar, the escalating Danville protests gave Virginian red- 
baiters a chance to get to grips with their foes at close quarters. The protesters were 
immediately labelled outside agitators, both by political leaders and Danville citizens. 
Most of the vitriol, however, revolved around Tuck, who had secured a reputation as 
one of the state's leading defenders of white supremacy. On 5 July 1963, W. O. 
Collins, a white Danville resident, wrote to Tuck that "we really are in need of 
legislation to curb the invasion of our communities by paid professional race agitators 
that travel city to city bent on creating ill will between our citizens, wrecking our 
economy and placing our lives in jeopardy. "98 This was a theme taken up by J. C. 
Owen, "a white voting citizen of the State of Virginia, " who wrote to Tuck on 26 
June. "We have had very little trouble with our Negro Population of about 12,000 
until recently, " he stated, "at which time a group of agitators from other states 
converged upon our city and managed to arouse approximately 250 to 300 of our 
negro population... " Tuck, in his reply to Owen, agreed that "our troubles have been 
stirred up largely by the outsiders. " To remedy both Owen and Collins' complaints, 
Tuck stated that "today I have introduced a bill that will stop them. The law I have 
proposed would prevent such trouble as they have inflicted on Danville and in other 
communities. "99 
By the time of Danville's racial disturbances, Tuck had taken up a position on 
HUAC, an appointment that did not go unnoticed by his constituents. 100 A committee 
calling itself the "Capitol Hill Committee on the Danville Story" was set up by 
98 W. O. Collins letter to William Munford Tuck, 5 July 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 4205. 
99 J. C. Owen letter to William Munford Tuck, 26 June 1963; Tuck letter to Owen, 27 June 1963, Tuck 
Papers, Folder 4204. 
100 Tuck's two committee assignments as a US Senator were Un-American Activities and Judiciary. 
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protesters in Danville, and became an immediate target of concern for those 
suspecting subversive activities. The city manager, T. Edward Temple, wrote to Tuck 
to air his fears over the planned speech to the Capitol Hill Committee by Mrs Jacob 
Karro. "You will note, " wrote Temple, "that Mrs Jacob Karro is the same character 
who has been constantly in demand as a speaker before almost every liberal group 
from Maine to Georgia. You will note on the back of the [enclosed] sheet the names 
of the so-called Capitol Hill Committee on the Danville Story. If you would kindly 
have these individuals checked I shall appreciate it. I strongly suspect that the 
majority of them will be found as members of front organizations of the Communist 
Party. "10' 
In an exchange of letters with J. R. Orgain, Tuck revealed the complicated 
network which linked the national red-baiters and anti-communists of HUAC to like- 
minded individuals and groups at the state level. On 14 June 1963, Orgain wrote to 
Tuck asking whether HUAC's records "indicate any Communist activity or 
associations" by a Mr and Mrs Stem, Robert Zellner and Samuel Pearson, Jr. Only 
four days later, Tuck wrote to HUAC's Francis J. McNamara. He enclosed a copy of 
Orgain's letter, informing him that "you will note in his [Orgain's] letter that he 
inquires about the Communist activity of certain individuals and organizations. I will 
be grateful if you will supply me with any information which you may have 
concerning them. " Two days later, on 20 June, McNamara replied to Tuck that "a 
check of the public records, files and publications of this committee has disclosed no 
record on John Robert Zellner or Samuel J. Pearson, Jr. " Tuck relayed this 
information to Orgain on 21 June: just one week after he had made his original 
101 T. Edward Temple letter to William Munford Tuck, 29 January 1964, Tuck Papers, Folder 4299. 
193 
enquiry to Congressman Tuck on subversive activities, Orgain knew the contents of 
selected HUAC files. 102 
Clearly, when seeking to link civil rights activity to communism, some of 
Virginia's segregationists felt that they could rely on Tuck to furnish them with 
privileged HUAC information. One of Tuck's closest personal friends, John W. 
Carter, of Carter & Carter Law Offices in Danville, corresponded with him at the time 
of the disturbances. "As you may have heard, " wrote Carter, "CORE has opened 
headquarters here in Danville, and we are sure to have more trouble as soon as they 
get cranked up. " As an example of the usefulness of communist-tainting materials in 
such circumstances, Carter continued that "Armstead Sapp was very successful in 
Greensboro when he was able to expose a white woman affiliated with CORE as a 
known communist. I am wondering whether the [sic] HUAC or the Senate Committee 
may have anything on CORE. " 03 
102 J. R. Orgain letter to William Munford Tuck, 14 June 1963; Tuck letter to Orgain, 18 June 1963, 
copied to McNamara; Tuck letter to McNamara, 18 June 1963; McNamara letter to Tuck, 20 June 
1963; Tuck letter to Orgain, 21 June 1963; Tuck Papers, Folder 4246. Although there is no supporting 
evidence for this, Orgain claimed in a letter to Hamilton Crockford of the Richmond Times-Dispatch 
that Danville was the "first major city targeted" because the "Communist Front" Southern Conference 
Education Fund [SCEF] thought it would bring all the more embarrassment to Tuck to have 
communist-led civil rights demonstrations in his constituency, especially, "with him on the HUAC. " 
Orgain letter to Hamilton Crockford, 9 September 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 5107. 
103 John W. Carter letter to William Munford Tuck, 17 April 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 4300. 
Armistead Sapp was the lawyer employed by Greensboro's S&W and Mayfair cafeterias for the case 
against the sit-in demonstrators. He successfully managed to undermine two protesters, Alice and 
Victor Jerome, with accusations of communism. See William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: 
Greensboro. North Carolina. and the Black Struggle For Freedom (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), pp. 112-3. Tuck's role as go-between for local red-baiters and their national HUAC 
equivalents was not confined to the Danville disturbances. A citizen from Roanoke, for example, 
sought to use Tuck's position on HUAC to investigate the NAACP. Having received extra 
appropriations to undertake, paradoxically, an investigation of the un-American activities of such right 
wing groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the Minutemen, Horace Walker wrote to Tuck that he was "of 
the opinion that such organizations as the NAACP and others in the civil rights movement should also 
be investigated to determine if they are in any way connected to Communistic backing or support. " 
Horace E. Walker letter to William Munford Tuck, 29 April 1965, Tuck Papers, Folder 4343. 
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Ultimately, Tuck's use of red-baiting against the civil rights movement was 
more of a pragmatic response than an expression of genuine anti-communism. 
Although it was clearly his favoured weapon, red-baiting was not, however, the only 
part of the Massive Resistance armoury that Tuck utilised. He did, for example, back 
legislative shows of southern strength, and was a signatory of the Southern Manifesto. 
Moreover, in July 1956 Tuck initiated a second manifesto along with William M. 
Colmer of Mississippi and Edwin E. Willis of Louisiana. Entitled the "Warning of 
Grave Dangers, " Tuck, Colmer and Willis railed against the civil rights measures 
under debate in Congress. Their manifesto was signed by 83 members of Congress, 
just 18 less than had signed the Southern Manifesto. '°4 
V 
No single group posed more of a potential threat to a solid, white wall of 
resistance to desegregation in Virginia than the state's racial progressives. Comprised 
of local, predominately white Virginians, such interracial groups as the Virginia 
Council on Human Relations [VCHR] and its affiliates in Charlottesville and 
Richmond spoke, in the words of Benjamin Muse, for the "silent" and "submerged" 
majority of Virginians. 105 Segregationists sought to undermine the Council and its 
affiliates with the minimum of delay. Spawned from the by then firmly integrationist 
Southern Regional Council [SRC], the VCHR fought for full compliance with the 
spirit of Brown. To the majority of white segregationists, the only whites who 
104 Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 148. Bartley noted that the "Warning" 
"found `grave' dangers to liberty inherent in national legislative protection for civil rights. " 
105 For more on Benjamin Muse's views, see Matthew D. Lassiter, "A `Fighting Moderate': Benjamin 
Muse's Search for the Submerged South, " in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma. 
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habitually stood against continued segregation were by definition either communist, 
northern, or both. 
Established in February 1955, the VCHR fully expected to be red-baited, 
possibly due to the bitter experiences of its parent organisation, the SRC. Virginia's 
segregationists did not disappoint. The first draft of an anonymous document entitled 
"Introducing the Virginia Council on Human Relations, " for example, stated that the 
organisation believed "that free speech, free discussion, and freedom of association 
must at all costs be preserved, unhampered by any personal action or public policy 
that tends to intimidate individuals or deprive lawful organizations of their civil and 
Constitutional liberties. "lob 
In July 1956, while Stanley was formulating his hard line resistance 
legislation, he had been warned by H. P. Moore to be "most watchful of the Virginia 
Council on Human Relations for they can infiltrate into many phases of the public, 
warping their minds on this subject. "107 Again, the language is revealing: 
"infiltration" certainly had overtones of popular perceptions of communist subversion. 
Battle himself went on to say of the Charlottesville Council on Human Relations that 
"they do not in any sense of the word represent the feeling of the vast majority of 
citizens of this section who resent their activities as being those of a small group of 
extreme left-wingers, many of whom have recently moved to the community. "108 Two 
months later, Mrs Morris Brown, vice-president of the Charlottesville-Albemarle 
branch of the VCHR, felt sufficiently worried about such accusations of communist 
106 "Introducing the Virginia Council on Human Relations" Virginia Council on Human Relations 
[VCHR] Papers, Box 1, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia 
Library, Charlottesville. 
107 H. P. Moore letter to Tom Stanley, 29 July 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108. 
108 Battle quoted in Ely, Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 34. 
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leanings to write to the SRC's executive director, George S. Mitchell, asking, "Where 
can we get concrete information with regard to the Ford Foundation, the Southern 
Regional Council, etc. which would help us to lay at rest the charge of 
`communist'? "log 
Anderson M. Renick, commander of Roanoke's American Legion, waded in to 
the schools debate with red-baiting rhetoric. With the full extent of white support for 
desegregation still unknown, Renick released a statement reported by the Times- 
Dispatch. In it, he named "six persons exercising guiding influence in this Southern 
Regional Council who, " continued the Times-Dispatch, Renick claimed were 
affiliated with "subversive organisations. " In the same article, somewhat surprisingly, 
the paper gave the VCHR's then executive director, John H. Marion, the right of 
reply. "Mr Renick may be sincere in what he says, " he stated, "but he has certainly 
been grossly misinformed. Actually, the Southern Regional Council is a strongly anti- 
Communist organization. The twelve State councils affiliated with it, including the 
Virginia Council on Human Relations, are also anti-Communist organizations. "' 10 
Minutes from VCHR meetings show that, in a recurring theme of Massive 
Resistance era anti-communism, the ignominy of being red-baited did not entirely die 
out as resistance fever waned in Virginia. In June 1962, five months before Heslip M. 
"Happy" Lee gave up the VCHR presidency to Aubrey Brown, and three years after 
Almond had endorsed minimal desegregation, the Board of Directors met in the 
Monticello Hotel in Charlottesville. The minutes of the meeting recorded that "the 
Christian Anti-Communist group has been in Roanoke since the Board last met, " 
109 Mrs Morris Brown letter to George S. Mitchell, 9 September 1956, VCHR Papers, Box 1. 
110 Richmond Times-Dis ap tch clipping, "Legion Raps Group's Affiliation, " 1954-1964 Misc Papers 
re: VCHR", Boyle Papers, Box 27. 
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while noting that "the minister, however, was not very successful. "111 On a more 
worrying level, the meeting heard how Robert Welch, head of the extreme-right -- and 
extremely anti-communist -- John Birch Society, had contrasted communism with the 
Birchers on national television, implying "that it was an either or proposition. " The 
Birchers, it was noted with some trepidation, had moved into some of Richmond's 
high schools. 112 By 1963, the irrepressible correspondent J. R. Orgain, who from his 
language and style of prose appeared to believe he was still a member of the secret 
intelligence unit he claimed to have served in during the Second World War, sent 
copies of his "Confidential Report to the Governor of Virginia on the Virginia 
Council on Human Relations 12-23-63 (After 3 Months of Preliminary Study)" to 
Byrd, Abbitt and Tuck. Showing the lack of terminological precision common to so 
many red-baiters, Orgain blustered that the VCHR had developed into "a vehicle of 
Liberalism" which used communist front affiliations to obtain its objectives. "The 
national politicians are using the communists and the communists are using them, " he 
claimed. 113 
111 "VCHR Board of Directors Meeting, Monticello Hotel, Charlottesville, Va. 15 June, 1962 `Report 
from the Executive Director, Heslip M. Lee, "' Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 2, Virginia Historical 
Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
112 ibid. Formed in February 1959, and led by Robert Welch, the John Birch Society was based in 
Indianapolis. An indication of the extremism of the Birchers can be gleaned from their labelling of 
President Eisenhower himself as a willing participant in the communist conspiracy, of the State 
Department as riddled with Soviets, and the communist connections of such apparently random 
international figures as India's Nehru. For a more detailed look at the Birch Society's truly paranoid 
red-baiting polemic, see The Blue Book of the Birch Society [Ninth Edition] ([n. p. ]: Robert Welch, 
1961); Robert Welch, The Politician (Massachusetts: Robert Welch, 1963); and Robert Welch, M 
Neutralizers (Massachusetts: The John Birch Society, 1963). In his foreword to a report on the society 
issued in 1966, Dore Schary, National Chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, noted 
that, "In the period since November, 1964, the John Birch Society has emerged as the strongest of all 
Radical Right Organizations. " Schary, "Foreword" in Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster, Re oýrt 
on the John Birch Society 1966 (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. xi. 
113 J. R. Orgain, "Confidential Report to the Governor of Virginia on the Virginia Council on Human 
Relations 12-23-63 (After 3 Months of Preliminary Study), " Tuck Papers, Folder 5107. 
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One of the leading lights of the VCHR, and the woman primarily responsible 
for setting up its Charlottesville chapter, Sarah Patton Boyle was all too aware of the 
short- and long-term problems caused by segregationists' red-baiting. Showing 
obvious concern about the proposed southern visit of a HUAC sub-committee, she 
wrote to the Greenville, South Carolina attorney, John Bolt Culbertson. "If only we 
don't get Senator Eastland, I shan't complain, " she stated. "He does the most damage 
in one's community, I'm told, because his accusations that one is a communist are 
difficult to disprove to public satisfaction. " Then she precised one of the main reasons 
for red-baiting's ongoing popularity in white supremacist circles: "How the heck can 
you prove you're not a communist? Yet his [Eastland's] failure to establish you are is 
not enough to clear you in the minds of many. "' 4 
Boyle was no stranger to the many forms of abuse and slander racial 
moderates had to endure. In the wake of Brown, she had published an infamous article 
in the Saturday Evening Post that claimed "Southerners W111 Like Integration. "115 It 
caused a storm of protest, for here was a white woman, living in the South, openly 
supportive of the Supreme Court decision. As a result, she admitted she was "accused 
of being a traitor to the South, of having Negro blood, of being paid by the NAACP to 
tell lies, of wanting integration because I had a yen [sic] for black flesh (this usually 
complete with four letter words and general concepts which made me realize what 
extraordinarily pure minds I and all the people I'd ever known had) and finally of 
looking exactly like Mrs Roosevelt. " Sharing many of the racially progressive views 
114 Sarah Patton Boyle letter to John Bolt Culbertson, 20 November 1956, Boyle Papers, Box 1. 
115 Boyle claims that the original title was set to be the less sensationalist and inflammatory "We Are 
Readier Than We Think, " but this was changed against her wishes by pg editors who said that it 
"lacked reader appeal. " See Sarah Patton Boyle, The Desegregated Heart: a Virginian's Stand in Time 
of Transition (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962), pp. 201-202. 
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of the ex-First Lady as she did, it was the physical similarities to her to which Boyle 
humorously claimed to take offence. "The latter of course was the most unkindest out 
of all, and not one, but several hit upon this form of mental torture. "' 16 
In her autobiography, Boyle pondered the list of those progressive and 
humanitarian organisations standing for integration which had been labelled 
subversive, communist or communist fronts. The implication, she noted, "was that 
Communists were the chief people in our nation who were seriously concerned with 
other people's welfare. "117 There was a real danger that the red-baiting of 
integrationist organisations would forge a positive link in the minds of blacks between 
those groups who were most willing to help them, and communists -- not what 
Virginia's red-baiting segregationists had intended. 
VI 
The 1958 senatorial campaign of Dr Louise Oftedal Wensel offers perhaps the 
best example, in Virginia, of the ways in which the rhetoric of the Cold War could 
actually be used by those opposed to both red-baiting and Massive Resistance. ' 8A 
thirty-nine year old practising physician native to Fargo, North Dakota, Wensel had 
moved to Virginia in 1954. She and her family had been living in Washington, DC, 
but ironically chose to move south for the education of her children: "I didn't know, " 
116 Sarah Patton Boyle letter to John H. Marion, 1 October 1955, Boyle Papers, Box 4. 
117 Those moderate organisations included the National Council of Churches, the United Church 
Women, the YWCA, the YMCA, the Catholic Committee of the South, the Community Chest, the Red 
Cross, the United Nations, the AFL-CIO, the Anti-Defamation League, the National Urban League, the 
NAACP, and, finally, the Supreme Court. Boyle, The Desegregated Heart, pp. 233-234. 
118 For a fuller account of this campaign, see George Lewis, "`Any Old Joe Named Zilch'? The 
Senatorial Campaign of Dr Louise Oftedal Wensel, " The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 
Vol. 107, No. 3 (Summer 1999). 
200 
she recalls, "that I was going from the frying pan into the fire. "' 19 A reluctant political 
candidate, she proved to be Senator Byrd's primary source of opposition in a 
campaign that was steeped in the often vitriolic rhetoric of school desegregation and 
Massive Resistance. 120 
Although ultimately unsuccessful, Wensel's campaign is worthy of further 
investigation, not so much for the final outcome as for the manner in which it was 
conducted. Campaigning against the incumbent Senator two years after Massive 
Resistance's initial proclamation, Wensel joined a procession of candidates, including 
Martin A. Hutchinson and Francis Pickens Miller, who had attempted to harness and 
increase that anti-Byrd protest vote, none of whom had received more than 38% of the 
total votes cast. 121 Her campaign began simply, with a letter to the Times-Dispatch. It 
was in response to a breakfast-table discussion in her family home near Fishersville, 
Virginia, on 13 July, following the delivery of the morning newspaper. Angered by 
the Republican Party's decision not to proffer a candidate to run against Byrd, and 
spurred on by her family, Wensel wrote to the paper's editor. 122 On Monday 21 July, 
119Dr Louise Oftedal Wensel Fernbach interviewed by George Lewis, 18 April, 1998, Charlottesville, 
Virginia, University of Newcastle upon Tyne Oral History Collection [UNOHC]. 
120 Her campaign, however, has been largely dismissed or ignored by historians, and by biographers of 
Byrd. Ronald Heinemann's stately 1996 biography of Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, for example, simply states 
that he was opposed by Dr Wensel who had, "labor support". Heinemann, Ha= Byrd of Virginia, 
p. 344. Dr Wensel does not receive mention in J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Ha= Byrd and the Changing 
Face of Virginia Politics. 1945-1966 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1968). In a recent 
collection of essays on the subject of Virginia's Massive Resistance, Dr. Wensel is referred to in only 
one of those essays, as one offering a "quixotic challenge" to Byrd. Lassiter, "A `Fighting Moderate, ' 
p. 184. 
121 Byrd's campaigns had traditionally encountered a minority protest vote, both against him 
personally and his political organisation in general. A Richmond News Leader editorial, written on the 
day after the 1958 election, makes this point emphatically. "In any election in which Mr Byrd is a 
candidate... roughly 30 percent of the vote automatically will be cast against him. This is the `anti-Byrd 
vote. ' It is instinctively anti-Byrd, " the editorial continued, "as cats are instinctively anti-dog, and it 
[is] as easily predictable as the rising of the sun. " Editorial, Richmond News Leader, 5 November 
1958. 
122 The Wensel Family comprised of Louise, husband Henry T. Wensel, a psychologist at the 
Woodrow Wilson Rehabilitation Center near Fishersville, seventeen-year-old Bert, fifteen-year-old 
Linda, nine-year-old David, six-year-old Pamela, and five-year-old Teddy. 
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her letter was printed. The response was not what Wensel had expected. Indeed, she 
did not realise that the letter had been printed until she received a telephone call from 
the President of the AFL-CIO in Virginia, Harold Boyd. 
Boyd had called Wensel because he, and the organised labour concerns that he 
represented, wanted her to run in the senate race against Byrd. 123 An afternoon 
meeting that same Monday with Boyd and his AFL-CIO vice-president, Julian Carper, 
saw Wensel begin her initiation into the politics of running for public office. She was 
handed a copy of V. O. Key's seminal Southern Politics, received a telephone call of 
support from defeated but respected gubernatorial candidate Theodore "Ted" Dalton, 
was offered fund-raising promises from Major Reynolds of the Reynolds Aluminum 
Company and, perhaps most importantly, was swept along by the confident 
enthusiasm of Boyd himself. Boyd and Carper, Wensel recalls, treated her throughout 
that day's meeting as if she had already agreed to run. 124 
Although a working mother of five, Wensel decided to take up the challenge, 
egged on by the energetic enthusiasm of her eldest son, seventeen-year-old Bert. 
"Mother, " he said, "will make a good senator. "125 Boyd instructed Wensel to prepare a 
press release, and it was decided to delay the announcement that she would join the 
race until 25 July, the final day for nominations. This was a shrewd move on two 
counts. First, it suggested that Wensel had waited until the last moment in the hope 
that someone more qualified to run against the incumbent senator would come 
forward; she was, therefore, a reluctant candidate. Second, this reluctance added to the 
123 The editor of the Times-Dispatch also encouraged her to run. Wensel Fernbach interview, 
UNOHC. 
124 Bound Memoir, Louise Oftedal Wensel Papers, 1 Box only, Manuscript Division, Special 
Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. 
125 ibid. 
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impression that it was only because the issues at stake were so vitally important that a 
woman doctor responsible for patients across a wide geographical area, and with a 
family comprised of a working husband and five lively children, felt obliged to take a 
political stand; it was to be a campaign centred on heartfelt matters of principle. 
Picking up on the themes espoused by such contemporary political theorists as 
Hannah Arendt, the letter that had initially attracted Harold Boyd's attention in the 
Times-Dispatch contained what were to become the main pillars of Wensel's 
campaign, startling in their clarity. 126 "Is Virginia to become a dictatorship? How can 
we parents face our children if we sit back and accept the one-party rule of the Byrd 
machine with its plan for closing our public schools? " "Can we persuade our 
children, " she continued, "that democracy is better than communism if we succumb to 
the dictatorship of a man who proposes to destroy the very foundation of democracy -- 
our public schools? "127 It was the most effective and sustained use of Cold War 
rhetoric in an election contest against the Byrd Machine. 128 More usually, it was racial 
moderates and the more extreme integrationists who were the targets of such rhetoric. 
Indeed, it would not have been a surprise had Byrd himself red-baited his opponent in 
the 1958 campaign. 
Instead, Wensel seized the initiative. She even injected a new dimension into 
the anti-communist rhetoric that was increasingly common in Virginia politics, by 
126 Hannah Arendt's writings on totalitarianism pressed for the castigation of all oppressive totalitarian 
regimes, regardless of their "left-" or "right-" wing political polarity. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins 
of Totalitarianism [Third Edition] (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967). 
127 Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 1 Box only. 
128 Indeed, towards the end of Byrd's campaign against Francis Pickens Miller in 1952, billboards 
started appearing across the state emblazoned with the words, "Vote American -- Return Harry F. Byrd 
to the United States Senate -- Maintain your Democratic form of Government. " Francis Pickens Miller, 
Man From the Valley: Memoirs of a 20th-Century Virginian (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 199-200. 
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drawing parallels between the totalitarian aspects of Soviet Russia and Byrd's 
machine. Byrd, she maintained, had been working feverishly for the establishment of 
a dictatorship within the state for years. It was an indication of the organisation's 
success that the Republican Party had decided not to pit a candidate against the 
senator: to all intents and purposes, it was to be a one party election, Soviet-style. 
"Unless someone comes forward to be Republican candidate for the United States 
Senate, " Wensel wrote, "Virginians like Russians will have only one choice in the 
next election. "129 Thus, she exposed the contradiction common to so many southern 
leaders, who were deeply suspicious of centralised government on a national level, but 
were nevertheless keen to centralise government under their own power at a state 
level. Not only had Wensel established an effective line of attack, but taking up the 
anti-communist stance herself also worked as a pre-emptive strike, denying Byrd the 
opportunity of using red-baiting as a tactic against her. 
Wensel's anti-totalitarian strategy received broad coverage in the Winchester 
Evening Star. It published two articles on her appearance before the Winchester, AFL- 
CIO chapter, in which she was quoted as stating that "Virginia's program of Massive 
Resistance to integration is un-American, " and that it constituted "massive sabotage 
against our US Government. He [Byrd] wants Governor Almond to declare himself 
superior to the Supreme Court. But Governor Almond is a lawyer. He knows the 
consequences of sedition. " This was a forthright exposition of Wensel's views for any 
Virginian paper to print, but the Evening Star was not just any Virginian paper: it was 
owned by Harry Byrd, Sr, and edited at the time by his son, Harry Byrd, Jr. 130 
129 ibid. 
130Dr Wensel quoted in Winchester Evening Star, 11 October 1958, p. 1. The reasons for this apparent 
filial disloyalty are unclear, although Harry Byrd, Jr, had clashed with his father before in Evening Star 
editorials. After the 1952 Democratic Convention, for example, Harry Byrd, Jr, had endorsed the 
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The actual content of Wensel's campaign remained remarkably true to the 
spirit of her original letter to the Times-Dis an tch. The schools, she believed, had to be 
kept open at any cost. Initially, in common with so many other racial moderates of the 
time, the Richmond News Leader reported that "she did not believe in enforced 
integration, " a policy which then had the hallmarks of racial radicalism, not 
moderation. The Times-Dis an tch noted that, as an alternative to closing schools, "she 
proposed local option controls that would permit each city and county to deal with its 
own problems, " in line with Gray's original proposals. 131 By October, she had set out 
a more detailed plan. This included the proposed discontinuation of school social 
functions, and the establishment of integrated, dual vocational and academic schools. 
Then, she told Washington's Evening Star, "parents would have to assume their 
rightful responsibility for their children's social life. School would be a place for 
serious learning instead of a place to play at taxpayers' expense. " In a further attempt 
not to appear too radical for the moderate voters to whom she was trying to appeal, 
Wensel was quoted as saying that her suggestions "enable us to meet the Supreme 
Court requirements for desegregation without encouraging racially mixed marriages 
or offspring and without lowering the academic standards of our schools. "132 Such 
subtleties, however, were soon hammered flat by the press, who seemed determined to 
portray the contest as a Manichean struggle between open and closed schools. 
Stevenson-Sparkman ticket, whilst his father was considerably more circumspect. See Heinemann, 
Ha= Byrd of Virginia, p. 314. 
131 Richmond News Leader, 26 July 1958, p. 9.; Times-Dispatch 26 July 1958, p. 2. 
132 The Evening Star, Washington, DC, 24 October 1958, clipping in Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 
1 Box only. An similar story, run by the Associated Press appeared in the Washington Post and Times 
Herald, 24 October 1958, stating that Dr Wensel favoured desegregation, "without encouraging 
racially mixed marriages or offspring and without lowering the academic standards of our schools. " 
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Continuing her Cold War and totalitarian themes, Wensel argued that, by 
closing public schools, Byrd was displaying far greater subversive intent than any of 
Khrushchev's agents, since they had never succeeded in disrupting the country's 
education system. "Khrushchev really should give [Senator] Byrd a medal, " she was 
reported as saying in the Evening Star, "for accomplishing what none of his workers 
had been able to do -- close American public schools and persuade many Americans 
to defy the laws of their country. "133 It was a popular campaign proposition. The 
Times-Dispatch, for example, reported on a speech given to about one hundred 
members of the Richmond League of Women Voters in the tea room of the Richmond 
YWCA. The League turned out to be staunch supporters of Wensel throughout her 
campaign, and, when she rebuked Byrd for his "dictatorial control" of Virginian 
politics, the Times-Dispatch reported that they "applauded heartily and warmly. "134 
That Cold War theme was extended into a plea for more US backing for the United 
Nations, and, in direct opposition to Byrd's own professed admiration for the policy 
of "mass retaliation" in the light of a Soviet attack, a plea to "do everything possible 
to keep American soldiers out of foreign countries and Russian hydrogen bombs out 
of the United States. "135 
With such concerns as a stronger United Nations and an end to a policy of 
"massive retaliation, " Wensel's campaign exemplifies a major trend in women's post- 
war political activism identified by Susan Lynn. Many liberal women's organisations, 
noted Lynn, "expressed serious reservations about the increasing militarism of US 
foreign policy in the postwar world and played a critical role in educating the public 
133 Winchester Evening Star, 11 October 1958, clipping in Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 1 Box 
only. 
134 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 28 October 1958, p. 2. 
135 ibid. 
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about international concerns. "136 Wensel had attempted to do just that, until Virginia's 
press decided to concentrate so stubbornly on the single issue of the fate of the public 
schools. "What I didn't mention in my letter, " remembered Wensel, referring to her 
initial letter to the Times-Dispatch, but which was nevertheless "one of the things that 
I stressed in my campaign, was that we should be more interested in strengthening the 
United Nations... we had the nuclear weapons pointed at us at the time. " Asked about 
her contemporaries' reaction to her discussions of such internationalist concerns, she 
stated simply that she was "sorry to say I think it was essentially indifference. " 137 
However much the Cold War infused domestic politics in 1950s America, the 
electorate in 1958 Virginia was clearly most concerned with the central issues 
surrounding segregated schooling. In part that was a result of the successful press 
campaign to concentrate on the schools issue, but it was also because the school crisis 
was more immediate than the distant and somewhat intangible threat of nuclear 
missiles, over which Virginians felt that they had little or no immediate control. 
When the polls closed on 4 November 1958, Wensel had accumulated over 
120,000 votes, but still only managed just over 27% of the total votes cast. 138 
Commenting on her campaign's place in the history of post-war Virginia, Wensel 
believed that it was "important as a demonstration of what a person with political, 
social and financial handicaps can do to prevent evil, entrenched politicians from 
136 Susan Lynn, Progressive Women In Conservative Times: Racial Justice. Peace. and Feminism. . 
1945 to the 1960s (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 96. Lynn 
concentrates primarily on the work of the Young Woman's Christian Association [YWCA] and the 
American Friends Service Committee [AFSC]. In a statement released by their National Board in the 
year of Dr Wensel's campaign, for example, the YWCA deplored "the primary emphasis which is 
placed frequently in foreign policy on defense and military preparedness... We plead for a foreign 
policy in which the creative and constructive genius of the United States is directed toward affecting 
conditions in the world which will make peace possible. " Quoted in Lynn, Progressive Women in 
Conservative Times, p. 107. 
137 Wensel Fernbach interview, UNOHC. 
138 Her final total was 120,224 to Byrd's 317,221. See Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 81. 
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destroying the democratic process in American communities. " 139 Wensel's campaign 
contributed to the growing awareness that an increasing number of white Virginians 
would not tolerate closed public schools. It also offers an incisive look at the ways in 
which both the language and tensions of the Cold War permeated politics at the state 
level at mid-century. 
VII 
It was, perhaps, fitting that the Byrd Organisation chose David Mays to head 
the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government [VaCCG], set up by an Act 
of Assembly on 7 March 1958. In essence, the Commission was a States' Rights 
organisation, created "to develop and promulgate information concerning the dual 
system of government, federal and state, established under the Constitution of the 
United States and those of several states. "14° The Commission became the official 
propaganda arm of Virginia's Massive Resistance programme, producing and 
publishing reams of rhetoric intended to bolster the Old Dominion's stance against 
integration. Somewhat surprisingly, rather like Louise Wensel's campaign, it has been 
virtually ignored by historians of the era; surprising not only because of the central 
role it played in the battle for southern hearts and minds, but also for its particular take 
on anti-communism. 141 
139 Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 1 Box only. 
140 "Report to Governor, December, Yearly, " VaCCG Papers, Box 1. 
141There is no mention of the Committee in Ely, Crisis of Conservative Virginia, Lassiter and Lewis 
[eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, or Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New 
York: George Braziller, 1973). Numan Bartley simply states that, "Among latecomers to the public 
propaganda field, the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, with News Leader [sic] 
editor James Jackson Kilpatrick as Publications Committee chairman, was most consistently energetic 
in propaganda and lobbying activity during the massive resistance phase of southern race politics. " 
Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 183. The lack of literature on the VaCCG does, it should be 
noted, place a heavy emphasis on Mays' own accounts of its activities. 
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At different times during its existence, the Commission was comprised of 
between fifteen and seventeen people, many of them leading lights of Virginian 
politics. They included Mays as chairman, Kilpatrick as head of the publications 
division, Albertis S. Harrison, Burr P. Harrison, and the Byrd confidant and member 
of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, Judge J. Segar 
Gravatt. 142 In most of its output, the Commission mirrored the views of its chairman. 
A keen legal mind, just as Mays had attempted to modify Stanley's early response to 
Brown, so he steered what he consistently referred to in his candid diaries as "my 
VaCCG" away from the more hard line, extremist polemic of many of his peers. 143 In 
Virginia, the VaCCG came closest to fulfilling the role of an investigative committee, 
one of the state governments' three favoured approaches to anti-communism noted by 
Michael Heale. However, unlike the Johns Committee in Florida and, for example, the 
Sovereignty Commission in Mississippi, the VaCCG did not indulge in the kind of 
witch-hunting anti-communism practised by many of Virginia's southern 
neighbours. '44 
142 Other members of the VaCCG during its existence include William T. Muse, the Hon. E. Almer 
Ames, Jr, the Hon. Hale Collins, the Hon. Frederick T. Gray, the Hon. Garnett S. Moore, the Hon. W. 
Carrington Thompson, the Hon. William L. Winston, the Hon. W. C. Daniel, Edgar R. Lafferty, the 
Hon. Roy Smith, Leslie D. Campbell, Jr, the novelist John Dos Passos, Garnett S. Moore, Hugh V. 
White, Jr, William L. Winston, Sam Crutchfield, Jr, Charles Cross, Jr, John A. K. Donovan, and the 
secretary, May Gee. 
143 Emphasis added. In a perfect example of his shying away from the more lurid excesses of some of 
his segregationist colleagues, Mays noted that, having been contacted by the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties and sent a plaque by them to hang on his wall, "The Defenders 
are a rapid crowd who until now have given me as wide a birth as I am to give them, and to hang this 
would indicate a relationship foreign to my Commission and tend to reduce greatly its effectiveness. " 
Mays Diaries, 26 June 1964. 
144 The other two favoured approaches were loyalty oaths and communist-control laws. The VaCCG 
justifies Heale's emphasis on the importance of looking at such committees on a state by state basis. 
Michael J. Heale, McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation. 1935-1965 
[American History in Depth] (London: MacMillan, 1998), p. xvi. For more on the work of 
investigative committees, see pp. 7-27. 
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Mays' own calming influence continued in spite of the feelings of some of his 
fellow members. In a clear example of just how much it was his Commission, in 
August 1962 Mays made his excuses from a meeting of the League of Conservative 
Voters. "I can't involve the CCG [sic], " he wrote, "in a meeting at which such wild 
people as Judge Billy Old will be on the program. "las It had been Judge William 
"Billy" Old and his belief in the ultimate primacy of States' Rights who had, in 
November 1955, first urged Kilpatrick to take his well-publicised stance on 
interposition. Regardless of the fact that Kilpatrick was a high ranking member of the 
VaCCG in 1962, Mays could not countenance such links. Under his tutelage, the 
VaCCG strove to be realistic, accurate, workmanlike and even plodding in its legal 
strictures. 
Indeed, it was this style of reasoned, often legalistic advocacy which 
characterised much of the Commission's work, giving its resistance a distinctive cast. 
While the sit-ins were a target for red-baiting smears in many quarters, for example, 
Mays' Commission preferred to emphasise the illegality of the protests. On April 20 
1960, the VaCCG released "Race and the Restaurant: Two Opinion Pieces, " 
containing reprints of both Judge Soper's opinion in Williams v Howard Johnson's 
Restaurant, and of the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Washington Parking 
Authority v Burton. Mays recorded in his diary simply that "these point out clearly the 
illegality of the current trespasses by Negroes in white restaurants and may give a few 
people something to think about. "146 Likewise, rather than launching into demagogic, 
145 Mays Diaries, 17 August 1962. 
146 ibid., 20 April 1960. In his entry for 8 April 1960, concerning the distribution of Calhoun's Fort 
Hill address, which espoused a strong States' Rights doctrine, Mays noted that "we shall holdup its 
release until we can get out our folder dealing with the obvious illegality of the Negro lunchcounter sit 
downs. This effort of the Negroes is self-defeating since they have now turned from the federal courts 
to extra -- and illegal -- actions. " 
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racist rhetoric in his quest to convince Virginians that continued segregation was 
fundamental to their well-being, he noted that "Carter Pittman's article in the ABA 
[American Bar Association] Journal demonstrating the obvious -- that all men aren't 
created equal -- will fit nicely into our CCG [sic] reprints. "147 Even Almond, 
eschewing his occasional lapses into red-baiting, calmly told the Commission that 
"we have nothing to fear from communism if the young minds of the state can be 
impressed with the facts of history and the arguments pro and con on this great 
issue. "148 And that is exactly what the Commission set out to achieve. Through 
judicious reprintings of effective speeches, and through the widespread dissemination 
of original, educative works, it sought to add structure to the existing, genuine anti- 
communist fears of Virginians, and strove to support them with hard evidence. 
Furthermore, if there was a legal means to attain the desired result, however mundane 
it may have appeared, Mays drove his Commission towards it. 
The sheer scale of the Commission's publication activities was staggering. The 
Biennial Report to the Commission by the Executive Director, covering the period 
from 1 December 1963 to 1 December 1965, claimed that the total number of 
publications distributed by the VaCCG since its inception in 1958 stood at 
1,262,621.149 By December 1969, that figure had grown to 2,176,498 booklets and 
147 Mays Diaries, 26 August 1960. 
148 "Remarks of Governor J. Lindsay Almond before the Commission on Constitutional Government 
21 July, 1958, " VaCCG Papers, Box 2. 
149 "Report to General Assembly 1 December 1963 -1 December 1965, " VaCCG Papers, Box 1. The 
distribution lists included state legislators, Governors, and Chief Justices of every state; US 
Congressmen, and Federal (including Supreme Court) Judges; members of the Virginia Bar 
Association and all Virginia department heads; college and junior college libraries "throughout the 
nation"; all high school libraries in Virginia; city public libraries "throughout the nation"; state public 
libraries, law school libraries and state law libraries; chambers of commerce in any US city with a 
population over 100,000; daily newspapers in the US; "Magazines of national circulation"; all college 
deans; instructors in government and economics in all Virginia high schools; and "the various editors, 
news commentators, and columnists. " 
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pamphlets, and 16,425 books, including 37,600 copies of "Democracy and 
Despotism", and 39,055 of "Did the Court Interpret or Amend? " attacking the 
Supreme Court's decision-making process in the school desegregation cases. '5° What 
is more, they were distributed right at the core of government, both at state and federal 
level. "Where I could get them to do [so], I have used senators and congressmen as 
my `newsboys' to distribute my pamphlets on Civil Rights, " noted Mays, "because 
people in Washington are far [more] likely to read them when asked by a 
legislator. "'51 
Mays resolutely refused to red-bait, but still remained stoically anti- 
communist. "I believe that positive teaching is necessary, " he explained. "Prove the 
virtues of the American system and give communism some good kicks in the pants in 
passing. Nothing is done by mere negation, " he said. Then, coming to the crux of his 
position, he wrote that "the trouble is that we have thousands of orators denouncing 
communism without telling the people what it is and what to do about it. "152 He had 
also learnt from two earlier mistakes on the dissemination of anti-communist material. 
The Commission had once ordered a report on communism for Virginia's schools 
from a highly recommended Massachusetts researcher, referred to in VaCCG 
correspondence as "Dr Gannon. " Mays had, however, by his own admission, been so 
keen to get the programme underway that he gave Gannon insufficient time to 
prepare, and the report had to be shelved. It was not a mistake he would make 
again. '53 
150 "Report to Governor, December, Yearly", VaCCG Papers, Box 1. 
151 Mays Diaries, 19 February 1964. 
152 ibid., 26 April 1961. 
153 Mays first met Gannon on 7 February 1961, at the recommendation of Dean Manion, and had to 
shelve his 120-page report on 21 March of the same year. 
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Likewise, in 1961, great umbrage was caused by the linking of a VaCCG 
pamphlet on communism with the name of the John Birch Society. As William T. 
Muse felt compelled to tell the assembled members of the Virginia Bar Association, 
"it was unfortunate that the name of the John Birch Society was on the front page of 
the proof. That society had no connection with the preparation of the material. " The 
VaCCG, continued Muse, had simply employed a "highly recommended person" to 
compile the pamphlet, who had taken it upon himself to add the name of the Birch 
Society, for whom he also wrote. '54 Even Kilpatrick, perhaps the greatest firebrand of 
the VaCCG Board, referred to the John Birch Society as "a bunch of nuts. "155 
Accusations of involvement with the Birchers -- and, therefore, with extremes of 
racism, red-baiting and McCarthyism -- would have compromised the legalistic, 
respectable and moderate reputation that Mays and the Commission were so desperate 
to foster, especially among groups like the Bar Association. Here, then, was a 
segregationist, a Massive Resister, a States' Righter and an anti-communist clearly 
deploring irresponsible red-baiting. '56 
Mays' personal standpoint was wholeheartedly adopted by the Commission, 
most clearly in a joint campaign with the Farm Bureau Federation to portray 
communism accurately in school textbooks. This formed part of a wider mission to 
154 William Muse letter to Members of the Executive Committee, Virginia Bar Association, 24 March 
1961, VaCCG Papers, Box 1. 
155 James Kilpatrick quoted in Hugh V. White, Jr, letter to Mills E. Godwin, Jr, 13 March 1961, 
Godwin Personal Papers, Box 1. 
156 Mays' fear of a genuine subversive threat, and, therefore, his anti-communism, is exemplified by 
his donations to both the Crusade for Freedom and Radio Free Europe. The only hint of red-baiting in 
Mays' expansive and very personal diaries, in which he was not shy of voicing his true opinions, 
concerned public hearings in front of the Senate and House Committees on both Privileges and 
Elections, held on 30 November 1955. "Many spoke, black and white, " reported Mays, "some wisely, 
some foolishly, and one nigger lawyer was unbelievably arrogant. Meantime, some of the proceeding 
was broadcast by television nationwide although I was unconscious of it at the time. We certainly had 
some Commies with us. " Mays Diaries, 30 November 1955, emphasis added. 
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warn high school students of the dangers of the communist threat. Again, this whole 
episode was carried out in a highly systematic manner. On 12 April 1961, Mays 
personally accepted the request of the Farm Bureau's Maury Hubbard to serve as 
chairman on the agricultural agency's committee to instruct its members on the 
dangers of communism. Hubbard's credentials were strengthened by his recent visit to 
the Soviet Union, to see a communist system of government at first hand. The Farm 
Bureau's request reflects the impact Mays' stance on anti-communism had made in 
the three years since the VaCCG had been established, and offered him the 
opportunity to blend the VaCCG's programme with that of the bureau. '57 
Mays had dinner meetings with Farm Bureau representatives in June and 
October 1961 to finalise plans. 158 Meanwhile, the VaCCG strode onwards in its 
education drive. Woodrow Wilkerson began a scheme in September to review all 
encyclopaedias used in the state school system, evaluating their observations on 
capitalism, socialism, communism and "related matters, " and Mays attended hearings 
of the Advisory Committee of the State Department of Education on "teaching 
Democracy v. Communism in Senior Class of Va. public schools. " 59 In his diary 
entry of 21 March 1960, Mays revealed the thoroughness with which proposed school 
157 Very little evidence of the Farm Bureau's anti-communist activity remains. The only reference to 
the Committee in the Virginia Farm Bureau's files is a Report to the Board of Directors, Virginia Fram 
Bureau Federation - 23 August 1961. "Mr Johnson reported that the Committee on Communism had 
recommended as one of its projects, getting business organizations in the state to use good books (i. e. 
'YOU CAN TRUST THE COMMUNIST to do what they say') on the subject of Communism[, ] as 
Christmas gifts. On motion by Mr. Metz, seconded by Mr. Johnson and carried, the Board approved 
the employing of a person on a temporary basis to contact business organization, probably in the 
Richmond area, in an effort to get such organizations to use books of this type as Christmas gifts. " My 
thanks to Jonathan S. Shouse, Corporate Secretary, Virginia Farm Bureau Federation, for this 
information. Correspondence between Jonathan S. Shouse and George Lewis, 9 November 1999. 
158 Mays eventually became frustrated by the slow pace of the Farm Bureau's machinations. "Attended 
dinner meeting, " he wrote in June 1962, "which lasted more than three hours of the 'Paul Revere 
Committee' of the Va. Fed. Farm bureau at John Marshall Hotel. They are fine people and are devoted 
in war on communism but they do talk so long. " Mays Diaries, 27 June 1962. 
159 ibid., 6 September 1961 and 28 November 1961. 
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textbooks warning about the dangers of communism were vetted. Of three books 
submitted, he wrote, "the first was generally approved, the second was criticized 
mainly due to the relative space given communism, and the third was almost thrown 
out on the grounds that it had obvious errors and was not well written. As it was, the 
books were approved for [teachers'] use only. "160 
The VaCCG's role was also crucial in attempting the co-ordination and 
preparation of a south-wide, non-extremist but still resolutely defiant response to 
Brown. In 1958, only two months after the Commission had been established, 
Governor Almond told the South Carolina Bar Association that, "in brief, the whole 
purpose and conception of the Commission is to work in co-operation with our sister 
states to the end that several states may be restored to their proper dignity and 
defended in the exercise of their non-delegated and reserved powers under the 
Constitution. " In this undertaking, he was "earnestly inviting" the co-operation of 
South Carolina. 161 Again, tellingly, the VaCCG's chosen audience was a Bar 
Association. The approach was no different, but the aim this time was to unite the 
South in what Mays -- and, amongst others, Almond -- believed to be a formidable, 
region-wide, process of dignified resistance. 
It is an unfortunate result of both the omission of the VaCCG from the 
historiography of Massive Resistance, and of the preoccupation with the minutiae of 
meetings and committees in the Commission's own papers, that the efforts of Mays 
and his Commission to help other southern states with similar resistance bodies have 
160 ibid., 21 March 1960. According to his diary entry, the books in question were "American 
Capitalism (Case Series), Capitalism and other economic Systems (Case Series), and Heckman's Ih 
Economics of American Living (Rand McNally). " 
161 "The Achilles Heel of America: Address by Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, Governor of 
Virginia, South Carolina Bar Association, Columbia SC, May 2 1958, " Almond Personal Papers, Box 
13. 
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gone unnoticed. Although corroborating evidence is scarce, Mays' personal papers 
and diary suggest that the influence of "his" VaCCG was not confined to Virginia, but 
spread across the South and beyond in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It took a long 
time for Mays' plans for an inter-state meeting of southern legislators, which were to 
discuss the work of Commissions such as Virginia's, to come to fruition: he wrote to 
his opposite numbers in Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana and Florida on 12 August 
1959, but had to admit on the last day of August that he was "getting nowhere. "162 
These intended links, however, were not pursued without some misgivings. Again, 
stressing the legalistic, educational nature of the VaCCG, Mays confided that he was a 
little apprehensive in his attempts to forge links with the main segregationist 
protagonists of the Little Rock crisis two years earlier. "Both the Governor and I, " 
admitted Mays, "are charry [sic] about getting tangled up with rabid segregationists, 
and I wrote Faubus, of Arkansas, with some misgivings. " 163 
In September 1960, he was at last introduced to the other southern governors 
at the Hot Springs Southern Governors Conference, chaired by Virginia's J. Lindsay 
Almond, Jr. "I was careful to begin by pointing out, " reported Mays, "that my 
Commission was not set up to deal with school litigation, but was to put on an 
educational program concerning basic constitutional concepts, and that I had had that 
understanding before accepting the chairmanship. " The talk was applauded, and, 
according to Mays, "received vocal approval by Faubus, Hollings, Barnett, Hodges, 
and Patterson. " Somewhat bizarrely, however, John Patterson went on to announce 
that he did not want a similar Commission in Alabama, as it would, he claimed, 
162 Mays Diaries, 12 August 1959, and 31 August 1959. 
163 ibid., 12 August 1960. "Charry" is a misspelling of "chary, " meaning "careful" or "wary. " I am 
indebted to Janet B. Schwarz, Associate Reference Librarian of the Virginia Historical Society, for this 
interpretation. 
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remove power from the governor to the legislature and "enable aspirants for the 
governorship and attorney-generalship [sic] to use the commission as political 
stepping stones. "164 By September 1961, the VaCCG's Ed Welley told Virginia 
legislators that, in travelling around the country, he had been "congratulated 
universally" on the work that the VaCCG was doing. 165 
It would, initially, appear surprising that the best response Mays received from 
another state was from the legislature of Pennsylvania. He was delighted by its 
enthusiasm, and, on closer inspection, the reason for this becomes quite clear. Mays 
realised that Virginia specifically, and the South generally, needed an element of 
northern support in order to make Massive Resistance successful. It was a view shared 
by Kilpatrick. "We can never win this thing on votes from Southern representatives 
alone, " the Richmond News Leader editor had said. "If we are to win, and I am 
confident that in the end we will win, it must be with help from other areas of the 
country. " 166 Mays' logic was that, were Pennsylvania or any other northern state to 
establish a committee along the lines of the VaCCG, Massive Resistance could be 
explained as opposition not to racial integration, but simply as opposition to 
overbearing federal intervention into the affairs of individual states. On 29 May 1961, 
when Mays was first contacted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly about sending 
a delegation South to discuss constitutional government committees, he remarked that 
"this is the first real break we have had in the North. "167 A meeting was set up in 
164 ibid., 28 September 1960. 
165 ibid., 13 September 1961. Welley was, however, speaking at the same time as other Virginia Board 
heads to explain their budget requests for the next fiscal year, so his observations may have been prone 
to over-exaggeration. 
166Kilpatrick quoted in Thorndike, "James. J. Kilpatrick and the Virginia Campaign against Brown, " p. 
64. 
167 Mays Diaries, 29 May 1961. 
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Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in February of 1962. Indeed, so keen was Mays to make it a 
success that, when poor weather grounded his party's plans to fly North, they drove 
all the way in limousines. 168 It was a qualified success, both parties agreeing to meet 
again in Williamsburg, Virginia, in the summer, and the Pennsylvanians agreeing to 
set up a commission if they could take control of the legislature in their upcoming 
state elections. By January 1963, Philadelphia planned a constitutional commission, 
and Guy Kestler, one of its representatives, telephoned Mays for advice and for 
material in support of the promotion of States' Rights. 169 
In other states, the VaCCG's stock kept rising. In the Summer of 1963, Mays 
was asked by the University of Georgia to make a television recording espousing the 
Commission's views. In his home state, too, he was asked to make a "canned film" by 
the Central Virginia Educational Television Corporation on the subject of teaching 
anti-communism in schools. It was for use "where desired in different parts of the 
country. " Jack Kilpatrick went to Arizona, to "spread a bit of Gospel" in February 
1962, and then went on to try "his hand with the hapless `liberals' of Antioch College 
in Ohio" in May. The VaCCG was asked to send speakers all over the country, from 
Mobile, in the Summer of 1962, to the Student Congress of Young Americans For 
Freedom Convention at the University of Indiana, in the Summer of 1963. By March 
1964, Mays noted that the Governor-elect of Louisiana was planning to realign 
Louisiana's Sovereignty Commission along the lines of the VaCCG, a move which 
Alabama looked set to follow in April with a large order for VaCCG materials. "The 
word certainly gets around, " wrote Mays. '7° As Massive Resistance laws were being 
168 ibid., 26 February 1962. 
169 ibid., 17 January 1963. 
170 ibid., 7 August 1963; 29 April 1965; 28 February 1962; 7 May 1962; 27 August 1962; 9 August 
1963; 25 March 1964; 6 April 1964. 
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dismantled, and the force of white, northern public opinion was swinging inexorably 
towards support of southern civil rights agitators, there was concrete, widespread 
support for the line promulgated by the VaCCG: for its distancing of resistance from 
the more rabid displays of racist segregationists; for its espousal of legal arguments; 
for its educational approach to anti-communism, especially in schools; and for its 
heavy emphasis on the primacy of States' Rights. Moreover, what both the work of 
the commission and the diaries of its chairman establish beyond doubt is that there 
was a widespread exchange of ideas, information and resistance-minded argument 
between not only the states of the South, but also across the whole country. 
Mays' influence was also discernible in a very low key yet highly influential 
gathering of leading Virginians known as the Forum Club. Meeting on a regular social 
basis at Richmond's Commonwealth Club, usually on the second Monday of each 
month, the Forum Club included among its 112 members Mays, Kilpatrick, Coleman 
Andrews, Virginius Dabney, Admiral Alvin Duke Chandler, Albertis Harrison and 
countless members of Virginia's commercial elites. 171 Like the VaCCG, although 
probably due to its informal, almost secretive nature, The Forum Club is missing from 
the historiography of Virginia in the mid-twentieth century. 172 Granted, the overall 
influence of the club is unclear, but it is almost unthinkable that so many influential 
Virginians would meet at such crucial times in the Old Dominion's political 
development without exchanging and polishing their own views on relevant subjects. 
Indeed, even the club's moniker suggests an arena for discussion and debate. 
171 "Forum Club Notice of Meeting, " 15 September 1958, David J. Mays Papers, Box 1, Virginia 
Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. 
172 One of the few references to the Forum Club is as a place where Kilpatrick heard Mays' arguing 
for local option and tokenism as the most effective way to side-step desegregation. Thorndike, 
"Kilpatrick and the Campaign Against Brown, " in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, 
p. 70. 
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Furthermore, a "Notice of Meeting" sent to all members for Tuesday 21 
September 1954 reveals that Forum Club members were immersed in both Cold War 
and desegregation issues. "At our last meeting held 17 May 1954, the Supreme Court 
and its non-segregation decision crowded McCarthy off the program (that is, off our 
program), " the letter began, "but maybe before integration is settled we will feel that 
we would rather have McCarthy. We had a fine talk by Robert A. Wilson on the part 
played by the Richmond Citizens Association in civic affairs and we remained a few 
minutes overtime to hear a learned address by John C. Wyllie on communism. At 9: 00 
p. m. opinions were developing that almost turned our meeting into an all-night 
session. I believe we are going to hear from Mr Wyllie again! "173 The very fact that 
the club had a discernible "program" strongly suggests that it was more than simply a 
chance to chatter and dine. 174 
VIII 
In ideology and in method, half-way between the Commission on 
Constitutional Government and the White Citizens' Councils lay the Defenders of 
State Sovereignty and Individual Liberty. 175 Virginia's Defenders groups had much in 
common with the state's overall Massive Resistance strategies, mainly because of the 
overlap in personnel: the Defenders counted among their members three state 
173 "Forum Club Notice of Meeting, " 15 September 1954, Mays Papers, Box 1. 
174 A "Notice of Meeting" sent out on 15 September 1958, for example, stated that the meeting was to 
feature not only Kilpatrick speaking on the schools issue, but also Colgate Darden, President of the 
University of Virginia and a former US Delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
speaking on the role of the U. N. "Forum Club Notice of Meeting, " 15 September 1958, Mays Papers, 
Box 1. 
175 As McMillen has noted, neither Virginia, North Carolina nor Tennessee had actual Citizens' 
Councils groups. The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberty were, therefore, the 
closest to a Council group that Virginia's resistance movement produced. 
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senators, two state delegates, several county supervisors and clerks, and numerous 
members of the state's business elites. 176 Like the moderate Virginia Committee for 
Public Schools, the Defenders were originally made up of smaller, federated groups 
such as the Crusaders for Constitutional Government. 177 The thirty-seven chapters that 
were eventually federated may have had a membership as high as 12,000, but, unlike 
the VaCCG and its state-sponsored finances, many of the less successful enclaves 
were highly compromised by their lack of adequate funding. On 17 July 1961, for 
example, R. B. Crawford, the state-wide President of the Defenders, felt compelled to 
write to fellow Defender Bill Tuck that "it will be up to this Board to determine 
whether this organisation will continue -- If the larger chapters that have been 
delinquent in dues for the past two years do not pledge co-operation, we will, " he 
continued, "have to fold our tents. "178 
Like similar groups across the South, the Defenders were white supremacists 
with a deeply entrenched interest in Massive Resistance. Thus, the themes and means 
of opposition they espoused followed the pattern of Massive Resistance at the state 
level, although, unencumbered by any official designation or state position, such 
groups often used more vitriolic and vituperative rhetoric than their legislative peers. 
However, in many respects the Defenders' tactics represent a microcosm of those used 
by the state's legislators and segregationist leaders. Once again, anti-communism was 
widespread and multi-faceted. In 1960, for example, Crawford readily enjoined 
Defenders groups in the debate over internal infiltration of civil rights groups by 
176 Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction. 
1954-64 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p. 106. 
177 On 18 November 1959, for example, John W. Carter delivered a speech entitled, "The Saga of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia: Governor J. Lindsay Almond and his Pals, " in his capacity as vice- 
chairman of the Crusaders for Constitutional Government. Byrd Papers, Box 242. 
178 R. B. Crawford letter to William Tuck, 17 July 1961, Tuck Papers, Folder 5288. 
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communists. "Because you are on our side, " he wrote to all members, "we are now 
going to ask you to accept responsibility in your community -- the responsibility of 
helping to stop the Communist drive in our communities. "179 The Arlington chapter of 
the Defenders reinforced this same point, but rather more colourfully. "We know not 
the spirit in which Tennis Champion Laura Lou Kunnen wore the Rebel flag on the 
seat of her pants, " it wrote in late February 1959, "whether in defiance of judicial 
tyranny or in contempt for a South that prostrates itself before the first onslaught of 
communism's mailed fist. If it was worn in defiance, we salute her; if in disdain, we 
grant her justification. " 80 
Again, that claim of communist involvement in general civil rights activity 
was bolstered by more specific attacks on individual incidents of civil rights agitation. 
The sit-ins, the NAACP and, for example, the involvement of racial moderates in civil 
rights, were all on the receiving end of the Defenders' red-baiting assaults. The sit-ins 
were labelled as having been "exposed" as being "planned and led by Communists, 
their secret agents and their dupes" by HUAC and the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee. ' 81 
Referring to the failure of continued segregation in Arlington schools, and a 
court ordered shift towards a pupil assignment programme, the Arlington Defenders' 
"corresponding secretary, " Mrs Marian Gatterman, wrote to Almond that its members 
felt "that the contamination of the NAACP, through its vast associations with the 
179 R. B. Crawford letter to "Members, " Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, 20 
September 1960, Byrd Papers, Box 243. 
180 "Arlington Chapter: Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties. Sic Temper Tyrannis. 
Defenders Views From Here and There, " News sheet, 20 February 1959, Almond Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 87. 
181 "Students, White Negro, Red Dupes; J. Edgar Hoover Exposes Youth as Target of Communists, " 
Byrd Papers, Box 243. 
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Communist Party should have been brought out [in court], and this would have 
certainly... strengthened our stand publicly and legally. "182 Almond's reply concluded 
that there was no "available evidence" for such claims: he was not questioning the use 
of red-baiting on moral grounds, simply, as a trained lawyer, on legal grounds. 183 
Rather self-effacingly, J. C. Hoge, President of the Blacksburg Chapter of the 
Defenders, told Almond that "I doubt if you have heard of our chapter as we have 
done nothing. I am rather disappointed with the whole affair. I have nothing against 
the negro, " he continued, "but I fear very much what I feel is behind the NAACP. " 84 
Once again, the implication was that, if the NAACP were communist infiltrated and 
motivated, so was another villain of Brown, the Supreme Court. "Broadcast Number 
22, " one of a series of Defenders radio propaganda programs, entitled "The Truth 
About the Civil Rights Fight, " was unequivocal in its condemnation of the "left-wing" 
court. "The South is the only strong bastion of states rights and individual liberty, " it 
proclaimed, picking up on the wider themes of resistance. "As such, " the broadcast 
continued, "it is the number one target of these budding federal tyrants. For only over 
the prostrate body politic of the South can they reach their goal of the superstate. And 
what better way is there to neutralize Southern opposition than to besiege the South 
with a tyrannical Supreme Court? " 85 
Justifying the VCHR's attempts to ensure that it was well prepared against 
attacks on the alleged communist connections of its parent organisation, the Southern 
182 Mrs Marian Gatterman letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, [copied to Tom Stanley], 3 August 1956, 
Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108. 
183 J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, letter to Mrs Marian Gattermann [copied to Tom Stanley], 6 August 1956, 
Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 106. 
184 J. C. Hoge letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 4 December 1959, Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
87. 
185 "Broadcast #22: The Truth About the Civil Rights Fight, " Boyle Papers, Box 21. 
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Regional Council, the Arlington Defenders released a one-page news sheet in March 
1961, entitled, "Human Relations Committee Commie Connected? " This news sheet 
found it "highly significant" that, as part of a membership deal to join the Fairfax 
County Council on Human Relations, $5 per calendar year would also guarantee a 
subscription to New South, the official publication of the SRC. Quoting the 
ubiquitous communist informant Paul Couch, the Defenders made it clear that, as an 
ex-CPUSA agent, one of the positions Couch had been given was "Tennessee editor 
of the Communist Magazine, The New South. "186 The inference was clear. If the 
Fairfax committee was giving away what an ex-communist, and now anti-communist 
informant, claimed was a paper connected to the CPUSA, then that committee was 
surely red. 
It is, of course, important to remember that the Defenders fell back on all the 
established weapons of resistance at their disposal, not just anti-communism. Various 
Defenders' groups, for example, drew attention to such issues as the miscegenation 
that would, they felt, be inevitable once schools were desegregated. Nativist 
arguments were also redeployed, some of which claimed that it was inherently 
"American" to segregate and discriminate. The United States, it was claimed, had 
been founded upon principles of racial separation, in stark contrast to the South 
American colonies of the Spanish and Portuguese which encouraged 
miscegenation. '87 An advocacy of the primacy of States' Rights, though, was the most 
186 "The Arlington Defender: Human Relations Commie Connected? " 13 March 1961, William Tuck 
Papers, Folder 5288. 
187 Defenders "Broadcast #17, " for example, includes a very ponderous nativist argument: "The white 
men and women, chiefly of British, German, Dutch, and Scandinavian stocks, who colonized and 
occupied what is now the United States, were strongly imbued with race preference. They did not 
follow the example of the Spanish and Portuguese (in whom, for historical reasons this instinct of race 
preference was much weaker) who, in colonizing South and Central America, amalgamated with the 
Indians found in possession of the land, and in some cases with the Negroes brought over as slaves. 
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frequently used argument. A 1959 speech given by Danville's John W. Carter to the 
Lunenburg Chapter of the Defenders, made this wider intent very clear. "In January of 
this year, " he began, "we lost the first great battle in our fight to preserve the 
sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Virginia. " Token integration was, therefore, 
interpreted without reference to race; what was at issue first and foremost was States' 
Rights and the sovereignty of Virginia. 188 
Instead, the founders of the future United States maintained their practice of non-amalgamation 
rigorously, with only slight racial blendings along the fringes of each group. Hence, it is nonsense to 
say that racial discrimination, the necessary consequence of race preference, is `Un-American. "' Boyle 
Papers, Box 21. 
188 "The Saga of the Commonwealth of Virginia: Governor J. Lindsay Almond and his Pals, " 18 
November 1959, Byrd Papers, Box 242. 
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Chapter Four 
North Carolina 
A predominately rural state, North Carolina's reputation at mid-century rested 
upon its comparative liberalism in a region characterised by reactionary politics. In 
contrast to Virginia's conservative, agrarian powerbase and white supremacist 
oligarchy, North Carolina was dominated by elites whose power rested not only on 
the land, but on the industrial muscle of tobacco, textile and furniture manufacturing. 
Much of the Tar Heel State's economic success was based upon the widespread belief 
that, although a southern state, it was nonetheless industrially, commercially, and, 
indeed, culturally progressive. ' William Chafe has hinted at the somewhat illusory 
quality of the state's progressivism by dubbing it a "progressive mystique. " Other 
southern commentators have been even blunter. Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, for 
example, have termed it a "progressive myth. ,2 To a certain extent, Chafe suggests, 
the image of economic progressivism was used to shield an intransigent political 
culture, and to forestall meaningful racial and social change. As notoriously vitriolic 
1 North Carolina, for example, was second in a list of states drawn up to show the percentage of in- 
state communities that had an Industrial Development Organisation to co-ordinate and solicit industrial 
development: the Tar Heel state boasted 211 communities with at least one Development Organisation, 
second only to Florida with 227. Similarly, a list based on the advertising money devoted to State 
Redevelopment Programs, as at 15 August 1964, saw North Carolina ranked 5th out of all 50 states, 
with a budget of $140,000. See James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: the Southern Crusade for 
Industrial Redevelopment. 1936-1990 (2nd Edition) (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993) p. 83 
and p. 91 respectively. 
2 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro. North Carolina. and the Black Struggle 
For Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 6, and Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, 
The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New 
York: Meridian, 1976), pp. 218-222. "The progressive image of the state projected in the late 1940s 
has evolved into a progressive myth that remains accepted as fact by much of the state's native 
leadership, " wrote Bass and De Vries, "despite ample evidence to the contrary. " p. 219. 
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political campaigns in 1950 and 1954 suggested, there were deep pockets of 
reactionary conservatism and racism in the state. 
As will be seen in this chapter, North Carolina's. political leaders had to tread 
carefully throughout the Massive Resistance era. To appease the state's 
segregationists, they strove to avoid compliance with Brown; to appease the state's 
powerful business elites, they sought to avoid social and racial conflict. There was a 
shrewd realisation that continued external investment, especially from the North, 
relied upon political and social stability, both of which would be compromised by 
either civil rights agitation or violent responses to such activity. Regardless of the real 
extent of the state's progressivism, as long as continued segregation and an image of 
moderation could be reconciled, North Carolina's segregationist elites remained 
satisfied. 
Thus, North Carolina's legislature decided upon a course of what Jonathan 
Houghton has convincingly described as "sly resistance" to the Brown decision. 3 
Although continually striving to maintain segregation in the state, the legislature -- 
and Governor Luther Hodges in particular -- took great care to couch resistance 
rhetoric in moderate terms, avoiding the twin extremes of wholesale desegregation on 
the one hand, and public school closures on the other. Local option plans were 
formulated to provide token desegregation, which not only ensured minimum 
compliance with Brown, but also allowed Hodges to refer to "safety valves" and "the 
middle way. " North Carolina's resistance strategies often had a temperate appearance, 
but they nevertheless postponed meaningful school desegregation for more than a 
3 Jonathan T. Y. Houghton, "The North Carolina Republican Party: From Reconstruction to the Radical 
Right, " Dissertation, Chapel Hill, 1993. 
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decade. That facade of moderate resistance was occasionally punctured by virulent 
anti-communism, however, and served to reveal the true intensity of white 
supremacist feeling in areas of the Tar Heel State. 
II 
North Carolinians were well aware of a Communist Party presence within 
their state from shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution. "While in Burlington in 
1925, " wrote Erwin A. Holt to various North Carolina newspaper editors in 1952, a 
preacher known as "Evangelist Ham (who is still going strong), warned against 
communist propaganda from Moscow headquarters -- a warning which was and still 
continues largely ignored. "4 Evangelist Ham's suspicions were confirmed by official 
reports on Communist activity, both from the Party itself and from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation [FBI]. Unfortunately, the CPUSA merged membership figures for 
both North and South Carolina together; nonetheless, a tally of members on New 
Year's Day 1936 revealed that 176 Carolinians were officially registered as 
Communists. 5 At the time of the first All-Southern Communist Party Conference, 
held in Chattanooga in September 1937, that number had risen to 274.6 
According to the FBI report on state-by-state Communist membership 
completed in 1949, North Carolina alone had 138 Party members, just twelve less 
than Virginia. 7 With that in mind, Director J. Edgar Hoover's insistence that the real 
4 Erwin A. Holt letter to "Editors, " Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 34, Southern Historical 
Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
5 Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New York: Basic 
Books, 1984), p. 380. 
6 ibid., p. 275. 
7 FBI file on HUAC, Roll 3- 573, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands. 
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menace of internal communism lay not with the official members of the Party but 
with their unseen, underground cadres provoked fear in the minds of North Carolina's 
citizens, and especially the state's powerful industrial magnates and business elites. 
Moreover, in North Carolina there was less of a possibility that segregationists could 
write off Communist Party activity as that of recently settled, first generation 
immigrants. Party membership in the Carolinas had traditionally been drawn from 
native-born Americans, rather than the foreign-born membership that characterised 
the Party nationally. In the 1930s, for example, District 16, which encompassed the 
Carolinas and Virginia, had a foreign-born membership of only 4%. In contrast, 
District 1 (New England) boasted a 90% foreign-born membership. 8 
Tim Minchin's detailed work on the Textile Union Workers of America 
[TWUA] has suggested that the "only location in the textile South where the 
Communists had any influence was at Erwin Mills" in Durham, North Carolina. As 
his study has shown, the mill workers' main concerns were economic, and were 
structured around the privileges and disadvantages of race: their main priority was 
increased pay, whether it came from union pressure or from companies aping union 
pay structures to ward off further labour organising. Furthermore, the ideological 
concerns of communism were often less significant than the Party's organisational 
skill. ' "There were workers in Erwin Mills, " Minchin quotes Erwin Mills shop 
steward and Communist Party member Bill Evans as saying, "who didn't know the 
difference between Communism and rheumatism... All they had to do was raise the 
8 Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 162. 
9 Timothy J. Minchin, `What Do We Need a Union For? ' The TWUA in the South. 1945-1955 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Minchin's work on the TWUA, therefore, dovetails 
neatly with the work of Gerald Zahavi. Gerald Zahavi, "Passionate Commitments: Race, Sex, and 
Communism at Schenectady General Electric, 1932-1954, " Journal of American History, Vol. 83, No. 
2 (1996). 
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race issue; it would create much more interest and excitement among workers than the 
Communist issue. "" 
The recollections of Junius Scales support Minchin's view that, although not 
widespread, there was nonetheless an active communist presence at work in North 
Carolina industry. Scales was a CPUSA member and an integral part of Local 22 of 
the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America 
[UCAPAWA] Union in Winston-Salem, a non-textile union. " l He worked for better 
conditions at the town's major industrial employer, the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company. Scales provided an example of the very communist menace that 
segregationist leaders continually warned their constituents about after the Second 
World War. "As cold war attitudes pervaded the domestic political atmosphere and as 
the Communist and leftist forces became more and more isolated, " remembered 
Scales, "the Reynolds company added a second major weapon to its arsenal: Red- 
baiting. 9,12 Sam Hall, Chairman of CPUSA's North Carolina district, felt that "an 
effort has been made to create a red 'bogey. ,, 
13 Scales' memoirs suggest that there 
was a genuine communist presence in North Carolina, which, in the deteriorating 
global climate, justified a measure of anti-communism at both grass-roots and 
legislative levels. "I never identified anyone as a Communist to another unless he or 
she was publicly known as such or had expressly asked for the designation, " Scales 
wrote, suggesting that he was fully conscious of a larger Communist Party presence 
than was officially registered. '4 
lo Bill Evans quoted in Minchin, What Do we Need a Union For, p. 45. 
11 ibid., p. 44. 
12 Junius Scales and Richard Nickson, Cause at Heart: A Former Communist Remembers (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1987), p. 204. 
13 Sam Hall letter to Frank Porter Graham, 19 March 1947, Box 31, Graham Papers. 
14 Scales and Nickson, Cause at Heart, p. 297. 
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While still working for Reynolds tobacco, Scales concluded that the company 
saw itself as threatened by two distinct enemies. "The Reynolds version of the 
situation in Winston-Salem seems to be that black hordes were advancing on it in one 
direction while the Red Army was closing in from another, " he wrote. 15 By suggesting 
that the Reynolds Company's two greatest fears were communist infiltration and 
increasing black protest, Scales showed that, however "progressive" it claimed to be, 
North Carolina nevertheless adhered to South-wide trends: Tar Heel business elites 
saw civil rights agitation as a vehicle for red insurgency. 
In 1949, events in the sleepy town of Albemarle, just East of Charlotte, gave 
an indication of the ways in which one individual could exploit the residual feelings 
of anti-communism that North Carolina's communist presence engendered. Coming 
five years before Brown and seven years before the solidification of a truly massive 
resistance effort, Albemarle's anti-communist crusade serves to show just how 
receptive southerners were to red-baiting at a local level, and the effect that such a 
drive could have on politics at the state level. 
In October 1949, Major Paul Cyr, an army officer previously unknown in 
Albemarle, started what appeared to be a solo drive to awaken the town to the threat 
of communism as he perceived it. His patriotic credentials were perfect: a war hero 
trained by the Office of Strategic Services [OSS] and the British Secret Service in 
World War II, he had twice parachuted behind enemy lines. He began his crusade 
with a speech in front of 185 members of the Albemarle Executives Club in the 
town's First Street Methodist Church, on Tuesday 11 October. According to the local 
press, "his listeners were stirred by his appeal for them to do something about the 
15 ibid., p. 204. 
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threat of communism that hangs over this country today. " The paper went on to report 
that the Major "warned that men who openly opposed communism are often 
communists, seeking to gain the confidence of the American people. "16 Identifying a 
communist was, therefore, going to be somewhat difficult. 
In short order, Major Cyr's initiative incited a community-wide crusade 
against communism. Enthusiastic local citizens took up the gauntlet, and spread the 
Major's message to specially convened meetings of Albemarle's clubs and 
associations. '7 A Stanly News and Press editorial urged citizens to swamp politicians 
at all levels with letters, "not a batch of form letters, but individually written letters 
expressing personal opinion, " outlining the dangers that the United States faced from 
this ill-defined communist menace. The first week of November was declared "Stamp 
Out Communism in America Week" by Albemarle's Mayor W. H. Morrow. By 11 
November, an estimated 1,000 homes had been canvassed. 18 
There is much about the Albemarle crusade that remains unexplained, not least 
the apparently random choice of the town as the focus of Major Cyr's campaign. 
What the crusade does show, however, is that many of the concerns voiced by North 
Carolinians during Massive Resistance's pomp were in evidence before the 1950s. As 
whites did across the South, for example, so Oron Rogers of the town's Chamber of 
Commerce explicitly linked the anti-communism generated by Major Cyr to wider 
16 Stanly News and Press, 14 October 1949, p. 1. Newspapers covering Cyr's crusade, such as the 
Stanly News and Press and the weekly Albemarle Enterprise can be found in the North Carolina 
Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
17 Edward L. Gehring, for example, addressed the members of the Albemarle Women's Club on the 
communist threat on 24 October. Having received the unanimous support of the women, he called a 
meeting of "representatives from civic clubs, fraternal orders and churches" to be held at the City Hall 
six days later. Stanly News and Press, 25 October 1949, p. 1. The Stanly News and Press reported that 
the clubs canvassed included the Albemarle Women's Club, the "P. O. S. of A. " [sic], the American 
Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, the JC's, and the Civitan Club. 18 Figures quoted in Stanly News and Press, 11 November 1949, p. 1. 
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appeals for States' Rights. In one of the letters to Tar Heel senators that Cyr had urged 
Albemarle citizens to write, Rogers wrote to Frank Porter Graham to ask him to "use 
your personal and official influence against infiltration in the government of anything 
that leans in a Communist direction. I personally consider, " he continued, "much 
pending legislation to have the taint of socialism, or Communism, or whatever else 
one may call `excessive government. "'1 9 The term "excessive government" 
foreshadowed Massive Resistance rhetoric on the subject of States' Rights. 
Even in the midst of Albemarle's anti-communist crusade, however, there 
were voices of dissent. Local resident Harvey Cox, Jr, for example, wrote to Senator 
Graham to voice his concern over Major Cyr's operations. "This cry of `communism' 
is a smokescreen in my opinion, " he wrote, "a smoke screen to divert our attention 
from the real issues that face the Congress and the American people, " namely the 
"growing crisis in our free enterprise economy, one that cannot be blamed on 
Communism, and that is of course the growing period of overproduction. "20 As all 
consuming as the Cold War may have been, not everyone was totally enveloped by its 
concerns. Cox went on to decry Governor William B. Umstead's attacks on those who 
had "coddled" communism, which, Cox told Graham, "means you I suppose. He gave 
a particularly nasty speech slanted at you recently at Lexington. " Cox's next line is 
critical to understanding the inconsistencies in uses of anti-communism. "Mr 
Umstead, " he wrote, "apparently isn't at all interested in the real needs of the people 
and wants to make his whole campaign one of hysterical red-smearing. " Evidently, by 
19 Oron J. Rogers letter to Frank Porter Graham, 10 November 1949, Graham Papers, Box 78. Graham 
was fulfilling the term of Senator J. Melville Broughton, who died in office. 
20 Harvey A. Cox, Jr, letter to Frank Porter Graham, 25 November 1949, Graham Papers, Box 78. 
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the end of the 1940s there were vocal individuals unimpressed by the cynical 
deployment of red-baiting. 21 
On the whole, however, Albemarle's crusade against communism was at least 
a partial success, influencing politicians at both local and state levels. The papers of 
Senator Clyde Hoey reveal that, of all the letters received by him on the subject of 
communism between 1949 and 1950, nearly 86% were from Albemarle residents. 22 
Frank Porter Graham, too, was inundated: 27 of the 34 letters Graham received on the 
subject of communism throughout 1949 were from Albemarle residents, just under 
80%. 23 The support and campaigning zeal created by one man's crusade, in one 
particular locality, shows how one community could distort a specific politician's 
understanding of public opinion. Without the Albemarle crusade, the combined 
mailbags of Hoey and Graham would in all probability have contained only twelve 
letters on communism. 
III 
One of the most controversial and written about figures of mid-twentieth 
century North Carolinian politics was the doyen of the state's liberal left, Frank Porter 
Graham. 24 President of the University of North Carolina from 1931 to 1949, 
unsuccessful Senate candidate, Governor-appointed Senator, active participant in the 
21 ibid. 
22 30 of the 35 letters in Hoey's "Communism 1949-1950" folder were from Albemarle residents, 
Clyde Roark Hoey Papers, Box 143, Special Collections Library, Duke University. 
23 See "Communism 1949" folder, Graham Papers, Box 78. 
24 Secondary texts on Frank Porter Graham include John Ehle, `Dr Frank': Life With Frank Porter 
Graham (Chapel Hill: Franklin Street Books, 1993); Warren Ashby, Frank Porter Graham: A Southern 
Liberal (Winston-Salem, N. C.: John F. Blair, 1980); and Julian M. Pleasants and Augustus M. Bums 
III, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1990). 
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Southern Conference for Human Welfare [SCHW], appointee to Truman's Committee 
on Civil Rights, and member of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, each 
phase of Graham's career drew the full wrath of red-baiters and anti-communists. 
What was perhaps most remarkable about Graham, however, was his good-natured 
rebuttal of all such claims, and their negligible impact on his popularity. Indeed, on 
occasion, Graham worked for organisations not despite, but because of 
segregationists' red-baiting attacks on them. His work for SCHW, for example, is well 
chronicled elsewhere, but the circumstances behind his accession to the chairmanship 
of the Conference are worth revisiting. 25 In the wake of the controversy surrounding 
SCHW's inaugural meeting in Birmingham in 1938, the organisation was ravaged by 
red-baiting. Graham, in the words of Thomas Kreuger, agreed to take the post of 
Chairman -- a post that he had previously turned down -- only when "he heard of the 
attacks on the organization. " It was because of the red-baiting and, to a lesser extent, 
race-baiting of SCHW that Graham thought he should take over, to add stability and 
direction. 26 
Two incidents revealed the "hit and miss" efficacy of red-baiting, the enduring 
appeal of "Dr Frank" in North Carolina's more progressive circles, and the man's own 
dignified, good humoured strategy of dealing with repeated accusations of communist 
links. In October 1946, Graham was elected the first chairman of the Oak Ridge 
Institute of Nuclear Studies, which aimed to make nuclear facilities available to 
university researchers. Two years later, a right-wing radio broadcaster, Fulton Lewis, 
25 See in addition to the above mentioned books on Graham himself, Thomas A. Kreuger, And 
Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference For Human Welfare. 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1967); Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets 1929- 
1Q (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); and Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: 
Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 26 Kreuger, And Promises to Keep, pp. 38-39. 
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Jr, who objected to Graham's appointment, used his weekday radio show to pursue a 
personal vendetta against Graham. 27 Starting on 28 December 1948, Lewis began to 
trawl through Graham's past association with left wing causes. 28 
Not all North Carolinians, though, were convinced that Lewis' claims justified 
Graham's suspension from his Oak Ridge duties. L. K. Jackson protested directly to 
Lewis, stating that "very few men in America have done as much as he [Graham] has ' 
done... to break down the most flagrant types of nazism in the South, which, " he felt, 
"is a disgrace to America and a reflection upon all people who claim they believe in 
the democratic way of life. s29 In issuing its report on Graham, the Atomic Energy 
Commission [AEC] itself appreciated that much of the controversy surrounding Dr 
Frank was due to his "active role in championing freedom of speech and other basic 
civil or economic rights, " and, therefore, condoned his behaviour. "The specific 
purposes for which he had these associations, " the committee concluded, "were in 
keeping with American traditions and principles. "30 There was no doubt that the 
choice of language was very deliberate: Graham, the commission was suggesting, was 
in no ways "un-American. " 
27 According to Oliver Pilat, biographer of Drew Pearson, another of Lewis' targets, "Fulton Lewis, Jr, 
was a nuisance because he had a five-day-a-week radio program on top of a syndicated Washington 
newspaper column and a Washington newsletter called Exclusive. " Oliver Pilat, Drew Pearson: An 
Unauthorized Biography (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1973), p. 29. 
28 Lewis rhetorically asked Graham if he was "willing to resign publicly from all organizations which 
are listed as subversive, Communist or Communist-front in view of your present access to Atomic 
Energy information? " "Broadcast of Fulton Lewis, Jr, December 28,1948, " Graham Papers, Box 36. 
29 L. K. Jackson letter to Fulton Lewis, Jr, 14 January 1949, Graham Papers, Box 36. Jackson went on 
to place Graham in the pantheon of domestic social reformers who were regular targets of red-baiting. 
"It is a dark day in the history of America when such men and women as Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, 
Henry A. Wallace, Dr Frank Porter Graham, A. Phillip Randolph and Mrs Katherine Hyndman are 
smeared with the black ink of disloyalty and branded with the hot iron of communism, " Jackson 
thought, "simply because they have come from under the blanket of hypocrisy and are fighting, 
bleeding and dying to make the pronouncements of America on democracy a practice of our every day 
life. " 
30 Atomic Energy Commission Report quoted in Ashby, Frank Porter Graham, p. 237. 
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As was the case throughout his career, Graham did not go out of his way to 
exonerate himself. In the wake of Lewis' attacks, he relied simply on repeated factual 
declarations of his beliefs, and remained unfazed by red-baiting. It was typical of the 
man that his statement to the Joint Congressional Committee investigating his 
appointment to Oak Ridge included an appeal to "Let the facts tell the story of (1) my 
connection with the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies; (2) my connection with 
several organizations on the Attorney General's list as Communist or Communist 
fronts; and (3) my economic and political views expressed in representative excerpts 
from talks and statements made by me over the last twenty years. s31 
Many of the themes of the Oak Ridge controversy recurred during Graham's 
time at UNC, a University which was condemned by many contemporary right- 
wingers as a viper's nest of left-leaning subversives. Much of that condemnation 
stemmed from the 1949 "Freistadt Affair, " which strongly polarised anti-communist 
opinion both at, and about, the University. The robustly segregationist senator, Clyde 
Hoey, maintained that a soldier studying at UNC had tipped him off that a fellow 
student with an AEC Fellowship, Hans Freistadt, was a member of the CPUSA. Hoey 
doggedly preserved the anonymity of his source, and received widespread praise for 
his "outing" of the Communist. "I want to congratulate you, " a Raleigh physician 
wrote to Hoey in late May 1949. "If communists dont [sic] like our form of 
government let them get out, " he continued, "and if they insist in putting in their 
communistic views and way of life, then lets [sic] run them out. "32 
31 "Frank Porter Graham Statement to Joint Congressional Committee, " Graham Papers, Box 36. 
32 Robert P. Noble, MD, letter to Clyde Roark Hoey, 27 May 1949, Hoey Papers, Box 143. 
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Once again, though, Hoey and his fellow red-baiters did not receive universal 
support. It emerged that Freistadt was already well known as a communist on the 
campus, suggesting that it was his links to the AEC and its nuclear secrets that caused 
such panic. 33 Jonathan Marshall, a fellow student, was outraged at the witch-hunt. 
"The Freistadt case represents far more than a question of whether one insignificant 
little communist should receive a government scholarship or not, " he wrote in a IM 
Heel article enclosed with a letter to Hoey. Rather, he felt that it "hits at the very 
foundation of our American concept of Democracy. By the very fact that we are afraid 
of Freistadt and his kind, " he continued, "we admit a fear that democracy is not strong 
enough. This columnist feels that our democracy is strong enough, " he concluded, "to 
withstand thousands of communists if we do not become hysterical and make martyrs 
of them. s34 Graham himself had given a speech only recently beforehand, in which he 
had acknowledged that "everyone who knows me knows that I am and have always 
been opposed to Communism, Fascism and every other form of totalitarian tyranny. I 
have never been, " he had reiterated, "am not now and will never be a Communist a 
pro-Communist or fellow-traveler. , 35 
In 1950, during Graham's infamous senatorial race against Willis Smith, the 
red-baiting that characterised so many campaigns against Graham was closely linked 
to questions of race. As a result, the campaign has often been seen as the zenith of 
33 An editorial in the campus newspaper, the Tar Heel, for example, registered the fact that "readers of 
this page are thoroughly familiar with Freistadt's philosophy, for the Stubbering, Austria, native is the 
most prolific `Letters to the Editor' writer at Carolina... " Clipping, Tar Heel editorial, [n. d. ], Hoey 
Papers, Box 143. 
34 Tar Heel article by Jonathan Marshall, enclosed with Jonathan Marshall to Clyde Roark Hoey, 21 
May 1949, Hoey Papers, Box 143. 
35 "Speech, 1948, " Graham Papers, Box 34. 
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southern reaction. 36 As with most southern elections, the race for the vacant Senate 
seat boiled down to a race for the Democratic party nomination. In 1950, the 
candidates were Graham, incumbent since Governor Kerr Scott had appointed him to 
fulfil the last year of the late Senator J. Melville Broughton's unexpired term, A. 
Willis Smith and Robert Rice Reynolds, who, in the words of Graham's contemporary 
and close associate John Ehle, "was not going to win, but he would muddy the waters 
a little bit. "37 When the results were in, Graham had received 303,605 votes, with 
Smith, his nearest challenger, polling 250,222. With 48.9%, Graham was just short of 
the majority that would give him outright victory in the first May primary. 38 On 25 
June 1950, election night for the resultant run-off, Smith polled 281,114 to Graham's 
261,789.39 
The Smith camp had changed tactics between the first primary and the run-off, 
and it reaped heavy reward. Although the delineation between the two was not always 
clear cut, in the first campaign Smith had concentrated more on red-baiting Graham; 
in the second, he concentrated more on race-baiting. Both methods played to popular 
contemporary concerns, with the escalating Korean crisis heightening Cold War anti- 
communism, and the impending Supreme Court decision in the Sweatt v. Painter case 
heightening racial tensions. 0 Ultimately, however, it appeared that playing on 
36 The tactics and rhetoric used in the 1950 election were even more scathing than those used by 
George Smathers against Claude Pepper of Florida in the same year. For a personalised account of that 
campaign, see Claude Denson Pepper with Hays Gorey, Pepper: Eyewitness to a Century (San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1987), esp. pp. 189-214. 
37 Ehle, Dr Frank, p. 162. Smith, a corporate lawyer, had recently been elected President of the 
American Bar Association, and was Chairman of Duke University's Board of Trustees. 
38 Figures quoted in Pleasants & Burns, Frank Porter Graham, p. 186. 
39 Figures quoted in ibid., p. 244. 
40 North Carolina had filed an amicus curiae brief with the Court in Sweatt v. Painter, which on 5 June 
ruled that a separate black law school in Texas was not equal to its white counterpart. Although the 
Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff on appeal, it did not overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, arguing that 
the decision in Sweatt v. Painter applied only to graduate schools. NAACP attorneys, however, saw it 
as a launching pad for an all-out attack on the separate-but-equal premise. A retrospective article on the 
239 
Graham's alleged links with communist-fronted organisations was a marginally less 
successful tactic than preying on his acceptance of increased civil rights for the state's 
black populational 
That red- and race-baiting has been well chronicled 42 Once again Graham 
refused to take a strong stand against such charges, much to the chagrin of his support 
staff. Indeed, it had long been part of Graham's psychological make-up to steer away 
from direct attacks on his political position, especially if those attacks were based 
only in rumour. Alexander Heard, who joined Graham at the UNC faculty, 
remembered that in the late 1930s Norman Thomas warned Howard Kester of 
communist involvement in the SCHW. Heard reminisced that Graham "wrote back to 
Howard Kester and said in effect, `Now Howard, I have a lot of respect for you and I 
admire you in many ways, but I just can't go along with all this innuendo and these 
unsupported charges. These people may well be Communist, but I don't have any 
proof of it yet and until I have some proof I'm just going to have to tell you that I 
can't go with you on this. "43 Looking back on Graham's ultimate defeat in 1950, one 
campaign in the Baltimore Evening Sun published on 3 July 1950, titled "North Carolina Takes 
Second Look At Primary, " stated that the timing "of the North Korean explosion adds an interesting 
postscript by way of a question to North Carolina's senatorial primary runoff last Saturday: would 
Frank Graham have been defeated had the communists invaded South Korea sooner? " Article in, 
"Campaign Scrapbook, " Allard K. Lowenstein Papers, Box 28, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson 
Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
41 Perhaps the best example of the truly wretched, insidious nature of the race-baiting in the run-off 
was a picture that appeared as a variant to an often-used photograph of black GIs dancing with white 
women in London during World War II. The picture was released with Graham's wife's head 
superimposed onto one of the white women in the photograph. See Graham Papers, Box 39, or 
Pleasants and Burns [eds], Frank Porter Graham, p. 221. 
42 The writings on the campaign are voluminous. Pleasants and Bums Frank Porter Graham 
concentrates almost solely on the campaign, which is described as "taking on the trappings of a 
factional brawl, " p. 2. Ashby denotes considerable time to the campaign, as does Ehle. See Ashby, 
Frank Porter Graham, pp. 243-285, and Ehle, Dr Frank, pp. 161-187. See also Julian M. Pleasants, 
"The Last Hurrah: Bob Reynolds and the U. S. Senate Race in 1950, " The North Carolina Historical 
Review 65 (January 1988), pp. 52-75. 
43Alexander Heard, Southern Oral History Program [A-344], Southern Historical Collection, Wilson 
Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
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of his closest lieutenants during the campaign, Allard Lowenstein, felt that it was that 
continued failure to reply to scurrilous rumours that cost Graham his election, not the 
red-baiting or race-baiting per se. In a letter to Michael Straight, editor of The New 
Republic, Lowenstein noted that it "has been fashionable for Northern liberal 
publications to blame Senator Graham's defeat on what is described variously as his 
`timidity' or as `backsliding on his principles. ,, 44 It was one of Graham's abiding 
principles that he should not stoop to the level of red-baiters, believing that he could 
shrug off the effects of their attacks by reiterating his own stance on relevant issues 
and ignoring their claims. 
IV 
Race- and red-baiting were clearly well established in North Carolina when, 
on 17 May 1954, the Supreme Court promulgated the first Brown decision. Paralleling 
Virginia's Gray and Perrow Plans, North Carolina's legislative response to Brown 
was also marked by the reports of two commissions, both chaired by Thomas Jenkins 
Pearsall. However, in two vital respects at least, Massive Resistance in North Carolina 
differed dramatically from that in Virginia. Unlike the Old Dominion, North Carolina 
was not named in the original Brown case. As a result, Tar Heel legislators had more 
time to formulate a response. More importantly, perhaps, whereas most members of 
the Byrd Machine prioritised the preservation of segregation, North Carolina's elites 
wished to preserve both segregation and their progressive image. 
44 Allard Lowenstein letter to Michael Straight, 3 August 1950, Graham Papers, Box 39. For an 
account of Lowenstein's role in the campaign, see William H. Chafe, Never Stop Running: Allard 
Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American Liberalism (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 87- 
92. 
241 
Almost as well known as North Carolina's reputation for being moderate is its 
governor's reaction to Brown. Umstead was "terribly disappointed, " but was 
nonetheless adamant that the Supreme Court had spoken and should be obeyed 45 
Irving Carlyle, a well-respected Winston-Salem political leader, summed up the 
state's initial response when he publicly stated that, as good citizens, "we have no 
other course except to obey the law laid down by the United States Supreme Court. s46 
One of Umstead's last political acts before his untimely death in the autumn of 1954 
was the establishment of the Special Advisory Committee on Education, under 
Pearsall, then a state senator. In a letter written to National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] state president Kelly Alexander, however, 
Umstead made it quite clear that he was "in thorough agreement with the 
announcement made by the State Board of Education some time ago that the schools 
in North Carolina will open in September on the same basis upon which they have 
been operating. "47 In the absence of a court timetable for desegregating the schools, 
North Carolina was in no immediate rush to desegregate. 
Beyond the initial platitudes of Umstead and Carlysle, however, there was 
caution in North Carolina just as there was in Virginia. No politician or legislator 
wanted to take the first step towards defining the state's long-term strategy. 
Furthermore, the early establishment of Pearsall's committee gave the impression that 
the state was actively pursuing a response to Brown, even though, in reality, the 
committee was bereft of ideas. "It is a tremendous responsibility and I feel terribly 
as Umstead quoted in Raleigh News and Observer, 18 May 1954, p. 1. 
46 Carlysle quoted in Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, p. 48. 
47 William Umstead letter to Kelly Alexander, 24 June 1954, William B. Umstead Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 58, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and 
History, Raleigh, North Carolina. 
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inadequate, " Pearsall wrote to M. P. "Mickie" Dawson, of Rocky Mount, in August 
1954, the month in which his committee was established. "The distressing part, " he 
continued, "is [that] everyone on the Committee, as well as the Governor, seems 
almost lost as to where to turn. We are almost forced entirely to depend upon time and 
Providence to provide the answer. s48 
It fell to Luther Hartwell Hodges, a former vice-president of the Marshall 
Field and Company Mills, and consultant for the State Department on the 
International Management Conference, to try to give the state some direction 49 
Steeped in the progressive business culture of North Carolina, he had become 
Umstead's Lieutenant Governor in January 1953. When Umstead died in November 
1954, Hodges fulfilled his term until the gubernatorial election of 1956. His business 
and management experience fitted perfectly with North Carolina's image, and when 
he ran for the governorship in his own right in 1956 he carried every county. In 
recognition of the needs of the state's business elites, Hodges realised a middle 
ground had to be found between the extremes of integration and interposition. Full- 
scale resistance and racial extremism would surely frighten off prospective northern 
investors; actual desegregation was anathema to the vast majority of white North 
Carolinians. " Swinging away from Umstead's initial compliant platitudes, Hodges 
48 Thomas Pearsall letter to M. P. "Mickie" Dawson, 16 August 1954, Thomas Jenkins Pearsall Papers, 
Box 1, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
49 The International Management Conference was set up to offer technical assistance to European 
businesses. 
so A good example of the dilemma that concurrent drives for continued segregation and economic 
advancement presented North Carolina's leaders with is provided by the presence of military towns in 
the state. Military towns, mindful of federal law and of the presence of black GIs, often pushed for 
quicker desegregation than their civilian equivalents. As David Cecelski has noted, in Havelock, 
adjacent to the Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station in Craven County, on North Carolina's eastern 
seaboard, public elementary schools "had been integrated since 1959. " Whilst keen to forestall 
desegregation, Hodges was nevertheless also aware of the important economic role that federal military 
bases played. They had, for example, been central to pulling eastern areas of North Carolina out of the 
pre-war depression. David Cecelski, Along Freedom Road: Hyde Counly. North Carolina. and the Fate 
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propagated what Houghton usefully termed North Carolina's "sly" resistances' 
Underlying the surface veneer of North Carolina's respectable, measured response to 
Brown was Hodges' steadfast determination to defy federal attempts to force 
desegregation upon the state. That veneer also tempered indigenous civil rights 
activity in North Carolina, leading the state's African Americans to believe that more 
was being done to ameliorate their position than was, in fact, the case. 
The report of the first Pearsall committee was delivered as part of Hodges' 
Budget and Biennial message on 6 January 1955; the second, which became known as 
the Pearsall Plan, was delivered eighteen months later in June 1956. The initial 
committee's report, anticipating the second Brown decision, recommended that the 
task of pupil assignment be delegated to local school boards. It was a stultifying delay 
tactic: if the NAACP was to attempt to bring suit to secure desegregation, it would 
have to do so in each locality separately. Even if the NAACP did decide to stretch its 
resources in such suits, the provisions of the Pupil Assignment Act allowed 
segregationists to claim that they had assigned students to particular schools according 
to a litany of non-racial criteria. Adhering strictly to a legal framework, therefore, 
North Carolina's resisters sought to do as little as possible to implement Brown. 
By the Summer of 1955, in line with the second Brown decision, Hodges 
proposed the voluntary school attendance plan often referred to by contemporaries as 
"voluntary segregation. " At the end of September, the governor authorised Attorney 
General William B. Rodman, Jr, to give a statement to the press that exemplified the 
state's twin needs of moderation and continued segregation. The plan for voluntary 
of Black schools in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 18 and p. 181 
ftn. 40. 
51 Houghton, "The North Carolina Republican Party. " 
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segregation, said Rodman, "is designed primarily to permit communities that, 
sometime in the future, may be faced with an integration problem as a result of a court 
order or otherwise, to close their public schools if they wish and try other methods of 
educating their children. s52 Rodman thus couched the ultimate hard line sanction of 
school closures in conciliatory tones. The time frame of "sometime in the future" was 
even more vague than the Supreme Court's "all deliberate speed. " 
Ever mindful of the progressive image North Carolina was trying to preserve, 
Hodges lambasted as "extremist" anyone who opposed the plan, whether they did so 
because they felt that it was not sufficiently progressive, or because it did not ensure 
total segregation. "Those who would force this State to choose between integrated 
schools and abandonment of the public school system, " he pronounced, "will be 
responsible if, in the choice, we lose the public school system. .. and find, to our eternal 
sorrow, the personal racial bitterness which North Carolinians of both races have 
avoided so successfully. i53 When it appeared in June 1956, the Pearsall Plan 
incorporated Hodges' new stance. The formidable maze of litigation facing potential 
desegregation suits was preserved from the first Pearsall report, but, more radically, it 
also allowed for school boards to close public schools faced by the direct threat of 
imminent desegregation, if countenanced by a public referendum. In the event of 
school closures, the Plan would also provide state tuition grants for white students 
wanting to attend private schools. 
$2 "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and 
Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3,1957, " p. 5, Basil Lee Whitener Papers, Box 82, 
Special Collections Library, Duke University. 
53 ibid., p. 4. Chafe is correct in his assertion that, `By the time he had finished the speech, Hodges had 
succeeded in creating a situation where anything he proposed -- short of an outright endorsement of the 
Ku Klux Klan -- could be portrayed as `moderate. "' Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, p. 52. 
245 
Because of the provisions for actually closing public schools, the 1956 
Pearsall Plan was far more hard line than its 1955 predecessor. As Davison Douglas 
has perceptively noted, though, it was less extreme than the plans of Alabama, 
Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina, all of which dropped any constitutional 
provision for public education. 54 No doubt because of its provisions for more hard line 
resistance, Hodges strove to sell the Pearsall Plan as a moderate response to Brown. In 
a September speech, broadcast on both radio and television, he used a paternalistic 
tone in hoping that, with the provisions of the Plan, "the traditional good relationship 
between our races in North Carolina will take care of us. " It was as part of an effort 
"to be sure [that] we don't have trouble" that Hodges insisted that North Carolina 
needed "the `safety valves' of school attendance grants and local option such as are 
provided by our constitutional amendment [to allow the implementation of the 
Pearsall Plan] .,, 
55 Following a major publicity campaign, the North Carolina electorate 
ratified the Plan in a referendum by a ratio of four to one, a greater margin than that 
which had ratified the Gray Commission in Virginia. 56 
The initial appeals to moderation encapsulated by the Pearsall and, Gray Plans 
were not, however, the only link between the Tar Heel State and the Old Dominion. 
North Carolina's response was more closely entwined with Virginia's than has 
54 See Davison M. Douglas, Reading. Writing. & Race: The Desegregation of Charlotte Schools 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 33. The Pearsall Plan was devised as a 
"safety valve" against integration. As Chafe has succinctly described it, it was "a local-option clause 
permitting a school district, or any portion thereof, to close its schools by public referendum if 
desegregation occurred, and a constitutional amendment granting state tuition aid for white students in 
those districts to attend private schools. " Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights p. 53. 
55 "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and 
Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3,1957, " Whitener Papers, Box 82, p. 11. 
56 Douglas, Reading, Writing. & Race, p. 33. Virginia's Gray Plan had received support in a ratio of 
three to one in an equivalent referendum. See Matthew D. Lassiter, "A `Fighting Moderate': Benjamin 
Muse's Search for the Submerged South, " in Matthew D. Lassiter and Andrew B. Lewis [eds], 
Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1998), p. 175. 
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hitherto been acknowledged. In January 1955, for example, Judge A. M. Aiken of the 
Corporation Court in Danville, Virginia, wrote to Hodges in simple terms. "For all 
your recent public statements, " he said, "my admiration and congratulations. s57 Of 
greater importance to the direction of both Virginia's and North Carolina's Massive 
Resistance, however, was a meeting on 3 May 1955. Hodges, his administrative 
assistant Paul A. Johnstone, Attorney General McMullan, Pearsall, various members 
of the Assembly, and other members of the first Advisory Committee on Education, 
met David Mays, sometime counsel for Virginia's Gray Commission. Mays' 
conclusions from the meeting were that both states saw their legislation on pupil 
assignment merely as "a stop gap, not an ultimate solution, " and, damningly, that "the 
leaders know of no solution which will retain both the public school system and 
segregation. , 58 If total segregation was to be maintained, it would have to be through 
private schooling. As Pearsall had himself admitted to Curtis Briggs eight months 
earlier in September 1954, however, "the problem of our Committee is to find a way 
to preserve our schools within the Court's decision. "59 
Token integration was the logical solution. A two-hour meeting between Mays 
and Johnstone, in October 1956, reinforced this feeling. Johnstone, according to 
Mays, stated that the North Carolina legislature was "grateful" to its Virginian 
counterparts for recognising that some integration was unavoidable. The Virginia 
57 Judge A. M. Aiken letter to Luther Hodges, 14 January 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 39, 
State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, 
North Carolina. 
58 David Mays Diaries, 3 May 1955, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Va. In his diaries, Mays 
also stressed the point that North Carolina had more time to manoeuvre, given that no federal suit was 
pending there. In July 1955, he commented that, "Meantime NC has followed our lead in declaring the 
policy of segregation for the 1955-56 school year. Of course, they have a better chance of getting away 
with it since no federal suit is pending against any NC locality. " Mays Diaries, 11 July 1955. 
59 Thomas Pearsall letter to Curtis Briggs, 13 September 1954, Pearsall Papers, Box 1. 
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Public Education Commission's report had, after all, recommended that tuition grants 
should be provided "in localities where integration occurred. " Because of this, Mays 
reported that Johnstone believed Virginia had "rendered a great service to the leaders 
of other southern states by being the first responsible people to recognize this, and that 
all leaders in his own state are in agreement on the point, but not yet able, for political 
reasons, to recognize it publicly. "60 
When Hodges' governorship ended in 1960, it was no surprise that North 
Carolina's voters embraced Terry Sanford of Laurinburg as his successor. Having 
served as the president of the Young Democratic Clubs of North Carolina from 1949- 
1950, and been assistant director of the Institute of Government at UNC-Chapel Hill, 
he had the relevant political experience for the post. More importantly perhaps, he had 
practised law from 1948 until his gubernatorial election in 1960, which helped him 
bring a rational approach to the governorship that sought to avoid legally untenable 
positions of resistance. Indeed, he seamlessly extended Hodges' much vaunted 
moderation, continuing to defer any desegregation decisions to local school boards. 
By 1961, Sanford's office had formulated a stock reply to constituents' complaints 
and concerns over desegregation, describing how "students have been assigned to 
these schools by action of the local school boards. Under our North Carolina system 
of public education, " the letter continued, "the local board has complete authority over 
the assignment of students and, therefore, there is nothing that this office or any 
agency of state government can do to either encourage or prevent such assignment. "61 
60 Mays Diaries, 2 October 1956. 
61 Form letter of Governor Sanford, as at August 1961, Terry Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111, 
State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, 
North Carolina. 
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V 
As across the South, North Carolinians fleshed out legislative measures 
designed to forestall school desegregation with an advocacy of the primacy of States' 
Rights. Although North Carolina was lacking a central figure with the urgency and 
zeal of Virginia's James Kilpatrick and his appeals to interposition, Governor Hodges 
often hinted at a deep resentment of what he saw as the Supreme Court's infringement 
of North Carolina's sovereign status. Apart from Hodges, however, and a few other 
notable exceptions, North Carolinians did not appeal to States' Rights with the same 
regularity as their Virginian counterparts. Such diversity in the tenacity of 
segregationists' adherence to States' Rights, not only between two states, but also 
between individuals within the same state, is testament to the complexity of 
segregationist responses to questions of resistance strategy. Rather than examining the 
elaborate nature of that response, however, historians have been drawn to studies of 
the self-declared "moderate" nature of those whites who looked to sustain North 
Carolina's progressive reputation. 62 
On 5 January 1955, Hodges issued a statement commenting on the 
interposition movement that Kilpatrick had precipitated, announcing that he himself 
"was in accord with the opinion in many parts of the South that the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in its segregation decisions, had assumed the authority to change 
the Constitution of the United States at the will of the members of the Court and 
without legal precedent. s63 Having consulted Pearsall, Hodges released another 
62 Douglas, in particular, and to a certain extent Cecelski, favour detailed discussions of white attitudes 
to segregation, rather than the myriad ways in which different segregationists utilised different 
arguments to promote, sustain, and propagate their beliefs in white supremacy. Douglas, Reading. 
Writing. and Race; Cecelski, Along Freedom Road. 
63 "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and 
Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3,1957, " Whitener Papers, Box 82, p. 6. 
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statement a month later. They had agreed that Pearsall's advisory committee should 
consider a resolution to "reaffirm North Carolina's position with the other Southern 
States in emphasizing the strong resentment our people feel toward the unjustified 
usurpation of power by the Supreme Court of the United States. s64 Belying wider 
attempts to appear moderate, Hodges became one of only two southern governors in 
the peripheral South to endorse interposition, albeit, as Numan Bartley has noted, as 
"a protest, not a statement of policy. s65 The other Governor to do so was that icon of 
immoderate southern resistance, Orval Faubus. 
As if his position on federal intervention was in any way ambiguous, Hodges 
took the opportunity to reiterate it when he announced his candidacy for the 1956 
gubernatorial primary to an audience in Leaksville. "I do not agree with the Supreme 
Court decision, " he said, "and I think it usurped the rights of the States and the 
Congress in its decision. s66 Hodges gave his full support to the Southern Manifesto, 
sponsored and co-drafted as it was by his North Carolina colleague, Sam Ervin. 67 His 
support for the Manifesto allowed him to appeal to the state's more intransigent 
segregationists, but in a relatively moderate manner. The document did, after all, only 
advocate all legal means for defying the Supreme Court's desegregation edicts. 
The North Carolina Patriots, the state's foremost White Citizens Council body, 
supported the same strong line of States' Rights as Hodges, and in particular rejected 
the validity of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the established social and racial 
mores of individual southern states. They wrote to UNC faculty member and fellow 
64 ibid., p. 7. 
65 Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During t1950's 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 144. 
66 "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and 
Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3,1957, " Whitener Papers, Box 82, p. 8. 
67 The other two main authors of the Manifesto were Richard Russell and John Stennis. 
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Patriot Wesley Critz George in February 1956, enclosing a copy of The Civil Rights 
Revolution, by Aldrich Blake. "As Mr Blake so well puts it, " wrote the Patriots, "`The 
real issue over civil rights is not race, color, creed or national origin, but a FREE 
SOCIETY vs. STATISM. ,, 68 This drew a parallel to what many southerners in the 
1950s understood to be the mechanics of a socialist state, or, in its most extreme form, 
a Soviet-style, centralised system of government. Put in the most simple terms 
possible, as Walter J. Alston of Henderson did in a letter to Hodges in January 1956, 
"if States do not have any rights, then we are drifting to a Socialist or Communist 
State. "69 
In much the same way, C. Dana Malpass linked an infringement of States' 
Rights to a socialist central government in his campaign for a seat in the House of 
Representatives in 1960. Clearly, in some quarters, such rhetoric had not lost its 
potency in North Carolina as the 1950s drew to a close. The pamphlet produced to 
publicise Malpass's campaign stated that a "return to [a] constitutional position on 
States' Rights is long overdue. " Tellingly, he wove his concern for States' Rights 
tightly into a wider desire to eradicate socialism. "The choice of the voter on 
November 8, " concluded his pamphlet, "is between the Republican party of 
performance and the U. S. Socialist (Democratic) party of promises. s7° 
More often than not, as Malpass and Alston exemplified, what States' Rights 
sentiment there was in North Carolina was inexorably linked to discussions of the 
global situation. Moreover, some citizens chose to define the segregation issue as an 
68 North Carolina Patriots letter to Wesley Critz George, 11 February 1956, Wesley Critz George 
Papers, Box 2, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. Capitals in original. 
69 Walter J. Alston letter to Luther Hodges, 14 January 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 117. 
70 "C. Dana Malpass, Republican Candidate for the House of Representatives from Hanover County, 
Wilmington, N. C.: For Progress Vote Republican, " George Papers, Box 8. 
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integral part of that Cold War struggle. An editorial in the N. C. Christian Advocate in 
January 1955, for example, discussed the speech given by State Senator 0. Arthur 
Kirkman to the "Brotherhood Class" of West Market Street Church, in Greensboro. 
Kirkman supported the theory that, if southerners were either "thoroughly 
Communist" or "thoroughly Christian, " the segregation problem could be successfully 
addressed: in communist Russia, blacks would be dispatched to Siberia, he claimed, 
or subjected to some other method of disappearance, "then there would be no race 
issue"; conversely, he believed that if Americans chose a path of genuine Christianity 
"closer to home, " again there would be no race problem. "Mr Kirkman's incisive 
analysis cuts to the quick, " the Advocate summarised. "We are too good to apply the 
Communist treatment to this problem; we are not good enough to apply the 
Gospel..: '71 
In both arenas -- Cold War abroad and segregation at home -- the stakes were 
high. It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that all North Carolinians gave equal 
weight to both issues: many did attempt to differentiate between the two concerns, 
often imbuing one with more importance than the other. Lloyd B Owens, for example, 
Senior Vice Commander of an Asheville-based veterans' association, wrote to Hodges 
in the winter of 1959. "It surely is a very definite fact that our negro situation in 
America could very easily become much worse than our Russian communist one is at 
the present time since our negro question is a more internal affair, " he wrote. 2 For 
71 "Is This Subsidized Propaganda? Editorial From the N. C. Christian Advocate, Greensboro N. C. " 20 
January 1955, clipping in Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 104, Archives and Research Services, 
Library of Virginia, Richmond. Kirkman implied, therefore, that the Christian line was integrationist, 
in stark contrast to some of his segregationist-minded fellow churchmen. For more on the arguments 
underpinning religious segregation, see David L. Chappell, "Religious Ideas of the Segregationists, " 
Journal of American Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1998) pp. 237-261. 
72 Lloyd B. Owens letter to Luther Hodges, 16 February 1959, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 421. 
Emphasis my own. 
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Owens, there was no mention of any of the other possible points of conflict of the 
1950s, be they over gender roles, or teenage rebellion and perceived delinquency. In 
his mind, at least, the most pervasive problem of the late 1950s was that of communist 
insurgency; he noted, however, that the one source of unrest that could eclipse the 
threat of external communism was the racial situation. 
North Carolinians became increasingly aware that the United States' racial 
dilemmas were being played out on a world stage. In May 1961, for example, 
Charlotte was selected to host North Carolina's first state-sponsored International 
Trade Fair, to run from 12 to 21 October of the same year. The organisers showed an 
understandable paranoia about how the city's residual patterns of racial segregation 
and discrimination would impact on such an international forum. Two African 
Americans, Dr R. A. Hawkins, Chairman of the Mecklenburg Organization on 
Political Affairs, and Joseph Charles Jones, Chairman of the Student Protest 
Movement, outlined their concerns in a joint letter to Terry Sanford 
73 The success of 
such a trade fair should have boosted the image of North Carolina's progressive 
culture, especially in the wake of the sit-in movement. 
4 "In your considerations of the 
potential site, " wrote Hawkins and Jones, "we wonder if it occurred to your board that 
public accommodations such as the leading hotels, motels, restaurants and theaters of 
this city... refuse to honor colored citizens of this community in the use of their 
accommodations. " The use of such facilities, they noted, would be integral to the 
73 Dr R. A. Hawkins and Joseph Charles Jones letter to Terry Sanford, 4 May 1961, Sanford 
Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111. The letter was copied to, among others, the President, former- 
Governor Hodges and President Kennedy's Special Assistant, Attorney Frank D. Reeves. 
74 Indeed, Charles Jones was himself active in the sit-in movement. In the words of Davison Douglas, 
he "led several hundred other students in a sit-in protest at several downtown Charlotte lunch counters 
that refused service to black customers, " on 9 February 1960. Douglas, Reading. Writing. & Race, p. 
85. 
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success or failure of the fair. What Hawkins and Jones were essentially highlighting 
was that, "with colored peoples being invited from other parts of the world, we assure 
you that this humiliation will be quite an embarrassment to our community, state and 
nation. " Fleshing those concerns out onto the world stage, the two authors reasoned 
that, unless action was taken to deconstruct Charlotte's racist systems, more aid and 
comfort would be given "to the Communists in their attempt to embarrass our nation 
in the eyes of the colored peoples of the world, by our refusal to treat all peoples as 
equal. "75 Segregated conditions could all too easily undo all that the trade fair sought 
to achieve. 
By mid-century, furthermore, technological advances had made possible the 
speedy dissemination of information, not just around the nation, but around the globe. 
"Modem communication methods have made it possible for Russia to flash the news 
of any segration [sic] incident around the world in a few hours, " commented Mrs 
Glenn A. Bassett to Governor Terry Sanford, in early 1961. A self-described "former 
North Carolinian, " Mrs Bassett had moved to Leadville, Colorado, but by those very 
same communication methods kept in touch with the situation in her home state. "We 
cannot afford to wash our dirty linen in public, " she continued. "We have to settle 
integration (or desegration [sic]) before we will be able to convince the dark races of 
the rest of the world that DEMOCRACY does mean FREEDOM. "76 
Southerners in general were increasingly aware of the valuable propaganda 
that the Soviet Union was able to generate from the region's racial situation. Some 
North Carolinians, therefore, interpreted Hodges' attempts to label the state's 
75 Dr R. A. Hawkins and Joseph Charles Jones letter to Terry Sanford, 4 May 1961, Sanford 
Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111. 
76 Mrs Glenn A. Bassett letter to Terry Sanford, 12 January 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
111. 
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resistance "moderate" as an active attempt to negate this Soviet source of propaganda. 
W. W. Finlator, for example, of the First Baptist Church in the eastern seaboard's 
Elizabeth City, sought to inform Hodges of the perspective on Brown and Massive 
Resistance that he had gleaned whilst travelling to Europe in the early summer of 
1955. "To the traveler returning to these shores, " he wrote, "nothing seems to have 
raised the stock of the United States in the eyes of the world or given the communist 
racist propaganda against us such a jolt as these rulings of the Court [Brown 1 and II]. 
Finlator confidently told Hodges that "You were aware of this when you acted with 
such courage and statesmanship during the General Assembly at the time this issue 
was raised. "77 Finlator's letter strongly suggested that Hodges was deemed to be 
giving much needed direction to North Carolina's resistance campaign. Clearly, as 
Hodges and the North Carolinian legislature had hoped that their constituents might, 
the Reverend believed that the Pearsall Plan was taking the prudent middle ground in 
order to deflate Soviet propaganda based on the United States' internal racial turmoil. 
Finlator did not countenance the idea of the Plan as an attempt to perpetuate 
segregated schooling in North Carolina for as long as possible. 
Some citizens of the Tar Heel State were also aware, however, that, regardless 
of their own stated racial progressivism, other, less moderate approaches to 
segregation amongst their southern neighbours could impact negatively on the nation 
as a whole. Katie Pridgen, of Lincolnton, for example, wrote to Senator Hoey in 1948 
to denounce the recent behaviour of the wife of South Carolina's Governor, Olin 
Johnson. She noted how "happy the Communists and the Ku Klux Klan will be to 
spread abroad the statement that Mrs Olin Johnson.. . is reported to have made -- that 
77 W. W. Finlator letter to Luther Hodges, 4 August 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40. 
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she refused to attend the democratic dinner lest she have to sit beside a negro! How 
can we expect to lead anyone into the world of tomorrow with such nullifications in 
the saddle? "78 
On the domestic front, if the likes of Junius Scales and Frank Porter Graham 
had confirmed a connection between civil rights activity and communist insurgency in 
the minds of the majority of North Carolina's segregationists, then the Brown decision 
cemented that link. Professor C. E. Branscomb of Laurel Fork was one keen to advise 
Governor Umstead on a plan to thwart the Supreme Court's proposals for 
desegregation. The Professor would start "colored schools" a month early, so that 
states with compulsory education attendance laws could assign black students to 
schools whilst white children were still on vacation. "The teacher can dismiss the 
school upon approval of the administration, " continued Branscomb, "should Federal 
Communists assert the authority that they are to force the students into the school 
where they do not belong. " Then, tying those concerns tightly to a broader Massive 
Resistance rhetoric, Branscomb linked his plans to an avowedly States' Rights 
standpoint. "Any interruption of the schools under any plan by Federal agents, " he 
concluded, "constitutes a destruction of education by the states. s79 Gastonia's Elva 
Harrison felt that compulsory desegregation, against the will of either parent or pupil, 
was "a restriction of force equal to anything sponsored by Soviet Russia. , 80 Four 
years later, in 1958, C. A. Rea was somewhat starker in his terms. "Don't be 
deceived, " he wrote to Hodges. "Segregation (separation of Races, Purity) is not 
unchristian. Integration, (mixing of the races, mongrelization) is anti-Christ, 
7$ Katie B. Pridgen letter to Clyde Hoey, 22 February 1948, Hoey Papers, Box 142. 
79 Professor C. E. Branscomb letter to William Umstead, 29 May 1954, Box 58.1, Umstead 
Gubernatorial Papers. 
8° Elva Harrison letter to William Umstead, 28 May 1954, Box 58.1, Umstead Gubernatorial Papers. 
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Communism. Read the Bible (King James Version) Know the Truth, Be Led by the 
Truth.,, 81 
The Cold War had introduced Americans to the rhetoric of the Soviet 
technique of "divide and conquer, " and, to southern eyes at least, attempts to integrate 
met all the criteria for such a campaign. Many believed that the South would be split 
over such questions as whether or not to desegregate, how to go about desegregation, 
or to what extent desegregation should be pursued. Under such pressures, it followed 
that internal violence could ensue, providing conditions perfect for a communist 
uprising. 82 There is some evidence to suggest that a minority of the state's 
segregationists rescinded on calls for the continuation of total segregation simply to 
ensure that there was less division. In the Summer of 1954, Dr J. Symington warned 
Governor Umstead that maintaining "segregation regardless of consequences... might 
mean war. Some feel so strongly about it that they would go to war, " he continued. 
Symington, however, was unwilling to countenance such actions. Such headstrong 
adherence to segregation, he thought, "would be playing into the hands of the 
communists. " When confronted by the two evils of forced integration and war with 
the Soviet Union, the doctor made it quite clear that he would give in to the former in 
order to prevent the latter. 83 
In the main, North Carolinians did not feel that the state's African Americans 
were themselves communist; they were merely unwitting dupes in a wider communist 
plot. In the minds of such a paternalistic society, especially one which liked to dwell 
81 C. A. Rea letter to Hodges, 20 October 1958, Box 313, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers. 
82 Beatrice Loeb, for example, wrote that, "I wish to say that I would help a Negro as readily as I would 
help one of my own race. I wish them every good thing, and I believe they are being made a political 
foot-ball, and I also see the fine hand of Communism, with its `divide and conquer' techniques. " Mrs 
George H. Loeb letter to Wesley Critz George, 12 January 1956, George Papers, Box 3. 
83 Dr J. Symington letter to William B Umstead, 1 July 1954, Umstead Gubernatorial Papers, Box 58.2. 
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upon its support for improving black conditions within a segregated system, there was 
a genuine belief that blacks were content with their lot. "Many of our best and most 
thoughtful colored citizens, " wrote E. S. Askew, "those who are not under the 
influence or pressure of outside paid professional agitators -- some of them 
Communists -- recognise the realities of the problem, and are opposed to mixing the 
schools. s84 The subtext of the message was clear: in the minds of segregationists, 
North Carolina's African American population would not have agitated for greater 
civil rights in general, or mixed schooling in particular, if they had been left to their 
own devices without communists "stirring up" trouble. 
"I am no expert, " Norfolk's John Fallin wrote to Wesley Critz George in 1955, 
"but I have tried to find the original motivating source of these militant Negro moves 
to mix with white people. " Again, believing that blacks were too content to agitate for 
racial change without the stimuli of external radical forces, Fallin concluded that, "I 
believe the answer is International Communism. "85 This feeling was closely coupled 
to the belief that Soviet interest in the whole situation stemmed from a wish to 
ferment internal turmoil in the Unites States. "Are the thinking people too blind to see 
Communism behind this anti-segregation subject? " wondered Mrs Joseph Graham, of 
Lincoln County. "They are using negroes to start all this disturbance and cause a split 
among the American people. 9,86 As the letters of Fallin and Graham both suggested, 
North Carolinians at grass-roots level were undeniably gripped by a genuine fear of 
communism. However cynically red-baiting was deployed as a weapon by 
84,, A Physical Not a Spiritual Separation: Race Suicide -- Ecclesiastical Edict, " by E. S. Askew [n. d. ], 
Box 16, George Papers. 
85 John H. Fallin letter to Wesley Critz George, 6 October 1955, George Papers, Box 2. 
86 Mrs Joseph Graham letter to Wesley Critz George, "Undated 1954, " George Papers, Box 2. 
258 
segregationists, North Carolina citizens still harboured real fears of communist 
insurgency. 
Two of the most pressing matters for southern segregationists were, therefore, 
the growing threat of desegregation and the possibility of communist infiltration. One 
organisation in particular was held to represent both of those concerns: the NAACP. It 
was because of the intrusion into southern affairs by such national organisations as the 
NAACP, thought North Carolina's segregationists, that school desegregation was 
threatened. There was little argument as to the motivating force behind the 
Association. The Deputy Sheriff of Rowan County, for example, felt simply that it 
was "a Communist inspired organization, " whilst Greensboro's John Lambert had "a 
good many colored friends who tell me they prefer it [the segregated school system] 
as it is. [The] NAACP maybe causing most of the trouble, " he wrote to Hodges in 
January 1956. "They may be more of a racket than sincere. Communists may have a 
hand in this, hoping to create another Civil War, then moving in for the kill. , 87 
Allison James, a pharmacist from Winston-Salem who showed his true segregationist 
colours as one of the most energetic members of the Board of Directors of the Patriots 
of North Carolina, Inc., was more certain. He wrote to every Tar Heel School 
Superintendent in 1956 that, "The Communists, Fellow Travelers, and the NAACP 
are trying to force early integration. Their propaganda, " he continued, "has blinded a 
few school officials who proceeded to integrate before their false theories were 
investigated. "88 For Mrs O. W. Hines of McCleansville, the NAACP's subversive 
87 Woodrow W. Wilson, Deputy Sheriff of Rowan County, letter to Luther Hodges, 19 July 1955, 
Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40; John W. Lambert letter to Luther Hodges, 2 January 1956, 
Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 119. 
88 Allison James letter to "All Superintendents of Schools in North Carolina; re: Data on White and 
Negro Testing Programs, Status of Teachers, and other items related to the non-segregation problems 
facing the South, " [1956 Undated] George Papers, Box 4. 
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menace had not dissipated six years after Brown. "Russia is [at the] back of all of it, " 
she wrote in March 1960, and the Soviets were "financing the Communist [sic] and 
the NAACP. " The Soviet Union wanted to "weaken or divide us[, ] she knows this 
negro subject is a sore spot with America. "89 A year later, a new governor faced the 
same old accusations. "How do you get away with it? " Marguerite Hale asked Terry 
Sanford. "How can you allow this spread of Communism without lifting your finger 
to try to stop it, or perhaps you are a member of the NAACP also. "90 
The North Carolina branch of the NAACP was involved in two specific 
incidents which showed how vulnerable the Association was to red-baiting attacks: 
one revolved around Assistant Attorney General I. Beverly Lake, the other around the 
notorious "Kissing Case. " The NAACP's standing amongst segregationist white 
North Carolinians was never exactly high, but in the Summer of 1955 it plummeted 
further when the Association demanded the dismissal of Hodges' Assistant Attorney 
General, the rabidly segregationist I. Beverly Lake, because of remarks he had made 
suggesting that North Carolina should prepare private funding to finance private 
schools in an attempt to circumvent Brown. Lake, therefore, was undoing much of the 
hard work that Hodges had put in to cast the Pearsall Plan as a moderate response to 
Brown. Not wishing to be seen to give in to black demands, however, Hodges decided 
to stand by Lake. Exemplifying the governor's need to appeal not only to the state's 
moderates, but also to its staunch segregationists, Hodges was deluged by 
correspondence praising both Lake and his own continued support for the assistant 
attorney general. 
89 Mrs O. W. Hines letter to Luther Hodges, 11 March 1960, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 523. 
90 Marguerite S. Hale letter to Terry Sanford, 20 July 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111. 
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According to Hodges' private secretary, E. L. Rankin, in the days after the 
furore the Governor received "considerable mail about the segregation problem in the 
public schools, " the vast majority of which supported Lake's position. 91 Frank L. 
Austin, the Principal of Hartwell School in Concord, told Hodges that it was 
"reassuring to read your reply to the NAACP, " before going on to equate the 
NAACP's extremism with that of the Ku Klux Klan. "Both are extremists! " he wrote. 
"They incite apprehension, fear, hatred, and violence. The Klan's deeds were through 
physical force: the NAACP accomplishes theirs through influence, pressure and 
legislation. s92 More common than the equation with the Klan's extremism was the 
repetition of charges of communist leadership and direction. "Every Communist 
organization in America is behind this integration fuss to destroy the White race and 
to raise up a nation of Mongrells [sic], " proclaimed Charlotte's Parks A. Yandle. "The 
NAACP Organization is... evil and should not be allowed to exist. "93 H. V. Carver was 
"proud" of his governor who would, he felt, "not sell out the white race to a few paid 
negro adgatators [sic] and comminist [sic] Pressure groups. " 94 
Even such an apparently localised event as the remarks of one state's assistant 
attorney general provoked a response from across the entire South. "The time has 
come, " thought Hubert Bickley, of Marion, South Carolina, "... where the white man 
must arise, or forever be lost to a communist inspired NAACP rule. " Bickley asked 
Hodges when and where he thought that the NAACP insurgency would stop. That 
would be, he felt, "when your chair as governor will be filled with a negro, it is when 
91 E. L. Rankin reply to D. B. Martin's letter of 15 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 41. 
92 Frank L. Austin letter to Luther Hodges, 18 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 39. 
93 Parks A. Yandle letter to Luther Hodges, 18 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40. 
94 H. V. Carver letter to Luther Hodges, 20 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40. 
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your daughter or grand daughter will have a negro husband, it is when you and I will 
be ruled by a communist inspired NAACP government. "95 
D. B. Martin, on the other hand, the Associate Agency Director of the Durham- 
based, black-owned North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, aimed to 
embarrass Hodges by exposing North Carolina's pretensions to moderation, and its 
considerably more hard line, segregationist reality. He claimed that the actions of 
Hodges and Lake had compromised North Carolina's reputation as "one of the better 
southern states. " The Assistant Attorney General -- after all, a legal appointment -- 
should not, thought Martin, condone such "unwarranted" and "undemocratic" attacks 
on the NAACP and the Supreme Court. To do so "automatically classifies the State of 
North Carolina among other southern states, formerly of less prestige, " concluded 
Martin, "such as Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, " precisely the position 
that the State's well planned resistance strategies strove to avoid. 6 Hodges, although 
outraging Martin, did not totally lose sight of his own carefully crafted position. In 
response to one constituent's suggested revocation of the NAACP's charter, for 
example, Hodges reverted to type. "I have had my office investigate the possibility, " 
he replied, "and find that the NAACP is an unincorporated association which does not 
require a charter under State law. " It was, therefore, only within a strictly legal 
framework that the Governor would "make every effort to combat the disturbing 
activities of this organization. s97 
A testament to the extent and success of red-baiting attempts on North 
Carolina's NAACP was the Association's attitude to what became known as the 
95 J. Hubert Bickley letter to Luther Hodges, 30 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 39. 
96 D. B. Martin letter to Luther Hodges, 15 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 41. 
97 Luther Hodges letter to Louis F. Lawler, 3 August 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40. 
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"Kissing Case" in Monroe, N. C. The case held many parallels to that of Virginia's 
Martinsville Seven: both, for a short time, became world-wide cause celebres; both 
were the type of cases in which the NAACP could have been expected to mount a 
defence, yet was reluctant to do so. Reports stated that Dave "Fuzzy" Simpson and 
Hanover Thompson, two black boys aged eight and nine respectively, were arrested 
for allegedly kissing a seven-year-old white girl on 28 October 1958. It was claimed 
by the Committee to Combat Racial Injustice [CCRI] that, although juveniles, the two 
boys were held in Monroe Jail for six days where they were kept incommunicado. 
Again according to the CCRI, when they were brought to trial they were not allowed 
representation by counsel. 
News of the case was carried by various newspapers and national magazines, 
including The Nation which published a report sympathetic to the two black boys. 
Chester M. Davis was sufficiently moved by what he -- and many other 
segregationists -- felt was The Nation's one-sided view of the case to write a rebuttal. 
He set out his version of events in the Winston-Salem Journal Sentinel, published on 
8 February 1959. At best, it was a paternalistic view of the boys' treatment; at its most 
insidious, it was a reiteration of white supremacist assumptions and ideals. Those 
press reports and the CCRI's stance, claimed Davis, had failed to mention that 
keeping juveniles in an adult penitentiary was standard procedure in Union County, 
which at that time had no separate juvenile facilities. Furthermore, it was claimed that 
Judge Price of the Juvenile Court had applied to obtain places for the boys in 
Morrison Training School, in Hoffman in Richmond County. The institution, 
according to Price, was full. To counter the claims of the boys being held 
incommunicado, Davis claimed that Hanover Thompson's mother made no attempt to 
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see her son in jail. More unlikely, however, was the explanation that David Simpson's 
mother "came daily to the jail and was admitted to see David the one time she asked 
to do so. "98 Bizarrely, no explanation was given for the motive behind Mrs Simpson's 
visits to the jail when she had not asked to see her son. Finally, Judge Price was 
quoted by Davis as saying that no request for counsel was ever filed by the boys' 
defence. 99 
Taken in its entirety, the case highlights the obvious paranoia that members of 
the NAACP harboured with regard to being labelled communist, especially in the 
wake of the wide purges of suspected radicals in the Association at the national 
level. '°° In one of his two journal-Sentinel articles, tellingly entitled, "Propaganda 
Campaign Is On: Communist Front Shouts `Kissing Case' to World, " Davis reported 
that the Association's leaders "are deeply concerned about the possibility that the 
[CCRI] is a Communist directed `front. ' They are frightened, " he continued, "at being 
identified with the Communist movement. As Kelly Alexander of Charlotte, president 
of the Carolina NAACP Board of Directors, told this reporter, `If we ever get 
identified with communism, the Ku Klux Klan and the White Councils will pick up 
the charge that we are `reds' and use it like a club to beat us to death. "'lol Hodges, 
mindful that the state's more intransigent segregationists viewed the NAACP itself as 
98 Clipping, "`Kissing Case' is Distorted in the Northern Press, " Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 
423. 
99 ibid. 
100 For more on the NAACP's stance on anti-communism, see Kenneth R. Janken, "From Colonial 
Liberation to Cold War Liberalism: Walter White, the NAACP, and Foreign Affairs, 1941-1955, " 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21, No. 6 (1998) pp. 1074-1095; and Wilson Record, Race and 
Radicalism: the NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict [Communism in American Life Series] 
(Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964). 
101 Clipping "Propaganda Campaign Is On: Communist Front Shouts 'Kissing Case' to World, " in 
Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 423. 
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communist tainted, noted that "even the NAACP organization in North Carolina is 
disturbed over the way in which this case is being exploited. "' 02 
The sexual nature of the case, too, alarmed the NAACP hierarchy. Robert F. 
Williams, the maverick leader of the Monroe chapter of the NAACP and advocate of 
armed self-defence, was unequivocal as to why the Association's national leadership 
shunned representation in the case. "The national office of the NAACP wouldn't have 
anything to do with the case, " he wrote, "because it was a `sex case. ,, 103 As an 
integral part of Massive Resistance rhetoric, segregationists played on fears of 
miscegenation. To many whites, any dismantling of the South's racial barriers would 
unleash a torrent of inter-racial sex. In order to heighten those fears, segregationists 
played upon the traditional supremacist belief that African Americans harboured an 
innate, bestial sexuality, which they were waiting to unleash on southern white 
womanhood. As Tim Tyson has commented, "For many white citizens, the case 
seemed to confirm the sexual fears that accompanied their vision of where school 
desegregation would lead. "' 04 Once more, the case provoked fears of juvenile 
delinquency, warnings of which also formed an intrinsic part of resistance rhetoric. 
According to a firsthand account written by Robert Williams' close associate Julian 
Mayfield, "Monroe officials cast doubt on the legitimacy of the boys' births. 
Moreover, they had asserted that James and Fuzzy were delinquents who had been in 
trouble with the police before... "tos 
102 Luther Hodges Statement, 12 February 1959, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 423. 
103 Robert F. Williams, Negroes With Guns (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998), p. 22. 
104 Tim Tyson introduction to ibid., p. xx. 
105 Julian Mayfield's account reproduced in James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries 
(Washington, DC: Open Hand Publishing, Inc., 1985), pp. 172-174. Quotation from p. 173. 
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Miss Barbara Easton, of New York City, wrote a letter to Governor Hodges 
which gave a further explanation of the NAACP's concerns. She claimed that both of 
Davis' articles in the Journal and Sentinel were "pure propaganda, filled with emotion 
rather than fact. " Incisively hitting upon the NAACP's very fears, she continued that 
this "most obvious propaganda device is that of calling the CCRI a `Communist 
Front. ' This is a common trick; when you dislike a person or a group or a cause you 
yell `red! ' and hope to obscure the real reason thereby. "106 The NAACP, it would 
appear, had learned this lesson the hard way, and had learned it well. They avoided 
any representation in the case until 31 December, 65 days after the arrests. 
It was, eventually, the pressure of international press coverage that forced the 
NAACP to make representations in the case, and which pressurised North Carolina's 
ruling elites into a resolution of the affair. As Mayfield's account attests, a journalist 
on the London News Chronicle, Joyce Egginton, published stories of the case which 
were soon disseminated across Europe. As a result, there were "massive 
demonstrations in Paris, Rome and Vienna. The hugest, " Mayfield maintained, "was 
in Rotterdam, where the United States Embassy was stoned, " and an international 
committee was formed to pressurise for the boys' release. A petition was sent from 
Europe to the States, where it eventually passed from Eleanor Roosevelt, via President 
Eisenhower to Hodges. On 13 February 1959, four months after the boys were first 
arrested, Hodges ordered the children's' release. '07 
106 Barbara Easton letter to Luther Hodges, 24 February 1959, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 421. 
107 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the NAACP's reluctance to take part in the defence of the boys, the 
Association's Kelly Alexander refuted the accusation that international pressure had had a hand in their 
release. "According to Mr. Alexander, " wrote Mayfield, "he and journalist Harry Golden, through 
consultations with Governor Hodges, had effected Hanover and Fuzzy's release. " Mayfield quoted in 
Forman, Making of Black Revolutionaries, p. 173 and p. 174. 
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The NAACP, however, was far from being the only target of segregationist 
red-baiting in North Carolina. As the drive for integration spread from specific school 
desegregation to southern society in general, Massive Resisters became adept at using 
red-baiting to undermine an expanding range of enemies. When Greensboro students 
began a new wave of sit-in demonstrations in Woolworth's in February 1960, for 
example, segregationists immediately sought to redeploy red-baiting tactics against 
those sitting-in. The task was made a little easier by the fact that the Communist Party 
had indeed attempted to give aid to the four originators of the Greensboro sit-ins, 
Franklin McCain, Ezell Blair, Jr, Dave Richmond and Joseph McNeil. As Franklin 
McCain remembered in an interview with Howell Raines, "We got a lot of attention 
from the Communist party [sic]. The Communist party sent representatives down to 
Greensboro to assist us in any way that we deemed appropriate. If it meant actual 
participation, they offered to sit-in with us. If it meant you needed x number of dollars 
to do this, they made it known that money was available, assistance was available. 
Just don't sit down here in Greensboro and want for things you need. " Party aid was 
rejected, however, because "we didn't need it, there was no reason to affiliate with the 
Communist Party. We were in the driver's seat... "108 McCain also exemplified the 
shared language that emerged between segregationists and civil rights agitators in the 
Cold War. One of the reasons for declining Communist aid, remembered McCain, 
was that "it was a Christian movement, and Christians and Communists just don't 
mix. "109 Just as segregationists attacked "godless" communism, therefore, so many 
108 Franklin McCain quoted in Howell Raines, [ed. ] My Soul Is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep 
South Remembered (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 81. 
109 Franklin McCain quoted in ibid., p. 81. 
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civil rights activists, themselves patriotic and God-fearing, felt that communism was 
un-American and un-Christian. 
Three years after those sit-ins began, the Director of the North Carolina State 
Bureau of Justice [SBI] filed a report after a group of about 4,000 marching black 
protesters had clashed with about 3,000 white resisters. On 29 May 1963, SBI 
Director W. F. Anderson reported that the American Patriot News Sheet was 
distributed by white resisters at the march, "and this tells how the communists are 
using these demonstrations to further their own cause of communism. " Even though 
Anderson did criticise the white mob whose leadership, he reported, "secretly issued 
pocket knives to a large number of white persons who were participating in the 
demonstrations, " his report contained no analysis of the charges that communists led 
the black march, and certainly no refutation. Indeed, it reads very much as though the 
SBI was endorsing the view that such agitation was the work of communist 
infiltrators. ' 0 
A minority of North Carolinian segregationists were still attempting to link 
external subversive threats to internal racial turbulence when Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Bill of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. In 1963, for example, 
Agnew H. Bahnsen wrote to Grady Allred, of K&W cafeterias in Winston-Salem, 
defining "two of the biggest, if not the biggest problems which will face our 
generation. " These were, he continued, "communism on the international front and the 
race issue on the domestic front. Both, " he believed, "can easily become fraught with 
emotionalism and cause both sides to make serious mistakes. ""' 
1 10 "Bureau of Investigation, N. C. Department of Justice, Raleigh, " report of 29 May 1963, Sanford 
Gubernatorial Papers, Box 346. 
111 Agnew H. Bahnen letter to Grady Allred, 19 September 1963, Box 346, Sanford Gubernatorial 
Papers. 
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VI 
As Frank Porter Graham's travails proved, North Carolina's segregationist 
leaders traditionally targeted the campus and faculty of the University at Chapel Hill 
as a haven of left-wing subversion. The university did not help its position in the eyes 
of those segregationists by insisting on the rights of free speech and academic 
freedom for all-comers. Regardless of the political climate in the 1950s, Ralph 
Bunche, Benjamin Mays, Roy Wilkins, Linus Pauling and Langston Hughes were all 
invited by the institution to give formal addresses. As Paul Hastings, a member of the 
Patriots, explained in a letter to his governor, "Many citizens of our state are disturbed 
and distressed over the many radicals that are brought to the University of North 
Carolina and allowed to poison the minds of the students with their views. Some of 
them, " he continued, "are outright Communist [sic], and others have belonged to 
many Communist front organizations that promote the Communist line and 
programs. "I 12 Langston Hughes' involvement caused perhaps the greatest 
consternation; he was, after all, an outspoken black activist and paid-up Communist 
Party member. Moreover, he appeared to have gone out of his way to offend the 
Christian principles upon which many segregationists claimed to lay their racial 
views. Hastings quoted Hughes' poem, "`Goodbye Christ' which is the most 
blasphemous thing I have ever read about the Lord Jesus Christ: 
Put one more S in the USA 
To Make it Soviet. 
The USA when we take control 
112 Paul D. Hastings letter to Luther Hodges, 26 April 1960, George Papers, Box 7. 
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Will be the USSA then. "' 13 
His appearance at UNC produced a predictable protest from even more predictable 
sources. 
In 1960, W. N. Jefferies suggested to Dr L. J. Herring, of Wilson's Herring 
Implement Co., that support should be gathered for a man he believed deserved the 
governorship, and who would, "if elected, see to it that the state schools are 
investigated and cleared of any subversives, Communists or subversive teachings 
within. The man who is out-spoken, " continued Jefferies, "capable, and able, is Dr I. 
Beverly Lake. "' 14 Greensboro's Eugene Hood exclaimed that "North Carolinians have 
become so accustomed to hearing practically nothing from [UNC at] Chapel Hill 
except racist propaganda until many have come to believe that most of our so-called 
intellectuals at college level are concerned primarily with preaching and teaching the 
one-world philosophy of communism. "' 15 R. N. White simply pointed out that Chapel 
Hill was "known to so many as, `The Little Moscow of the South. "" 16 
Hastings, Jefferies, Hood and White were all members of North Carolina's 
White Citizens' Councils, which, as historian Neil McMillen has clearly shown -- and 
as the Southern Regional Council's contemporary research suggested -- were not as 
successful as those of other southern states. "? In the direct wake of Brown, a cluster 
of small organisations jockeyed for segregationist support in North Carolina. In 
November 1954, for example, a Durham-based group known as the North Carolina 
113 ibid. 
1 14 W. N. Jefferies letter to Dr L. J. Herring, 30 March 1960, George Papers, Box 7. 
113 Eugene Hood letter to The Editor, Greensboro Daily News, 22 November 1954, George Papers, 
Box 2. 
1 16 R. N. White letter to Wesley Critz George, 23 November 1954, George Papers, Box 2. 
117 See Neil McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organised Resistance to the Second Reconstruction. 
1954-1964 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), esp. pp. 112-115. 
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Association for the Preservation of the White Race, Inc., [NCAPWR], approached 
Gene Hood to head their operations. 118 The NCAPWR's stance was not a subtle one, 
relying on coarse expositions of anti-communism and a belief in the inferior bloodline 
of African Americans. One broadsheet produced by the NCAPWR, for example, was 
headlined, "Negro Blood Destroyed the Civilization of Egypt, India, Phoenicia, 
Carthage, Greece and Rome: He Will Destroy America! " The organisation believed 
America to be weakening, as she looked "frantically around for Russian spies, 
believing that Russia will attack us with armies.. . In the meantime, " the broadsheet 
continued, "Russia is laughing. She has a more deadly weapon than the atomic bomb. 
She knows our strength is in our white stock, and that when she has mixed our blood 
with Negro that we are licked forever. "' 19 
Upton Blevis presided over a similar group called the Constitution of White 
Men Incorporated [CWMI]. The preamble to their incorporation notice made their 
intentions quite clear: they wished to "examine carefully, very carefully, " all 
prospective federal and state employees "to prevent the election or appointment of any 
person who is inclined toward internationalism, interracialism, atheism, or 
communism"; to teach the State and nation's children to protect them from "the evils 
of excessive liberalism and excessive tolerance and how they lead to internationalism, 
inter-racialism, and atheism, which are the three absolutely necessary steps leading to 
communism, treason, degradation, total ruin and destruction of individuals and 
118 Eugene Hood letter to Wesley George, 22 November 1954, George Papers, Box 2. 
119 North Carolina Association for the Preservation of the White Race, Inc., "Negro Blood Destroyed 
the Civilization of Egypt, India, Phoenicia, Carthage, Greece and Rome: He Will Destroy America! " 
George Papers, Box 1. 
271 
nations"; and, finally, to identify, discredit, and expose every source of "propaganda 
against the southern people and segregation. "120 
The fractious world of North Carolina's organised white resistance was 
transformed by Wesley Critz George, a geneticist and eugenicist. 121 Under his 
tutelage, the Patriots of North Carolina, Inc., provided more direction for Tar Heel 
segregationists than at any other stage of Massive Resistance. George strove to bring 
an element of scientific certainty to racial arguments, even though, in the wake of the 
holocaust, some southern segregationists felt that eugenics had sinister overtones. In 
May 1951, for example, George was elected to the Presidency of the North Carolina 
Academy of Science, based in Raleigh, and, more insidiously, to the membership of 
the nascent American Eugenics Society, Inc., [AES] in April 1954.122 Like George 
himself, the AES sought respectability, boasting a Park Avenue, New York City, 
postal address. The Professor came to prominence not because of his work for the 
various North Carolina White Citizens' Council groups to which he gave direction, 
but predominately for his published scientific works which purported to show a 
genetic basis for black inferiority. Indeed, he received literally thousands of requests 
120 "Constitution of White Men Incorporated: Preamble, " [n. d. ] George Papers, Box 2. 
121 It was indicative of George's vast influence among the state's active white supremacists that the 
letters of Hastings, Jefferies, Hood and White -- and many more -- were copied to him, regardless of 
their original, intended recipient. The doctrine of eugenics was created by Francis Galton, a cousin of 
Charles Darwin, who defined it as "the science which deals with all the influences that improve the 
inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage. " Quoted in 
Marek Kohn, The Race Gall: The Return of Racial Science (London: Random House, 1995), p. 
114. 
122 George was Professor of Histology and Embryology at UNC from 1924 to 1949, and was Chairman 
of the Department of Anatomy from 1939 to 1949, before becoming Professor Emeritus in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
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for copies of, "Race, Heredity, and Civilization, " "Human Progress and the Race 
Problem, " and, "Genes, Brains, and Social Policies. s123 
Throughout his life, George remained deeply convinced that African 
Americans were inferior to white Americans, a difference which he attempted to 
justify on mainly scientific grounds. As early as July 1944, for example, he had 
publicly proclaimed that "the race problem is not a religious one; it is socio- 
biological ., 
024 More caustically, he wrote to sociologist Howard Odum to remind him 
that he was "a breeder of fine cattle, and know[s] something about genetics. And yet, " 
he continued, referring to recently published newspaper reports of Odum's relatively 
moderate stance on the desegregation question, "you are promoting public policies the 
ultimate results of which would be to do to the white race in America the sort of thing 
that would be done to your Jersey herd if the state were to require you to incorporate 
into your herd the sorriest scrub bull in North Carolina. " Quite simply, George wrote, 
"I do not understand. "' 25 
George's scientific stance proved to be a popular proposition. Eugene Cook, 
Georgia's attorney general and author of "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP, " had a 
reputation as a red-baiter. Even Cook, though, admitted to George that he had only 
concentrated on the legal defence of segregation and of repulsing "subversive plots" 
in his home state because "of my lack of knowledge of the premise on which you have 
based your observations and conclusions. s126 It is unlikely that Cook would have 
eschewed red-baiting had he had more of a grasp of George's brand of scientific 
123 The three essays were eventually published in one complete volume in 1967: Wesley Critz George, 
Race Problems and Human Progress: Three Timely Essays (West Sayville, N. Y.: Research, Inc., 
1967). 
124 "A Statement to the Statement of Four Ministers, " 25 July 1944, George Papers, Box 1. 
125 Wesley Critz George letter to Howard Odum, 24 May 1944, George Papers, Box 1. 
126 Eugene Cook letter to Wesley George, 27 March 1957, George Papers, Box 6. 
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racism, but the Georgia attorney general was certainly impressed. Alabama's governor 
John Patterson was equally affected; he ordered a manuscript from George for a book 
tentatively titled, "The Biology of the Race Problem, " and paid him $3,000 for its due 
completion. 127 
George's reaction to Brown, ten years after his cattle-breeding letter to Odum, 
found him restating his original position with ever more urgency. Furthermore, he 
authored a petition and submitted it to Hodges and the North Carolina Senate and 
House of Representatives. It concluded that the undersigned deplored "the efforts of 
some people to identify a program of integration of the races with Christianity. " Once 
again, he stated that it was "rather a biological-social problem, " although he 
consistently downplayed the latter in favour of the former, scientific approach. "It is 
unbelievable, " he continued, "that we should passively accept such an outcome by 
edict. s128 The petition, and George's position on race, illuminate two crucial aspects 
of anti-communism, both vital to a full understanding of its multi-faceted 
applications. In praising George's stance, many correspondents warned George that he 
could only expect to be the victim of intimidation and vitriol himself. "Anyone who 
takes a position favoring segregation, " wrote L. A. Crowell, Jr, a physician at 
Lincolnton's Gordon Cromwell Memorial Hospital, "... is sure to receive a lot of nasty 
letters from the so-called left wing element. Their main weapon, " he continued, "is the 
127 George liaised with the Governor, John Patterson, but more often it was with one of Patterson's 
aide's, a certain "Mr Smith. " The Alabamians, however, inexplicably shelved the book, and George 
resorted to having it published privately by his "East Coast Friends, " whom he adamantly refused to 
name. Eugene Cook letter to Wesley George, 25 March 1957, George Papers, Box 6; Wesley Critz 
George Oral History, T-3822/1, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
128 "Petition to Governor Luther Hodges, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, " "undated 
1954, " George Papers, Box 2. So successful was the petition that there were calls for copies of it from 
around the state. "Would it be possible to start the petition on its rounds in Mecklenburg? " wrote 
Albert Boyle, Jr, for example, in early 1954. Albert Boyle, Jr, letter to Wesley George, George Papers, 
Box 2. 
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attempt to cow and intimidate all who differ from their views. Don't give up the 
fight, " he concluded, "stick to your own guns. "129 An editorial in the News and 
Courier supporting George's position warned that "Dr George may find himself being 
`investigated' by eggheads and assailed as 'un-American. ,, 130 
The other crucial aspect of anti-communism revealed by George was that, 
under his guidance, the Patriots refrained from red-baiting civil rights agitators. It was 
not that members -- even Board members -- did not want to use anti-communism or 
red-baiting to undermine their opponents' positions; often they did propose to, but 
George refused to countenance such attacks, and vetoed their use. In 1955, Allison 
James sent George the text of an advertisement that he proposed as part of a 
recruitment drive for the Citizens' Council group. Entitled "The Eight Ifs and Your 
Answer, " the advert was devised to solicit a response of eight "yes" answers in 
agreement with the eight statements James had proposed: eight agreements from the 
reader meant that "you should immediately join the Patriots of North Carolina, 
Incorporated. "131 These included saying "yes" if "... you believe there can be NO 
compromise on the matter of segregation, " and if "you believe the rights of the 
Sovereign States to handle their own internal affairs. " Question four on the list was 
another staple of Massive Resistance. Say "yes, " the advert continued, "If you realize 
that either Communistic influences or economic pressure groups stand behind every 
effort made to invade States' Rights and force integration and miscegenation on the 
peoples of the South. " George returned the proposed advertisement to James with his 
129 L. A. Crowell, Jr, MD, letter to Wesley George, 20 November 1954, George Papers, Box 2. 
'30 Editorial, News and Courier, 20 November 1954, clipping in George Papers, Box 2. 
131 "Ad. proposed by Mr James, "The Eight Ifs and Your Answer, " [n. d. ] 1955, George Papers, Box 3. 
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comments. He had ticked statements one to eight with the exception of "four, " besides 
which was written, "Correct! But desirable? "132 
There is, however, no doubt that George was himself an anti-communist. An 
article in the New York Times Magazine in early 1956, for example, quoted George 
as believing that school integration was a "Communist-clerical conspiracy to promote 
miscegenation and thereby the ultimate downfall of America's civilization. "133 In an 
oral history interview given towards the end of his life, George acknowledged that, 
when he began to popularise racial science, "we had been through many years of 
agitation on the race problem by what we may speak of as the left wing, by the 
NAACP, " and by what he termed "that element in society and the nation who were 
trying to bring about a forced integration of the white and the nigra [sic] races"134 
Rather than denying the pernicious nature of communism, George simply did 
not believe in the efficacy of red-baiting. This was partly because of the enduring 
popularity of his writings on race science, and partly because he realised that red- 
baiting had become an overused tool of the rabid demagogue. By red-baiting, 
furthermore, he believed that he would detract from what he saw as the stark 
correctness of his scientific line. 135 When Paul Hastings wrote to George in March 
132 ibid. 
133 George quoted in Steven Niven, "Wesley Critz George: Scientist and Segregationist, " hJMJh 
Carolina Literary Review, No. 7 (1998) pp. 39-41. Niven's erudite, short piece is one of the very few 
secondary sources on Wesley Critz George. 
134 Oral History, T-3822/1. Furthermore, in a speech examining the decision of South Africa's African 
National Congress [ANC] to reject non-violence and take up arms to end apartheid, George stated that 
"the timing and co-ordination of events throughout the world suggest and give strong support to the 
inference that our racial problems and social conflicts spring from the dark shadows of world intrigue 
and from Communism. " "Communism and World Wide Violence, " by WC George [n. d. ], George 
Papers, Box 14. Although the speech is not dated, it must have been late on in George's career, as it 
refers to an article in the Charlotte Observer of September 1963. 
135 The evidence in George's personal papers suggests that he was continuously praised by a wealth of 
correspondents for his three race science essays up until the Spring of 1961, when they were compiled 
in one volume, titled, Race. Heredity, and Civilization, which was itself equally praised and sought 
after. It is, perhaps, strange that George did not attempt to make more of Soviet involvement in the 
South's civil rights agitation, especially considering the blossoming branch of Soviet eugenics. 
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1956 to suggest the release of a Patriot statement elucidating the link between 
communists and the NAACP, George said that he thought the idea "seems a good 
one. "136 However, the Professor was adamant that it was "not the area in which my 
talents lie or my special knowledge. " That area was clearly racial science, and with 
limited knowledge of the relevant facts, George told Hastings that he "should not 
want to make charges of Communist connection on the basis of newspaper stories. " 
Press accounts, he believed, were "too unreliable. "137 
Although George ensured that the organisation was not a red-baiting outfit, it 
nonetheless implicitly attacked all things un-American: the name of the organisation 
itself, as opposed to, for example, the Citizens' Councils of South Carolina, suggested 
patriotic American-ness; the organisation's headed notepaper stated simply, "National 
Integrity, Constitutional Government, Racial Integrity, States' Rights, Individual 
Liberties, Private Property. , 138 There could be no doubting the inference that private 
property was an integral part of Americanism, and, conversely, anathema to 
communism. 
George's stature as President of the Patriots was unrivalled by any other 
individual member within the cantankerous world of North Carolina's organised 
white resistance. 139 Indeed, he remained aloof from much of the infighting and inner 
Variously referred to as, "Michurinism, " "Lamarckism, " or "Lysenko's Genetics, " Soviet scientists had 
begun to pioneer socio-biological work which suggested that "apparent differences in races are only 
the result of differing environment. " This, therefore, directly contradicted George's own stance of 
genetic inferiority of races. Quotes from John H. Falin letter to The Editor, Norfolk Ledger Dispatch, 
copied to George, 26 September 1955, George Papers, Box 3. 
136 Paul Hastings letter to Wesley George, 28 March 1956, George Papers, Box 4. Hastings worked for 
Reidsville's Hastings Furniture Company and was a member of the Patriots. 
137 Wesley George letter to Paul Hastings, 2 April 1956, George Papers, Box 4. 
138 Headed notepaper as at 12 March 1959, George Papers, Box 7. 
139 One indication of that stature is that almost all correspondence between members of the Patriots and 
the Governor or General Assembly, or simply between Patriot members, can be found copied to 
George in his personal files. 
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turmoil that has led Neil McMillen to award the Patriots "the dubious distinction of 
being the most short-lived of the major resistance groups in the eleven state area. " 40 
Finally imploding in the Summer of 1958, its replacement, the North Carolina 
Defenders of States' Rights [NC Defenders], was "even less effective at recruiting a 
mass following than had been the Patriots. "14' McMillen has ascribed this to problems 
"encountered by organized segregationists in states where the atmosphere was one of 
comparative racial moderation. s142 No doubt true, he does not, however, consider the 
precise nature of the in-fighting that so disrupted the organisation. In 1956, it was the 
Patriot's Eugene "Gene" Hood causing the most internal dissent. Hastings wrote to 
Allison James, who had by that time been appointed full-time executive secretary, that 
Dallas E. Gwynn, a Patriot member from Leaksville, "went to Gene Hood's home last 
week and said that Gene raved and ranted like a mad man, stating that he and Paul 
Hastings had wrecked the Patriots organisation. , 143 Furthermore, Gwynn felt that 
fellow-Patriot C. L. Shuping was the man to make a success of the organisation. A 
year later, though, Shuping was lambasted by Erwin A. Holt, who told the then- 
President S. H. McCall, Jr, that it was Shuping who was "responsible for our being in 
the bad shape that we are in now. " Holt very much regretted to add that, "so long as 
Mr C. L. Shuping is our general consul[, ] we will never get anywhere. s144 Clearly, 
with such personality clashes and differences of personal opinion, all was not well. 
140 Neil McMillen, Citizens' Councils, p. 114. 
141 ibid. 
142 ibid., p. 115. 
143 Paul Hastings letter to Allison James, 19 July 1956, George Papers, Box 4. Only six days earlier, 
Gwynn had himself written a substantial letter to George about the ills of the Patriots, especially the 
feud between Allison James and C. L. Shuping. Dallas E. Gwynn letter to Wesley George, 13 July 
1956, George Papers, Box 4. 
144 Erwin A. Holt letter to S. H. McCall, Jr, 18 March 1957, Erwin Allen Holt Papers, Box 1, Southern 
Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
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With George at the helm, much of that internal friction was glossed over, but 
by the Spring of 1957, his patience had run out and he tendered his resignation on 22 
March. '45 The reasons behind his departure appear twofold: he was winding down his 
public activities in general because of his wife's ill-health; and, in reference to the 
Patriot's lack of success, he stated that he could not "afford to waste my strength in 
spinning wheels that do nothing. "lab Once released from his grip, first the Patriots and 
then their successor, the NC Defenders, began to countenance the red-baiting that 
George had previously forced them to shun. They used red-baiting in general terms, 
and they used it specifically. In early 1959, for example, Earl LeBaron wrote to fellow 
NC Defender Sterling R. Booth, Jr, that "we have the biggest made-to-order weapon 
for our cause if we only use it! This does not involve us in attacking any race or 
religion, only defending the American and Southern way of life against Communism 
and race-mixing. s147 As LeBaron no doubt realised, North Carolinians harboured 
genuine anti-communist views as a direct consequence of the Cold War. All that 
segregationists had to do, therefore, was remind their fellow citizens of the link 
between civil rights activism and communism to tap into those fears. 
LeBaron's next letter to Booth, four days later, throws up an interesting 
anomaly in the use of red-baiting and anti-communism. LeBaron had written a 
television programme purporting to show links between communists and the NAACP, 
entitled "History Behind the News. " It was to be broadcast on Hartwell Campbell's 
145 George wrote to Robert Porter of the Patriots, "I hereby tender my resignation as a member of the 
Board of Directors of the Patriots of North Carolina, Incorporated. " Wesley George letter to Robert 
Porter, 22 March 1957, George Papers, Box 6. 
'46 Wesley George letter to Robert Porter, 8 April 1957, George Papers, Box 6. On the subject of his 
wife's health, George turned down an invitation to speak in front of Patriots in Burlington on 13 July 
1957 because he felt his wife's health would suffer if he were to become involved again. George 
Papers, Box 6. 
147 Earl LeBaron letter to Sterling R. Booth, Jr, 14 January 1959, Holt Papers, Box 1. 
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WNCT station, but LeBaron found Campbell strangely recalcitrant in his attitude to 
screening the programme. Mr Campbell, wrote LeBaron, refused to air the programme 
unless he himself could "seek out and offer equal time to the Communists and the 
NAACP. "148 Much to the annoyance of the NC Defenders, and in stark opposition to 
many episodes of public red-baiting, Campbell would not show the programme 
without giving the NAACP the chance to reply to LeBaron's accusations of red 
infiltration. '49 
In general terms, though, the Board and membership of the NC Defenders 
recognised that they needed to "combat the menace to our society posed by the 
Socialists, Integrationists, Communists, and their fellow-travelers, " who were, it was 
felt, "working night and day with millions of dollars at their disposal to destroy 
America. " 50 By July 1960, new NC Defenders President, the Reverend James P. 
"Jimmy" Dees, was adamant that unless communist-inspired integration was defeated, 
"we can be sure that our Southern way of life will be lost to a mulatto culture and a 
Communist-Socialist system. "15' Specifically, red-baiting was used by the NC 
Defenders in attempts to discredit the very real dangers posed to continued 
segregation by the nascent sit-in movement. A radio broadcast by the Alamance 
County division of the NC Defenders over Radio WFNS AM and FM in February 
1960, for example, specifically targeted the Greensboro sit-in protesters. "This is the 
new negro, " the report stated, not only a "protege of the NAACP, " but also a "product 
148 Earl LeBaron letter to Sterling R. Booth, Jr, 18 January 1959, Holt Papers, Box 1. 
149 It was actually a stipulation of the Federal Communications Commission to offer equal time to both 
sides of an argument on matters of public controversy. It was, however, usually ignored. 
150 Letter to All Members, 20 June 1959, Holt Papers, Box 1. 
151 James P. Dees letter to "All Members, " 23 July 1960, Holt Papers, Box 1. 
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of communist cunning. "' 52 By 22 July, the escalating situation required a statement to 
the press "for immediate release. " It was to register a "protest against efforts to 
racially integrate the lunch counters, " as well as wider integration moves. It concluded 
that the sit-ins violated private property rights, and were established to foment 
"violence and race hatred and social anarchy, which serve the goals of the Communist 
offensive, "153 
After George's departure, the NC Defenders' belief in the strong grass-roots 
support for anti-communism also led them to use it as a device for fund-raising. Dees 
wrote a letter to potential fund-raisers to donate money for the employment of two 
full-time secretaries, who should both be sufficiently aware of the situation to attempt 
to "change the direction in which the State has been, not drifting, but resolutely led by 
men fronting for the Communist program and Communist-Socialist party and 
ideology. " Dees asked for a total of $50,000, but added that, if donors so wished, 
"your pledge or contribution will be kept confidential, although every patriotic citizen 
should be proud to be identified with this battle for survival, and battle for survival it 
iS. 
154 
But it was not just the NC Defenders themselves who moved on to red-baiting 
after George's departure. In the most blatant example of the ties between segregation, 
red-baiting and States' Rights in North Carolina, W. C. Brown formed the Southern 
Association for the Restoration of States' Rights, based in Raleigh. Writing to inform 
Governor Sanford of the group's formation in the Summer of 1963, Brown clarified 
his nascent group's intended position. "I am proud enough of my State, " he began, "to 
152 "North Carolina Defenders of States' Rights, Inc., Alamance County Division: Radio Broadcast of 
Sunday, February 28,1960 over radio WFNS AM & FM 12: 45 pm, " George Papers, Box 7. 
153 "For Immediate Release, " 22 July 1960, Holt Papers, Box 1. , 154 James P. Dees Form Letter, 30 January 1961, Holt Papers, Box 1. 
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want to protect it from the threat of Segregation, Communism, and Atheism. " He did, 
in fact, "pray for my State each night. "lss Furthermore, as Brown informed Sanford, 
he believed that "the backbone of North Carolina is initialled JFK on one side and 
NAACP on the other. " There was, therefore, a common theme running through all 
North Carolina's White Citizens' Councils and organised resistance bodies: unless 
George was in charge, when red-baiting was unceremoniously avoided, all referred 
constantly to the primacy of States' Rights, the dangers of integration, the subversion 
of the NAACP, and the insidious nature of the all-pervasive internal communist 
threat. 
VII 
Two high-profile politicians in North Carolina embodied the diverse but 
equally committed approaches brought by individuals to sustaining segregation in the 
state. One was Senator Samuel James Ervin, Jr, the other I. Beverly Lake, who had 
first come to white supremacists' attention for his anti-NAACP remarks whilst 
Assistant Attorney General in the Summer of 1955. Lake had kept a relatively low 
profile for the rest of the 1950s, but re-emerged in 1960 as the segregationists' 
candidate for the upcoming gubernatorial election, and received the NC Defenders' 
full and enduring support. George himself came out of his self-imposed exile from 
Citizens' Council activity to write to all former Patriot members. "You will be 
interested in supporting a candidate, " he wrote, "who stands for, and one who will act 
to preserve segregation of the races in our schools and through our State. "56 
155 W . C. Brown 
letter to Terry Sanford, 30 August 1963, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 346. 
156 Wesley George letter to "Former Members of the Patriots of North Carolina, Inc., " 5 February 
1960, George Papers, Box 7. 
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By March, Hastings had written to the NC Defenders' President, Jimmy Dees. 
Using the organisation's own estimate of its membership numbers, Hastings urged 
Dees to write to each and every one of the Patriots' 20,000 former members. Each 
one, he felt, should be sent "a well considered letters [sic] setting forth the fact that 
there is no other man in public life in North Carolina today outside of Dr Lake who 
would stand a chance of being elected Governor that has stood for segregation of the 
races like he has. "157 Ever since the two Brown decisions, Lake had publicly equated 
the NAACP with desegregation and communists, or, at the very least, "fellow 
travelers. " To a meeting of the Association of County Accountants in Asheville in the 
Summer of 1955, for example, he claimed that it was "cruel and dishonourable for the 
NAACP and its fellow travelers to lead our Negro friends to believe that they have a 
choice between sending their children to mixed schools or to Negro public schools. In 
truth, " he harshly concluded, "we have no intention of supporting mixed schools. "58 
He was still vehemently against the Pearsall Plan and any integration of North 
Carolina's public schools when the 1960 campaign was under way. 
It is difficult to tell whether or not Lake's campaign was specifically aimed at 
North Carolina's poor white population, traditionally the most welcoming 
constituency for demagogic appeals to red- and race-baiting, but in replying to his 
overtures for funding, over a third of the correspondents from whom he received 
letters claimed that they would be more than willing to send money, but that they 
could not afford to. 159 Regardless, there were certainly overtones of demagoguery in 
157 Paul D. Hastings letter to Jimmy P. Dees, 9 March 1960, George Papers, Box 7. 
158 "`Separate Schools For the Races' Address by I Beverly Lake at Meeting of Association of County 
Accountants, Asheville, N. C., 22 August 1955, " Reed Sarratt Papers, Box 3, Southern Historical 
Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
159 For a collection of those letters, see George Papers, Box 7. 
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his campaign, and he red-baited with vigour. "I sincerely trust that the people of North 
Carolina will elect Dr I. Beverly Lake, " wrote former-Patriot and NC Defender W. N. 
Jefferies in April, as that would ensure a governor "who would investigate our 
Schools for Communist [sic] and Subversives. " Referring to a speech recently given 
by Lake in Danbury, Jefferies reported that Lake "told the negroes to their teeth and 
the audience that such matters would be investigated if he is elected. " Echoing his 
controversial 1955 stance, Lake had concluded by promising "that there will be no 
NAACP in the State of North Carolina if he is Governor. "160 According to George 
Hodges, North Carolina representative for Virginia's Shenandoah Life Insurance 
Company, "It will be a disgrace to have our state called southern if we fail in the 
campaign. "161 
Lake's campaign did not manage to defeat Sanford, but, as Earl Black has 
pointed out, the second primary provided the sole example of a post-Brown runoff in 
which a more militant segregationist -- in this case Lake -- failed to defeat a more 
racially moderate opponent -- in this case Sanford. 
162 Sanford by no means ran on an 
integrationist ticket, but was far more in keeping with North Carolina's smooth, sly 
resistance strategies than his overtly racist opponent. 
163 Guy Benton Johnson's 
daughter, Nancy, witnessed the campaign first-hand. She wrote to her parents shortly 
after Sanford's victory, explaining that she "became very worried as the Lake and 
Sanford campaign neared completion. " Lake's campaigners, she recalled, showed 
more zeal and energy than Sanford's, and "the campaign got rather nasty and bitter 
160 W. N. Jefferies letter to Charles A. Cannon, 14 April 1960, George Papers, Box 7. 
161 George Hodges letter to Wesley George, 26 May 1960, George Papers, Box 7. 
162 Earl Black, Southern Governors and Civil Rights: Racial Segregation as a campaign Issue in the 
Second Reconstruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 217. 
163 Sanford, for example, stated that, "I am and have been on the solid ground of being in favor of the 
North Carolina approach. " Sanford quoted in ibid., p. 217. 
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toward the end. The Lake supporters... began digging up every tiny detail they could 
that might smear Sanford's character and make him seem a pawn of the labor unions, 
the NAACP, or some other influence group. It was, " she concluded, "really very 
messy. s164 
A lawyer and a quintessential, gallus-wearing southern patriarchal gentleman, 
Samuel James Ervin, Jr, was another of North Carolina's influential resistance 
leaders. 165 A co-author of the Southern Manifesto, the Senator was a symbol of the 
segregated South. Like Lake, Ervin was not a formal member of the Patriots or NC 
Defenders, but often supported the White Citizens' Councils' various approaches to 
the maintenance of segregation. Like Wesley Critz George, Ervin was an anti- 
communist, but did not regularly or overtly red-bait. Like Virginia's David Mays, 
Ervin's response to the two Supreme Court Brown decisions were firmly rooted in 
United States law and legal manoeuvring. 
Indeed, in many respects Ervin epitomised the legalistic approach to Massive 
Resistance. His main argument against Brown was not that it allowed communist- 
dominated outside agitators to destroy the South's racial mores, but rather that it was, 
simply, the product of incorrect legal procedure: in deciding the case, "The members 
of the United States Supreme Court as it is now constituted ignored the judicial 
164 Nancy Johnson letter to her parents ("Dear Folks"), 1 July 1960, Guy Benton Johnson Papers, Box 
1, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
165 The Samuel J. Ervin, Jr, Papers are at the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. For an upcoming, all-encompassing biography of Ervin, 
see Karl E. Campbell, The Last of the Founding Fathers: Senator Sam Ervin and the Road to Watergate 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming). A colourful portrait of Ervin is painted 
by Alistair Cook. "lie is seventy-six years old, " wrote Cook in 1973, "an old-time -- almost a 
professional -- Southerner, who is a one-man anthology of Biblical tags and Southern folk wisdom and 
has a face as homely as a turnip... he is of the earth earthy and yet retains the instinctive courtesy of an 
old-fashioned Southerner. But, for all his air of being a country lawyer... he is a graduate of the Harvard 
Law School and the Senate's expert on constitutional law. " Alistair Cook, The American : Letters 
From America. 1969-1979 (llarmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1980), pp. 117-118. 
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process and usurped power to amend the Constitution when they handed down the 
school segregation decision, " he explained to Dr Isaac Taylor of the UNC School of 
Medicine. "This would never have happened, he thought, had there been "qualified 
men on the Court. "166 His replies to the only two extant letters he received in the wake 
of Brown that were in favour of integration were suitably brief. "It is obvious that our 
views diverge, " he wrote, "because you think that the Constitution of the United 
States ought to be interpreted to conform to the precepts of religion while I think it 
ought to be interpreted to conform with the principles of Constitutional law. , 167 
Emphasising a legalistic response to Brown, Ervin appeared in a series of 
heavily pre-scripted television interviews, carefully -- though badly -- choreographed 
by Dick Morphew, anchorman of the "Program of the Citizens' Council Forum 
Series. s168 Morphew looked perpetually uncomfortable throughout the series, but 
Ervin appeared a little more at ease. The Senator talked about proposed federal civil 
rights legislation in 1959, followed by a programme devoted to a "Discussion of 
Constitutional Rights and Civil Rights. " Despite his hosts' rather more bellicose 
position, Ervin remained true to his principles. In discussing Constitutional and Civil 
Rights, for example, Ervin would say no more than that there was "nothing in the 
school desegregation decision that requires desegregation, it merely prohibits what it 
called discrimination on racial grounds... "169 
166 Samuel Ervin letter to Dr Isaac Taylor, 2 June 1954, Ervin Papers, Folder 279. Ervin often railed 
against the appointment to the Supreme Court of only one member who had previous experience as a 
Judge, and claimed that "only two or three of them ever practised law in a serious manner. " 
167 Samuel Ervin letter to Lewis E. Eveline, 12 March 1956, Ervin Papers, Folder 1120. 
168 Copies of these television interviews appear on videotape in "Motion Picture Films" section, Ervin 
Papers. 
169 . Program of the Citizens' Council Forum series, Discussion of Constitutional Rights and Civil 
Rights, " Tape 1, Film 1, Ervin Papers. 
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When pushed on matters of anti-communism and the subversive, "red" 
infiltration of civil rights groups, Ervin did not take the bait. H. L. Coble, of the H. L. 
Coble Construction Company and a forthright member of the Patriots, told the 
Senator that he had "long believed that the NAACP was Communist inspired and 
Communist dominated. That belief is now borne out by the testimony in the Federal 
Court trial of Junius Scales for violation of the Smith Act"170 Ervin noted Coble's 
suggestion that the FBI should be called upon to investigate the NAACP, but rejected 
it "in view of the fact that the present Administration is `kowtowing' to this 
organization... "171 It would, he felt, "be utterly futile to request that the FBI 
investigate it. As you know, " he concluded, somewhat mischievously, "the FBI is 
subject to the directions of the Attorney General. " That was as close as Ervin got to 
red-baiting: a knowingly roguish stirring of the waters, but no more. 
In a similar manner to George's desire to preserve the impact of his eugenic 
approach to segregation, Ervin did not want to employ methods that might 
compromise the strength of his legal stance. He was anti-communist, and freely 
admitted it. In 1962, for example, Ervin wrote to the First Union Bank's Alan B. Orr 
that, "I share the views expressed by you in respect to the threat which communism 
poses to the United States and the free world. " He believed it necessary not only to 
have greater and more numerous weapons than the Soviets, but also to "have the 
willingness to fight and the will to win if we are to preserve our freedom. "172 Ervin, 
though, perhaps more than any other Massive Resister in the South, personified the 
170 H. L. Coble letter to Samuel Ervin, Jr, 26 February 1958, Ervin Papers, Folder 1649. 
171 Samuel Ervin, Jr, letter to II. L. Coble, 5 March 1958, Ervin Papers, Folder 1649. 
172 Samuel Ervin letter to Alan B. Orr, 9 February 1962, Ervin Papers, Folder 2981. 
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need to differentiate between genuine sentiments of anti-communism and the cynical 
deployment of red-baiting in the battle to preserve segregation. 173 
Instead of red-baiting, Ervin busied himself with legal obstruction to civil 
rights legislation of all kinds. When, for example, the Kennedy Administration finally 
submitted legislation to ban the poll tax in federal elections in February 1962, Ervin 
was in charge of the Senate subcommittee holding hearings on the proposed 
legislation. Unsurprisingly, the bill was immediately stalled in the committee stage. 174 
More importantly, perhaps, Ervin attempted to derail the landmark 1964 Civil Rights 
Bill with an amendment which, according to Hubert Humphrey's aide John Sewart, 
"would have gutted the bill" if it had been adopted. 175 In the wake of cloture in June 
1964, time was precious for the southern Democratic caucuses trying to retard the 
proposed bill's progress. On 10 June, therefore, Ervin proposed a "double jeopardy" 
amendment, which would prohibit persons being tried in a federal court if they had 
already been acquitted of the same crime by a state court. The amendment was 
defeated 47-48, but a later recalculation showed that it should have passed 48-47. 
Complicated Senate rules, however, forbade its adoption once the mistake had been 
recognised. 176 The next day, a watered down version of Ervin's amendment, 
173 By September 1963, Ervin's moderate stance led him to clearly and publicly condemn his more 
extreme peers, in an attempt to rally southern senatorial support against impending federal civil rights 
legislation. lie refrained, for example, from endorsing George Wallace's use of State Troopers to 
prevent the opening of the State University at Tuscaloosa. His reasoning was that "such conduct 
seriously handicaps Southern Senators in their fight against civil rights bills, and aids and abets those 
who advocate the passage of such bills. " Ervin "Form Letter" on George Wallace, as at September 
1963, Ervin Papers, Folder 3889. 
174 Mark Stem, Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson and Civil Rights (New Brunswick, N. J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1992) pp. 73-4. 
175 John Stewart quoted in Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1985), p. 204. 
176 Ervin's amendment should have followed a proposal by Russell Long and Herman Talmadge on 
jury trial. Once cloture had been invoked, however, Talmadge chose to withdraw his amendment. 
Ervin's "double jeopardy" amendment had technically been attached to the Talmadge amendment, and 
thus should also have been passed over in the order of business. ibid., p. 204. 
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proposing only that a person could not be tried twice under United States law, passed 
80-16.177 Ervin and the South's Democratic caucuses had come within a whisker of 
undermining the 1964 Civil Rights Act, not by red-baiting, mob-violence or the more 
extreme forms of Massive Resistance, but by carefully conceived legal manoeuvring. 
177 For more on the debate over Ervin's "double jeopardy" amendment, see ibid. pp. 203-207. 
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Conclusion 
Assessing the importance of anti-communism as a weapon of Massive 
Resistance is, ultimately, a somewhat difficult affair. Segregationists' success in 
convincing those on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line that Moscow's hand lay 
behind the civil rights movement, for instance, cannot readily be measured by 
empirical data. That task is further complicated by the problems of trying to measure 
the success of Massive Resistance as a whole. Overall, any evaluation of Massive 
Resistance's effectiveness must take into account the differences between its long and 
short term achievements. 
In the short term, Massive Resistance was by no means unsuccessful. By using 
a wide range of tactics to delay the implementation of Brown, segregationists certainly 
succeeded in postponing the inevitable where school desegregation was concerned. A 
dynamic blend of States' Rights arguments, red-baiting, demagogic rhetoric, white 
supremacist dogma, specific legislation, pragmatism and occasional mob violence had 
ensured minimum compliance: there were, for example, no African Americans in 
white schools or colleges in Mississippi, Alabama or South Carolina by 1962. By 
1964, a decade after the first Brown decision, only 2.3% of southern blacks attended 
desegregated schools. ' Those schools often provided the focal point of segregationist 
ire in the Massive Resistance era, but it is important to note, as does Steven Lawson, 
that African American attention in the civil rights movement was equally focused 
upon obtaining the vote as a means of political advancement. Yet here, too, Massive 
Resistance enjoyed some palpable short term successes. Southern intransigence had 
1 Figures quoted in J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke: the Supreme Court and Schoo 
Integration: 1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 65. 
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also managed to restrict the numbers of southern blacks registering to vote across the 
South: between 1957 and 1960, for example, black voter registration increased by 
only 3%. As David Goldfield has pointed out, even that figure was misleading since 
almost all the gains occurred in the cities. 2 In 1960, only 29.1% of the region's 
African Americans were registered voters. 3 
By the end of the 1950s, however, southern resistance was already losing 
much of its intensity, cohesion and potency. Once Eisenhower had, however 
belatedly, sent federal troops to Little Rock to desegregate Central High in 1957, it 
was clear that there would be no total victory for proponents of continued southern 
segregation. In the final analysis, executive power would be used to enforce 
desegregation, which, after all, was the law of the land. When Virginia's own Massive 
Resistance laws were struck down by both state and federal courts in 1959, it became 
clearer still that resisters would not be able to prohibit desegregation by legal 
manoeuvring any more than they would by mob action. By the early 1960s, moreover, 
the white South's resistance campaign was faced with an increasingly hostile 
American public: the civil rights movement had largely succeeded in convincing that 
public, and northern white liberals in particular, that it was a legitimate movement 
seeking genuinely American, democratic goals. In contrast, it was segregationists who 
were now perceived as un-American. 4 
It is testament to the complexities of Massive Resistance, however, that, even 
in the short-term, victory and defeat were never clear cut. Where, on the one hand, the 
2 David Goldfield, Black. White. and Southern: Race Relations and Southern Culture 1940 to the 
Present (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 151. 
3 Figures quoted in Steven F. Lawson, Running For Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in 
America Since 1941 (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991), p. 85. 
4 As an indication of the waning of resistance, the number of voting age African Americans registered 
to vote in the South had risen by 1964 to 43.1%. ibid. 
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Little Rock crisis forced the federal government into action to ensure compliance with 
Brown, on the other it caused deep fissures in local black civil rights leadership and 
spurred a tremendous white backlash which further retarded racial progress. 5 When 
sit-in demonstrations took place in Little Rock in 1960, for example, city authorities 
took a hard line approach. On one occasion, an Arkansas judge presiding over the trial 
of a sit-in demonstrator exceeded the maximum sentencing limits set out in the Act 
under which the protester had been charged. 6 Furthermore, whilst the vitriolic nature 
of so much of the rhetoric of Massive Resistance -- and the more extreme, violent 
manifestations of resistance -- united die-hard followers of southern segregation, such 
aggression could also backfire on the white South. The often belligerent stance of the 
staunchest segregationists ensured a strong response from both federal government 
and civil rights activists, and sometimes alienated the region's less dogmatic 
opponents of desegregation. In the context of widespread and often vituperative white 
resistance, the civil rights movement ultimately succeeded in precipitating an 
avalanche of federal intervention and federal legislation, culminating in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
The story of Virginia's resistance highlights many of the difficulties inherent 
in judging the extent of Massive Resistance's success. The Old Dominion's white 
elites were impressive in their early displays of obduracy. By actually closing some of 
its public schools, however, Virginia invited fierce and determined opposition from 
5 John Kirk has noted in the wake of the Little Rock school crisis that Arkansas' "white business 
leadership looked to return to the state of race relations that predated 1957, with the token integration 
of the city's schools as the only concession to change. Indeed, they recoiled from any suggestion of 
using their influence to cultivate a more racially enlightened attitude in the city. " John A. Kirk, "Black 
Activism in Arkansas, 1940-1970, " PhD Dissertation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1997, p. 
213. 
6 ibid., p. 227. 
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the federal government and judiciary. Senator Harry Byrd, Sr, did not heed the advice 
of those such as David Mays who advocated a softer line of resistance, similar to that 
in North Carolina. Again in the short term, Virginia was successful: with the notable 
exception of Prince Edward County, where schools were actually closed, 
segregationists were able to maintain segregated schools until 1959. African 
American voting registration in the Old Dominion was limited to just 22.8% in 1960, 
compared to a South-wide total of 29.1%. By 1964, however, once the full effect of 
the dismantling of Virginia's Massive Resistance laws had been felt, the state's 
African Americans made impressive gains: in that year, 45.7% of the Old Dominion's 
voting age blacks were registered to vote, a figure over 2% higher than the South- 
wide figure for blacks of 43.1%. 7 
North Carolina's "sly resistance" was, if anything, more successful than 
Virginia's school closures and all-out defiance. The Tar Heel state had largely 
succeeded in projecting an image that racial change was already underway, and that 
progressive forces were running the state. In reality, though, there was a minimum of 
compliance masked by limited, tokenistic desegregation. As a result of this strategy, 
North Carolina initially faced less acute federal pressure to desegregate thoroughly 
than her more conspicuously intransigent neighbours. Not only did this allow for 
slower rates of desegregation, but it also facilitated the continuation of resistance after 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.8 
7 Figures quoted in Lawson, Running For Freedom_ p. 85. 
8 Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, for example, have demonstrated that, from 1965 to 1974, North 
Carolina ranked behind only South Carolina and Mississippi in conservative voting records in 
Congress. Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and 
Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Meridian, 1976), pp. 221-2. 
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If Massive Resistance's long-term goal is taken -- as it surely must be -- as an 
attempt to prohibit the desegregation of southern society and exclude the vast majority 
of southern blacks from the political process, then it clearly failed. After federal 
legislation addressed civil and voting rights in 1964 and 1965 respectively, the South 
was forced to scale down what had been a truly extensive, diverse resistance 
operation. Segregationists, however, were by no means willing to embrace de facto 
racial equality. Instead, the South transformed its strategies, and post-1965 resistance 
was maintained in more measured, focused and perhaps ultimately more effective 
ways than it had been in Massive Resistance's heyday. Certainly, continued resistance 
drew more heavily from the approach of North Carolina's resisters than from 
Virginia's. 
So obdurate did resisters prove to be after the Civil and Voting Rights Acts 
that it took three further Supreme Court decisions to overcome continued 
prevarication by local school boards, and to encourage further desegregation in public 
schools. In 1968, Green v New Kent County held that freedom of choice, "local 
option" plans were no longer an appropriate means of complying with Brown; one 
year later, Alexander v Holmes County finally laid to rest the "all deliberate speed" 
provision of Brown II, and ordered school boards "to terminate dual school systems at 
once"; the 1971 decision in Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg upheld the 1970 edict of 
North Carolina Judge James McMillan, who had ordered cross-town busing for black 
and white school children to ensure a racial mix in public schools .9 Swann may have 
been brought against a North Carolina school board, but, nonetheless, the decision 
9 Goldfield, Black. White. and Southern, pp. 257-8. 
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was greeted with white violence and threats of boycotts. 10 Pickets outside McMillan's 
house included his neighbours, and he received threatening telephone calls. Indeed, 
the judge felt so threatened by the response of many of Charlotte's white citizens that 
he resorted to carrying a gun. Once white North Carolinians were threatened with the 
probability or real desegregation, the state's carefully constructed moderate facade 
dissolved. " 
Seventeen years after the first Brown decision, the combined impact of Green, 
Alexander and Swann succeeded in convincing some -- but by no means all -- 
southern white parents that school desegregation was inevitable. Whereas 60% of 
white respondents to a poll had objected to integrated public schools in 1963, that 
number had dropped to only 16% by 1970.12 By the mid-1970s, southern schools 
surpassed their northern counterparts as the least segregated in the US: the South had 
47.1% of its school age black population in schools with a white majority, compared 
to 42.5% in the North. 13 
As the upheavals in Charlotte dramatised, however, not all white southerners 
were convinced to embrace integration, and resistance to school desegregation lived 
on. An increasing number of whites fled to the suburbs, for example, and pressed for 
"neighborhood schools" which would reflect the racial make-up of the new, exclusive 
white suburbs. Where they could afford it, many concerned white parents sent their 
children to private schools which became popularly known as "seg academies. " As 
10 One antibusing protester, addressing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, made his intentions 
clear by saying, "I served in Korea, I served in Vietnam. I'll serve in Charlotte if I have to. " Quoted in 
Davison M. Douglas, Reading. Writing & Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 162. 
11 For the mobilisation of antibusing sentiment in North Carolina, see ibid., pp. 160-189. 
12 Goldfield, Black. White. and Southern, p. 262. 
13 Lawson, Running For Freedom, p. 138. 
Francis Wilhoit has pointed out, many segregationists attempted to transform their 
arguments against school desegregation into arguments against busing. In the wake of 
Swann, segregationists attempted to use the issue as a screen for their ongoing 
racism. 14 Even though a considerable number of US school children -- North and 
South -- had been bused to school before the Swann decision, it was only once busing 
became a tool for furthering school desegregation that it provided a focus for 
opposition and outrage. 15 
Even in the wake of the 1965 Civil Rights Act, resistance continued to operate 
against full and equitable black political participation. In the aftermath of full-scale 
Massive Resistance, southern segregationists still did their utmost to limit the 
effectiveness of the black vote. The vote dilution schemes upon which segregationists 
attached their hopes of maintaining white supremacy were manifold: anti-singleshot 
or "full-slate" voting systems were introduced, requiring each voter to mark his or her 
ballot paper for the same number of candidates as there were officers to be elected, 
thus prohibiting "single-shot" voting; the "majority-vote" rule, stipulating that a run- 
off election must be held if no candidate received a majority of votes, was widely 
implemented; and voter wards were gerrymandered to ensure ongoing white political 
success. 
By the mid- to late-1960s, moreover, segregationists had learned many of the 
harsher lessons of the mid- to late-1950s. They were careful to couch these restrictive 
14 Wilhoit notes that "The slogan `No Busing! ' is being used today by unreconstructed Massive 
Resisters in the same way that they used the slogans "states' rights" and "freedom of choice" in the 
fifties and sixties -- namely, to rationalise their white supremacy racism and make it more palatable to 
the courts and the nation at large. " Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: 
George Braziller, 1973), p. 276. 
15 In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, for example, 23,600 pupils were bused to school with the minimum of 
fuss before Swann turned it into an expressly racial issue. Goldfield, Black. White. and Southern, p. 
258. 
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voting practices in sophisticated and opaque terms. In January 1966, a planned racial 
gerrymander of the Mississippi Delta area, which engineered a white majority in each 
of five newly created districts, was rejected by Mississippi legislators. They chose 
instead a plan which created three new districts, one of which preserved a slight black 
majority. Whereas the first plan would have fallen foul of Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, the second plan was sufficiently subtle to pass. There was indeed a 
theoretical majority of blacks in one district, but segregationists had continued to 
restrict the voting franchise to such an extent that, in practice, a white majority was 
maintained. 16 
Although manifestations of anti-communism in the United States had preceded 
the emergence and consolidation of Massive Resistance, the two became inextricably 
linked. This was in part because the global concerns of the Cold War permeated all 
facets of southern life; the multiple strands of Massive Resistance became saturated 
with Cold War anxieties and rhetoric. In such a climate, anti-communism acquired 
added purchase in the public imagination. It was also partly due to the fact that anti- 
communism, perhaps more so than any other weapon in the resisters' arsenal, proved 
to be multi-faceted and highly flexible. As this thesis has suggested, it was utilised by 
a wide range of pressure groups and individuals in an equally wide variety of ways. 
More often than not, segregationists employed anti-communism to respond to specific 
threats to their racial codes and practices. When Brown posed a legal threat to 
continued segregation, for example, all those who were perceived to be behind the 
decision were targeted: the Supreme Court for deciding in favour of desegregation; 
16 The first plan was devised by Representative Kenneth Williams. The second, submitted by W. B. 
Alexander, passed by 25 votes to 21. Frank R. Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in 
Mississippi After 1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 17. 
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the NAACP for bringing the case to court; and Gunnar Myrdal, for co-authoring An 
American Dilemma. Likewise, when civil rights groups "invaded" a southern town or 
city, they were singled out by segregationists in concerted campaigns designed to 
highlight the role of communists in the financing, planning and leadership of that civil 
rights activity. 
It was also hugely important for the segregationist cause to find a means of 
undermining any internal threat from a small, but potentially troublesome, group of 
pro-desegregation southern whites. Almost all of the weapons in the resistance arsenal 
were geared towards stopping northern, federal aggression or discrediting black 
activism. States' Rights, in particular, offered no defence against southern white racial 
dissenters. Anti-communism, however, provided segregationists with an extremely 
effective weapon against those heretical white southerners who actively opposed 
continued segregation and discrimination in the region. Conversely, it also offered an 
opportunity to present civil rights agitators as part of a national problem; 
segregationists attempted to use the ubiquitous anti-communist atmosphere of the 
1950s to unite the whole country against the "un-American" forces "invading" the 
South. Attempts to impose general patterns on segregationists' uses of anti- 
communism can, however, be misleading. As the case studies of Virginia and North 
Carolina revealed, committed individuals such as Major Cyr in Albemarle could have 
a huge impact on the use of anti-communism and red-baiting at the local level, while 
individuals such as Virginia's Bill Tuck provided links between national and state- 
wide anti-communist campaigns. 
Perhaps every bit as important as stressing the diverse application of anti- 
communist and red-baiting tactics by segregationists, this thesis also serves as a 
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reminder that these weapons were by no means guaranteed success. Moreover, it 
explains that white segregationists did not have a monopoly on anti-communism and 
red-baiting in the South. On occasion, anti-communism was used as a weapon against 
them; at others, it was not white but black separatists who took up red-baiting. 
Examining the ways in which segregationists used and abused anti- 
communism helps us to appreciate the often subtle variations in segregationist thought 
and action in the two decades following the Second World War. For too long, those 
segregationists have been treated in the historical record as monolithic, inflexible, and 
often ignorant reactionaries. Rather, many were intelligent, resourceful, pragmatic and 
rational, even if they geared those talents towards the preservation of racial 
segregation, white power and, on many occasions, their own personal political 
advancement. Above all, anti-communism highlights how independent leading 
segregationists could be in both thought and deed. Some of the region's most 
influential policy makers and segregationist polemicists took up diametrically 
opposed positions on the use of red-baiting. Likewise, some tempered their racist 
outbursts in the knowledge that their actions were being played out on the world 
stage, where blatant racism would be detrimental to diplomatic attempts to woo newly 
independent, post-colonial nations into America's sphere of influence. Others, 
however, simply continued regardless, refusing to let such concerns impinge on what 
they saw as their right to live in a segregated society. 
It was, perhaps, no coincidence that Massive Resistance began to wilt as the 
effectiveness of anti-communism diminished. As Michael Heale has explained, 
nation-wide domestic anti-communism had in large part been the domain of the 
Republican Party. In 1954 and 1958, though, it was the Democrats who controlled 
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both Houses, and a liberal anti-communist consensus emerged to replace the 
Republican-led anti-communist one. The end of the Korean War and the death of 
Josef Stalin somewhat tempered public perception of the USSR as a relentlessly 
aggressive and recklessly expansionist power; both events paved the way for a long 
drawn out, tense and expensive stand-off between the two nations, where many had 
previously feared open warfare. Domestically, a series of Supreme Court decisions in 
1956 and 1957 undermined red-baiting and the more injudicious uses of anti- 
communism. 17 Anti-communism was not dead as a domestic political weapon, but it 
was certainly moribund. 18 
In the South, however, it took a little longer to dismantle anti-communism and 
red-baiting as political weapons. This stemmed in part from the animosity that the 
region's segregationists directed towards the Supreme Court, but also from anti- 
communism's effectiveness as a weapon of Massive Resistance. In many respects, 
however, southern anti-communism was a victim of its own success, for it was 
overused by segregationists and began to face mounting opposition. That overuse was 
increasingly exposed as hysterical, paranoid, or, indeed, un-American in its frequent 
disregard for the Constitution and for due process. National opinion swung in support 
17 See Michael Heale, American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within. 1830-1970 [The 
American Moment] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 191-202. Those Supreme 
Court decisions included Pennsylvania v Nelson, which held that state sedition laws had no validity; 
and Jencks v US, which stated that the defence must have access to confidential information supplied 
by government informants and the FBI. The Court handed down three decrees in one day on 17 June 
1957: two decisions striking down contempt charges against witnesses refusing to answer questions, 
Watkins v US and Sweezy v New Hampshire; and Yates v US, in which the Supreme Court reversed 14 
Smith Act convictions and greatly reduced the scope of the Act. 
18 Communist accusations were, for example, levelled at student radicals in the late 1960s, and against 
revolutionary groups such as the Black Panthers, but with little success. The Panthers openly supported 
the Communist regime in North Korea, and often printed letters of support from, and excerpts from 
speeches of, Kim Il-Sung in their newspaper. See, for example, Kim Il-Sung, "On Intensifying Anti- 
Imperialists Anti-US Struggle to Crush US Imperialism, Unify and Defend World Peace, " The Black 
Panther: Black Community News Service Vol. IV, No. 3 (20 December 1967) p. 16; Kim Il-Sung, 
"Left Opportunism and Modem Revisionism, " The Black Panther: Black Community News Service 
Vol. III, No. 32 (29 November 1969) p. 10-11. 
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of many of those civil rights groups and activists who had previously been targeted as 
"red. " Furthermore, as many of the legal and, indeed, extra-legal weapons of Massive 
Resistance were removed from the segregationists' armoury by a succession of court 
decisions and forceful federal interventions, many segregationists became less and 
less discerning in their attempts to label civil rights activists as communist. They were 
caught up in a vicious circle: red-baiting was one of the few weapons left with which 
segregationists could discredit the Movement; the general public was increasingly 
aware of segregationists' cynical use of red-baiting against the Movement. 
By the early 1960s, and certainly by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, anti- 
communism no longer had a central place in southern resistance strategy. Resistance 
methods had been transformed, and now offered subtler, often masked forms of 
opposition to desegregation. After over a decade as one of the white South's most 
effective and flexible tools of resistance, anti-communism no longer suited the needs 
of the white South. After the ravages of McCarthyism and the injudicious use of red- 
baiting by countless demagogic southerners, the one thing that anti-communism could 
not lend the new era of southern resistance was respectability. 
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